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Abstract 
This thesis introduces three novel competitive games that fill the gaps 
between games of perfect information and games of imperfect information. Each 
game has a common underlying structure with small, but crucial, differences. 
Concretely, each game has trials in which dominance should be respected and trials 
where trickery attempts are possible. Furthermore, we focus on risk attitude 
(Envelope Game); explore reasoning processes through verbal protocols (Transfer 
Game); and assess the effects of additional information (Suitcase Game). 
Behavioural experiments show that even these simple games are cognitively very 
challenging and that behaviour often deviates from the predictions of popular 
frameworks. The main contributions from this thesis are (a) the creation of three 
novel games that help fill the gaps between perfect information and imperfect 
information; and (b) the exploration of these games and their implications. Findings 
from the first experiment indicate a linear relationship between the willingness to 
transfer value from Option A to Option B and a higher initial value for Option A. We 
also found that decision times for player one reflect which choices he contemplates 
whilst decision time for player two does not relate to her choices. Finally, most 
participants are assessed as risk averse. When larger amounts are involved a risk 
averse player one more strongly desires to transfer value compared with a non-averse 
player one; but we do not find any behavioural differences for player two. From our 
second experiment we learn that participants are often not consistent in their 
reasoning and behaviour across trials. Despite the simplicity of the game we observe 
many violations of dominance. Furthermore, participants do not strongly adhere to a 
specific framework. Using verbal protocols we learn about the reasoning that is used 
to make decisions. This procedure also identified a weakness of the design: 
participants often consider small amounts irrelevant (since they barely affect 
payoffs). Our third experiment focuses on the effect of additional knowledge. We 
find evidence that equal divisions are made more frequently when additional 
knowledge is provided and that participants attempt to trick their opponents. 
Furthermore, we explore whether heuristics can explain behaviour since frameworks 
are often too precise or make ‘random behaviour’ predictions.  
Key Words: Game Theory, Sequential, Constant-Sum, Information Asymmetry, 
Bluffing, Dominance, Risk Attitude, Verbal Protocols.  
xvii 
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PBNE: Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. 
RA: Risk Averse. 
RN: Risk Neutral. 
RS: Risk Seeking. 
S: Small AV (Announced Value). 
SB: Small to Big directionality. When a transfer is suggested in the Transfer Game 
we assign an SB-directionality if the transfer goes from the box with 80 tokens to the 
box with 40 tokens. 
SONA: an online system used to recruit participants for experiments. 
Splitter: Player one in the suitcase game is also known as the Splitter. 
SPP: Sealed Package Paradigm. 
UG: Ultimatum Game. 
WTP: Willingness To Pay. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In everyday life we face numerous occasions in which outcomes depend on 
the interaction of choices. The winner of a game of chess is decided through the 
interactions between the black player and the white player. The result on a maths 
exam is decided by both the knowledge, topics revised and overall level of effort put 
in by the student and by the concrete exam questions that the teacher selected. These 
examples involve a social dance or game in which individual agents aim for specific 
outcomes based on their knowledge and assumptions. They are ideal for analysis by 
the field of game theory in which we convert the formal and logical properties of 
strategic scenarios into abstract forms which we refer to as ‘games’. The decision 
maker becomes a ‘player’ and his choices are referred to as ‘moves’.  
Colman (1982) defined the field of game theory as followed: 
“Game theory is concerned with the logic of decision making in social 
situations in which the outcomes depend upon the decisions of two or 
more autonomous agents. An essential feature of such situations is that 
the decision maker only has partial control of the outcomes.”  
In essence, game theory studies strategic interactions. Traditional game 
theory is highly mathematical and aims to provide a normative account of how 
rational agents should behave when interacting with other rational agents. 
Concretely, rational players are assumed to make choices that lead to an equilibrium 
state (Seidenfeld, 2001). Their aim is to make a best response against the strategy 
that their opponent plays. In this context a ‘best response’ is defined as a strategy 
choice which leads to the most favourable outcome against the anticipated strategy 
played by the opponent. We reach a Nash equilibrium whenever the best response 
strategies intersect – in such a state neither player can gain by unilaterally changing 
their strategy. 
Over the years the field has expanded enormously and now addresses logic 
and strategic interactions in many disciplines including economics, animal 
behaviour, evolutionary theory, and psychology. However, even in simple games 
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people behave differently from what is expected by standard theory. The Prisoner’s 
Dilemma provides a good example (See Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Example Prisoners Dilemma 
 
The numbers in this figure represent years in jail; thus lower numbers are preferred. 
Regardless the decision made by the other player it is always better to confess since it leads 
to less jail-time. 
 
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma two players make a binary choice by deciding to 
confess a crime versus plead innocence. The game is designed such that players 
receive a better pay-off from confessing than from pleading innocence – regardless 
what the other player does. For this reason it is called a “dominant strategy”. 
However, the dilemma lies in the fact that mutual confession has a worse pay-off 
than mutual pleading of innocence (Binmore, 2007). Nash predictions are that both 
players choose their dominant strategy but observations often show coordination on 
pleading innocence.  
Furthermore, many experiments show that participants do not reason too 
deeply. A classic example is the Beauty Contest Game (Nagel, 1995) in which 
participants write down a number between 0 and 100. Whoever wrote down the 
number closest to a predefined fraction of the average estimate (e.g. 
2
3
F  ) wins the 
game (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2004). When the winner is the person whose number 
is closest to two thirds of the average number it can be deduced that numbers larger 
than 66 are never the best response. After all one should never guess more than two 
thirds of the maximum amount (
2
100 66
3
  ) even when all the other players guess 
the maximum number. However, if the assumption is made that other players reach 
this conclusion then the maximum number to expect from opponents is no longer 
100 but 66. Using the same logic as before one should never guess more than two 
thirds of this new maximum value: i.e. one should never guess more than 44. Given 
that other players reach the same conclusion over and over the end result from 
backwards induction is that every player should guess 'zero'. This is the best 
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response against the best response of everyone else and hence forms the Nash 
equilibrium for this game (Duffy & Nagel, 1997). Instead, participants reason about 
the task up to a certain level (typically one or two steps). There are many limitations 
to deal with when reasoning about a game (e.g. knowledge, difficulty, time 
constraints) and players are not always fully rational as is assumed in standard game 
theory – they act under “bounded rationality”. Players do not look for the best 
solution; they simply look for a satisficing one (Simon, 1972). Due to such 
behavioural departures from standard theory it became essential to modify the theory 
and to look at observations and behaviour. The field of behavioural game theory was 
created to experimentally test how people behave in the same strategic interactions 
that are studied by mathematical game theory and by formulating theories of formal 
interactions. We focus on choices made in experiments and realize that such choices 
are not always fully rational.  
In this thesis we explore behaviour in three different experiments and we use 
additional techniques to see why choices are made and how participants reason about 
their task. Furthermore, we are interested in topics such as risk attitudes, bluffing 
behaviour and whether dominant choices are acknowledged.  
 
1.2 Basic concepts in game theory 
Before we introduce the reader to the design of our experimental games we 
discuss some common terminology. We distinguish between sequential and 
simultaneous games; subdivide sequential games into games of perfect versus 
imperfect information; and divide games of imperfect information into symmetrical 
versus asymmetrical games. Finally, we distinguish between games with complete 
versus incomplete information.  
Simultaneous games are those in which players decide upon their strategy at 
the same time or at least without knowledge on the strategy chosen by the other 
player. Games such as Rock-Paper-Scissors are good examples. In sequential games, 
choices are made turn based; furthermore, players are provided with some 
knowledge regarding the moves made by players who were earlier in the sequence. 
An example is chess: the white and black player take turns and have knowledge on 
the moves made by their counterpart. Sequential games can be subdivided into 
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games of perfect versus imperfect information. Games of perfect information are 
sequential designs in which you observe the moves made by all other players (this 
includes ‘nature’ as a potential player). Chess is still a valid example since both the 
white and the black player observe all the moves that are made by their counterpart. 
Games of imperfect information are sequential designs in which not all the moves 
are observed by all players. Poker is an example since players do not know which 
cards their opponents hold in their hand (which is decided by ‘nature’). Sequential 
games with imperfect information can be further divided as games with symmetric 
information versus asymmetric information. Symmetrical information games are 
those in which both players know equally much (e.g. poker) whilst asymmetrical 
information games are those where one player has more information than another 
player (e.g. buyers often know less than sellers). Finally, we distinguish between the 
concepts of complete and incomplete information. Complete information implies that 
players know the full structure of the game and the corresponding pay-offs
1
; when 
this is not the case we speak of incomplete information. Poker is a game of complete 
information (since the structure of the game and pay-offs are known) whilst an 
example of a game of incomplete information is found in scenarios where 
participants are not aware of the full rules of the game they play (e.g. someone who 
learns a new board game can be caught off guard by not realising alternative “victory 
conditions”).Table 1 summarizes these concepts. 
Table 1: Basic Concepts related to Experimental Design 
Concept Definition 
Simultaneous Design Players make their decisions simultaneously.  
E.g. rock-paper-scissors. 
Sequential Design Players make their decisions sequentially. Having such a sequence allows 
players to have knowledge on the decisions of players who are earlier in the 
sequence. A subdivision can be made into perfect versus imperfect 
information.  
E.g. chess. 
Perfect Information This is a sequential design in which all players observe all previous moves 
made by all other players (note that nature is considered a player as well).  
E.g. chess. 
Imperfect Information This is sequential design in which not all players observe all the previous 
moves made by all players (note that nature is considered a player as well). 
E.g. Poker. 
Symmetric Information This is a sequential design with imperfect information in which all players 
have the same degree of (limited) information. 
E.g. Poker. 
Asymmetric Information This is a sequential design with imperfect information in which some 
                                                 
1
 And the assumption is made that everyone knows that everyone has complete information. 
2
 Note that we did not use these images (nor the ‘he’ versus ‘she’ terminology) during our 
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players have more information than others.  
E.g. the buyer often knows less about a good than the seller. 
Complete Information Players know the full structure of the game and the related pay-offs for each 
player. An additional assumption is made that all players know that all 
players have complete information. 
E.g. Poker. 
Incomplete Information Whenever Players do not know the full structure of the game and its related 
pay-offs we speak of Incomplete Information. E.g. a novice player who is 
not aware of alternative victory conditions operates under incomplete 
information since he does not fully grasp the structure of the game he plays. 
 
1.3 Design of our games 
We designed three novel competitive games that allow natural phenomena 
such as bluffing behaviour to occur in a simple set-up. Each game involves two 
players whom we refer to as Player One (P1) and Player Two (P2). In the remainder 
of this thesis we consistently depict P1 as a male and P2 as a female character
2
 (see 
Figure 2). Furthermore, we consistently use ‘green’ colours for P1-actions and ‘blue’ 
colours for P2-actions.  
Figure 2: Depicting P1 and P2 
 
Throughout this thesis we represent P1 and P2 with these characters. Furthermore, we 
consistently assign a male gender to P1 and a female gender to P2 to minimize ambiguity.  
 
The three games are sequential games with complete but (asymmetrically) 
imperfect information. They involve complete information since players know the 
structure and corresponding pay-offs. And it is played sequentially with a consistent 
knowledge deficit for the second player implying asymmetric information.  
Furthermore, each game involves a constant-sum design which means that 
the gains of the individual players sum together to the same constant value regardless 
the choices that are made – choices merely affect how the ‘sum’ is divided between 
                                                 
2
 Note that we did not use these images (nor the ‘he’ versus ‘she’ terminology) during our 
experiments; it is used in this thesis to minimize ambiguity for the reader.  
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the players. This implies that the game is strictly competitive since one player’s 
gains correspond to the other player’s losses. Concretely, each experimental trial 
involves the division of a constant value into two segments which we abstractly refer 
to as ‘Option A’ and ‘Option B’. P1 can affect the value of the two segments by 
making a value-transfer from Option A to Option B; whilst P2 decides which player 
receives which option as their pay-off. Since choices are made sequentially, P2 
knows how much value (if any) is transferred from Option A to Option B (see  
Figure 3 for an overview of shared features between the three games).  
Figure 3: Skeleton Features shared by our three games  
 
Each of our three experimental games is framed in a different way. 
Furthermore, the games differ in terms of their knowledge structure regarding the 
two options; which lets us explore the gaps between games of perfect information 
and games of imperfect information (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: The knowledge structure of our three games 
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This figure provides an overview of the knowledge structure of our three experimental 
games. Players either know the numerical value of an option or they do not know the value. 
Furthermore, it illustrates framing differences and indicates the corresponding chapters.  
 
In the Envelope Game (Chapter 2) Option A and Option B are framed as two 
‘Envelopes’; it is set-up such that P1 solely knows the value of Option A whilst P2 
does not know the value of either option. In the Transfer Game (Chapter 3) Option A 
and Option B are framed as two ‘Boxes’; the set-up is such that P1 knows the value 
of both options whilst P2 does not know the value of either option. Finally, the 
Suitcase Game (Chapter 4) is framed as a ‘Suitcase’ (Option A) and a ‘Table’ 
(Option B); here, P1 knows the value of both options whilst P2 only knows the value 
of Option B. Each of these games involves information asymmetry with a more 
knowledgeable P1 – this is essential for the games to be viable (i.e. since P2 
allocates the options it is essential that P1 has the information advantage). 
In this thesis we explore how game theory analyses these games and what 
preliminary results can be found experimentally. Furthermore, we look at more 
recent behavioural approaches such as level k reasoning. The next three subsections 
explain the games in more details and elaborate on additional background knowledge 
that is included in the individual games.  
 
1.3.1 Envelope Game 
The first game is framed in terms of Envelopes that contain valuable coins. 
Participants are told that each envelope contains at minimum two coins and that the 
sum of the envelopes is exactly twelve coins. Furthermore, P1 knows the content of 
one of the two envelopes (which we later refer to as the Opened Envelope) whilst P2 
does not know the content of either envelope (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Knowledge structure in the Envelope Game 
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One minor adjustment was needed to the design to keep the desired 
knowledge structure intact. When the game is played with two envelopes it is easy 
for P1 to deduce the value of the closed envelope – since he already knows the value 
of the opened envelope and the summed value of the two envelopes. For this reason 
each trial starts off with three envelopes (each containing at minimum two coins and 
their total sum being exactly twelve coins) and one of them is randomly destroyed 
without revealing its value. Thus, P1 cannot deduce the value of the closed envelope.  
The task for P1 is to transfer coins from the opened envelope to the closed 
envelope – which may be any (integer) amount including zero and the full value of 
the opened envelope. P2 knows how many coins are transferred but does not know 
the original content of either envelope. Her choice is to allocate one of the envelopes 
to herself whilst the remaining envelope is given to P1.  
 
1.3.2 Transfer Game 
The Transfer Game has a similar design as the Envelope Game but does not 
need a third option to maintain its knowledge structure. This experiment uses the 
framing of two boxes and has tokens as its currency
3
. Participants know that every 
trial involves two boxes one of which contains 40 tokens whilst the other contains 80 
tokens. The knowledge structure is such that P1 knows which box contains the 40 
versus 80 tokens whilst P2 does not have this knowledge (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6: Knowledge structure in the Transfer Game 
 
The task is in many ways the same as in the Envelope Game. P1 can transfer 
tokens from Option A to Option B whilst P2 allocates each player with one box. 
However, given that each trial consists of one box with 40 tokens and one box with 
80 tokens we now predefine the transfer amount – since the game is otherwise 
                                                 
3
 Note that whenever tokens are used as currency this means that participants are not aware of the 
stakes of their choices. In the Envelope Game they knew how much a coin was worth; but in the other 
two experiments they have no knowledge regarding the value of their tokens.  
  Introduction   
 
9 
 
limited to two recurring scenarios for P1
4
. This means that P1 no longer chooses how 
many tokens to transfer: he simply decides whether to make the transfer that is 
suggested to him. Concretely, P1 sees the value of the two boxes and is informed 
about the potential transfer amount; he either makes this transfer or he does not 
transfer. P2 knows how many tokens could have been transferred and whether this 
transfer was made. As before, she allocates one option to herself and the other option 
to P1. 
 
1.3.3 Suitcase Game 
The Suitcase Game is our third and final design. Similar to the Transfer 
Game tokens are used as currency and P1 knows the content of both options. Now, 
however, P2 also knows the content of Option B (see Figure 7). The game is framed 
in terms of a suitcase whose value is only known to P1 and a table amount that is 
known by both players.  
Figure 7: Knowledge in the Suitcase Game 
 
This game also deviates from its predecessors by providing additional 
knowledge in half of its trials. Concretely, the additional knowledge consists of two 
numerical values and one of them is guaranteed to be found in the suitcase (before 
P1 opens it); furthermore, participants know that both amounts are equally likely. In 
line with the previous games P1 can transfer tokens from the Suitcase (Option A) to 
the Table (Option B) and P2 knows how many tokens are transferred. Again, P2 
decides who receives the table and who receives the suitcase by selecting her desired 
option. Similar to the Envelope Game P1 decides upon the transfer amount himself 
(since the suitcase value differs on every trial). Finally, it is worth mentioning that 
the Suitcase Game differs from the other games by initially having an empty table 
                                                 
4
 Either Option A is the box with 80 tokens which allows P1 to decrease the variance between the two 
options; or Option A is the box with 40 tokens which allows P1 to increase the variance between the 
two options.  
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amount (i.e. Option B has zero tokens at the start of each trial); this simplifies the 
task and should not affect theoretical predictions – this is viable in the Suitcase 
Game since both players know the value of the Table amount.  
In the next section we introduce some relevant existing games and illustrate 
how they relate to our own design.  
 
1.4 Experimental games in the literature 
In this section we introduce the reader to existing experimental games with a 
relationship to our own design. Our focus lies on two-player sequential games. First, 
we introduce Cake Cutting Games and Ultimatum Games. Then we discuss 
modifications of the Ultimatum Game that involve information asymmetry. Finally, 
we discuss a game by Gneezy (2005) that explored deceitfulness in a somewhat 
similar design as our own games and an experiment by Van Dijk and Zeelenberg 
(2007) about conditional feedback, regret and curiosity which also uses a similar 
design.    
The setup of Cake Cutting Games (CCG) is such that a resource (i.e. a 
“cake”) is divided using a ‘divide and choose’ protocol for fair division (Chen, Lai, 
Parkes and Procaccia, 2013): P1 divides the cake into two parts whilst P2 decides 
who receives which part of the cake (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Cake Cutting Game (CCG): setup 
 
Our own experiments can be seen as CCGs with different degrees of 
imperfect information. In each of our experiments P1 either divides the cake into two 
segments (suitcase game) or he is able to adjust an initial cake distribution (envelope 
and transfer game) whilst P2 allocates the cake-segments to the two players.  
Another game of interest is the Ultimatum Game (UG). This is a sequential 
game with complete and perfect information. P1 divides a resource into two parts 
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and decides on the allocation of the pieces to the players. P2 decides whether to 
accept or reject the suggested division (see Figure 9).  
Figure 9: Ultimatum game (UG): setup 
 
If P2 accepts the division then both players receive their allocated share. 
However, if she rejects the division then both players go home without any cake 
whatsoever (i.e. zero pay-offs). This implies that the UG is not constant-sum in 
nature, since P2’s decision affects whether the individual pay-offs sum together to 
form the whole cake or whether the individual pay-offs sum to a value of zero cake. 
Economic theory suggests that P1 should offer the bare minimum to his opponent 
and that P2 should accept any division in which she receives a non-zero share (Güth, 
1995; Thaler, 1988; Camerer & Thaler, 1995; Rubinstein, 2007). The UG differs 
from our own experimental games in three important ways. Firstly, the task for P2 in 
the UG is to agree or disagree to a proposed division of a monetary amount; in our 
own experimental games her task is to decide between the two options and choose 
whichever option she prefers. Secondly, the UG is not a constant-sum game whilst 
our own experiments all have a constant-sum nature. Finally, the UG involves 
perfect information whilst our games involve imperfect information and information 
asymmetry. However, it is worthwhile to point out that UG-variations have been 
explored in the context of imperfect information (e.g. Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; 
Rapoport, Sundali and Seale, 1994; Croson, 1996). These variations are considered 
more like real life bargaining due to the typical information asymmetry in real life 
scenarios. Next, we introduce the reader to the Offer Game and Demand Game 
(which are variations of the UG) and explore the relationship between these games 
and our own designs.   
The Offer Game is a modification on the UG in which P2 is aware of the 
value offered to her whilst she does not know what value is kept by P1. In essence 
when deciding whether to accept or reject a cake-division she only observes the slice 
of cake that is offered to her. The Demand Game explores the opposite scenario: 
here, P2 can see the slice of cake that is claimed by P1 but she does not know the 
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size of the slice offered to her. Figure 10 summarizes the differences between the 
three versions.  
Figure 10: Contrasting ultimatum, offer and demand games 
 
This figure illustrates that differences between the offer, demand and ultimatum game 
involve the knowledge held by P2.  
 
The Suitcase Game displays a strong similarity to the Offer Game. In the 
Suitcase Game, the table amount is known by both players whilst the suitcase 
amount remains a mystery; in the Offer Game the offered amount is known whilst 
the amount that is kept by P1 remains a mystery. The main difference between the 
games is the task given to P2 – in the Offer Game she either accepts or rejects the 
offer whilst in the Suitcase Game she decides between the offered amount on the 
table and the hidden amount in the suitcase. The Transfer Game and Envelope Game 
also have similarities with the Offer Game, however, they involve uncertainty for P2 
about the exact offer – since the initial value of neither option is known to her in 
these games. It is worth mentioning that the distinction between the Offer and 
Demand game fades in our own set-up since P2 can choose whether to pick the cake-
slice whose value is (partly) revealed versus the unrevealed slice.   
Another game of interest involves deceitful signalling behaviour and is 
described by Gneezy (2005). In this game there are two potential outcomes. P1 
knows the pay-offs that are associated to the two outcomes but P2 does not know 
these pay-offs (asymmetrical information). The game is set up such that P1 decides 
between sending a truthful message (i.e. “Option A will earn you more money than 
Option B”) or a deceitful message (i.e. “Option B will earn you more money than 
Option A”). P2 receives the message and decides which outcome is realised. This 
experiment was run as a one-shot game (i.e. involving only one trial) in which 
participants faced one of three potential treatments (see Table 2).  
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Table 2: Treatments in Gneezy's experiment 
 Option A Option B 
Treatment A 5,  6 6,  5 
Treatment B 5, 15 15, 5 
Treatment C 5, 15 6,  5 
 
Treatments A and B involved constant-sum pay-offs (with big versus small 
pay-off differences); whilst Treatment C involved a potentially high pay-off for P2 
with small pay-off differences for P1. In each treatment Player One would gain from 
a deceitful message (i.e. saying that Outcome B would give the second player a 
better pay-off than Outcome A), however, the consequences of deceit differ 
depending on the treatment and findings indicate that participants react differently in 
the three treatments. Downsides of the design are that it remains unclear why 
decisions are made and that P2 has incomplete information since she does not know 
the pay-off structure of the game
5
. Gneezy’s design relates well to the transfer game 
since P1 knows the value of the two options whilst P2 picks between the options. 
However, instead of making a transfer P1 now sends a message; not all treatments 
have a constant-sum setup; and most importantly Gneezy’s design involves 
incomplete information which makes it hard for P2 to assess whether or not her 
interests diverge from P1’s interests. One reason why this game is worthwhile to 
mention is that the act of transferring value (in our games) can be seen as a signal. 
The opposing player may make a transfer because there was a big value in Option A; 
or he may make a transfer in attempt to ‘trick’ P2 into thinking that way.  
Finally, we discuss the Sealed Package Paradigm (SPP) introduced by Van 
Dijk and Zeelenberg (2007). In this design participants made a one-shot decision 
between receiving 15 euro for certain versus a sealed package with unknown 
content. Two factors were manipulated namely feedback and additional information. 
Participants either learn what was in the sealed package regardless their decision 
(unconditional information) versus they learn the content of the sealed package only 
if they choose the sealed package (conditional information). Furthermore, 
participants either receive no additional information; or they know that the content of 
the sealed package is round; or they know that the content of the sealed package is 
                                                 
5
 The appendix of their experiment illustrates that the second player has no information whether a 
competitive or a cooperative game is played. This may be representative of real life scenarios to a 
certain degree, however, normally we have at least an inkling whether our own interests diverge from 
the salesperson’s and we have a better contextualization to assess our choices. The game described is 
a game of incomplete information.  
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not round. The design was setup to explore the somewhat opposing topics of regret 
and curiosity and their relationship to additional information and feedback. The 
authors hypothesized that (a) additional knowledge increases curiosity, (b) without 
information participants would be more likely to avoid regret (i.e. with unconditional 
feedback they would be more likely to pick the sealed package than with conditional 
feedback), (c) with additional information participants would be more curious about 
the package and thus those with conditional feedback are expected to choose the 
package more than those with unconditional feedback. The three hypotheses were 
supported by their data. This experiment has a close relationship to the Suitcase 
Game as the participant chooses between a fixed value and an unknown alternative. 
However, many differences exist in the setup of the two games. Firstly, the SPP is 
played as a one-shot task whilst the suitcase game involves sixteen trials. Secondly, 
the SPP is not a strategic game: it is not played against a strategic agent (instead the 
experimenter decides upon the content of the package without any competitiveness 
between the experimenter and the participants) and it may not even be a constant-
sum game (since the total earnings are earned by one player who (assumedly) earns a 
different pay-off depending on his choice). Finally, the manipulations in the SPP are 
such that curiosity is piqued by additional information whilst feelings of regret are 
induced by unconditional feedback. In the Suitcase Game we sometimes provide 
additional information but this is in the shape of two amounts that can be seen as 
minimum and maximum values for the original suitcase content; these values do not 
pique curiosity they simply provide knowledge to base decisions on. Furthermore, 
the Suitcase Game solely provides unconditional feedback and it remains 
questionable whether conditional feedback would still induce curiosity when the 
‘sealed package’ is reduced to a monetary amount.  
 
1.5 Outline of the thesis  
We end this chapter by providing the reader with an outline of the thesis. The 
next three chapters discuss the experimental games in more detail. We start by 
introducing the Envelope Game (Chapter 2), then we continue with the Transfer 
Game (Chapter 3) and finally we discuss the Suitcase Game (Chapter 4). Next, we 
provide an overview of implications and future directions (Chapter 5). And finally 
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we formulate an overall conclusion (Chapter 6). At the end of this thesis we include 
the reference list and appendix.  
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Chapter 2 Envelope Game: risk attitude and choices under imperfect 
information 
 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter we introduce a new sequential game involving imperfect 
information. We compute Nash predictions, predictions from level k models 
and predictions from the maximin principle. Our initial exploration 
compares experimental behaviour with theoretical predictions. Furthermore, 
the risk attitude of our sample is assessed after the experiment to allow the 
assessment of a potential relationship between experimental behaviour and 
risk attitude. Our findings suggest that behaviour cannot be explained by 
these frameworks on their own.  
 
Introduction 
There are many scenarios in real life where one person’s gains result in 
another person’s losses; and often these scenarios involve asymmetric information. 
Therefore, it is of considerable interest how people reason about such problems and 
how they should approach them. An easy example involves a car dealer who places a 
discount on one of his cars. Real life consumers are often drawn towards discounted 
items, however, a rational agent may worry whether the discount signals an 
underlying issue. In this paper we explore when and how value-changes are made in 
a context of imperfect information and how participants should approach these 
scenarios (i.e. do they reason things through from a complex game theoretic 
standpoint or do they explore simple reasoning strategies).  
 
Paradigm 
We propose a two-player game involving three envelopes that respectively 
contain X, Y and Z coins. Participants are informed that a minimum of two coins is 
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present in each envelope and that the three envelopes sum to exactly twelve coins
6
 
(see Figure 11). 
Figure 11: Coins in the Three Envelopes 
  
This figure summarizes the background knowledge that is given to participants in the 
envelope game. There are three envelopes initially which each contain at minimum two coins 
and it is known that the sum of the three envelopes is exactly twelve coins.  
 
One envelope is destroyed by Player One (P1) with neither player knowing 
its content. A second envelope is then opened by P1 and he can assess its content but 
Player Two (P2) cannot. The third envelope remains closed and neither player knows 
its content. Only the ‘opened’ and ‘closed’ envelopes are relevant to participants. 
The knowledge structure of the game is summarized in Figure 12.  
 Figure 12: Knowledge structure in the Envelope Game 
 
The task for P1 is to decide how many coins (if any) to transfer from the 
opened envelope (OE) to the closed envelope (CE). Coins are integer values and thus 
the smallest unit that can be transferred is a single coin. The task for P2 is to choose 
between the OE and the CE. Since the unchosen envelope is given to P1 it is a purely 
competitive game. Of high importance is the fact that P2 knows how many coins are 
                                                 
6
 We provide this information (minimum two coins in each envelope and the sum of the envelopes is 
exactly twelve coins) to ensure that all participants perceive the task in a similar way. It would not be 
ideal if a transfer of three coins is considered small by one participant and huge by another participant.  
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transferred even though she does not know the initial content of any of the 
envelopes.  
Finally, we explain to the reader why we included the destroyed envelope 
(DE) in our design – it indeed seems seem odd to include a third envelope simply to 
destroy it at the start of the game, however, there is an underlying logic. Our desire 
in this game is to explore how P1 behaves when he has limited knowledge and thus 
it is essential that the content of the CE cannot be deduced by subtracting the content 
of the OE from the total sum of twelve coins that are spread out across the envelopes 
(without the DE this would have been possible). Furthermore, we cannot omit the 
knowledge of the summed total of the envelopes since this would make it hard to 
control for within-subject differences in perception on the relative size of the OE-
content.  
 
Links to the literature 
It is worthwhile to inform the reader that we include a risk attitude 
assessment at the end of our experimental sessions. We are curious how 
experimental behaviour from our novel game relates to risk attitudes. Dohmen et al. 
(2011) stated that risk measurements generally take place in context of a financial 
lottery but that alternative approaches can reach similar conclusions and be easier to 
understand. Furthermore, data from their follow-up survey (with different subjects) 
suggested that the best predictor for any given context originates from its own 
context. The literature generally suggests that participants behave risk aversely in 
experiments (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2011; Holt and Laury, 2002).    
 
Assumptions and game structure 
In this chapter we refer to P1 as ‘Opener’ whilst we refer to P2 as ‘Chooser’7. 
We now discuss the assumptions and game structure in more detail. In this thesis we 
make the assumption that participants want to maximize their own pay-off (and thus 
                                                 
7
 These terms are used interchangeably in this chapter, but we use a different terminology for P1 
across experimental games (to make it easier for the reader to distinguish between the three games). 
In Chapter 3 we will refer to P1 as ‘Decider’ and in Chapter 4 we refer to P1 as ‘Splitter’.  
The terminology for P2 is kept consistent (‘Chooser’ in each chapter) given that the task for P2 is 
consistent across our three games.  
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minimize the pay-off of the other player). Furthermore, since the Opener knows the 
content of the OE – which differs between trials – we assume that his behavioural 
differences are due to differential OE-values. Similarly, the Chooser knows the 
number of coins that is transferred from the OE to the CE and thus we assume that 
her behavioural differences are due to differences in the transfer amount. It can be 
computed that the OE contains at most eight coins since the CE and DE each require 
a minimum of two coins (i.e. 2+2=4) whilst the three envelopes must sum to exactly 
twelve coins (i.e. 12-4=8) (see Figure 13).  
Figure 13: Maximum value of the OE 
         
This figure illustrates that the maximum value of the OE must be eight coins. To assign the 
maximum number of coins to the OE it is required that both CE and DE have the minimum 
content (i.e. two coins each); Given that the three envelopes must sum to twelve coins it can 
thus be deduced that the OE contains maximum eight coins.  
 
As a consequence rational Openers should never transfer more than three 
coins due to strong dominance: in the best scenario he finds eight coins in the OE 
whilst the CE only contains two coins; if three coins are transferred the two 
envelopes would contain five coins each (i.e. if more than three coins are transferred 
then the CE must contain more coins than the OE regardless their initial values). 
Whenever three coins (or more) are transferred the Chooser cannot be worse off 
from picking the CE – and thus the Opener cannot gain from transferring more than 
three coins. Since rational players would never transfer more than three coins we 
exclude these possibilities from our game theoretic analysis. The structure of the 
experimental game is illustrated in Table 3.  
Table 3: The Expected Value of the CE in each scenario 
Initial 
amount OE 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3 
OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) 
2 2 5 1 6 0 7   
3 3 4.5 2 5.5 1 6.5 0 7.5 
4 4 4 3 5 2 6 1 7 
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5 5 3.5 4 4.5 3 5.5 2 6.5 
6 6 3 5 4 4 5 3 6 
7 7 2.5 6 3.5 5 4.5 4 5.5 
8 8 2 7 3 6 4 5 5 
 
The Opener finds out how many coins are initially in the OE and decides 
how many coins to transfer. He thus knows how many coins are left in the OE if he 
transfers ‘x’ coins; furthermore, he can compute the expected value (EV) for the CE 
when a transfer of ‘x’ coins is made. His computations of EV(CE) take into account 
how many coins are initially in the OE and respect the requirement that a minimum 
of two coins is found in each envelope (see Appendix 1.1 for details and an example 
on the computation of EV(CE) ). The reader should note that each of the scenarios 
from Table 3 occurs with a different probability as is indicated in Table 4. The 
computation of these probabilities is described in Appendix 1.2.   
Table 4: probability of finding 'x' coins in the OE 
Initial amount OE Probability 
2 64
729
 
3 192
729
 
4 240
729
 
5 160
729
 
6 60
729
 
7 12
729
 
8 1
729
 
 
This table summarizes the probability in which the OE is expected to contain two, three, 
four, five, six, seven or eight coins. 
 
Before we discuss the predictions for Nash, level k and maximin we point out 
to the reader that the computation of Nash predictions are often quite complex even 
in the context of the simple games that we discuss across our chapters. Furthermore, 
level k predictions oftentimes require additional assumptions to reach a stable state.  
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Nash predictions 
In this section we discuss the Nash predictions for the Envelope Game. Since 
we discuss a sequential game involving imperfect information we explore the Perfect 
Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE). The basic structure of the game is displayed in 
Figure 14; however, decisions that lead to dominant choice options for the opposing 
player are excluded from the game tree – as they can never be part of the Nash 
Equilibrium in a competitive game. Furthermore, we point out to the reader that P2 
is aware about the actions taken by P1 but these “information sets” are omitted from 
the figure to avoid cluttering it unnecessarily. The figure is only meant to give a 
rough indication of the underlying complexity of the game and its structure. 
Figure 14: Structure of the Envelope Game 
 
Firstly, Nature (i.e. red colours) dictates how many coins are found in the OE 
– this knowledge is referred to as P1’s type and has values such as ‘init 2’ in our 
figure (e.g. “the initial value of the opened envelope is 2 coins”). It is worthwhile to 
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explain that ‘type’ is a commonly used term in signalling games to refer to a feature 
assigned by nature to P1 which P2 cannot assess. In our setup P1’s type thus refers to 
the initial content of the OE. The probabilities of each type occurring by random 
chance are indicated on the branches (these probabilities have been computed in 
Appendix 1.2). P1 decides how many coins to transfer from the OE to the CE (i.e. 
green colours). Finally, P2 decides whether she wants the OE or the CE as her pay-
off (i.e. blue colours). The end-nodes of each decision-branch display the pay-offs of 
the two players. The pay-off nodes consist of the value in the OE (which is a fixed 
value for each branch) and the expected value of the CE (which is not a fixed value). 
Table 5 reminds the reader how expected values are computed for each branch of the 
decision tree (the computation of this table is explained in Appendix 1.1).  
Table 5: EV(CE) values in each scenario 
Amount OE Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3 
OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) 
2 2 5 1 6 0 7   
3 3 4.5 2 5.5 1 6.5 0 7.5 
4 4 4 3 5 2 6 1 7 
5 5 3.5 4 4.5 3 5.5 2 6.5 
6 6 3 5 4 4 5 3 6 
7 7 2.5 6 3.5 5 4.5 4 5.5 
8 8 2 7 3 6 4 5 5 
 
Before we discuss the PBNE computations in more detail we inform the 
reader about the different shapes in which a PBNE may exist. In order of discussion 
we will introduce potential Pooling, Separating, Semi-Separating and Fully Mixed 
PBNE’s.  
 
Pooling PBNE 
When P1 makes the same choice regardless his type (i.e. he transfer the same 
amount of coins) we speak of “Pooling PBNEs”. Potential Pooling PBNE’s are thus 
the following strategies: “always transfer 0 coins”, “always transfer 1 coin” or 
“always transfer 2 coins”. Larger transfer amounts (i.e. 3  coins) cannot result into 
Nash equilibria since P2 would have a ‘dominant choice’ ensuring that P2 receives a 
better or equal pay-off compared with P1 – this would make P1 deviate. 
Furthermore, there cannot be a Pooling PBNE in which P1 consistently transfers one 
coin; or two coins. The reason is that the two envelopes would have a different EV 
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implying that P2 should consistently pick the CE – again, this would imply that P1 
wants to change his choice at least for some of his ‘types’ (see Equation 1 and 
Equation 2).   
Equation 1: Computing the EV for the two envelopes if one coin is transferred by each type of 
P1 
EV(OE)=
64
1
729
 + 
192
2
729
 + 
240
3
729
 +
160
4
729
 +
60
5
729
 +
12
6
729
 +
1
7
729
  
=
2187
3
729
  
EV(CE)=
64
6
729
 + 
192
5.5
729
 + 
240
5
729
 +
160
4.5
729
 +
60
4
729
 +
12
3.5
729
 +
1
3
729
  
=
3645
5
729
  
Equation 2: Computing the EV for the two envelopes if two coins are transferred by each type 
of P1 
EV(OE)=
64
0
729
 + 
192
1
729
 + 
240
2
729
 +
160
3
729
 +
60
4
729
 +
12
5
729
 +
1
6
729
  
=
1458
2
729
  
EV(CE)=
64
7
729
 + 
192
6.5
729
 + 
240
6
729
 +
160
5.5
729
 +
60
5
729
 +
12
4.5
729
 +
1
4
729
  
=
4374
6
729
  
The only possible Pooling PBNE requires P1 to consistently “transfer zero 
coins”. Equation 3 illustrates that the expected payoff for P2 is unaffected by her 
decision whenever P1 decided to not make a transfer. 
Equation 3: Computing the EV for the two envelopes if zero coins are transferred by each type 
of P1 
EV(OE)=
64
2
729
 + 
192
3
729
 + 
240
4
729
 +
160
5
729
 +
60
6
729
 +
12
7
729
 +
1
8
729
                         
 =
2916
4
729
  
EV(CE)=
64
5
729
 + 
192
4.5
729
 + 
240
4
729
 +
160
3.5
729
 +
60
3
729
 +
12
2.5
729
 +
1
2
729
                     
 =
2916
4
729
  
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Given that EV(CE|no transfer)= EV(OE|no transfer)P2 can choose the CE in 
any probability she likes when no transfer is made – though later on we will set 
restrictions on this probability such that we can ensure the existence of the 
equilibrium state (if possible). To simplify the next step in exploring the potential 
Pooling PBNE we reduce the number of types to the most extreme cases (i.e. OE=8 
and OE=2) since all other cases would hold if both OE=8 and OE=2 are able to 
maintain an equilibrium state together. The simplified game structure and its 
potential Pooling PBNE state is displayed in Figure 15. 
Figure 15: Simplified structure to contrast the most extreme scenarios 
 
The potential Pooling PBNE is indicated by orange colour on the game tree. 
P1’s decisions and payoffs are indicated in blue and P2’s decisions and payoffs are 
indicated in green. Our general approach to explore whether a PBNE exists is to first 
assume that it exists and to assess which parameters are required for it to be a stable 
state; if we cannot set parameters without contradiction then we can conclude that 
the assumed PBNE state doesn’t exist. The first parameter to compute, Q, expresses 
the minimal probability at which P2 should select the CE when no transfer is made 
such that P1 does not desire to deviate regardless his type. To compute these 
parameter values we do not need to take the probability of each type in account since 
we make comparisons between the expected payoffs (EP) of transferring versus not 
transferring within the same type. These probabilities are only relevant when we 
compute the expected payoff for P2 ( P2EP ); here, we simply compute how P2 should 
behave when no transfer is made such that P1 has no desire to ever make the 
transfer. Concretely, we compute the expected payoff for P1 ( P1EP ) from 
transferring if P2 were to consistently pick the CE if a transfer is made; and compare 
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with his EP from not transferring if P2 picked the CE with probability Q if no 
transfer is made
8
. This allows us to set the value of Q such that P1 cannot gain from 
transferring which is a requirement to be in the assumed equilibrium state (see 
Figure 16 and Equation 4). 
Figure 16: Setting the value for Q 
 
Equation 4: Setting the value for Q 
   P1 P1EP transfer0|OE=8 EP transfer1|OE=8
5
8 2(1 ) 7 8 2 2 7 6 5
6
Q Q Q Q Q Q            
   P1 P1EP transfer0|OE=2 EP transfer1|OE=2
4
2 5(1 ) 1 2 5 5 1 3 4
3
Q Q Q Q Q Q              
Next, we relax P2’s preference of picking the CE when a transfer is made: we 
compute the minimum probability in which P2 should select the CE if a transfer is 
made such that P1 does not desire to deviate. We again make the comparison with a 
consistent CE-decision as this is the most extreme case possible for which our 
parameter R must hold true (see Figure 17 and Equation 5). 
Figure 17: Setting the value of R 
                                                 
8
 We point out to the reader that we compare P1EP  from not transferring with a consistent CE-
preference if a transfer were made simply because it is the most extreme scenario for which our Q-
value needs to hold true. I.e. the equilibrium should exist if P2 were to pick CE consistently if a 
transfer is made; meanwhile the equilibrium will not hold if the OE were picked consistently if the 
transfer is made. Thus, a 100% preference for the CE when the transfer is made offers the most 
extreme case that has to be satisfied for an equilibrium state. When we later compute the parameter R 
we calculate which alternative probabilities of CE-preference when transfers are made maintain the 
equilibrium state. 
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Equation 5: Setting the value of R 
   P1 P1EP transfer0|OE=8 EP transfer1|OE=8
5
7 3(1 ) 8 7 3 3 8 4 5
4
R R R R R R             
   P1 P1EP transfer0|OE=2 EP transfer1|OE=2
4
1 6(1 ) 2 1 6 6 2 5 4
5
R R R R R R              
We conclude that a Nash equilibrium in which P1 never transfers coins is 
found as long as P2 picks the CE at least 83% of the time when no transfer is made 
(i.e. 
5
6
Q  ) whilst picking the CE at least 80% of the time if a transfer were 
somehow made (
4
5
R  ). Together these choice probabilities ensure that P1 cannot 
gain from transferring a single coin even in the most extreme scenarios (i.e. even in 
OE=8 and OE=2); thus, P1 would not desire to deviate from the equilibrium state. 
We point out to the reader that the same choice probabilities ensure that larger 
transfers are not preferred either (i.e. if P1 does not desire to make a one-coin 
transfer in these conditions then he surely does not want to make a two-coin transfer 
either).  
 
Separating PBNE 
The next PBNE we explore is the Separating PBNE. Here different types 
employ different strategies. There are two Separating PBNE’s possible. They both 
involve zero coin transfers for types init2, init3 and init4 – if this were not the case 
then these types would want to deviate to a zero coin transfer. Furthermore, type 
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init5 makes a one coin transfer, type init7 makes a two coin transfer and type init8 
makes a three coin transfer – again, else they would want to deviate to these 
strategies. The first Separating PBNE we explore has type init6 transferring one coin 
(Figure 18); and the second Separating PBNE has type init6 transferring two coins 
(Figure 19). Note that P1 may also use a mixed strategy for type init6 but this would 
be classified as Semi-Separating PBNE and is discussed in the next section. 
Figure 18: Exploring a Separating PBNE where type init6 transfers one coin 
 
If type init6 transfers one coin then P2 would pick the CE for zero coin 
transfers whilst she would pick the OE for one and two coin transfers (due to a 
higher EV). P1s of type init2, init3 and init4 would want to change their choice and 
transfer one or two coins whilst type init5, init6 and init7 would want to change and 
transfer 0 coins. This is not a PBNE.  
 
Figure 19: Exploring a Separating PBNE where type init6 transfers two coins 
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If Type init6 transferred two coins then P2 would pick the CE for zero, one 
and two coin transfers (due to higher EVs). P1 would want to change strategies as he 
is better off by not increasing the CE-value. There is again no PBNE.  
 
Semi-Separating PBNE 
 The next PBNE we explore is the Semi-Separating PBNE; an equilibrium is  
possible in which type init6 mixes between transferring one and two coins. The other 
types would have pure strategies – type init2, init3 and init4 would transfer zero 
coins; type init5 would transfer one coin; type init7 transfers two coins and type init8 
transfers three coins (see Figure 20).  
Figure 20: Exploring a potential Semi-Separating PBNE 
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The first step to explore whether there is such a PBNE is to compute the 
probability of being in the ‘init6’ node if a transfer of one coin is made; and to 
compute the probability of being in the ‘init6’ node if a transfer of two coins is 
made. These probabilities should not contradict each other for a PBNE to exist. 
Bayes’ rule is used for these computation; and as can be seen in Figure 20 we coded 
the probability of ‘transferring one coin’ when in the init6 node as ‘Q’ whilst the 
probability of ‘transferring two coins’ when in the init6 node is coded as ‘1-Q’.  
If transfer 1:  
6 1| 6
6| 1
6 1| 6 5 1| 5
*
* *
init t init
init t
init t init init t init
prob prob
prob
prob prob prob prob


 
= 6| 1
60
*
729
60 160
* *1
729 729
init t
Q
prob
Q


 
(Note: we temporarily equate this function to the variable ‘X’ for ease of 
calculations) 
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Next, we compute the expected pay-off for P2 if a one-coin transfer is made, 
based on the probabilities we computed. Our goal is to make P2 indifferent between 
picking the OE and the CE (i.e. a requirement for the PBNE to exist) so we equate 
the EP of the two envelopes which allows us to compute the probability of being in 
the ‘init6’ node when a one-coin transfer is made.  
Expected Payoff for P2 if one coin is transferred: 
- EV(OE)=  5(X) + 4(1-X)  
- EV(CE)= 4(X) + 4.5(1-X)  
- To be indifferent between OE and CE it is required that:  
5(X) + 4(1-X) = 4(X) + 4.5(1-X)    X + 4 - 4X = 4.5 - 4.5X   
5.5X - 4X = 4.5 - 4    1.5X = 1.5   X = 1 
Given that we coded 
6| 1init tprob as ‘X’ this means: 
 6| 1
60
*
729 1
60 160
* *1
729 729
init t
Q
prob
Q
 

  
From this we compute the required probability of transferring one coin if you 
are of type init6 (i.e. the variable Q). As this computation results into an erroneous 
result (see Equation 6), we know that there is no PBNE possible that fits the 
requirements – and hence we do not even need to look at the EP if two coins were to 
be transferred.  
Equation 6: Solving the equation for the value of Q 
6| 1
60
*
729
60 160
* *1
729 729
init t
Q
prob
Q


 = X = 1 
60
*
729 1
60 160
* *1
729 729
Q
Q
 

60 60 160
* * *1
729 729 729
Q Q  
160
0 0 *1
729
  
160
0
729
   
There is no Semi-Separating PBNE.  
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Fully Mixed PBNE 
 Finally, it is possible for a Fully Mixed PBNE to exist. This would mean that 
both P1 and P2 use mixed strategies. However, in such a scenario P2 would simply 
deviate towards picking the CE consistently as it provides a higher EV. Hence, there 
can be no Fully Mixed PBNE. 
 
Note to the reader: 
Notice that there is no PBNE in which P1 transfers zero coins in all scenarios 
except for the scenario where he finds 8 coins (in which he can equalize the 
envelopes by making a three-coin transfer). This is because it would affect the 
 EV OE and  EV CE  such that  EV CE >EV(OE)  whenever a zero-coin transfer 
is made. P2 would have a better deal unless P1 changes his strategy such that he 
transfers zero coins also when he finds 8 coins in the OE.  
 
Risk Averse Behaviour 
Finally, we explore how risk averse participants would behave according to 
the Nash equilibrium. Our predictions are that the risk averse Opener does not desire 
to deviate from his risk neutral equilibrium strategy: if he were to transfer his EP 
would decrease. Thus, the Opener continues to use his never transfer strategy. For a 
risk averse Chooser we expect the equilibrium state to involve a consistent CE-
decision if a transfer were (hypothetically) made since this provides her with a 
higher EV; furthermore, if no transfer is made we expect her to pick the CE 
consistently too given that EV(CE) can never be worse than EV(OE) . 
 
Nash Conclusion 
The Nash equilibria for this game involve Openers to consistently not 
transfer coins (i.e. resulting into equal EVs for the two envelopes). The most obvious 
equilibrium state that can be reached is a state in which the Chooser consistently 
picks the CE – this strategy implies that the Opener does not desire to transfer since 
any transfer he makes simply decreases the OE-value that he himself expects to 
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receive as payoff. Furthermore, the Chooser does not desire to deviate from her 
strategy since the two envelopes have the same EV: she cannot gain from selecting 
the OE. However, this equilibrium state can be maintained even if the Chooser uses a 
mixed strategy. Concretely, she should pick the CE when no transfer is made at least 
83% of the time to ensure that P1 cannot gain from transferring if he were to find a 
large amount in the OE; furthermore, she should pick the CE in at least 80% of the 
cases if a (hypothetical)
 9
 transfer is made to ensure that the Opener cannot gain from 
transferring if he were to find the lowest value in the OE. These percentages are 
computed such that even the most extreme OE-values cannot compel the Opener to 
make a one-coin transfer; and obviously, he cannot gain from larger transfers either 
as long as the Chooser uses this strategy. 
The only possible risk averse PBNE is for P1 to never transfer and for P2 to 
consistently pick the CE.  
 
Level k predictions  
In this section we discuss level k predictions for the Envelope Game. We use 
a simplified notation to denote the level of reasoning for the Opener as xO  whilst we 
denote the level of reasoning for the Chooser as xC ; the subscript ‘x’ refers to their 
level of reasoning. For example, 0O  refers to the Opener reasoning at level 0. 
Experimental evidence suggests that participants are mostly reasoning at level one 
and level two (Colman, Pulman and Lawrence, 2014; Camerer, Ho and Chong, 
2004), however, we allow ourselves to assess predictions a few steps further such 
that we can compare experimental behaviour with a larger number of possible 
strategies. We make the assumptions that each player considers themselves to reason 
exactly one level higher than their opponent and that they aim to make a best 
response on the assumed behaviour of the opponent. Thus, xO  makes his decisions 
on assumption that his opponent is x-1C  whilst xC  makes her decisions on 
                                                 
9
 We speak of a ‘hypothetical’ transfer since our equilibrium state suggests that transfers are never 
made; However, to ensure that this state is ‘stable’ Choosers have to pick the CE with a certain 
probability if a transfer were made such that the Opener expects to lose out from transferring. This 
scenario is hypothetical in the sense that the equilibrium suggests that such a scenario would not occur 
but it is a required parameter for the equilibrium to exist.   
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assumption that her opponent is x-1O . The starting point for analysis is 0O  and 0C . 
We first discuss level k predictions under assumption of risk neutrality since this is 
the way level k models were initially designed; afterwards, we also explore level k 
predictions under the assumption of risk averseness since experimental research 
often suggests that participants behave in a risk averse way (e.g. Dohmen et al., 
2011). To our knowledge we are the first study to explore level k predictions under 
the assumption of risk averseness. Summary tables of decisions made at each level of 
reasoning are provided both for the risk neutrality (Table 6) and risk aversion (Table 
8). 
We start with risk neutral predictions. 0O  and 0C are unsophisticated players 
who make random decisions without considering the actions of their opponent. At 
level one we start observing strategic behaviour since 1O  makes a best response to 
0C  whilst 1C  makes a best response to 0O . Since he expects his opponent to choose 
randomly 1O  does not need to change his best-response strategy: he randomly 
decides how many coins to transfer. Meanwhile, 1C  expects random behaviour from 
her unsophisticated 0O -opponent and she realises that this implies a higher EV for 
the CE whenever a transfer is made. If no transfer is made she knows that it is not 
due to a strategic consideration which implies that she can decide randomly (i.e.
EV(CE)=EV(OE) ). We now reach level two reasoning. 2O  tries to exploit 1C ’s 
decision rule by transferring exactly one coin when the OE contains a large enough 
value to ensure that  OE - 1coin > EV CE  + 1coin  whilst not transferring in other 
scenarios. Concretely, he transfers one coin when the OE contained six, seven or 
eight coins whilst he does not transfer coins when the OE contained two, three or 
four coins. 2O  is indifferent between transferring one coin versus not transferring 
when five coins are found in the CE. Meanwhile, 2C  behaves the same as 1C : she 
chooses the CE when a transfer is made (due to its higher EV) whilst she chooses 
randomly when no transfer is made. We now reach level three reasoning. 3O behaves 
the same as 2O : he transfers one coin when the OE contained six, seven or eight 
coins whilst he does not transfer when the OE contained two, three or four coins. He 
randomly decides whether to transfer one coin or not whenever the OE contains five 
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coins. Meanwhile, 3C  comes to the realisation that 2O  only transfers a coin when it 
results into a higher EV for the OE than for the CE whilst he does not transfer when 
the OE has four or less coins initially
10
; thus 3C  picks the OE whenever a coin is 
transferred whilst she picks the CE when no transfer is made. When we reach level 
four (or higher levels) it becomes clear that the Opener and Chooser keep reversing 
their strategies in attempt to outsmart their opponent. Thus,
4O  transfers one coin 
when the OE contains two, three or four coins whilst he does not transfer when the 
OE contains five, six, seven or eight coins. (Note that 
4O does not transfer when five 
coins are found: he expects to receive more coins by not transferring). Meanwhile, 
4C  behaves the same as 3C  but reverses her strategy at level five, etc. A summary of 
the strategies used by risk neutral players is provided in Table 6. 
Table 6: Level k reasoning for risk neutral choices 
 Opener Chooser 
Level 0 Random Random 
Level 1 Random if transfer is made: CE 
if no transfer is made: random 
Level 2 if OE=6,7,8: transfer one coin 
if OE=5: transfer one or zero coins 
if OE=2,3,4: transfer zero coins 
if transfer is made: CE 
if no transfer is made: random 
Level 3 if OE=6,7,8: transfer one coin 
if OE=5: transfer one or zero coins 
if OE=2,3,4: transfer zero coins 
if transfer one: OE 
if transfer zero: CE 
(other transfer amounts are not 
possible anymore) 
Level 4 if OE=2,3,4: transfer one coin 
if OE=5,6,7,8: transfer zero coins 
if transfer one: OE 
if transfer zero: CE 
Level 5 if OE=2,3,4: transfer one coin 
if OE=5,6,7,8: transfer zero coins 
if transfer one: CE 
if transfer zero: OE 
Loop  Both players try to outsmart each other by reversing their strategy 
whenever the opponent exploits it on the previous level.  
 
Next, we discuss the level k predictions under assumption that the Opener is 
risk averse
11
. This analysis is original to the best of our knowledge and seems 
worthwhile to explore given that experimental literature typically concludes that 
participants are risk averse (and since we assess the risk attitude of our experimental 
sample). The main difference for our risk averse predictions is that 0O  attempts to 
                                                 
10
 Of course, if the OE contains five coins he randomly decides whether to transfer one coin or not.  
11
 We explore risk aversion solely through the Opener given that level k reasoning is a sequential 
exploration of reasoning processes and hence non-random behaviour for the level zero Chooser would 
lead to odd best-response sequences. Concretely, the Opener would change his strategy at level one 
based on his opponent’s behaviour at level zero; meanwhile, the Chooser at level one would also 
change her strategy based on her opponent’s level-zero behaviour. Allowing a non-random level-zero 
Chooser would break the ‘sequential’ reasoning processes that we aim to explore.  
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decrease the value difference between the two envelopes. Thus, 0O  transfers three 
coins if OE=8; transfers two coins if OE=7; transfer one or two coins if OE=6 (since 
the two strategies result into the exact same EV-difference between the two 
envelopes he is indifferent); and transfers one coin if OE=5. If two, three or four 
coins are found in the OE he cannot decrease the value difference and thus does not 
make a transfer. Meanwhile, 0C is assumed to pick randomly. We now discuss level 
one. 1O considers his opponent to behave randomly and thus he can behave in the 
same way as he did as 
0O . However, 1C now makes a best response on 0O  which 
implies that she expects to be in an OE=8 scenario when three coins are transferred 
in an OE=7 or OE=6 scenario when two coins are transferred, in an OE=6 or OE=5 
scenario if one coin is transferred and in a OE=4, OE=3 or OE=2 scenario if no coins 
are transferred. To assess her best response strategy we look at Table 7.  
Table 7: EV(CE) when zero, one or two coins are transferred 
Probability Initial 
OE 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3 
OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) 
64/729 2 2 5 1 6 0 7   
192/729 3 3 4.5 2 5.5 1 6.5 0 7.5 
240/729 4 4 4 3 5 2 6 1 7 
160/729 5 5 3.5 4 4.5 3 5.5 2 6.5 
60/729 6 6 3 5 4 4 5 3 6 
12/729 7 7 2.5 6 3.5 5 4.5 4 5.5 
1/729 8 8 2 7 3 6 4 5 5 
 
When no coins are transferred 1C observed that EV(CE)>EV(OE) and thus 
she picks CE. When one or two coins are transferred CE remains a better option (see 
Equation 7 and Equation 8).   
Equation 7: EV(CE) and EV(OE) when one coin is transferred based on assumptions 
initialOE=6 initialOE=5EV(CE)=4 prob +4.5 prob   
initialOE=6 initialOE=5EV(OE)=5 prob +4 prob   
initialOE=6 initialOE=5 initialOE=6 initialOE=5EV(CE)>EV(OE) 4 prob +4.5 prob 5 prob +4 prob     
initialOE=5 initialOE=60.5 prob 1 prob    0.5 160 1 60    80 60   
(Note that this inequality holds regardless the probability in which OE=6 ends up 
transferring one instead of two coins). 
Equation 8: EV(CE) and EV(OE) when two coins are transferred based on assumptions 
initialOE=7 initialOE=6EV(CE)=4.5 prob +5 prob   
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initialOE=7 initialOE=6EV(OE)=5 prob +4 prob   
initialOE=7 initialOE=6 initialOE=7 initialOE=6EV(CE)>EV(OE) 4.5 prob +5 prob >5 prob +4 prob    
initialOE=6 initialOE=71 prob >0.5 prob   1 60>0.5 12   60>6  
(Note that this inequality holds as long as the probability in which a two coin transfer 
is made when OE=6 is 10% or more of the OE=6 cases
12
).  
Finally, when three coins are transferred 
1C  expects both envelopes to be 
equal which means that she can pick randomly; this allows the possibility of 
consistently choosing the CE which is arguably the most sensible choice given that 
CE cannot be worse than OE when three coins are transferred (due to strong 
dominance). Thus, 1C  uses a strategy of consistently picking CE. We now discuss 
level two. 2O realises that 1C  consistently chooses the CE and thus his best response 
is to never transfer coins. 2C  behaves the same as 1C : she consistently picks the CE. 
We now discuss level three. 3O  behaves the same as 2O : he never transfers coins 
because the opponent consistently picks the CE regardless his own decision. 
Meanwhile, 3C is aware that 2O  never makes the transfer. She cannot make a better 
‘best response’ than her strategy from the previous level and a stable state is 
reached
13
. The Opener never transfers whilst the Chooser consistently picks the CE. 
A summary of the strategies used by risk averse players is found in Table 8. 
Table 8: Level k reasoning when the Opener is risk averse  
 
 
                                                 
12
 Given that we assume it to be a random decision whether to transfer two coins versus one coin 
(whenever six coins are found in the OE by the risk averse Decider at level zero) it seems realistic to 
conclude that EV(CE) > EV(OE) when a two coin transfer is made.  
13
 The reader may argue that her best response is to randomly choose if no transfer is made. However, 
this strategy is not better than the strategy she used at her previous level and we argue that there is no 
incentive for her to change.  
 P1 P2 
Level 0 If OE=8: transfer 3 
If OE=7: transfer 2 
If OE=6: transfer 2 or 1 
If OE=5: transfer 1 
If OE=4, 3 or 2: transfer 0 
Random 
Level 1 If OE=8: transfer 3 
If OE=7: transfer 2 
If OE=6: transfer 2 or 1 
If OE=5: transfer 1 
If OE=4, 3 or 2: transfer 0 
If transfer 3: pick random/CE 
If transfer 2: pick CE 
If transfer 1: pick CE 
If transfer 0: pick CE 
Level 2 Never transfer CE 
Level 3 Never transfer CE 
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Maximin principle  
The maximin principle is a strongly pessimistic principle suggested by Wald 
in 1945 and ensures that the player receives the best out of all worst-case-scenario 
outcomes. Concretely, the participant assesses the worst possible outcome for each 
decision he can make; and he makes that decision whose worst outcome is superior 
to the worst outcome of the alternative decisions (Colman, 1982). Using the same 
table we introduced in the section on assumptions and game structure we indicate the 
maximin strategies with a green background in Table 9. 
Table 9: Maximin strategies for P1 
Initial 
amount OE 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3 
OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) OE EV(CE) 
2 2 5 1 6 0 7   
3 3 4.5 2 5.5 1 6.5 0 7.5 
4 4 4 3 5 2 6 1 7 
5 5 3.5 4 4.5 3 5.5 2 6.5 
6 6 3 5 4 4 5 3 6 
7 7 2.5 6 3.5 5 4.5 4 5.5 
8 8 2 7 3 6 4 5 5 
This table illustrates the maximin predictions for the envelope game conditional on the 
amount that is initially found in the OE.   
 
When the initial amount in the OE is two, three or four coins the maximin 
strategy for the Opener is to transfer zero coins since any transfer would increment 
the difference between the OE and EV(CE). For an initial amount of five coins in the 
OE his maximin strategy is to transfer one coin ensuring a minimum EP of four 
coins compared to a minimum EP of three and a half coins (if zero coins were 
transferred) or three coins (if two coins were transferred). When the initial amount in 
the OE is six coins there are two viable strategies according the theorem since both a 
one coin transfer and a two coin transfer result into the same minimum EP. His 
maximin strategy when seven coins are found in the OE is to transfer two coins since 
the minimum EP is then four and a half coins whilst it would be four coins (if three 
coins were transferred) or three and a half coins (if one coin were transferred). 
Finally, when the OE initially contains eight coins his maximin strategy is to transfer 
three coins since it results in a minimum payoff of five coins compared to a 
minimum EP of four or less coins.  
For the Chooser the maximin strategy whenever a transfer is made is simply 
to pick the CE. She does not know the initial value of either envelope; however, she 
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knows that both envelopes have the same minimum content of two coins initially. 
Thus, if a transfer is made the CE has a higher minimum value (i.e. two coins plus 
the transfer amount) compared with the OE (which remains with a minimum value 
of two coins minus the transfer amount
14
).  
 
Experimental setup  
Participants 
Participants in our experiment were 36 students and employees from 
Warwick University, with an average age of 22 years old. Our sample was 
predominantly female (27 female, 13 male)
15
. Recruitment was done through SONA, 
an online system for participant recruitment. We decided in advance on a sample size 
of 36 participants with twelve participants in each of three experimental sessions. 
We opted for a relatively small sample in each of our experiments such that we can 
explore a 'proof of concept'; to help fine-tune future versions of these experiments 
and to assess whether our novel games are interesting to explore further before we 
make strong financial investments. Each session consisted of exactly twelve 
participants such that perception on the number of potential opponents remains 
constant and to make the experimental matchmaking slightly easier to program. To 
avoid cancelling sessions due to participants not showing up we recruited four 
additional participants per session; if more than twelve participants showed up 
before the starting time we randomly selected participants to be send home with a £2 
show-up fee. The possibility of being send home (due to an exact number of 
participants being required for the study) was advertised on SONA when participants 
signed up. Excluding participants happened through a procedure of shuffling a deck 
of cards (containing the cubicle numbers of all occupied computers) and randomly 
drawing one or more cards. 
At the end of the experiment participants were paid a show-up fee (£2) and 
an additional performance fee (£0-£20) based on a random lottery incentive system. 
Deciding the performance fee based on a randomly selected trial is a frequently used 
                                                 
14
 Out of accuracy, we add that if three or more coins are transferred the minimum for the OE is set at 
zero coins (not at a negative value) since whatever is transferred is ensured to have been in the OE 
initially and can be deducted without making the OE negative in value.  
15
 Note that we have demographics data on three additional subjects since our demographics do not 
distinguish between the people who participated and those who were send home with a show-up fee... 
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procedure in the field (Laury, 2005); it encourages subjects to do well on all trials 
(i.e. making extreme strategies more risky)
16
 and helps avoid wealth effects (Cox and 
Epstein, 1989)
17
. The expected pay-off for the average participant was £11; and the 
average participant earned £10.66. Participants are told during an introductory 
PowerPoint explanation that they earn a performance fee based on their payoff in a 
randomly selected trial with each 'coin' translating to a value of £2; additionally, they 
are informed of a certain £2 show-up fee. We did not provide participants with 
details regarding the random selection procedure for the 'performance fee' trial; 
concretely, a python script randomly selects a trial per participant to base their 
performance fee on. Different participants can thus be remunerated upon 
performance in different trials.  
 
Materials 
The experiment was performed in the Behavioural Science Lab; the coding 
was done by the author using a combination of python, HTML/CSS and willow
18
. 
Participants face a total of twenty trials; and they swap between being in the role of 
P1 and being in the role of P2 on each consecutive trial to maximize fairness and 
exposure to both roles. We desired to collect data on all possible scenarios equally 
often for each participant and thus we controlled the initial value of the OE such that 
each participant faces the same scenarios equally often in their P1 trials (i.e. with the 
following amounts found in the OE 2, 2, 3, 3, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). The initial value of the 
CE is generated randomly and conforms to the probabilities of encountering each 
potential value given the specific content from the OE (see Appendix 1.3).  
Given our small explorative sample size we subdivided each experimental 
session into two mini-sessions. Concretely, sessions consist of twelve participants; 
six of them are placed in 'Mini-Session A' whilst the other six are placed in 'Mini-
                                                 
16
 If the performance fee was based on average performance then the effects of extreme strategies 
would average out whilst now subjects need to decide whether they want to take the risk of an 
extreme strategy versus play safe. 
17
Wealth effects are scenarios in which behavioural changes occur due to the accumulation of wealth 
on prior trials or in previous parts of the experiment. When subjects earn money on every trial it is 
possible for someone who earned a big amount of money early on to take more risk in later trials 
(compared to someone who earned the minimum).  
18
 Willow is a framework used to combine these different languages and allow interactive decision 
making. Details on willow can be found on: http://econwillow.sourceforge.net/ 
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Session B'. Participants can only be matched with others from the same mini-session. 
We did not inform participants that they are in one of two mini-sessions as this 
would affect their perspective on potential opponents to be (re-)matched with. The 
logic behind these independent mini-sessions is to maintain the same prior 
experience for participants who are matched together whilst decreasing the risk of 
biases due to sequence effects (i.e. we now use twice as many randomly generated 
trial orders). Every trial participants are randomly re-matched and they do not know 
who they are matched with but they are aware that they are randomly re-matched. 
We did not drop variables, conditions or trials from our analysis.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three experimental sessions with exactly twelve 
participants per session (N=36). A one-hour timeframe was booked for each session 
but sessions typically finished after 45 minutes. Using an alphabetical listing of 
signed-up participants we allocated everyone to numbered cubicles. The experiment 
is set-up such that adjacently seated participants have the same starting role; though 
they are unaware of this feature (see Figure 21).  
Figure 21: Experimental Setup 
 
This figure provides a schematic overview of our experimental layout. Participants sit in two 
rows of desks each with a computer. Shutters (partitions) are used such that they can only 
see their own computer. Participants in the same row (e.g. 1-6) start the experiment in the 
same role.   
If more than twelve people showed up we would randomly exclude 
participants by blindly selecting a cubicle number from a pack of numbered cards 
after shuffling the cards in front of the participants. Excluded participants received a 
£2 show-up fee and filled in a payment receipt after which the doors were closed and 
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the experimental setup was explained by means of a PowerPoint presentation (see 
Appendix 1.4 for details on instructions). The main points from the PowerPoint 
instructions are shortly summarized below: 
Each trial involves three envelopes containing a number of valuable coins. You are informed 
that the envelopes have a combined value of twelve coins and that each envelope contains at 
least two coins initially. You are either assigned the role of Opener (player one) or the role 
of Chooser (player two). As Opener you are first tasked to select an envelope to Destroy by 
clicking the button underneath the envelope of choice; this envelope is then destroyed and its 
contents remain unknown for both players. Next, the Opener selects one of the two 
remaining envelopes to Open by clicking on the button underneath; the Opener has the 
privilege to look inside the envelope and he will know the content of the Opened Envelope -- 
the Chooser does not know its content. The content of the third envelope, the Closed 
Envelope, is unknown to both players. The final task for the Opener is to decide upon an 
amount of coins to transfer from the Opened to the Closed Envelope. This amount should be 
an integer value; it is possible to transfer zero coins or the full value of the Opened Envelope 
but you cannot transfer more coins than the Opened Envelope contains and you cannot 
transfer non-integer amounts. Once the Opener typed their desired transfer amount and 
pressed the 'continue' button their task is done. Next, the Chooser has to make a decision. 
She sees how many coins are transferred from the Opened to the Closed Envelope. Her task 
is to decide which of these two envelopes she wants to have for herself (which decides her 
own payoff) by clicking the button underneath the desired option. The unchosen option is 
assigned to the Opener (deciding his payoff). Feedback is provided after every trial 
specifying which envelope you received and what its final contents are; furthermore, 
feedback also informs you of the envelope received by the other player and its content. After 
each trial your role swaps (i.e. Openers become Choosers and Choosers become Openers) 
and you are randomly re-matched with another player for the next trial. A total of twenty 
trials is played for the experiment. Regarding your final payment you receive a participation 
fee of £2 and additionally you earn a performance fee based on the amount of coins you win 
in a randomly selected trial. The performance fee can be anything between zero and twenty 
pounds and each coin in the experiment is worth exactly two pounds.  
Participants were given the opportunity to raise their hand if further 
clarification was required and were informed that they could do so at any time during 
the experiment if they had further questions. Before starting the experiment 
participants were asked to put their electronic devices and notes away. Furthermore, 
between each experimental cubicle we pulled out ‘shutters’ (i.e. partitions) to avoid 
the temptation of glancing on a neighbour’s computer screen. At the end of the 
experiment pay-offs were calculated using a python script. Concretely, the script 
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randomly generates a trial number for each participant and assesses how many coins 
they won on that particular trial. Coins are multiplied by a factor of two to generate 
the performance fee and a two pounds show-up fee is added to the total. The python 
script does this for every participant and makes a clean output file with a summary 
overview of cubicle numbers and payments.  
 Whilst the experimenter computed payoffs participants answered 
hypothetical questions to assess their risk attitude
19
. We assess risk attitude in two 
different ways (see Appendix 1.5). Firstly, we use a variation on the experimental 
game in which the participant faces two envelopes and is told that the left envelope 
contains eight coins whilst the right envelope contains four coins. Furthermore, the 
participant is informed that the computer will randomly decide whether they receive 
the left or the right envelope (i.e. they play the role of Opener against Nature). If 
desired they can transfer coins from the left envelope (with eight coins) to the right 
envelope (with four coins) before the computer makes this random choice. Based on 
their decision we assess their risk attitude. Secondly, subjects face three types of 
lotteries. Each lottery has a specified chance of winning £10 (i.e. the odds are 80%, 
50% and 20%) and winning £0 otherwise. For every lottery subjects make multiple 
decisions regarding their preference for the lottery ticket versus a fixed value. 
Different fixed values are offered (in random order) until we observe a preference 
shift in the lottery
20
. We assess the risk attitude based on the indifference point at 
which participants shift their preferences (an example is provided in Appendix 1.6). 
Finally, participants fill in receipts for payment and are asked to come forward when 
we call their cubicle number to receive payment in exchange for their receipt ticket. 
Data from the experiment is stored in a time-stamped folder containing a multitude 
of CSV-files (i.e. one for each trial played by each participant ─ this guarantees that 
not all data would be lost if the program were to somehow malfunction) and these 
are converted into a big CSV-datafile using a python script. The data is analysed 
using RStudio.  
 
                                                 
19
Notice that subjects are not paid for the risk measurement; wealth effects from the experiment are 
less likely to influence our risk measurement when it is presented as hypothetical scenarios.  
20
 E.g. the subject prefers a lottery ticket over £5 but he prefers £5.5 over the same lottery ticket. 
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Objectives  
Given that this is an exploratory study we assess whether behaviour aligns 
with predictions from Nash, level k and the maximin principle. Furthermore, we 
assess whether behavioural patterns can be related to the risk attitude of our 
participants. This chapter has the following structure. We initially focus on the 
behaviour of Openers and compare behaviour with the predictions from the three 
frameworks (both for aggregate and within-subject data). Next, we discuss violations 
of dominance and focus on behavioural patterns in contexts without dominance. A 
relationship between the OE-amount and the transfer amount is explored and we 
assess whether decision time relates to either of these variables. Then, we look at 
Chooser behaviour. We first assess whether there is a relationship between the 
transfer amount and envelope selection; and whether decision time relates to either 
of these variables. Next, we discuss whether dominance is violated and we end the 
section by comparing the predictions from the three frameworks with observed 
Chooser-behaviour. Finally, we discuss two risk attitude measurements. A 
comparison between the two measurements is made; and then we assess whether 
behaviour of Openers and Choosers differs between subjects that are assessed as 
purely ‘risk averse’ (i.e. the majority of our sample) and those that are assessed in 
another way.  
 
Results  
Opener behaviour 
We start this section by exploring whether experimental behaviour of the 
Opener relates to the predictions of the frameworks introduced earlier (i.e. Nash, 
level k and maximin) by combining suggested strategies into ‘profiles’21. For each 
profile we explain its strategy and indicate the corresponding frameworks. We use 
subscripts for Nash and level k to indicate whether predictions involve a risk averse 
or risk neutral assumption (see Table 10). 
Table 10: Strategy profiles for Openers according to theories and models 
                                                 
21
 Note that we do not assess the more complex ‘mixed strategies’ that are suggested by Nash. This is 
true for P1 and P2 across our three chapters – simply since it is hard to assess mixed strategies with 
our limited data. Furthermore, the existing evidence suggests that human decision makers rarely use 
mixed strategies and only do so in special types of situations. 
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 Strategy Framework 
Profile 1 Never transfer coins 
ANash , NNash , ALevel2  
Profile 2 If OE=2/3/4: no transfer  
If OE=5: transfer one or zero coins 
If OE=6/7/8: transfer one coin 
NLevel2  
Profile 3 If OE=2/3/4: transfer one coin  
If OE=5/6/7/8: no transfer  
NLevel4  
Profile 4 If OE=2/3/4: no transfer  
If OE=5: transfer one coin 
If OE=6: transfer one or two coins 
If OE=7: transfer two coins 
If OE=8: transfer three coins 
Maximin, ALevel1   
A summary of the Opener’s experimental behaviour is found in Table 11. 
Concretely, we display for each possible OE-value which proportion of decision 
resulted into specific transfer amounts
22
. Orange background colours indicate 
dominated strategies.  
Table 11: Splitter behaviour in the envelope game 
Amount 
OE 
Transfer Amount 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
2 .63 .33 .04  
3 .66 .31 .03 0  
4 .53 .33 .08 .04 .01  
5 .33 .47 .17 .03 0 0  
6 .14 .56 .28 0 .03 0 0  
7 .19 .39 .25 .11 0 .03 0 .03  
8 .19 .22 .31 .19 .03 .03 0 .03 0 
This table provides a summary of Opener behaviour across scenarios. Each row discusses a 
specific scenario (e.g. two coins are found in the OE) whilst the columns indicate potential 
transfer amounts. Each cell of the table indicates the proportion of decisions involving a 
specific OE-amount and a specific transfer amount.  
 
None of these four profiles does a good job at explaining aggregate behaviour 
on its own. Profile 1 faces the reality that transfers are made and become more 
frequent when the OE contains larger amounts – in contrast with its 'never transfer' 
prediction. Profile 2 expected no transfers to be made in cases where the OE 
contained small values (such as two, three or four coins) but aggregate data suggests 
that transfers are made in one third of such scenarios. Profile 3 expected no transfers 
to be made for larger OE-amounts (i.e. five, six, seven or eight coins) whilst a one-
coin transfer was expected for small OE-amounts (i.e. two, three or four coins); if 
anything the general trend of aggregate data is opposite to predictions from Profile 3. 
Finally, Profile 4 suggested that participants would aim to maximize their minimum 
                                                 
22
 The amounts in the table represent proportions per row since scenarios with two, three and four 
coins in the OE occur twice as frequent in the experiment compared with the other scenarios; hence, 
proportions allow a better comparison compared with raw frequencies. 
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payoff which is in line with the general trend of the aggregate data but fails to 
explain about one third of our observations. One possible explanation for the data is 
that different participants may adhere to different strategy profiles. Thus, we next 
zoom in on the behaviour of individual participants. For each of our 36 participants 
we assess the frequency in which their Opener-behaviour is in line with each of these 
four profiles. They each faced ten trials as Opener, however, since trials with two, 
three or four coins in the OE occur twice as frequent we assess behaviour on a seven-
point scale to avoid biasing our assessment due to experimental frequency
23
. An 
overview of profile adherence can be found in Table 12. We assigned a green 
background for scores of 5.5 (or more) on the seven-point scale to indicate strong 
adherence.  
Table 12: Qualitatively assessing whether P1s behave according to the four strategy profiles 
that were deduced from theories and models 
Subject Profile1 Profile 2 Profile 3 Profile 4 
0 3.5 4.5 1 5.5 
1 3.5 3.5 1.5 4.5 
2 3 6 0 6 
3 1 1 3 2 
4 2 4 2 4 
5 2.5 2.5 2 3.5 
6 4 5 1 4.5 
7 3 4 0 7 
8 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 
9 3 4 2 4 
10 3.5 5.5 2 3.5 
11 1.5 1.5 2 3.5 
12 0 2 3 1 
13 1.5 3.5 0.5 4.5 
14 4.5 2.5 4 2.5 
15 2 4 1 4 
16 3 3 2 3 
17 3.5 5.5 2 4.5 
18 0 2 3.5 1 
19 2 4 1 5 
20 2.5 4.5 2.5 3.5 
21 3 3 4.5 2 
22 2.5 3.5 3 4.5 
23 4 5 1 5 
24 5 4 3.5 3 
25 6 3 5.5 2 
26 7 4 4 3 
27 3 4 2 4 
28 0 1 4 1 
29 2 6 1.5 4 
                                                 
23
 Concretely, trials in which the OE contains two, three or four coins initially are assigned a 0.5-value 
for profile adherence whilst trials in which the OE contains five, six, seven or eight coins receive a 
1.0-value for profile adherence. Thus, our ten trials are now assessed on a seven-point scale. 
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30 2.5 4.5 2 2.5 
31 2.5 3.5 2 3.5 
32 3.5 6.5 1.5 3.5 
33 0.5 4.5 3.5 2.5 
34 2 6 1.5 4 
35 2 4 1 5 
mean (Score)  2.68 3.79 2.17 3.57 
freq (Score 5. 5 )  2 6 1 3 
 
We now provide a descriptive summary of these findings. It seems clear that 
certain participants show a strong adherence to a specific profile but they are a 
minority. There were two subjects who fully adhered to the predictions of a specific 
profile (i.e. Subject26 fully adhered to profile one and Subject7 fully adhered to 
profile four). In total there were ten participants with an adherence-score of 5.5 (or 
more) on our seven-point scale. Two of these participants had a high score on two 
different profiles simultaneously. Furthermore, it appears that strategy profiles two 
and four (which generally provide the same predictions) are most compatible with 
experimental behaviour. However, the most stringent finding is that the majority of 
participants (i.e. 26 out of 36 Openers) does not strongly behave in accordance with 
any of these profiles across their experimental trials. It is unclear whether they 
simply behave according to different profiles on different trials or whether they 
behave in ways that are not predicted by any of these three frameworks
24
. Overall, 
predictions are not well-satisfied.  
To finalize this section we zoom in more deeply on observed behaviour. 
Concretely, we provide the reader with a short discussion on violations of dominance 
and take a closer look at behaviour in a non-dominated context without consideration 
for strategic profiles. Firstly, violations of dominance are occasionally observed but 
they are uncommon. Since most game-theoretic models consider it irrational to select 
dominated choices we shortly discuss when these decisions were made. Concretely, 
Openers should not transfer three coins unless eight coins are found in the OE since 
the Chooser has a weakly dominant choice whenever a three coin transfer is made 
(i.e. the CE cannot be worse than the OE in such scenarios). Furthermore, Openers 
should never transfer more than three tokens since this would involve a strong 
dominant choice for the Chooser. Looking at our data we observe seven trials in 
which the Opener transferred more than three coins; such decisions are generally 
                                                 
24
 We inform the reader that we employ a procedure of verbal protocols to help assess thought 
processes and adherence to theories and models across trials in our next chapter.  
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made twice by the same participants and the OE typically contained seven or eight 
coins initially on such trials (see Appendix 1.7). Furthermore, there were 15 trials in 
which exactly three coins were transferred. Seven of these trials remained viable 
since the OE initially contained eight coins in which case the two envelopes have an 
equal value after the transfer; however, eight of these trials involved an initial OE-
content that was less than eight coins (implying a violation of dominance). Finally, 
we take a closer look at non-dominated choices (i.e. when zero, one or two coins are 
transferred) and the context in which these choices are made (see Table 13).  
Table 13: Overview of choice frequencies for all scenarios 
Initial amount 
of coins in  OE 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 
2 45 24 3 
3 48 22 2 
4 38 24 6 
5 12 17 6 
6 5 20 10 
7 7 14 9 
8 7 8 11 
 
We performed a one-way repeated measures ANOVA to assess whether a 
relationship exists between the initial OE-value and the transfer amount, when the 
transfer amount is less than three coins (i.e. excluding scenarios with dominance). 
Openers indeed transfer more value when larger amounts are found in the OE (
1,334F
=33.77, p=1.45 8e , 
2
partialη =0.092). Additionally, we wondered whether decision 
speed can be predicted from the initial amount in the OE and the chosen transfer 
amount when looking at trials in which less than three coins were transferred. After 
all, previous research through psychology and decisions making (Luce, 1986) has 
suggested that harder choices are made more slowly. Concretely, we recoded 
decision times for each individual Opener into z-scores after which we ran a two-
way ANOVA. We conclude that the initial amount in the OE does not predict 
decision time (
6,317F =0.617, p=0.012, 
2
partialη =0.022) but that the transfer amount 
does relate to the decision time variable ( 2,317F =4.378, p=0.0134, 
2
partialη =0.0287): 
slower decisions are made when the subject makes larger transfers (i.e. when riskier 
decisions are made the participant took more time deciding)
25
. This also suggests 
                                                 
25
 We also checked for a potential interaction effect between the amount in the OE and the transfer 
amount but such an interaction was not found( 12,317F =1.956, p=0.028, 
2
partialη = 0.073) 
  Envelope Game   
 
48 
 
that difficult choices in our experiment are not defined by the amount found in the 
OE; hard choices are simply those in which the subject takes a higher degree of risk 
(i.e. decides upon a larger transfer amount). Output files of these ANOVA's can be 
found in Appendix 1.8. 
 
Chooser behaviour 
The experimental behaviour of Choosers is summarized in Figure 22. 
Concretely, the figure displays the frequency in which the OE versus CE is chosen 
when zero, one, two or three-plus coins are transferred. Since a transfer of three or 
more coins results in a dominant choice for the Chooser we merge such scenarios.  
Figure 22: Relationship between transfer amount and Chooser’s choice 
 
 
For each of the transfer amounts we observe a preference towards choosing 
the CE (i.e. the green bars). We ran a repeated measures ANOVA to assess whether 
there is a relationship between the envelope choice and the transfer amount. We 
again excluded trials involving dominance (i.e. when three or more coins are 
transferred) to minimize noise. Results indicate that the CE-preference is not affected 
by increasing the transfer amount (
1,334F =0.043, p=0.836, 
2
partialη =0.00012).  
Next, we converted the decision time of individual Choosers into z-scores to 
assess whether a relationship exists between the transfer amount, the Chooser’s 
decision and her decision time. Our two-way ANOVA excludes trials involving 
dominance to minimize noise. Its results suggest no relationship between the transfer 
amount and decision time ( 2,326F =0.564, p=0.569, 
2
partialη =0.003) and no relationship 
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between the chosen envelope and decision time (
1,326F =0.123, p=0.726, 
2
partialη = 
0.0003)
26
. Statistical output from these tests can again be found in Appendix 1.8. 
Overall the CE is chosen in 496 out of 720 trials (69% of the trials). We point 
out to the reader that Choosers have a strongly dominant choice when more than 
three coins are transferred; such scenarios occurred seven times and the Chooser 
acted in accordance with dominance each time. Furthermore, a transfer of three coins 
results in a scenario of weak dominance; this scenario occurred fifteen times and 
Choosers made their choice in accordance with dominance in fourteen of these cases. 
It is worthwhile to stress that choices in accordance with dominance are not 
necessarily due to awareness of dominance; these choices may simply be due to a 
high feeling of risk in relation to the OE since a seemingly large value is transferred. 
Furthermore, it may be difficult for participants to realise when dominance is 
involved since this requires a number of calculations
27
. 
Similarly to our analysis for Openers we summarize potential strategies that 
Choosers can follow according to popular theories and models; and we indicate 
which theories or models make these predictions (see Table 14). 
Table 14: Strategy profiles for Choosers in the envelope game 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Always pick the CE 
ANash , NNash , ALevel1  
Profile 2 If no transfer: random 
If transfer: CE 
NLevel1 , maximin 
Profile 3 If no transfer: CE 
If transfer 1 coin: OE 
NLevel3  
Profile 4 If no transfer: OE 
If transfer 1 coin: CE 
NLevel5  
 
We assess whether these three profiles apply to Chooser behaviour on their 
ten trials. We use a colour coding to indicate profile adherence: blue (profile 1), 
orange (profile 2), purple (profile 3) or red (profile 4) (see Table 15). 
                                                 
26
 For completeness we add that there is no interaction effect either ( 2,326F =0.492, p=0.612, 
2
partialη
=0.003). 
27
 To realise that the CE cannot be worse than the OE whenever three or more coins are transferred it 
is required that participants compute the maximum OE-value possible. The maximum OE-value is 
reached whenever the other two envelopes contain the minimum of two coins. Since the total sum 
equals twelve coins participants would need to deduce that the OE can maximally contain 12-2-2 = 8 
coins. Furthermore, participants need to realise that a transfer of three coins from this maximum OE-
value of 8 coins results into a remainder of five coins in the OE; whilst such a scenario would imply 
that the CE has a minimum value of two coins plus the additional (transferred) three coins. This may 
be too cognitively demanding for experimental subjects to realise. 
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Table 15: Chooser behaviour within-subject 
Subject 
number 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3+ 
CE OE CE OE CE OE CE OE 
0 1 5 0 1 0 1 2 0 
1 3 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 
2 5 0 1 1 2 0 1 0 
3 4 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 
4 3 2 3 0 0 0 2 0 
5 3 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 
6 4 0 0 2 2 0 2 0 
7 5 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
8 5 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 
9 0 2 2 2 3 0 1 0 
10 3 2 1 1 3 0 0 0 
11 2 1 1 4 0 1 1 0 
12 3 0 2 2 0 3 0 0 
13 1 2 2 3 2 0 0 0 
14 1 1 4 2 2 0 0 0 
15 5 0 3 0 1 1 0 0 
16 4 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 
17 4 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 
18 1 0 7 0 0 0 2 0 
19 5 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 
20 3 0 4 0 2 0 1 0 
21 1 5 1 2 0 0 1 0 
22 1 2 5 0 1 0 1 0 
23 6 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 
24 3 1 4 2 0 0 0 0 
25 5 1 2 1 1 0 0 0 
26 2 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 
27 3 1 2 4 0 0 0 0 
28 1 1 6 1 0 0 1 0 
29 2 1 4 2 1 0 0 0 
30 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 
31 4 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 
32 6 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
32 1 1 5 2 0 1 0 0 
33 0 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 
34 1 0 5 1 2 0 1 0 
35 1 5 0 1 0 1 2 0 
 
None of these profiles does a good job at consistently explaining Chooser-
behaviour when we do not allow ‘trembling hand’ possibilities. Three participants 
behaved according to the first profile; four participants behaved according to the 
second profile, two participants behaved according to the third profile and one 
participant behaved according to profile four. If we allow minor trembling hand 
mistakes we find slightly more adherence for profile 1, however, the behaviour of 
most Choosers remains unexplained.  
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Risk attitude 
Finally, we assess whether there is a relationship between the risk attitude of 
participants and their experimental behaviour. We assessed risk attitude in two 
different ways; one version uses a similar design as the experimental game whilst 
another version calculates the indifference point of participants by looking at 
preferences between a lottery ticket (which either wins a specific amount of money 
or wins nothing) versus a certain fixed amount (see Appendix 1.5). We coded each 
of our 36 subjects once on each risk measurement though the lottery assessment 
consisted of three lotteries with different probabilities of winning the lottery. Three 
lotteries were implemented to account for scenarios in which indifference point 
estimates suggest trembling hand phenomena (i.e. if a subject indicates a preference 
of £5 for certain over a lottery ticket whilst indicating a preference for the same 
lottery ticket over a certain £5.50 then clearly a mistake was made). However, the 
downside of multiple lotteries is that six participants could not be categorized under 
a ‘pure’ risk attitude due to differential preferences across lotteries. Concretely, 
behaviour in the “two envelope” measurement is coded as risk averse (RA), risk 
neutral (RN) or risk seeking (RS); whilst behaviour on the “lottery” measurement 
also includes mixtures such as RA/NA and RA/RN/RS
28
.  
Table 16 summarizes how the coding on the two risk attitude measurements 
overlaps for individual participants.  
Table 16: Correspondence between the two envelope and lottery risk attitude measurements 
  Overall Lottery Measurement 
  RA RA/RN RN RA/RN/RS 
Two Envelopes 
Measurement 
RA 23 3 2 3 
RN 4 0 1 0 
 
Neither assessment involves a pure RS-coding; at best the lottery assessment 
coded three subjects as a mixture of RA/RN/RS. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
the majority of participants is coded as risk averse (i.e. 23 out of 36 subjects were 
coded ‘RA’ for both assessments) which is in line with past literature (e.g. Dohmen 
et al., 2011; Holt and Laury, 2002). The main differences between the two 
                                                 
28
 We point out to the reader that the lottery assessment is computed by looking which risk coding 
occurred the most frequently for each subject across the three lotteries. A three-way tie thus means 
that the individual was coded as RA, RN and RS once each. A two-way tie is possible whenever an 
assessment is excluded due to the violation of transitivity (i.e. the trembling hand phenomena 
described earlier).  
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assessments can be attributed due to mixed assessments on the lottery coding: 80% 
of non-mixed assessments overlap between the two measurements suggesting that 
they generally make the same assessments.  
 
Risk attitude and behaviour by P1 
Next, we divided Openers based on their risk attitude (on the overall lottery 
assessment) into an ‘averse’ and a ‘non-averse’ group. The non-averse group 
includes all mixed codings since only three non-averse participants were considered 
purely risk neutral (i.e. otherwise our comparison group is too limited). Behaviour 
from the averse and the non-averse group is compared in Table 17 and Table 18; 
scenarios involving transfers of more than three coins are excluded from these tables 
since they violate dominance. The most frequent behavioural tendencies are 
indicated by an orange background.  
Table 17: Averse Opener behaviour (lottery assessment) 
Initial amount of 
coins in the OE 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3 
2 31 20 3  
3 36 16 2 0 
4 29 17 4 3 
5 11 10 5 1 
6 5 17 4 0 
7 6 11 6 3 
8 5 5 9 6 
 
Table 18: Non-averse Opener behaviour (lottery assessment) 
Initial amount of 
coins in the OE 
Transfer 0 Transfer 1 Transfer 2 Transfer 3 
2 14 4 0  
3 12 6 0 0 
4 9 7 2 0 
5 1 7 1 0 
6 0 3 6 0 
7 1 3 3 1 
8 2 3 2 1 
 
When we focus on the most frequent decisions of each row (i.e. orange 
background colour) we observe a pattern similar to profile two (i.e. risk neutral level 
two predictions) and profile four for risk averse Openers (i.e. risk averse level one 
and maximin predictions). The table of ‘non-averse’ coded Openers illustrates 
roughly the same pattern; the main difference between the two tables relates to large 
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OE-values: risk averse Openers appear to have a stronger desire to transfer value 
compared with non-averse Openers.  
 
Risk attitude and behaviour by P2 
Finally, we explored whether ‘risk averse’ participants are more likely to pick 
the CE as Chooser. The CE always has a higher (or equal) EV compared with the OE 
and thus it is sensible to assume that a risk averse Chooser would have a stronger 
CE-preference). We separated data for averse and non-averse coded Choosers 
(similar as before the non-averse group includes all the mixed assessments); 
furthermore, we separated data based on coins being transferred versus status quo 
scenarios (i.e. behavioural differences may only occur if a transfer is made) (see 
Table 19 and Table 20).  
Table 19: Risk attitude and Chooser behaviour when zero coins transferred 
 Picked CE Picked OE 
Averse 71 43 
Non Averse 75 39 
 
Table 20: Risk attitude and Chooser behaviour when coins are transferred 
 Picked CE Picked OE 
Averse 115 41 
Non Averse 111 45 
 
Behaviour of averse and non averse Choosers is remarkably similar both 
when zero coins are transferred and when coins are transferred. Risk averse and non-
averse Choosers do not make different choices based on the lottery risk attitude 
coding. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we introduced the reader to a novel sequential game which 
involves a low degree of knowledge for both of its players. The game structure was 
analysed through the lenses of three popular frameworks (i.e. Nash equilibrium, level 
k models and the maximin principle). The author also stressed how complex the 
calculations of some of these frameworks are (which makes it somewhat implausible 
that participants approach the task by performing such computations). Intuitively, the 
  Envelope Game   
 
54 
 
Nash predictions for the Opener have strong appeal as a solution: it simply suggests 
that he should never make value-transfers (which is a sensible idea due to his lack of 
perfect information). When we compare experimental behaviour and predicted 
strategy profiles we only find a minority of participants who behave strongly 
according to the predictions of a specific framework. It remains unclear how the 
majority of participants approaches the task – though potentially they might be using 
a combination of these frameworks.  
Other conclusions which we draw from this paper are that participants 
occasionally violate dominance but not too frequently. Furthermore, it are usually 
the same individuals who make such decisions twice; additionally all violations 
against dominance occurred during the first ten trials of the experiment indicating 
potential learning effects. It is possible that these errors of judgment are due to the 
difficulty for participants to grasp the underlying structure of the game  
When we take a closer look at scenarios without dominance we observe a 
relationship between the Opener’s choice and the scenario he faces. Concretely, 
Openers transfer more coins when more coins are available in the OE. However, for 
Choosers the CE-preference (i.e. her decision) is not affected by the transfer amount 
– when we compare data from trials in which zero, one or two coins are transferred 
(i.e. without dominance).  
Regarding decision times we observed that the decision times of Openers 
reflect the choices that were contemplated since slower decisions are generally made 
when he makes larger transfers; however, the scenario he faces (i.e. the initial 
amount in the OE) does not affect his decision time. For Choosers we do not find a 
relationship involving her decision time and the scenario or her choice. Finally, we 
observed that most of our participants are coded as ‘risk averse’; risk averse Openers 
appear to have a stronger desire to transfer value when the OE contains larger 
amounts (compared to non-averse Openers) but that risk attitude does not affect the 
behaviour of Choosers.  
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Chapter 3 Transfer Game: a game of dominance, bluffing and verbal protocols 
  
Abstract 
This chapter explores a new competitive game with a simple structure. The 
predictions of Nash, level k and maximin theorem are explored and we look at 
behaviour both in a context where options are dominated and in a context 
where bluffing is possible. Furthermore, in a follow-up experiment we assess 
the value of verbal protocols for our experimental design.  
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we suggested a risk attitude measurement that 
consisted of a simple one-shot decision involving two envelopes. Participants knew 
that the left envelope contained eight coins and that the right envelope contained four 
coins. They decided how many (if any) coins to transfer from the left envelope (eight 
coins) to the right envelope (four coins) knowing that one envelope would be 
randomly selected as their (hypothetical) payoff. Our Transfer Game has a similar 
design but is framed differently. The choice options are now two boxes (instead of 
envelopes) and the currency is tokens (instead of coins). Furthermore, amounts are 
scaled upwards to 80 and 40 (instead of eight and four) and the game is played 
against a strategic agent (instead of being played against nature). Furthermore, the 
transfer game involves multiple trials (i.e. forty trials in Experiment Two and six 
trials in Experiment Three). In the next section we explain the design and point out 
the (deeper) differences with the two envelope risk measurement.  
 
Paradigm 
The transfer game involves two boxes: one box contains 80 tokens whilst the 
other box contains 40 tokens (see Figure 23).  
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Figure 23: Background Knowledge in the Transfer Game 
 
 
The game starts with the Decider (P1) opening the two boxes and finding out 
which amount is in which box. In contrast with our game from the previous chapter 
the transfer amount is now predefined. Concretely, the computer suggests to transfer 
a specific amount of tokens from ‘Box A’ to ‘Box B’ and P1 decides whether or not 
to make this transfer (see Figure 24).  
Figure 24: Player One Makes His Decision 
 
 
It is important to realise that the suggested transfer can be from the box with 
80 tokens to the box with 40 tokens (i.e. Big to Small; BS) but can also be from the 
box with 40 tokens to the box with 80 tokens (i.e. Small to Big; SB). Once P1 
decides whether or not to make the suggested transfer it is Player Two’s (P2) turn to 
act. She knows that one box initially contained 40 tokens whilst the other box 
contained 80 tokens; but she does not know which box contained which amount. She 
is informed about the suggested transfer (i.e. how many tokens could be transferred 
and whether this transfer would go in a left-to-right versus a right-to-left direction on 
the computer screen). Furthermore, she knows whether P1 decided to make this 
transfer. Her choice is to select whether she wants the box from which tokens can be 
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transferred (i.e. Direction From; DF) or the box to which tokens can be added (i.e. 
Direction To; DT) as her own pay-off (see Figure 25). The unchosen box is P1’s 
pay-off. 
Figure 25: Player Two Makes Her Decision 
 
 
There are five important differences between the Transfer Game and the risk 
measurement from the previous chapter. Firstly, the Transfer Game is played against 
a strategic agent whilst the risk measurement from the previous chapter involved a 
random agent. Secondly, the game now involves real pay-offs whilst the risk 
measurement task involved hypothetical pay-offs. Thirdly, the larger amount (i.e. 80 
tokens) can be in either box whilst this was fixed to the left ‘envelope’ in the risk 
measurement task. The fourth difference is that the transfer can go either in a Big to 
Small (BS) directionality or in a Small to Big (SB) directionality whilst the 
directionality was always BS for the risk measurement task. Finally, the transfer 
amount is now predefined by nature (i.e. P1 simply decides whether to make the 
suggested transfer) whilst in the risk measurement task P1 decided himself upon the 
transfer amount.  
Given that our previous chapter signified how only a minority of participants 
behave according to predictions of popular theoretical frameworks (i.e. Nash 
equilibrium, level k models and maximin theorem) we investigate in this chapter 
whether this remains the case when the game structure is simplified and easier to 
grasp. Concretely, there are only two options (Box A and Box B) and they always 
hold either (40, 80) or (80, 40) as their respective values at the start of each trial. 
Furthermore, the decision space for P1 is now heavily constrained to a (make 
transfer, do not make the transfer) decision compared to him deciding on a numerical 
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amount between two threshold values. This makes interpretation of decisions more 
straightforward and limits cognitive load by simplifying decisions. To additionally 
strengthen our conclusions we also explore this game through a verbal protocol 
approach in a follow-up study.    
 
Links to the literature  
We realise that mathematical and quantitative frameworks have offered us 
many useful insights into matters regarding human behaviour and reasoning. 
However, we believe that additional insights can be gained by exploring the ways in 
which participants reason about their task. Thus, in the current chapter we discuss 
two versions of the Transfer Game; one version is played by individuals (i.e. 
Experiment Two) whilst the other version is played by two-player teams who 
communicate through chatting software (i.e. Experiment Three). Usage of chatting 
software allows us to collect data on experimental reasoning processes. Similar 
procedures have been explored in the past by other authors. Furthermore, this 
procedure allows us to explore whether participants consistently reason according to 
a specific theoretical framework. 
Colman, Pulman and Lawrence (2014) indicated how it is theoretically 
problematic for certain theories to provide explanations for specific coordination 
games. They created twelve games to compare predictions of team reasoning, strong 
Stackelberg reasoning and level one and level two reasoning
29
. These games were 
designed such that there is no strong or weak dominance present. At the end of the 
experiment participants were provided with a list of eight possible motivations for 
their choices based on a pilot study. Data was collected on the degree in which 
participants agreed with the eight motivations and participants were asked to indicate 
the reasons they used in the order that they were generally employed (if multiple 
reasons were used). An interesting finding is that most players considered multiple 
motivations for their choices in the same game (79% of the players in their first 
experiment and 88% of the players in their second experiment). Furthermore, they 
realised thanks to the data on motivations that an Avoid The Worst heuristic 
                                                 
29
 They specifically created games in which theories have different predictions and thus they discuss 
3x3 and 4x4 experimental games. 
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(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996) approximates level one reasoning in many of their 
games; this realisation explains why Avoid The Worst is the most frequently 
selected motivation for behaviour in their experiment whilst level one reasoning 
explained decisions the best. Some of the decisions in line with level one reasoning 
might have been generated by the Avoid The Worst heuristic. Given that Chapter 2 
of this thesis suggested that most of our own participants do not behave according to 
predictions from one specific framework it seems worthwhile to assess choice 
consistency through the usage of verbal protocols. 
One experiment which uses verbal protocols for experimental games is found 
in Cooper and Kagel (2004). Their main focus was a comparison between teams and 
individuals in context of a competitive strategic game. They used the entry limit 
pricing game proposed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982). This game has a monopolist 
who is either a high cost type or a low cost type and an entrant
30
. The entrant is 
unaware of the monopolist’s type but it is common knowledge that the high and low 
cost type are equally likely to occur. Monopolists decide between seven possible 
outputs knowing that their decision is observed by the entrant; the entrant then 
decides to enter the market or not. It is only profitable for the entrant to enter the 
market if his opponent is the high cost type but he does not know which type the 
monopolist is. We do not discuss results from Cooper and Kagel (2004), however, 
we provide some more details of their procedure of verbal protocol collection to 
contrast with our own setup in Experiment Three.  
Cooper and Kagel (2004) provided feedback after every trial regarding the 
payoff earned and the monopolist’s type (i.e. high versus low cost); however, the 
authors additionally provided participants with an overview of choices and outcomes 
from other players in the same trial and with a ‘history’ of the last three trials that 
were played
31
. Ourselves we provide solely feedback on the trial that has just been 
played by the participants themselves. For team coordination Cooper and Kagel 
(2004) used chatting software to allow anonymous communication and additionally 
the current choice made by participants and their teammate was highlighted using a 
blue and pink colouring. Once choices converge there is a four second interval to 
                                                 
30
 We remind the reader that ‘type’ is a common term used in signalling games to refer to a feature 
that nature assigns to P1 (e.g. high or low production cost) which P2 cannot assess.  
31
 Concretely, additionally to the own scenario and payoff participants receive a summary of 
experimental behaviour and corresponding outcomes for all the other players in the past trial.  
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change the decision before it becomes final. If no uniform choice is made in the three 
minute timeframe then one of the teammates would be randomly selected as ‘leader’ 
whose choice becomes the team’s decision. Ourselves we also use a chatting room to 
allow private communication within each team whilst maintaining anonymity. 
However, we do not use a visual indicator of the current choice selection of 
teammates because it limits the need for written communication and we want to 
maximize the frequency in which participants explain their reasoning to teammates. 
Furthermore, we also use a time limit for team discussion and decision making (i.e. a 
two minute timer which is displayed on-screen), however, our own setup penalizes 
lack of coordination by not providing payoffs for trials in which the team did not 
make a uniform decision within the timeframe.  
 
Assumptions and game structure 
We assume that both players are rational agents who aim to maximize their 
own pay-off (and thus minimize the payoff of their opponent). Furthermore, we 
assume that behavioural differences for P1 (to whom we refer in this chapter as 
‘Decider’) are due to the transfer amount and transfer direction. Similarly, 
behavioural differences for P2 (to whom we refer in this chapter as ‘Chooser’) are 
assumed to be due to the transfer amount and the Decider’s decision (i.e. whether he 
made the transfer). We remind the reader that suggested transfers either have a BS-
directionality (i.e. Big to Small) or a SB-directionality (i.e. Small to Big) which is 
solely known by the Decider. Furthermore, the transfer amount is predefined in this 
experiment and is always one of the following amounts: five, ten, twenty, thirty and 
thirty-five tokens. Both players know the transfer amount and the Chooser knows 
whether her opponent decided to make the transfer. Her decision is to select either 
the DT (i.e. Direction To) or DF (i.e. Direction From) box as her own payoff whilst 
the remaining box is assigned to the Decider. The structure of the game is 
summarized in Table 21.  
Table 21: Structure of the Transfer Game 
 No transfer  Transfer 5 Transfer 10 Transfer 20 Transfer 30 Transfer 35 
 DF DT DF DT DF DT DF DT DF DT DF DT 
BS 80 40 75 45 70 50 60 60 50 70 45 75 
SB 40 80 35 85 30 90 20 100 10 110 5 115 
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It should be clear that transfers of 20 or more tokens lead to dominant choices 
for the Chooser (i.e. DT DF ; as is indicated in the table by a bold font).  
 
Nash predictions 
Since the transfer game is a sequential game of imperfect information we 
explore the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE) predictions. In contrast with 
the experimental game from the previous chapter we now predefined the transfer 
amount which implies that we have five unique scenarios to discuss (i.e. the transfer 
amount is always one of the following five, ten, twenty, thirty or thirty-five tokens). 
However, the reader should be aware that scenarios in which five or ten tokens can 
be transferred both reflect structures without dominance whilst scenarios in which 
thirty or thirty-five tokens can be transferred both reflect structures with strong 
dominance. As a result these scenarios consistently reach the same equilibrium states 
(but with different parametrical restrictions) and can be discussed together. In Figure 
26 we illustrate the structure of the experimental game with all decision nodes 
including placeholders for the pay-offs (i.e. P1, P2).  
Figure 26: Game structure for PBNE analysis 
 
Concretely, nature assigns P1 with a ‘type’ (i.e. BS versus SB) with equal 
probabilities for each type. P1 decides whether to transfer versus not transfer a 
specified token amount (i.e. 5, 10, 20, 30 or 35) and P2 decides whether to pick DT 
versus DF; she knows whether the transfer is made but she does not know P1’s type. 
We consistently start analysis by assuming that the equilibrium under investigation 
exists and then we explore step-by-step which parameter values are required for the 
equilibrium to remain intact under the required assumptions.  
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Pooling PBNE 
We speak of a Pooling PBNE when P1 makes the same decision regardless of 
his type. The two potential Pooling PBNEs are thus to transfer regardless the type; 
or to not transfer regardless the type. It should be straightforward that P2 can exploit 
a (Transfer, Transfer) strategy by consistently picking DT. Thus, P1 would want to 
deviate with at least one of his types implying that no such Pooling PBNE can exist. 
The only possible Pooling PBNE is thus a (No Transfer, No Transfer) strategy. If 
neither type of P1 transfers tokens then the Expected Payoff for P2 (
P2EP ) is the 
same regardless whether she picks DT or DF (i.e.
40 80 80 40
2 2
 
 ). She is thus 
indifferent between DT and DF if no transfer is made which means that she can 
decide upon any probability (including 100% and 0%) in which to pick DT when no 
transfer is made.  
We start by exploring the scenario of strong dominance since it seems 
intuitive that P1 should never make transfers in this context. Since the results are the 
same for 30 and 35 token scenarios we explain the analysis using 30 tokens as an 
example (though we do provide parameter values for the scenario in which 35 tokens 
can be transferred whenever an equilibrium is found). Figure 27 Provides the reader 
with the structure of the game when 30 tokens can be transferred assuming that P1 
never makes this transfer (i.e. we start by assuming the existence of the equilibrium 
and explore whether it is possible to set parameter values such that this equilibrium 
holds).  
Figure 27: Exploring a Pooling PBNE for the transfer amount of 30 tokens 
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It should immediately be clear that P2 is indifferent between DT and DF 
when no transfer is made since  P2EP DT|notransfer =  P2EP DF|notransfer  (see 
Equation 9)
32
.  
Equation 9: Expected Payoff (EP) computation if no transfer is made 
 P2EP DT|notransfer = 
1 1
40 80 60
2 2
   
 P2EP DF|notransfer = 
1 1
80 40 60
2 2
   
This means that she can choose DT in any probability she likes – though later 
on we set restrictions on this probability such that we remain in an equilibrium state. 
If an off-equilibrium state were reached (i.e. if P1 were to transfer) then we assess 
P2’s beliefs (‘p’) of being in the BS-Transfer node. We compute the P2EP  if she 
chooses DT versus DF if a transfer is made (see Equation 10). 
Equation 10: EP computation based on beliefs if a transfer of 30 tokens can be made 
 P2EP DT|transfer30  =  70 110 1 110 40p p p     
 P2EP DF|transfer30  =  50 10 1 10 40p p p     
For P2 to be indifferent between DT and DF the expected payoffs need to be 
the same. However, this requires the belief 
5
4
p   (i.e.110 40 10 40p p   ); since 
beliefs expresses probabilities it is immediately clear that P2 cannot be indifferent 
when a transfer is made. Furthermore, she cannot prefer DF in such a scenario since 
this requires a belief
5
4
p  . The only possible strategy for P2 when a transfer is 
made is thus to pick DT (i.e. involving the belief
5
4
p  ).  
Finally, to make sure that P1 cannot gain from off-equilibrium decisions we 
set the probability ‘Q’ of P2 choosing DT when no transfer is made (i.e. the 
equilibrium path) such that Equation 11 holds true.  
Equation 11: Setting the probability of P2 picking DT when no transfer is made in such a way 
that we prevent P1 from deviating from the equilibrium path 
                                                 
32
 Note that this is the case regardless the transfer amount since the right side of the figure remains the 
same in all possible scenarios.  
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   P1 P1EP transfer|BS EP notransfer|BS  
   P1 P1EP transfer|SB EP notransfer|SB  
Concretely, we set the probability ‘Q’ such that the expected payoff for P1 (
P1EP ) is equal or larger when he remains on the equilibrium path compared to when 
he deviates. Thus, any probability Q in which P2 picks DT (when no transfer is 
made) that is larger or equal than this threshold value is in equilibrium.  
Figure 28: Setting the value for Q such that P1 does not want to deviate 
 
For the BS-type we need to set ‘Q’ such that  80 40 1 50Q Q   
0.25Q  . For the SB-type the same ‘Q’ needs to be  40 80 1 10Q Q   
1.75Q  (which is true by default since Q is a probability). 
Thus, there is a Pooling PBNE in which P2 holds the belief 
5
4
p   such that 
she always picks DT when a transfer is made (since it consistently leads her to a 
higher EP) whilst she picks DT with a probability 0.25Q  when no transfer is made 
to prevent P1 from deviating (i.e. if P1 were to deviate his EP would decrease).  
The same Pooling PBNE is found when the transfer amount is 35 tokens; 
however, the parameters are slightly different. When 35 tokens can be transferred 
P2’s belief is 
11
8
p   and she always picks DT when a transfer is made. If no transfer 
is made she picks DT with a probability of 0.125Q  to prevent P1 from deviating.  
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Next, we assess the same Pooling Equilibrium for scenarios of weak 
dominance (i.e. when the transfer amount is 20 tokens). Due to the weak dominance 
a similar equilibrium should exist. 
Figure 29: Exploring a Pooling PBNE for transfer amount 20 tokens 
 
Again, P2 is indifferent between DT and DF when no transfer is made since 
 2 | 20PEP DT transfer =  2 | 20PEP DF transfer . This means that she can choose DT 
in any probability she likes – though later on we set restrictions on this probability 
such that we remain in an equilibrium state. If an off-equilibrium state were reached 
(i.e. if P1 were to transfer) then we need to assess P2’s beliefs (‘p’) of being in the 
BS-Transfer node. We compute the P2EP  if she chooses DT versus DF if a transfer is 
made (see Equation 12). 
Equation 12: Computing P2s belief if 20 tokens are transferred 
 2 | 20PEP DT transfer  =  60 100 1 100 40p p p     
 2 | 20PEP DF transfer  =  60 20 1 20 40p p p     
For P2 to be indifferent between DT and DF their expected payoffs need to 
be the same. This requires the belief 1p   (i.e. 100 40 20 40p p   ); which would 
mean that P2 is absolutely certain to be in the BS-transfer node. If she has even the 
slightest doubt she should pick DT ( 1p  ). She should never use a pure strategy of 
picking DF if a transfer were made since this requires an impossible belief ( 1p  ). 
Next, we set the probability ‘Q’ of P2 choosing DT when no transfer is made 
such that P1 does not desire to make off-equilibrium decisions (see Equation 13). 
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Equation 13: Setting the value for Q such that P1 does not want to deviate 
   1 1| |P PEP transfer BS EP notransfer BS  
   1 1| |P PEP transfer SB EP notransfer SB  
Concretely, we set the threshold for probability ‘Q’ such that the P1EP  is 
equal or larger when he remains on the equilibrium path compared to when he 
deviates. Any probability in which P2 picks DT when no transfer is made that is 
larger or equal compared to this threshold is in equilibrium. We first explore what 
probability Q should be in the most extreme scenario, i.e. when P2 consistently picks 
DT if a transfer is made (see Figure 30). 
Figure 30: Setting the value for Q such that P1 does not want to deviate 
 
For the BS-type we need to set ‘Q’ such that  80 40 1 60Q Q   
0.50Q  . For the SB-type the same ‘Q’ needs to be  40 80 1 20Q Q   
1.50Q   (which is true by default since Q is a probability). Thus, as long as P2 
picks DT when no transfer is made with a probability of 0.50Q  we have a PBNE. 
However, P2 may potentially use a mixed strategy if a transfer is made (if her 
belief is p=1 she may pick DF when a transfer is made
33
). Concretely, we calculate 
the probability ‘R’ in which she should pick DT when a transfer is made such that P1 
does not desire to leave the equilibrium path.  
                                                 
33
 Even though this seems somewhat weird due to the weak dominance that involved with a 20 token 
transfer it remains viable as long as the probability ensures that P1 does not want to deviate. 
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If P2 picks DT with a probability 0.50Q  when no transfer is made the BS-
type would never deviate so we only need to consider the SB-type when calculating 
‘R’. The most extreme scenario that can be in equilibrium is when P2 consistently 
picks DT when no transfer is made (see Figure 31). 
Figure 31: Computing the value of R such that P1 does not want to deviate  
 
Not making the transfer leads to an EP of 40 tokens for the SB-type and thus 
we need to set ‘R’ such that the EP for the SB-type is less than or equal to 40 tokens 
if he were to make the transfer (see Equation 14).  
Equation 14: Setting the value of R such that P1 does not want to deviate 
( | ) 40 20 100(1 ) 40 100 80 40 80 60EP transfer SB R R R R            
6 3
8 4
R R     
This means that P2 should choose DT in at least 
3
4
of the cases when a 
transfer is made to prevent P1 from deviating. In conclusion there is a Pooling PBNE 
for scenarios involving the transfer amount of 20 tokens. If P2 finds herself of the 
equilibrium path then her belief to be in the BS-transfer node is 1p  . Concretely, P2 
picks DT with probability 0.50Q  if no transfer is made whilst she picks DT with 
probability 
3
4
R   if a transfer is made. As long as these two requirements are met a 
pooling equilibrium in which P1 never transfers is found.  
Finally, we assess whether a Pooling Equilibrium exists for scenarios in 
which no dominance is involved. We use the scenario with transfer amount 10 as 
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example but the same conclusions hold if the transfer amount was 5 tokens. Based 
on the previous Pooling Equilibria the reader should have a hunch that a Pooling 
PBNE also exists in a context without dominance. 
Figure 32: Exploring a Pooling PBNE when the transfer amount is 10 tokens 
 
Again, P2 is indifferent between DT and DF when no transfer is made since 
 P2EP DT|notransfer10 =  P2EP DF|notransfer10 . She can choose DT in any 
probability she likes – but we restrict this probability to be in an equilibrium state. If 
an off-equilibrium state were reached (i.e. if P1 were to transfer) then we assess P2’s 
beliefs (‘p’) of being in the BS-Transfer node. We compute the P2EP  if she chooses 
DT versus DF if a transfer is made (see Equation 15). 
Equation 15: Computing EP for P2 if a transfer is made 
 P2EP DT|transfer10  =  50 90 1 90 40p p p     
 P2EP DF|transfer10  =  70 30 1 30 40p p p     
For P2 to be indifferent between DT and DF the EP of both choices need to 
be the same. This requires the belief 
3
4
p   (i.e. 90 40 30 40p p   ); furthermore 
P2 has a preference towards DF if 
3
4
p   and P2 has a preference towards DT if
3
4
p  . However, P2 should not have a belief favouring DF consistently as this 
would cause the SB-type to deviate from the equilibrium path – since 
P1EP (transfer|SB)  would be larger than P1EP (notransfer|SB)  regardless the choice 
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that P2 makes on the equilibrium path (i.e. 90 40 and 90 80 ). Thus, to have an 
equilibrium P2’s belief has to be restricted such that
3
4
p  . 
Next, we set the probability ‘Q’ of P2 choosing DT when no transfer is made 
such that P1 does not desire to make off-equilibrium decisions (see Equation 16). 
Equation 16: Setting Q 
   P1 P1EP transfer|BS EP notransfer|BS  
   P1 P1EP transfer|SB EP notransfer|SB  
Concretely, we set the threshold for probability ‘Q’ such that the P1EP  is 
equal or larger when he remains on the equilibrium path compared to when he 
deviates. Any probability in which P2 picks DT when no transfer is made that is 
larger or equal compared to this threshold is in equilibrium. We first explore what 
probability Q should be in the most extreme scenario, i.e. when P2 consistently picks 
DT if a transfer is made (see Figure 33) 
Figure 33: Setting the value of Q such that P1 does not want to deviate 
 
For the BS-type we need to set ‘Q’ such that  80 40 1 70Q Q   
0.75Q  . For the SB-type the same ‘Q’ needs to be  40 80 1 30Q Q   
1.25Q  (which is true by default since Q is a probability). Thus, as long as P2 picks 
DT when no transfer is made with a probability of 0.75Q  we can have a PBNE. 
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However, P2 may use a mixed strategy if a transfer is made if her belief is
3
4
p  .  Concretely, we calculate the probability ‘R’ in which she is allowed to pick 
DF when a transfer is made such that P1 still does not desire to leave the equilibrium 
path.  
When P2 picks DT with a probability 0.75Q  when no transfer is made the 
BS-type would never deviate
34
 so we only need to consider the SB-type when 
calculating ‘R’. The most extreme scenario that is possibly in equilibrium is when P2 
always picks DT when no transfer is made (see Figure 34).  
Figure 34: Computing value of R such that P1 does not want to deviate 
 
This leads to an EP of 40 tokens for the SB-type and thus we set ‘R’ such that 
the EP for the SB-player is less than or equal to 40 tokens when he makes the 
transfer (see Equation 17).  
Equation 17: Setting the value of R such that P1 does not want to deviate 
( | ) 40 30 90(1 ) 40 90 60 40 60 50EP transfer SB R R R R            
5
6
R   
Thus, as long as P2 picks DT with a probability 
5
6
R   there is no reason for 
P1 to deviate from the equilibrium path. In conclusion there is a Pooling PBNE for 
                                                 
34
 Since the EP for the BS-type would be 70 (or more) if he does not transfer – given that P2 picks DT 
with a probability of 75% (or more) in scenarios of no transfer – whilst his EP of transferring is 70 
tokens at most (i.e. if P2 consistently picks DT if a transfer is made P1 would receive 70 tokens as a 
transferring BS-type; now, however, we consider P2 who mixes strategy if a transfer is made which 
would decrease this EP-value). 
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scenarios without dominance as illustrated by the 10 token transfer amount. If P2 
finds herself off the equilibrium path then her belief of being on the BS-transfer node 
is
3
4
p  . Concretely, P2 picks DT with probability 0.75Q   if no transfer is made 
whilst she picks DT with probability 
5
6
R   if a transfer is made. As long as these 
two requirements are met a pooling equilibrium in which P1 never transfers is found.  
The same Pooling PBNE is found when the transfer amount is 5 tokens; the 
parameters are then: belief
5
8
p  , probability of P2 picking DT if no transfer is made 
0.875Q  and probability of P2 picking DT if a transfer is made
9
10
R  .  
Separating PBNE 
There are two pure strategies in this game that are potential Separating 
PBNEs. Firstly, if P1 transfers as BS-type whilst he does not transfer as SB-type; 
secondly, if P1 does not transfer as BS-type whilst he transfers as SB-type. Since P2 
can deduce P1’s type based on his decision, she can consistently pick the better pay-
off option – which implies that P1 wants to deviate (with at least one of his types). 
Therefore, there cannot be a Separating PBNE in this design.  
 
Semi-Separating PBNE 
Semi-Separating PBNE’s are those in which one type employs a mixed 
strategy whilst the other type employs a pure strategy. An example is found if the 
BS-type transfers in some (but not all) occasions whilst the SB-type never transfers. 
In our design there are four potential semi-separating PBNE’s for each of the transfer 
amounts.  
(a) First potential Semi-Separating PBNE: “Transfer if BS; Mixed Strategy if SB”. 
For each of the transfer amounts P2 would make a DT choice if no transfer is 
made (since she can infer to be in the “SB, No Transfer” node if this PBNE exists); if 
a transfer is made P2s beliefs (‘p’) should be such that she is indifferent between DT 
and DF for the semi-separating PBNE to exist.  
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First we assess the scenario of strong dominance using the example in which 
the transfer amount is 30 tokens (see Figure 35 and Equation 18) 
Figure 35: Transfer if BS; Mixed Strategy if SB: example transfer amount 30 
 
Equation 18: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 30PEP DT transfer =  70 110 1 110 40p p p     
 2 | 30PEP DF transfer  =  50 10 1 10 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 110 40 10 40p p   ⇔ 100 80p
⇔
5
4
p  . Since the belief ‘p’ cannot be set at a value higher than one there is no 
such Semi-Separating PBNE possible. The same holds true for the scenario in which 
35 tokens can be transferred.  
Next, we look at the scenario of weak dominance (see Figure 36 and 
Equation 19).  
Figure 36: Transfer if BS; Mixed Strategy if SB: example transfer amount 20 
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Equation 19: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 20PEP DT transfer  =  60 100 1 100 40p p p     
 2 | 20PEP DF transfer  =  60 20 1 20 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 100 40 20 40p p   ⇔ 80 80p  
⇔ 1p  . This does not lead to a Semi-Separating PBNE since P2 has the belief that 
transfers are made solely by BS-type opponents ( 1p  ) which contradicts the 
assumption of SB-type players using a mixed strategy.  
Finally, we explore the scenario without dominance using the example in 
which 10 tokens can be transferred (see Figure 37 and Equation 20). 
Figure 37: Transfer if BS; Mixed Strategy if SB: example transfer amount 10 
 
 
Equation 20: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
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 2 | 10PEP DT transfer  =  50 90 1 90 40p p p     
 2 | 10PEP DF transfer  =  70 30 1 30 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF ⇔ 90 40 30 40p p   ⇔ 60 80p ⇔ 
3
4
p 
 Next we compute the mixed strategy that P1 should use for this PBNE to 
exist; we use Bayes’ rule (see Equation 21).   
Equation 21: Using Bayes' Rule We Compute the Mixed Strategy for P1 
3
4
p  = 
|
| |
BS transfer BS
BS transfer BS SB transfer SB
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
=  
|
1
1
2
1 1
1
2 2 transfer SB
prob

  
⇔ 
|
3
(1 )
4 transfer SB
prob  =1 ⇔ 
|
4
1
3transfer SB
prob   =
1
3
 
 
Figure 38: Solving for the probability (‘R’) of P2 choosing DT if a transfer is made 
 
Finally, we solve for the probability of P2 choosing DT if a transfer is made 
(‘R’); it is essential that P1 expects the same pay-off in each scenario regardless P2s 
choices – or else P1 would deviate from using a mixed strategy (see  
Equation 22). 
Equation 22: Solving for the probability of P2 choosing DT if a transfer is made 
 1 |PEP transfer SB  =  1 |PEP notransfer SB  
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⇔  30 90 1 40R R   ⇔  90 60 40R  ⇔ 50 60R ⇔ 
5
6
R   
We conclude that there is a Semi-Separating PBNE when 10 tokens are 
transferred. The PBNE is such that the BS-type player always transfers whilst the 
SB-type player uses a mixed strategy of transferring in 
1
3
 cases. P2s beliefs are that 
3
4
p  and thus P2 will choose DT with a probability of 
5
6
R   if a transfer is made. 
If no transfer is made then P2 chooses DT. The same Semi-Separating PBNE is 
found when 5 tokens are transferred. P1 then uses a mixed strategy of transferring in 
3
5
 cases. P2s beliefs are 
5
8
p  and P2 will choose DT with a probability of 
9
10
R  if 
a transfer is made. If no transfer is made then P2 chooses DT.  
 
(b) Second potential Semi-Separating PBNE: “No Transfer if BS; Mixed Strategy if 
SB”. 
For each of the transfer amounts P2 would make a DT choice if a transfer is 
made (since she can infer to be in the “SB, Transfer” node if this PBNE exists); if no 
transfer is made P2’s beliefs (‘p’) should be such that she is indifferent between DT 
and DF for the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist (see Figure 39 for an example).  
Figure 39: No Transfer if BS; Mixed Strategy if SB: example transfer amount 10 
 
It should immediately be clear that none of the transfer amounts leads to a 
Semi-Separating PBNE in which P1 follows this strategy as the SB-type of P1 wants 
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to deviate to not transferring since the minimum he can receive from not transferring 
is already larger than his EP of transferring (i.e. 30 40 in the example below; if the 
transfer amount were larger the same desire holds but the numbers become more 
extreme e.g. 20 40  (i.e. for transfer amount 20) and 10 40  (i.e. for transfer 
amount 30)).  
 
(c) Third potential Semi-Separating PBNE: “BS: mix, SB: transfer” 
For each of the transfer amounts P2 would make a DF choice if no transfer is 
made (since she can infer to be in the “BS, No Transfer” node if this PBNE exists); if 
a transfer is made P2s beliefs (‘p’) should be such that she is indifferent between DT 
and DF for the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist. First, we assess whether this 
structure leads to a Semi-Separating PBNE under strong dominance using the 
example in which the transfer amount is 30 tokens. P2 would make a DT choice if no 
transfer is made (since she can infer to be in the “SB, No Transfer” node if this 
PBNE exists); if a transfer is made P2s beliefs (‘p’) should be such that she is 
indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist (see Figure 
40 and Equation 23). 
Figure 40: Mixed Strategy if BS; Transfer if SB: example transfer amount 30 
 
Equation 23: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 30PEP DT transfer  =   70 110 1 110 40p p p     
 2 | 30PEP DF transfer  =   50 10 1 10 40p p p     
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Thus P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 110 40 10 40p p   ⇔ 100 80p ⇔
5
4
p  . 
Since the belief ‘p’ expresses a probability it cannot be set at a value higher 
than one; hence, there is no PBNE. The same is true when the transfer amount is 35. 
Next we assess whether there is such a PBNE for scenarios of weak 
dominance. If no transfer is made then P2 picks “DF” (since she can deduce to be in 
the BS-no transfer node). If a transfer is made P2s beliefs (‘p’) should be such that 
she is indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist (see 
Figure 41 and Equation 24). 
Figure 41: Mixed Strategy if BS; Transfer if SB: example transfer amount 20 
 
Equation 24: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 20PEP DT transfer  =   60 100 1 100 40p p p     
 2 | 20PEP DF transfer  =   60 20 1 20 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 100 40 20 40p p   ⇔80 80p  ⇔ 1p   
This cannot be a Semi-Separating PBE since P2 beliefs are such that a  
transfer is made solely when P1 is the BS-type ( 1p  ) which contradicts the 
suggested PBNE structure.  
Finally, we explore the scenario without dominance using the example in 
which 10 tokens can be transferred (see Figure 42). 
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Figure 42: Mixed Strategy if BS; Transfer if SB: example transfer amount 10 
 
For the Semi-Separating PBE to exist we will need to set P2’s beliefs (“p”) 
such that she is indifferent between choosing DT and DF when a transfer is made 
(see Equation 25). 
Equation 25: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 10PEP DT transfer  =  50 90 1 90 40p p p     
 2 | 10PEP DF transfer  =  70 30 1 30 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 90 40 30 40p p   ⇔ 60 80p  ⇔ 
3
4
p   
Next, we compute which mixed strategy P1 should use for this PBNE to 
exist; we use Bayes’ rule (see Equation 26).  
Equation 26: Using Bayes' Rule We Compute the Mixed Strategy for P1 
P = 
3
4
= 
|
| |
SB transfer SB
BS transfer BS SB transfer SB
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
=  
|
1
1
2
1 1
1
2 2 transfer BS
prob

  
⇔ 
|
3
(1 )
4 transfer BS
prob  =1 ⇔ 
|
4
1
3transfer BS
prob   =
1
3
 
Finally, we solve for the probability of P2 choosing DT if a transfer is made (‘R’); it is essential 
that P1 expects the same pay-off in each scenario regardless P2s choices – or else P1 would 
deviate from using a mixed strategy (see Figure 43 and  
Equation 27). 
Figure 43: Solving for probability ('R') of P2 picking DT if a transfer is made 
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Equation 27: Solving for probability of P2 choosing DT if a transfer is made 
   1 1| |P PEP transfer BS EP notransfer BS  ⇔  70 50 1 40R R    ⇔  
50 20 40R  ⇔ 10 20R  ⇔ 
1
2
R    
Since ‘R’ is a probability it cannot be negative; hence, there is no Semi-
Separating PBNE involving this structure for the transfer amount of 10 tokens. The 
same holds true for the scenario in which 5 tokens can be transferred.  
 
(d) Fourth Potential Semi-Separating PBNE: “No Transfer if SB, mixed strategy if 
BS” 
For each of the transfer amounts P2 would make a DF choice if a transfer is 
made (since she can infer to be in the “BS, Transfer” node if this PBNE exists); if no 
transfer is made P2s beliefs (‘p’) should be such that she is indifferent between DT 
and DF for the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist. First, we assess whether there is a 
Semi-Separating PBNE for transfer amount 30 in which the BS-type uses a mixed 
strategy whilst the SB-type never transfers. If a transfer is made then P2 picks DT 
since she can infer to be in the BS-transfer node for which DT offers her a better 
payoff. If no transfer is made then her beliefs (‘p’) should make her indifferent 
between DT and DF in order for the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist (see Figure 44 
and Equation 28). 
Figure 44: Mixed Strategy if BS; No Transfer if SB: example transfer amount 30 
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Equation 28: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 30PEP DT notransfer ) =  40 80 1 80 40p p p     
 2 | 30PEP DF notransfer  =  80 40 1 40 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 80 40 40 40p p   ⇔ 40 80p  ⇔ 
1
2
p 
 Next we compute the mixed strategy that P1 should use for this PBNE to 
exist; we use Bayes’ rule (see Equation 29). 
Equation 29: Using Bayes' Rule We Compute the Mixed Strategy for P1 
1
2
p  = 
|
| |
BS notransfer SB
BS notransfer BS SB notransfer SB
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
=  
|
1
1
2
1 1
1
2 2 notransfer BS
prob

  
 
⇔ 
|
1
(1 )
2 notransfer BS
prob  =1 ⇔ 
|
2
1 1
1notransfer BS
prob     
Since Bayes’ rule suggests that the probability of not transferring when P1 is 
of the BS-type equals one; we can conclude that there is no Semi-Separating PBNE 
in which P1 uses a mixed strategy as BS-type since this is contradicted. Bayes’ rule 
suggests that P1 would deviate to a pure strategy of not transferring. Note that the 
same conclusion holds for transfer amount 35 since they both share a similar 
structure of strong dominance.  
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Next we look at the scenario of weak dominance. If a transfer is made P2 can 
deduce to be in the BS-transfer node; she would be indifferent between DT and DF 
since they both lead to a payoff of 60 tokens. For the Semi-Separating PBNE to exist 
we need to set P2’s beliefs (‘p’) such that she becomes indifferent between DT and 
DF if no transfer is made (see Figure 45 and Equation 30). 
Figure 45: Mixed Strategy if BS; No Transfer if SB: example transfer amount 20 
 
Equation 30: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 20PEP DT notransfer  =  40 80 1 80 40p p p      
 2 | 20PEP DF notransfer  =  80 40 1 40 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 80 40 40 40p p   ⇔ 40 80p ⇔
1
2
p  .  
Next we compute the mixed strategy that P1 should use for this PBNE to 
exist; we use Bayes’ rule (see Equation 31). 
 
Equation 31: Using Bayes' Rule We Compute the Mixed Strategy for P1 
P = 
1
2
= 
|
| |
BS notransfer SB
BS notransfer BS SB notransfer SB
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
=  
|
1
1
2
1 1
1
2 2 notransfer BS
prob

  
 
⇔ 
|
1
(1 )
2 notransfer BS
prob  =1 ⇔ 
|
2
1
1notransfer BS
prob   =1 
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Since Bayes’ rule suggests that the probability of not transferring for the BS-
type equals one; we can conclude that there is no Semi-Separating PBNE in which 
P1 uses a mixed strategy as BS-type since this is contradicted. Bayes’ rule suggests 
that P1 would deviate to a pure strategy of not transferring.   
Finally we look at scenarios without dominance using the example in which 
10 tokens can be transferred (see Figure 46 and Equation 32). 
Figure 46: Mixed Strategy if BS; No Transfer if SB: example transfer amount 10 
 
Equation 32: P2s beliefs have to make her indifferent between DT and DF for the Semi-
Separating PBNE to exist 
 2 | 10PEP DT notransfer  =  40 80 1 80 40p p p     
 2 | 10PEP DF notransfer  =  80 40 1 40 40p p p     
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 80 40 40 40p p   ⇔ 40 80p ⇔
1
2
p  . 
Next, we compute the mixed strategy that P1 should use for this PBNE to 
exist; we use Bayes’ rule (see Equation 33) 
Equation 33: Using Bayes' Rule We Compute the Mixed Strategy for P1 
1
2
p  = 
|
| |
SB notransfer SB
BS notransfer BS SB notransfer SB
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
=  
|
1
1
2
1 1
1
2 2 notransfer BS
prob

  
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⇔ 
|
1
(1 )
2 notransfer BS
prob  =1 ⇔ 
|
2
1
1notransfer BS
prob   =1 
Since Bayes’ rule suggests that the probability of not transferring when P1 is 
of the BS-type equals one; we can conclude that there is no Semi-Separating PBNE 
in which P1 uses a mixed strategy as BS-type since this is contradicted. Bayes’ rule 
suggests that P1 would deviate to a pure strategy of not transferring. Again, the same 
holds true for the scenario in which 5 tokens can be transferred.  
 
Fully Mixed PBNE 
Fully Mixed PBNE’s are those in which both the SB and BS-type use a 
mixed strategy. Using Bayes’ rule we calculate parameter values for ‘S’ and ‘T’ 
(P2’s beliefs) such that P2 becomes indifferent both if a transfer is made and if no 
transfer is made – if P2 is not indifferent in both scenarios then P1 would deviate 
with at least one of his types. If these parameter-values for ‘transfer’ and ‘no 
transfer’ scenarios contradict each other then there is no Fully Mixed PBNE 
possible. 
First, we assess whether there is a Fully Mixed PBNE for scenarios of strong 
dominance using the example in which the transfer amount is 30 tokens (see Figure 
47). 
Figure 47: Is there a Fully Mixed PBNE for transfer amount 30 tokens 
 
We use Bayes’ rule to compute parameter values for S and T which need to 
be compatible both in case a transfer is made and in case the transfer is not made. 
Equation 34 computes the values for S and T if a transfer is made. Since we find 
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impossible parameter values for the transfer scenario we do not need to assess the no 
transfer scenario.   
Equation 34: if a transfer of 30 tokens is made 
|
|
| |
BS transfer BS
BS transfer
BS transfer BS SB transfer SB
prob
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
 
= 
1
2
1 1
2 2
S
S T

  
= 
S
S T
 
 2 | 30PEP DT transfer  = 70 110 1
S S
S T S T
 
  
  
 = 40 110
S
S T
 

 
 2 | 30PEP DF transfer = 50 10 1
S S
S T S T
 
  
  
 = 40 10
S
S T


  
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 40 110 40 10
S S
S T S T
   
 
⇔ 
100 80
S
S T


 ⇔ 100 100 80S T S  ⇔ 100 20T S  ⇔ 
1
5
T S   
Since ‘T’ is a probability it cannot be negative; furthermore, T and S cannot 
be zero or the structure of Fully Mixed equilibrium is lost. We conclude that there is 
no Fully Mixed PBNE involving the transfer amount of 30 tokens. Similarly, there is 
no such PBNE for the 35 token scenario.  
Next, we assess whether there is a Fully Mixed PBNE when the transfer 
amount is 20 tokens following the same procedure (see Figure 48).  
Figure 48: Is there a Fully Mixed PBNE for transfer amount 20 tokens 
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We use Bayes’ rule again to compute parameter values for S and T which 
need to be compatible both in case a transfer is made and in case the transfer is not 
made.  
Equation 35: If a transfer of 20 tokens is made 
|
|
| |
BS transfer BS
BS transfer
BS transfer BS SB transfer SB
prob
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
= 
= 
1
2
1 1
2 2
S
S T

  
= 
S
S T
 
 2 | 20PEP DT transfer  = 60 100 1
S S
S T S T
 
  
  
 = 40 100
S
S T
 

 
 2 | 20PEP DF transfer  = 60 20 1
S S
S T S T
 
  
  
 = 40 20
S
S T


  
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 40 100
S
S T
 

 = 40 20
S
S T


  ⇔ 
80 80
S
S T


 ⇔ 80 80 80S T S  ⇔ 80 0T  ⇔ 0T  . Since ‘T’ equals zero we 
cannot have a Fully Mixed PBE as the path “SB, transfer” would never occur. There 
is again no need to even explore the no transfer scenario.  
Finally, we look at the scenario without dominance using the example in 
which 10 tokens can be transferred (see Figure 49).   
Figure 49: Assessing whether there is a Fully Mixed PBNE for amount 10 
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We compute the parameter values for S and T in case the transfer is made 
(see Equation 36) and in case the transfer is not made (see Equation 37).  
Equation 36: If a transfer of 10 tokens is made 
|
|
| |
BS transfer BS
BS transfer
BS transfer BS SB transfer SB
prob
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
= 
= 
1
2
1 1
2 2
S
S T

  
= 
S
S T
 
 2 | 10PEP DT transfer  = 50 90 1
S S
S T S T
 
  
  
 = 40 90
S
S T
 

 
 2 | 10PEP DF transfer  = 70 30 1
S S
S T S T
 
  
  
 = 40 30
S
S T


 
P2 is indifferent between DT and DF if 40 90 40 30
S S
S T S T
   
 
⇔ 
60 80
S
S T


  ⇔ 60 80 80S T S  ⇔80 20T S  ⇔ 
1
4
T S  
Equation 37: if no transfer of 10 tokens is made 
|
|
| |
BS notransfer BS
BS notransfer
BS notransfer BS SB notransfer SB
prob
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
= 
= 
1
(1 )
2
1 1
(1 ) (1 )
2 2
S
S T
 
    
= 
(1 )
(1 ) (1 )
S
S T

  
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 2 | 10PEP DT notransfer  = 
(1 ) (1 )
40 80 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
S S
S T S T
  
  
      
 =  
(1 )
40 80
(1 ) (1 )
S
S T

 
  
 
 2 | 10PEP DF notransfer  =
(1 ) (1 )
80 40 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
S S
S T S T
  
  
      
 =  
(1 )
40 40
(1 ) (1 )
S
S T


  
  
P2 is indifference between DT and DF if 
(1 )
40 80
(1 ) (1 )
S
S T

 
  
= 
(1 )
40 40
(1 ) (1 )
S
S T


  
⇔ 
(1 )
40 80
(1 ) (1 )
S
S T


  
  
⇔       40 1 1 80 1S T S     ⇔       1 1 1 2 1S T S      
⇔    1 1 2 2S T S     ⇔  2 2 2S R S     ⇔ 2S T S     ⇔ T S  
For the Fully Mixed PBNE to exist we need to satisfy 
1
4
T S and T S .  
This cannot be done and hence there is no such PBNE. The same is true when the 
transfer amount is 5 tokens.  
 
Nash conclusion 
Each of the five transfer amounts has a Nash equilibrium state in which the 
Decider consistently decides not to transfer value (see Figure 50). 
Figure 50: Equilibrium state in which the Decider never transfers value 
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Similar to the previous chapter the most obvious equilibrium state is one in 
which the Chooser consistently picks DT: this implies that the Decider does not want 
to transfer since any transfer he makes solely decreases his own expected payoff (i.e. 
DF decreases if transfers are made and the Chooser picks DT regardless whether the 
transfer is made). Furthermore, Choosers have no desire to change their strategy 
given that both boxes have the same EV when no transfer is made whilst DT has a 
higher EV when a transfer is made. However, the equilibrium state is maintained 
even when Choosers employ a mixed strategy with respect to certain probability 
thresholds. She should pick DT at least ‘Q’ percent of the time if no transfer is made 
to ensure that the Decider cannot gain from transferring if he were to transfer in BS-
directionality, whilst she should pick DT at least ‘R’ percent of the time if a 
(hypothetical) transfer is made to ensure that the Decider cannot gain from 
transferring in SB-directionality
35
 (see Table 22).  
Table 22: Probability thresholds for Chooser behaviour under the Nash equilibrium 
Transfer amount prob(P2 picks DT | no transfer)  prob(P2 picks DT | transfer)  
35 0.125Q   (strong dominance: no need to compute R)
36
 
30 0.25Q    (strong dominance: no need to compute R) 
20 0.50Q   0.75R   
10 0.75Q   0.833R   
5 0.875Q   0.90R   
 
                                                 
35
 Note that the values of the Q and R parameter depend upon the transfer amount.  
36
 We can compute the R-parameter such that the Decider would not desire to transfer, however, due 
to strong dominance it will always be better for the Chooser to pick DT if a transfer is made (since DT 
must have a larger value than DF in these scenarios). Hence, a rational Chooser would not consider a 
DF choice if 30 or 35 tokens are transferred.  
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Using the numerical example in which the transfer amount is five tokens we 
have an equilibrium state in which the Decider never transfers value whilst the 
Chooser picks DT at least 87.5% of the time if no transfer is made whilst picking DT 
at least 90% of the time if a (hypothetical) transfer were made. The probabilities 
employed by the Chooser ensure that the Decider does not desire to transfer 
regardless the directionality of the suggested transfer.  
A second equilibrium state exists solely for scenarios without dominance. 
This equilibrium allows the Decider to make a transfer when the directionality is BS 
whilst he uses a mixed strategy whenever the directionality is SB (see Figure 51).  
Figure 51: Equilibrium state in which the Decider transfers in BS-directionality and mixes in 
SB-directionality 
 
For this equilibrium to hold true we require knowledge on the probability in 
which the Decider makes the ‘no transfer’ decision in a SB-scenario. First we need 
to set the Chooser’s belief-parameter which reflects the probability assigned to being 
in the BS-node (contrasted with the SB-node) when a transfer is made. This 
parameter needs to be set such that Chooser’s EP of DT and DF are the same when a 
transfer is made as she would otherwise employ a ‘pure’ strategy (favouring DT or 
DF if a transfer is made) which would cause the Decider to change his strategy as 
well
37. Secondly, we use Bayes’ rule to compute the probability in which the Decider 
should transfer in SB-directionality. These computations require the Chooser’s 
belief-parameter (i.e. the probability of being in the BS-node if a transfer is made), 
the known probabilities of being in the BS versus SB node (which is decided by 
                                                 
37
 Note that these computations in essence set parameter values such that the opposing player cannot 
gain from deviating from the equilibrium state that we explore.  
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nature as 50%) and the probability of the Decider making the transfer in BS-
directionality (which is 100% for the suggested equilibrium structure). Together, 
these variables allow the computation of the Decider’s mixed strategy in SB-
directionality. Meanwhile, the Chooser’s belief was set such that she is indifferent 
between DT and DF if a transfer is made; however, she still needs to select DT in a 
specific probability such that the Decider cannot gain from deviating from the 
suggested equilibrium structure. Concretely, we solve for the probability R in which 
the Chooser picks DT if a transfer is made such that the following equation holds:
P1 P1EP (transfer|SB) = EP (transfer|BS) . 
Numerically we have an equilibrium state for the transfer amount of five 
tokens in which the Decider consistently transfers in BS-directionality whilst he 
transfers in SB-directionality in three out of five cases. The Chooser selects DT if no 
transfer is made (since this would only occur if the directionality is SB) whilst she 
picks DT with a probability of ninety percent if the transfer is made. We reach a 
stable state since neither player can increase their EP from changing their strategy. 
When the transfer amount is ten tokens the Decider again transfers consistently in 
BS-directionality but he would transfer in one out of three cases in SB-directionality. 
The Chooser again selects DT if no transfer is made (since it still occurs solely in 
SB-directionality) whilst she picks DT in five out of six cases when the transfer is 
made. A stable state is reached since neither player can gain from changing their 
strategy. 
 
Level k predictions 
In this section we discuss level k predictions for the Transfer Game. We use a 
simplified notation to denote the level of reasoning for the Decider as xD  whilst we 
denote the level of reasoning for the Chooser as xC ; the subscript ‘x’ refers to their 
level of reasoning. For example, 0D  refers to the Decider reasoning at level zero. 
Our main assumption is that each player considers themselves to reason exactly one 
level higher than their opponent and makes a best response on the assumed 
behaviour of the opponent. Thus, xD  makes his decisions on assumption that his 
opponent is x-1C  whilst xC  makes her decisions on assumption that her opponent is
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x-1D . We discuss level k predictions both under the assumption of risk neutrality and 
under the assumption of risk averseness; this is done separately for scenarios 
involving strong dominance, weak dominance and scenarios without dominance. We 
start with predictions for strong dominance under the assumption of risk neutrality.  
In scenarios of strong dominance (i.e. when 30 or 35 tokens can be 
transferred) 0D  and 0C are unsophisticated and make random decisions without 
considering the actions of the other player. At higher levels of reasoning decisions 
are based upon a best response strategy in relation to the expected actions of the 
opponent (who is assumed to be reasoning one level lower than themselves). 1D  
beliefs that the unsophisticated 0C  is equally likely to prefer DT versus DF 
(regardless whether the transfer is made) thus 1D decides randomly whether or not to 
transfer. Meanwhile, 1C ’s best response is to choose DT when the transfer is made 
since she realises dominance (i.e. DT is always better than DF when a transfer is 
made). When no transfer is made 1C  decides randomly since she expects 0D  to have 
decided randomly and hence either option can be better (same EVs). At level two 
2D ’s best response is to ‘never transfer’. 2C behaves the same as 1C : if a transfer is 
made she picks DT else she picks randomly. At level three we assume the same 
behaviour by both parties since neither can make a ‘better’ best-response. Thus, a 
stable state is reached in which the Decider never transfers and in which the Chooser 
picks DT if a transfer is made whilst she picks randomly if no transfer is made (see 
Table 23).  
Table 23: Level k predictions under strong dominance (i.e. transfer amount 30 and 35) 
 Decider Chooser 
 Info: Directionality Info: Choice made by P1 
 BS   SB Make Transfer Do Not Transfer 
Level 0 Random Random Random Random 
Level 1 Random Random DT Random 
Level 2 No Transfer No Transfer DT Random 
Level 3 No Transfer No Transfer DT Random 
  
Next, we assess the scenario in which weak dominance is involved (i.e. when 
20 tokens can be transferred). 0D  and 0C are again unsophisticated and make random 
decisions without considering the actions of the other player. 1D expects 0C  to 
decide randomly. Since 1D beliefs that the unsophisticated 0C  is equally likely to 
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prefer DT versus DF he decides randomly whether or not to transfer (both for BS 
and SB-directionality). Meanwhile, 
1C ’s best response is to choose DT whenever a 
transfer is made since she realises the weak dominance (i.e. DT cannot be worse than 
DF when a transfer is made). When no transfer is made 
1C  decides randomly since 
she expects 0D  to have decided randomly not to transfer and hence either option 
may be better (same EVs). Next, we discuss level two reasoning. 
2D ’s best response 
to 1C  is not to transfer in a SB-directionality whilst he decides randomly in a BS-
directionality. 2C  acts the same as 1C : if a transfer is made she picks DT due to 
weak dominance whilst she picks randomly if no transfer is made. We now assess 
level three reasoning. 3D  acts the same as 2D : he does not transfer in SB-
directionality whilst he decides randomly in BS-directionality. 3C  now realises that 
transfers are solely made in BS-directionality whilst no transfers are made in BS or 
SB-directionality. She picks DT whenever a transfer is made (weak dominance); and 
she also picks DT when no transfer is made since it is more likely to be the result of 
a SB-directionality than of a BS-directionality (i.e. the BS-type can decide to transfer 
whilst the SB-type cannot whilst both types are expected to have the same base 
frequency). Next, we discuss level four. 4D realises that 3C  always picks DT; thus, 
he does not transfer as BS-type (i.e. he does not want to make DF smaller since he 
expects to receive DF regardless his decision) and he does not transfer as SB-type 
either (i.e. he again expects to receive DF regardless his decision and thus he does 
not want to make DF any smaller). 4C  consistently picks DT just like 3C  did. 
Regarding higher level reasoning, we point out that neither player can do a better 
best-response on their opponent’s expected behaviour and thus a stable state is 
reached
38
 (see Table 24).  
Table 24: Level k predictions under weak dominance (i.e. transfer amount 20) 
 Decider Chooser 
 Info: Directionality Info: Choice made by P1 
  BS  SB Make Transfer Do Not Transfer 
Level 0 Random Random Random Random 
                                                 
38
 The reader may wonder why the level-five Chooser does not make random choice if no transfer is 
made given that it is the best response versus a level four Decider. The reasoning is that the behaviour 
from level four Choosers is equally good and thus she has no reason to change her strategy (both are a 
best response; whilst the one from level four was already successful at lower level so why should she 
change her strategy if she cannot gain from it).  
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Level 1 Random Random DT Random  
Level 2 Random No Transfer DT Random 
Level 3 Random No Transfer DT DT 
Level 4 No Transfer No Transfer DT DT 
Level 5 No Transfer No Transfer DT DT 
  
Finally, we assess level k reasoning for scenarios without dominance (i.e. 5 
and 10 token transfers). 
0D  and 0C remain unsophisticated and make random 
decisions without considering the actions of the other player. 1D expects 0C  to 
decide randomly. Since 1D beliefs that the unsophisticated 0C  is equally likely to 
prefer DT versus DF he decides randomly whether or not to transfer (both for BS 
and SB-directionality). Meanwhile, 1C ’s best response is to choose DT whenever a 
transfer is made since  EV DT|transfer >EV(DF|transfer) . When the transfer is not 
made 1C  chooses randomly since she expects 0D  to have decided randomly not to 
transfer and hence either option may be better (same EVs). Next, we discuss level 
two reasoning. 2D ’s best response to 1C  is to transfer in BS-directionality and not to 
transfer in SB-directionality. When we look at the Chooser we see that 2C  behaves 
the same as 1C : she picks DT if a transfer is made and she picks randomly if no 
transfer is made. Next, we discuss level-three behaviour. 3D  behaves the same as 
2D : he transfers in BS-directionality but does not transfer in SB-directionality. 
Meanwhile, 3C  realises that 2D attempts to outsmart her; thus, she deduces the 
directionality based on 2D ’s behaviour. Her best response is thus to pick DF if a 
transfer is made whilst picking DT if no transfer is made. From level four onwards 
Deciders and Choosers start reversing their strategies in continuous attempts to 
outsmart their opponent. 4D  now makes the transfer when the directionality is SB 
whilst he does not transfer when the directionality is BS. 4C  behaves the same as 3C . 
At the next level the Chooser realises that the opponent tries to outsmart her and 
hence she reverses tactics, one level higher the Decider realises that she reversed 
tactics and hence he reverses tactics etc. (see Table 25). 
Table 25: Level k predictions without dominance (i.e. amounts 5 and 10) 
 Decider Chooser 
  BS  SB Transfer No Transfer 
Level 0 Random Random Random Random 
Level 1 Random Random  DT Random  
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Level 2 Transfer No Transfer       DT Random 
Level 3 Transfer No Transfer DF DT 
Level 4 No Transfer Transfer DF DT 
 
Next, we discuss level k predictions under the assumption of risk averseness. 
Both the literature and the risk attitude measurement from our previous chapter 
suggest that participants in experimental games generally behave in risk averse 
fashion. Hence, it is worthwhile to explore how level k behaviour changes if we 
make such an assumption. The main difference for risk averse predictions is that 
0D  
attempts to decrease the value difference between the two boxes. We again start by 
discussing the predictions for strong dominance, followed by weak dominance 
followed by no dominance.  
In scenarios of strong dominance (i.e. when 30 or 35 tokens can be 
transferred) the unsophisticated 0D  player aims to decrease the value difference 
between the two boxes by making the transfer in BS-directionality but not in SB-
directionality. Meanwhile, the unsophisticated 0C  player is assumed to decide 
randomly without regards to her opponents actions. At higher levels of reasoning 
decisions are based solely upon a best response strategy in relation to the expected 
actions of the opponent (who is assumed to be reasoning one level lower than 
themselves). Thus, when we explore level one reasoning 1D  aims to make a best 
response to the behaviour of 0C . Since 0C  is assumed to behave randomly without 
consideration of the Decider’s strategy 1D employs the same strategy as he used at 
level zero: he makes the transfer in BS-directionality and he does not transfer in SB-
directionality. Meanwhile, 1C  makes a best response on 0D ’s behaviour by picking 
DT both when the transfer is made and when the transfer is not made. We now reach 
level two. 2D is aware that 1C  picks DT regardless his choice. Thus, his best 
response is to never transfer since it provides him with a better payoff regardless the 
directionality. Meanwhile, 2C  behaves the same as 1C : she always picks DT. We 
next reach level three. 3D behaves the same as 2D : he never makes the transfer. 
Meanwhile, 3C cannot make a better ‘best response’ than repeating her actions from 
the previous level and thus we have reached a stable state: the Decider never makes a 
transfer whilst the Chooser picks DT consistently (see Table 26).  
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Table 26: Risk averse level k predictions under strong dominance (i.e. transfer amount 30 or 35) 
 Decider Chooser 
  BS  SB Transfer No Transfer 
Level 0 Transfer No transfer Random Random 
Level 1 Transfer No transfer DT DT 
Level 2 No transfer No transfer DT DT 
Level 3 No transfer No transfer DT DT 
 
In scenarios of weak dominance (i.e. when 20 tokens can be transferred) the 
unsophisticated 
0D  player aims to decrease the value difference between the two 
boxes by making the transfer is BS-directionality whilst not making the transfer in 
SB-directionality. Meanwhile, the unsophisticated 0C  player is assumed to decide 
randomly without regards to her opponents actions. At higher levels of reasoning 
decisions are based upon a best response strategy in relation to the expected actions 
of the opponent (who is assumed to be reasoning one level lower than themselves) 
and on their risk averse attitude. 1D  behaves the same as 0D since he expects the 0C -
opponent to behave randomly. Meanwhile 1C realises that 0D only makes the transfer 
for BS-directionality. When the transfer is made 1C  picks DT (since it cannot be 
worse than DF). When the transfer is not made she picks DT (since her opponent 
would only refuse to transfer in SB-directionality). Next, we reach level two. 2D
knows that his opponent picks DT regardless whether he transfers. Thus, he does not 
transfer in BS-directionality (since it would decrease his expected payoff) nor does 
he transfer in SB-directionality (since it would decrease his expected payoff). 
Neither player can make a better ‘best response’ and thus we reached a stable state 
(see Table 27).  
Table 27: Risk averse level k predictions under weak dominance (i.e. transfer amount 20) 
 Decider Chooser 
  BS  SB Transfer No Transfer 
Level 0 Transfer No transfer Random Random 
Level 1 Transfer No transfer DT DT 
Level 2 No transfer No transfer DT DT 
Level 3 No transfer No transfer DT DT 
 
In scenarios without dominance (i.e. when 5 or 10 tokens can be transferred) 
the unsophisticated 0D  player aims to decrease the value difference between the two 
boxes by making the transfer is BS-directionality whilst not making the transfer in 
SB-directionality. Meanwhile, the unsophisticated 0C  player is assumed to decide 
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randomly without regards to her opponents actions. At higher levels of reasoning 
decisions are based upon a best response strategy in relation to the expected actions 
of the opponent (who is assumed to be reasoning one level lower than themselves). 
1D  behave the same as 0D since he expects the 0C -opponent to behave randomly. 
Meanwhile 1C realises that 0D only makes the transfer for BS-directionality and thus 
she can deduce directionality from her opponent’s behaviour. When the transfer is 
made 1C  picks DF and when the transfer is not made she picks DT. Next, we discuss 
level-two. 
2D  knows that 1C decides conditional on his own transfer decision. Thus, 
he attempts to exploit her behaviour by making the transfer when the directionality is 
SB whilst not transferring in BS-directionality. 2C  behaves the same as 1C . Next, 
we reach level three. 3D  behaves the same as 2D ; meanwhile, 3C has realised that 
2D exploits her decision rule and thus she reverses her strategy. 3C  now chooses DT 
when the transfer is made whilst she picks DF when the transfer is not made. It 
should be clear at this point that behaviour between the two players keeps on 
reversing itself at higher levels in a continuous attempt to outsmart the opponent.  
Table 28: Risk averse level k predictions without dominance (i.e. transfer amount 5 or 10) 
 Decider Chooser 
  BS SB Transfer No Transfer 
Level 0 Transfer No transfer Random Random 
Level 1 Transfer No transfer DF DT 
Level 2 No transfer Transfer DF DT 
Level 3 No transfer Transfer DT DF 
Level 4 Transfer No transfer DT DF 
 
 
Maximin principle 
The maximin principle is the paradigmatic risk averse strategy and ensures 
that the player receives the best out of all worst-case-scenario outcomes. Concretely, 
the participant assesses the worst possible outcome for each decision he can make; 
and he selects the decision whose worst outcome is superior to the worst outcome of 
alternative decisions (Colman, 1982). It is of particular interest to explore the 
maximin predictions for the Transfer Game experiment since the transfer amount is 
predefined by the computer (in contrast to the Envelope Game – and the later 
Suitcase Game – in which P1 decides upon the transfer amount himself). As a result 
choice options are often suboptimal to express the participant’s exact preferences. 
  Transfer Game   
 
97 
 
The maximin-behaving participant desires to transfer twenty tokens from the box 
with eighty tokens to the box with forty tokens such that his minimum pay-off is 
maximized (since sixty tokens is that maximum amount that can be ensured as a 
minimum pay-off in our setup). However, Deciders face decisions in which they 
have no control over the transfer amount nor the directionality of the transfer. For 
maximin-behaving Deciders we expect that (regardless the transfer amount) transfers 
are made when the directionality is BS whilst transfers are not made in SB-
directionality. As example, consider the scenario in which five tokens can be 
transferred. When the transfer is in SB-directionality the Decider earns at minimum 
forty tokens from not transferring whilst he earns at minimum thirty-five tokens 
from transferring. Using a minimax strategy he thus desires to not transfer since forty 
tokens offer a larger minimum value than thirty-five tokens. When the directionality 
is BS (big to small) the maximin-behaving Decider makes the transfer regardless the 
transfer amount since the minimum pay-off of transferring is always higher than the 
minimum pay-off of not transferring. For example, if five tokens can be transferred 
in BS-directionality the Decider earns at minimum forty tokens from not transferring 
whilst he earns at minimum forty-five tokens from transferring. Using a maximin 
strategy he thus desires to transfer since forty-five tokens offers him a larger 
minimum value than forty tokens. It is worthwhile to point out that when Deciders 
use a maximin strategy in scenarios of strong dominance (i.e. when the transfer 
amount is 30 or 35 tokens) they would make the transfer even though this means that 
the Chooser has a strongly dominance choice available and will end up with the 
larger box. The maximin strategy ensures that the Decider ends up with a smaller 
pay-off than the Chooser by avoiding the risk of a lower minimum pay-off. 
For Choosers maximin predictions are to pick DT whenever a transfer is 
made since DT is known to contain at least forty tokens (both boxes are known to 
contain at minimum forty tokens initially) plus the transfer amount whilst DF may 
contain forty tokens minus the transfer amount. If no transfer is made then the 
maximin prediction would be to pick randomly since both boxes have the same 
minimum value.   
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Experimental setup  
Participants 
Participants for Experiment Two were 24 students and employees from 
Warwick University, with an average age of 21 years old. Our overall sample (across 
Experiment Two and Experiment Three) was predominantly female (27 female, 16 
male)
39
. Recruitment was done through SONA, an online system for participant 
recruitment. We ran two experimental sessions each consisted of exactly twelve 
participants. The experiment is meant as a 'proof of concept' exploration for our 
experimental game which is why we kept the sample size relatively small. To avoid 
cancelling sessions due to participants not showing up we recruited four additional 
participants per session; if more than twelve participants showed up before the 
starting time we randomly selected participants to be send home with a £2 show-up 
fee. The possibility of being send home (due to an exact number of participants 
being required for the study) was advertised on SONA when participants signed up. 
Excluding participants happened through a procedure of shuffling a deck of cards 
(containing the cubicle numbers of all occupied computers) and randomly drawing 
one or more cards. 
Participants were paid a show-up fee (£2) and an additional performance fee 
(£0.50-£11.50) based on a random lottery incentive system. The expected pay-off for 
the average participant is £8; and the average participant earned £8.10. Participants 
are told during an introductory PowerPoint explanation that they earn a performance 
fee based on the amount of tokens won in a randomly selected trial. We did not 
inform participant of the conversion rate (tokens to pounds) to avoid potential biases 
due to monetary expectations. Each token that is won in the randomly selected trial 
translated into an additional £0.10 in performance fee. We did not provide 
participants with details regarding the random selection procedure for the 
'performance fee' trial; concretely, a python script randomly selects a trial per 
participant to base their performance fee on. Different participants can be 
remunerated upon performance in different trials.  
 
                                                 
39
 Note that demographics data from Experiment Two and Experiment Three was pooled together on 
SONA since we advertised both experiments using the same sign-up screen. Furthermore, we have 
missing information on the demographics of part of the sample due to yearly SONA-maintenance 
deleting demographics data from its server. 
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Materials 
The experiment was performed in the Behavioural Science Lab; the coding 
was done by the author using a combination of python, HTML/CSS and willow. 
Participants faced a total of forty trials; and they swapped between being in the role 
of P1 and being in the role of P2 on each consecutive trial (to maximize fairness and 
exposure to both roles). They were randomly re-matched on every trial with an 
anonymous opponent and were aware of this. Random re-matching was programmed 
to be fully random; in theory participants can be matched twice in a row with the 
same opponent but they do not know who they play against. The twenty trials played 
as P1 (Decider) are summarized in Figure 52; the same twenty trials are also played 
as P2 (but without the knowledge which of these trials is being played).  
Figure 52: Summary of possible scenarios  
 
This figure provides a schematic overview of the twenty trials that are played in either role.  
 Decider trials involve three variables. Firstly, the transfer amount is one of 
five values (i.e. five, ten, twenty, thirty or thirty-five tokens). Transfer amounts for 
the experiment were chosen such that we have trials representing scenarios without 
dominance (i.e. 5 and 10), scenarios with weak dominance (i.e. 20) and scenarios 
with strong dominance (i.e. 30 and 35).  
Secondly, the larger value is physically displayed on the left versus right side 
of the screen; this variable is included to account for potential biases due to physical 
preferences. Thirdly, the transfer direction is physically either from left to right or 
from right to left. Taken together the physical screen location and physical transfer 
direction allow us to explore both scenarios in which a transfer would increase the 
variance between the two boxes and scenarios in which a transfer would decrease 
their variance. In Appendix 2.1 we show that the physical screen location of the 
larger amount does not affect behaviour and thus we collapsed these two variables 
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(i.e. ‘physical screen location’ and ‘physical transfer direction’) into a new variable 
called ‘directionality’. As was mentioned in earlier sections directionality is coded as 
BS (i.e. Big to Small) when the suggested transfer is from the box with 80 tokens to 
the box with 40 tokens; or SB (i.e. Small to Big) when the suggested transfer is from 
the box with 40 tokens to the box with 80 tokens (see Figure 53). 
  
Figure 53: Collapsing Screen Location and Direction into the Directionality 
Variable 
 
This figure illustrates how screen location and direction are collapsed into a ‘directionality’ 
variable which is either BS or SB.  
 
It is worthwhile to point out that the Chooser does not know whether the 80 
tokens are in the left versus right box (i.e. physical screen location) and thus she 
cannot assess whether the directionality is BS versus SB. We code decisions made 
by Choosers based on whether she picks the box where the tokens can be transferred 
from (i.e. Direction From; DF) versus the box where tokens can be added to (i.e. 
Direction To; DT) (see Figure 54).  
Figure 54: Explaining the Coding for Player Two's Decisions 
 
This figure illustrates how we code Chooser decisions as DF versus DT based on the 
direction of the suggested transfer and the box-selection.  
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Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that we subdivided each experimental 
session into two mini-sessions. Concretely, sessions consist of twelve participants; 
six of them are placed in 'Mini-Session A' whilst the other six are placed in 'Mini-
Session B'. Participants can only be matched with others from the same mini-session. 
We did not inform participants that they are in one of two mini-sessions as this 
would affect their perspective on potential opponents to be (re-)matched with. The 
logic behind these independent mini-sessions is to maintain the same prior 
experience for participants who are matched together whilst decreasing the risk of 
biases due to sequence effects (i.e. we now use twice as many randomly generated 
trial orders). Every trial participants are randomly re-matched and they do not know 
who they are matched with. We did not drop variables, conditions or trials from our 
analysis.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two experimental sessions each consisting of 
exactly 12 participants (N=24). A 75-minute timeframe was available for each 
session and sessions typically lasted 60 minutes. Using an alphabetical listing of 
signed-up participants we allocated everyone to numbered cubicles. The experiment 
is set-up such that adjacently seated participants have the same starting role; though 
they are unaware of this feature (see Figure 55).  
Figure 55: Experimental Setup 
 
This figure provides a schematic overview of our experimental layout. Participants sit in two 
rows of desks each with a computer. Shutters (partitions) are used such that they can only 
see their own computer. Participants in the same row (e.g. 1-6) start the experiment in the 
same role.   
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If more than twelve people showed up we would randomly exclude 
participants by blindly selecting a cubicle number from a pack of numbered cards 
after shuffling the cards in front of the participants. Excluded participants received a 
£2 show-up fee and filled in a payment receipt after which the doors were closed and 
the experimental setup was explained by means of a PowerPoint presentation (see 
Appendix 2.2 for details on instructions). The main points from the PowerPoint 
instructions are shortly summarized below: 
Each trial you see two boxes on the screen. We refer to the left box as Box A and we refer to 
the right box as Box B. You are informed that one of the boxes contains 40 tokens whilst the 
other box contains 80 tokens -- but you do not know which box has which token amount. 
You are either assigned the role of Decider (player one) or the role of Chooser (player two). 
As Decider you can look at the true content of the two boxes and you are presented with a 
transfer suggestion. The computer suggests a transfer of a predefined token amount in a 
predefined direction and informs the Decider how many tokens would be in either box if the 
suggested transfer is made. You decide whether or not to make the suggested transfer by 
clicking on the corresponding button. Next, the Chooser has to make a decision. She does 
not know which box contains which token amount but she knows the transfer suggestion and 
whether or not this suggested transfer was made. Her task is to decide which of these two 
boxes she wants to have for herself (which decides her own payoff) by clicking the button 
underneath the desired option. The unchosen option is assigned to the Decider (deciding his 
payoff). Feedback is provided after every trial specifying which box you received and what 
its final contents are; furthermore, feedback also informs you of the box received by the 
other player and its content. After each trial your role swaps (i.e. Deciders become Choosers 
and Choosers become Deciders) and you are randomly re-matched with another player for 
the next trial. A total of forty trials is played for the experiment. Regarding your final 
payment you receive a participation fee of £2 and additionally you earn a performance fee 
based on the amount of tokens you win in a randomly selected trial.  
Participants were given the opportunity to raise their hand if further 
clarification was required and were informed that they could do so at any time during 
the experiment if they had further questions. Before starting the experiment 
participants were asked to put their electronic devices and notes away. Furthermore, 
between each experimental cubicle we pulled out ‘shutters’ (i.e. partitions) to avoid 
the temptation of glancing on a neighbour’s computer screen. At the end of the 
experiment pay-offs were calculated using a python script. Concretely, the script 
randomly generates a trial number for each participant and assesses how many 
tokens they won on that particular trial. Tokens are multiplied by a factor of 0.1 to 
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generate the performance fee and a two pounds show-up fee is added in. The python 
script does this for every participant and makes a clean output file with a summary of 
cubicle numbers and payments.  
 Finally, participants fill in receipts for payment and are asked to come 
forward when we call their cubicle number to receive payment in exchange for their 
receipt ticket. Data from the experiment is stored in a time-stamped folder containing 
a multitude of CSV-files (i.e. one for each trial played by each participant ─ if the 
program were to malfunction not all data would be lost) and these are converted into 
a big CSV-datafile using a python script. The data is analysed using RStudio.  
 
Objectives 
Our main objectives for this study are to assess behaviour in a novel 
experiment. We explore how well theories and models (henceforth referred to as 
‘frameworks’) predict behaviour. Additionally we collect data on reasoning in 
Experiment Three to assess how the task is approached and to which degree different 
frameworks explain behaviour. Furthermore, we assess whether adherence to 
frameworks is consistent across trials. This chapter has the following structure. First 
we discuss Experiment Two and categorize predictions of the frameworks which we 
discussed earlier into different ‘decision profiles’. We assess the degree in which 
behaviour aligns with these profiles (in contexts where the profile is applicable). 
Furthermore, we compare whether participants who behave according to a decision 
profile in their trials of a specific dominance level (e.g. strong dominance) also 
behave according to a (same or other) decision profile on trials involving a different 
dominance level. This is done separately for Deciders and Choosers. Next, we 
introduce Experiment Three and discuss the main differences in its setup compared 
with Experiment Two. The main idea of Experiment Three is to reach a better insight 
into reasoning processes to help explain behaviour. We discuss behaviour of 
Deciders and Choosers sequentially starting with scenarios of strong dominance and 
ending with scenarios without dominance. This section contains a summary of 
frequencies in which ‘teams’ reasoned in specific ways with quotations to provide 
the reader with an adequate understanding of how participants approached their 
tasks. We conclude the section on Experiment Three with a discussion on 
consistency of behaving according to specific frameworks across roles based on the 
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reasoning data collected and an assessment on whether dominance awareness 
persists across consecutive trials. Finally, we discuss relationships between 
behaviour in Experiment Two and reasoning data from Experiment Three.  
 
Results 
Experiment Two 
Decider behaviour 
In this section we first provide the reader with an overview of the predictions 
that were made by the theoretical models and frameworks discussed earlier and we 
provide an overview table with observed behaviour
40
. We discuss our predictions 
separately for scenarios of strong dominance, weak dominance and without 
dominance to simplify the discussion. We remind the reader that subscripts indicate 
risk attitudes (see Table 29, Table 30, and Table 31). 
Table 29: Strategy profiles for Deciders in scenarios of strong dominance 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Never transfer 
ANash , NNash , ALevel2 , NLevel2  
Profile 2 BS: transfer 
SB: no transfer 
Maximin, ALevel1  
 
Table 30: Strategy profiles for Deciders in scenarios of weak dominance 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Never transfer 
ANash , NNash , ALevel2 , NLevel4  
Profile 2 BS: transfer 
SB: no transfer 
Maximin, ALevel1  
Profile 3 BS: random 
SB: no transfer 
NLevel2  
 
Table 31: Strategy profiles for Deciders in scenarios without dominance 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Never transfer 
ANash , NNash  
Profile 2 BS: transfer 
SB: no transfer 
Maximin, NLevel2 , ALevel1  
Profile 4 BS: no transfer 
SB: transfer 
NLevel4 , ALevel3  
 
                                                 
40
 Note that we do not assess the more complex ‘mixed strategies’ that are suggested by Nash. This is 
true for P1 and P2 across our three chapters – it is hard to assess mixed strategies with our limited 
data; and additionally the literature suggests that human decision makers rarely use mixed strategies 
and only do so in special types of scenarios.  
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We calculated the frequency in which Deciders transfer versus do not transfer 
in each scenario. Each row has two observations per Decider under BS and two 
observations under SB (see Table 32).  
Table 32: Observed behaviour for Deciders 
Transfer   
Amount 
BS  SB 
Transfer No transfer Transfer No transfer 
35 20 28 15 33 
30 26 22 15 33 
20 34 14 16 32 
10 36 12 25 23 
5 28 20 26 22 
  
In BS-scenarios of strong dominance the Decider makes transfer and no 
transfer decisions in roughly the same frequencies and one third of the sample still 
makes the transfer in SB-scenarios. For BS-scenarios it is plausible that half the 
sample adheres to the first strategy profile whilst the other half of the sample adheres 
to the second profile; however, neither profile would predict that one third of the 
participants makes a transfer in SB-scenarios of strong dominance. This is extremely 
unexpected
41
. For scenarios of weak dominance we see the same odd transfer 
frequency in SB-directionality with one third of the sample making such transfers 
whilst we see a boost in transfer frequency in BS-directionality. This boost may 
potentially be due to a larger part of the sample behaving according to the second 
profile. For scenarios without dominance we observe a similar high preference for 
transferring in BS-directionality when the amount is ten tokens whilst the frequency 
of transferring five tokens is slightly lower. It is interesting that the five token 
scenario hasn’t got the same boost in transfer frequency for BS-scenarios compared 
to the ten and twenty token amount; our section on verbal protocols will shed some 
light on this. Finally, when we look at scenarios without dominance involving the 
SB-directionality we conclude that the transfer and no transfer frequencies look 
roughly the same.  
Next, we separate data on individual participants to assess whether certain 
strategy profiles are consistently used by particular Deciders. Since we only have 
two observations per Decider in BS and in SB scenarios for each transfer amount we 
merge scenarios depending on their dominance level (i.e. transfer amount 30 and 35 
                                                 
41
 Given our small sample it is worthwhile to consider a future replication study with a larger sample 
to assess whether the finding is consistent.  
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are taken together; and transfer amount 5 and 10 are taken together). Tables with 
data per dominance level are found in Appendix 2.3; but a summary table across 
dominance levels is provided in Table 33.  
Table 33: Decider profiles at each level of dominance 
 Strong dominance Weak dominance No dominance 
0 NA NA NA 
1 NA NA NA 
2 NA NA Profile 4 
3 Profile 2 NA NA 
4 Profile 1 NA NA 
5 NA Profile 2 Profile 1 
6 NA Profile 2 Profile 2 
7 Profile 2 Profile 3 NA 
8 NA Profile 2 NA 
9 Profile 2 NA NA 
10 NA NA NA 
11 Profile 1 Profile 3 NA 
12 NA Profile 3 NA 
13 Profile 2 NA Profile 2 
14 NA Profile 1 Profile 2 
15 Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 2 
16 NA Profile 3 NA 
17 NA NA Profile 2 
18 Profile 2 NA Profile 2 
19 Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 2 
20 NA NA NA 
21 NA Profile 1 NA 
22 NA Profile 3 NA 
23 Profile 1 NA NA 
 
Note that our coding into profiles allows for a slight ‘trembling hand’ for 
scenarios of strong dominance and scenarios without dominance but that this is not 
possible for scenarios of weak dominance due to its lower number of observations 
per participant (i.e. the only scenario of weak dominance that we can assess involves  
twenty tokens). We categorize five subjects as profile one (purple colours) and five 
subjects as profile two (i.e. green colours) in scenarios of strong dominance. This 
means that 60% of participants do not behave according to the strategy profiles 
suggested by theories in context of strong dominance. For scenarios of weak 
dominance we categorize two participants as profile 1 (i.e. purple colours); five 
participants as profile 2 (i.e. green colours) and five participants as profile three (i.e. 
orange colours). 50% of the sample does not behave according to predictions from 
the frameworks. For scenarios without dominance we observe one participant for 
profile 1 (i.e. purple colours), seven participants for profile 2 (i.e. green colours), and 
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one participant for profile 4 (i.e. red colours). This means that 63% of participants do 
not behave according to the suggested profiles for scenarios without dominance. 
Furthermore, our summary table suggests that participant’s choice profiles 
are not consistent across dominance levels. It is worth pointing out that profiles are 
based upon the actions that the Decider would take according to specific frameworks 
and that the level k framework suggests different actions according to the 
dominance. However, even when we take these relationships into account choice 
profiles for individual subjects remain inconsistent across the dominance levels. In 
the next section we look at aggregate data for each of the three dominance levels and 
assess whether there are any special relationships depending on the directionality of 
the suggested transfer.  
 
Strong dominance 
We first discuss Decider-behaviour in scenarios where 30 or 35 tokens can be 
transferred. Behaviour can be categorized by counting how frequently the Decider 
makes the transfer out of his four BS-decisions and his four SB-decisions (see Table 
34). 
Table 34: Decider behaviour in presence of strong dominance 
 BS SB 
Transfer/No Transfer: 4/0 4 0 
Transfer/No Transfer: 3/1 3 5 
Transfer/No Transfer: 2/2 8 3 
Transfer/No Transfer: 1/3 5 9 
Transfer/No Transfer: 0/4 4 7 
 
The data suggests a preference towards not transferring in SB-scenarios of 
strong dominance whilst being indifferent in BS-scenarios of strong dominance. 
Furthermore, as was mentioned earlier it is quite intriguing how one third of the 
participants does not have a strong preference towards not transferring in SB-
scenarios of strong dominance. Not only does it increase the risk by decreasing the 
value of the lowest possible payoff (going against predictions of maximin theorem) 
it also violates dominance. Surely, a rational Chooser would pick DT if a transfer is 
made in context of strong dominance; hence, a rational Decider should never make 
such transfers. It is worthwhile to consider a replication study of the experiment 
solely to assess whether this finding persists in a larger data sampling.  
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Weak dominance 
When we look at scenarios in which 20 tokens can be transferred we have 
only half as much data available compared to the scenarios of strong dominance (and 
compared with scenarios without dominance). This is simply due to our design 
having two values for scenarios of strong dominance (and for scenarios without 
dominance) whilst weak dominance can only be assessed with one specific transfer 
amount
42
. In Table 35 we explore Decider-behaviour in scenarios of weak 
dominance.  
Table 35: Decider behaviour in presence of weak dominance 
 BS SB 
Transfer/No Transfer: 2/0 13 5 
Transfer/No Transfer: 1/1 8 6 
Transfer/No Transfer: 0/2 3 13 
 
In scenarios of weak dominance behaviour appears to be strongly influenced 
by the directionality. In BS-directionality the majority of P1s makes the transfer 
consistently whilst in SB-scenarios the majority of P1s does not transfer. It is 
noteworthy that about one fifth of our Openers makes a consistent transfer decision 
in SB-scenarios despite weak dominance.  
 
Without dominance 
Finally, we look at scenarios without dominance (i.e. when the transfer 
amount is five or ten tokens) (see Table 36).  
Table 36: Decider behaviour in scenarios without dominance 
 BS SB 
Transfer/No Transfer: 4/0 7 5 
Transfer/No Transfer: 3/1 6 4 
Transfer/No Transfer: 2/2 8 5 
Transfer/No Transfer: 1/3 2 9 
Transfer/No Transfer: 0/4 1 1 
 
In scenarios without dominance the BS-type appears somewhat more likely 
to transfer compared to the SB-type. However, these differences do not appear to be 
                                                 
42
 It is true that we could use different amounts for the two boxes or simply provide more trials with 
twenty tokens as transfer amount, however, we consider the current approach more simplistic for 
exploratory purposes and find it more natural to have less weak dominant scenarios than scenarios for 
strong dominance and scenarios without dominance.  
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too  prominent with similar frequencies observed for SB one cell lower in the table 
compared to BS.  
 
Chooser behaviour 
Based on predictions from theoretical frameworks introduced earlier we 
expect Choosers to behave according to a specific profile. We discuss the possible 
profiles starting with scenarios of strong dominance
43
.  
Table 37: Chooser profiles for strong dominance 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Always pick DT 
ANash , NNash , ALevel2  
Profile 2 Transfer: DT 
No transfer: Random 
NLevel2 , maximin 
 
Table 38: Chooser profiles for weak dominance 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Always pick DT 
ANash , NNash , ALevel2 , NLevel4  
Profile 2 Transfer: DT 
No transfer: Random 
NLevel2 , maximin 
 
Table 39: Chooser decisions without dominance 
 Strategy Frameworks 
Profile 1 Always pick DT 
ANash , NNash  
Profile 2 Transfer: DT 
No transfer: Random 
NLevel2 , maximin 
Profile 3 Transfer: DT 
No transfer: DF 
ALevel3  
Profile 4 Transfer: DF 
No transfer DT 
NLevel4 , ALevel1  
 
Table 40 provides the reader with an overview of the choice profiles for P2; 
the raw assessments can be found in Appendix 2.4. We stress that we only assess 
strategy profiles for the dominance levels on which they are predicted by one of the 
frameworks as discussed earlier. Thus, we do not assess profile 3 or 4 in scenarios of 
strong and weak dominance.  
Table 40: Overview of the profiles for P2 
 Strong dominance Weak dominance No dominance 
0 NA NA NA 
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 Note that Nash also allows P2 to pick probabilistically as long as she has a strong enough 
preference for DT such that P1 does not desire to deviate. However, due to the added complexity and 
our limited number of trials we discount this option from our discussion.  
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1 Profile 2 NA NA 
2 NA NA Profile 4 
3 NA NA Profile 4 
4 Profile 2 NA NA 
5 Profile 2 Profile 1 NA 
6 Profile 2 NA NA 
7 NA Profile 2 NA 
8 NA NA Profile 2 
9 Profile 2 NA NA 
10 Profile 2 NA NA 
11 NA NA NA 
12 Profile 1 NA NA 
13 NA NA NA 
14 Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 1 
15 Profile 1 NA NA 
16 NA NA Profile 4 
17 Profile 2 NA NA 
18 NA NA NA 
19 NA NA NA 
20 NA NA Profile 3 
21 NA NA NA 
22 Profile 2 NA NA 
23 NA NA NA 
 
In this table we allowed for a slight trembling hand phenomenon in scenarios 
of strong dominance and scenarios without dominance but not for scenarios of weak 
dominance (since weak dominance involves only half the number of trials compared 
with the other dominance levels). Furthermore, profile 2 involves a ‘random’ choice 
for scenarios where the transfer is not made; allowing for a slight trembling hand can 
be somewhat ambiguous in this context since other profiles are similar but with a 
non-random prediction for that same scenario. Thus, the reader should keep in mind 
‘profile 2’ codings under strong dominance or without dominance may alternatively 
be interpret as ‘profile 1’ or ‘profile 3’ at occasions. Another remark is that all four 
profiles are predicted at times by level k models which the reader should keep in 
mind.  
The column of strong dominance observes the predicted profiles the most 
frequently; however, even for scenarios of strong dominance 54% of the sample is 
not categorized under the profiles which are suggested by theory. Furthermore, there 
does not appear to be a consistent pattern of strategy profiles across dominance 
levels when we look at the data for unique participants. 
The Chooser’s experimental behaviour is summarized in Table 41. 
Table 41: Chooser behaviour 
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Transfer 
amount 
Transfer No Transfer 
DF DT DF DT 
35 5 30 29 32 
30 7 34 24 31 
20 19 31 25 21 
10 35 26 18 17 
5 29 25 17 25 
 
We assessed a potential relationship between the Chooser’s decision and the 
Decider’s transfer choice. This is done separately for scenarios of strong dominance, 
weak dominance and scenarios without dominance. Since the frequency in which 
Choosers encounter certain scenarios depends upon the actions of Deciders we 
provide simplified tables for our analysis whilst the raw tables are provided in 
Appendix 2.5. Furthermore, it is possible that a particular Chooser never encounters 
a specific scenario. As concrete example, consider a scenario in which the Decider-
opponents for a certain Chooser all decide not to transfer under weak dominance; as 
a result we cannot assess how this Chooser behaves in scenarios of weak dominance 
when the transfer is made). Whenever this happens the Chooser is coded as 
‘unobserved’. We first discuss scenarios with strong dominance.  
 
Strong dominance 
 In Table 42 we contrast the frequency in which DF versus DT is chosen for 
scenarios of strong dominance. Data is separated depending on the Decider’s 
decision (i.e. whether the transfer is made or not).  
Table 42: P2 decisions in scenarios of strong dominance  
 Transfer No Transfer 
Freq(DF) > Freq(DT) 0 7 
Freq(DF) = Freq(DT) 2 3 
Freq(DF) < Freq(DT) 22 13 
Unobserved 0 1 
 
We observe a very strong preference for DT-choices when transfers are 
made. When transfers are not made we observe a less extreme preference towards 
DT.  
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Weak dominance 
Next, we discuss Chooser behaviour in scenarios of weak dominance (see 
Table 43). 
Table 43: P2 decisions in scenarios of weak dominance 
 Transfer No Transfer 
Freq(DF) > Freq(DT) 7 10 
Freq(DF) = Freq(DT) 4 3 
Freq(DF) < Freq(DT) 13 9 
Unobserved 0 2 
 
In scenarios of weak dominance there also appears to be a preference for DT 
when a transfer is made. When no transfer is made Choosers appear indifferent in 
scenarios of weak dominance.  
 
Without dominance 
Finally, we assess Chooser behaviour in scenarios without dominance (see 
Table 44). 
Table 44: P2s behaviour in scenarios without dominance 
 Transfer No Transfer 
Freq(DF) > Freq(DT) 13 9 
Freq(DF) = Freq(DT) 2 4 
Freq(DF) < Freq(DT) 9 10 
Unobserved 0 1 
 
In scenarios without dominance Choosers may have a small preference 
towards DF when transfers are made (though this could simply be noise) whilst they 
are indifferent if no transfer is made.  .  
Next, we discuss Experiment Three which uses verbal protocols to explore 
reasoning processes.  
 
Experiment Three 
Differences between Experiment Two and Experiment Three 
Whilst Experiment Two provides preliminary data on behaviour in the 
Transfer Game it remains unclear why the behaviour occurs. For example, the 
Decider may not make a twenty token transfer in SB-directionality because (a) he 
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notices the weak dominance involved with such a transfer, (b) he considers it risky to 
transfer that much in SB-directionality, (c) he rather has a minimum of forty tokens 
than a minimum of twenty tokens, (d) he thinks that not transferring leads to a better 
payoff due to bluffing and double-bluffing ideas. To have a better insight into the 
reasoning processes underlying behaviour we created Experiment Three in which the 
experiment is played in two-player teams. Choices have to be coordinated with a 
teammate and we can collect data on reasoning processes in a non-obtrusive way by 
looking at the discussions from each team's private chat-room. The main differences 
with the experimental set-up of Experiment Two are that we now have (a) a chatting 
window, (b) a countdown clock, (c) a confirmation message of the currently selected 
choice and (d) a penalty system in which the team receives zero tokens on trials in 
which they fail to make a uniform choice in the allotted timeframe (to further 
incentivise coordination).  
Our main goal from Experiment Three is thus to gain better insights into 
choice behaviour by collecting reasoning processes through verbal protocols. Before 
we discuss the findings from Experiment Three we point out to the reader that a 
comparison between individual data from the second experiment and team data from 
the third experiment is found in Appendix 2.6. We do not focus on team versus 
individual play within this chapter since data from the third experiment is quite 
limited and only descriptive comparisons can be made. For our exploration of the 
verbal protocol design we coded the chat logs of each team on the reasoning, 
bluffing ideas and dominance awareness (see Appendix 2.7). This coding was done 
solely by the author (given that it is a pilot experiment on verbal protocols) though 
future versions could employ independent coders.  
 
Participants 
Participants for Experiment Three were 36 students and employees from 
Warwick University, with an average age of 21 years old. These participants were 
grouped into two-player teams who had to make their decisions in unison resulting 
into an actual sample size of 18 teams (N=18). Our overall sample (across 
Experiment Two and Experiment Three) was predominantly female (27 female, 16 
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male)
44
. Recruitment was done through SONA, an online system for participant 
recruitment. We decided in advance on the sample size and had twelve participants 
in each of three experimental sessions. Each session consisted of exactly twelve 
participants which were grouped into six two-player 'teams'. To avoid cancelling 
sessions due to participants not showing up we recruited four additional participants 
per session; if more than twelve participants showed up before the starting time we 
randomly selected participants to be send home with a £2 show-up fee. The 
possibility of being send home (due to an exact number of participants being 
required for the study) was advertised on SONA when participants signed up. 
Excluding participants happened through a procedure of shuffling a deck of cards 
(containing the cubicle numbers of all occupied computers) and randomly drawing 
one or more cards. 
Participants were paid a show-up fee (£2) and an additional performance fee 
(£0.50-£11.50) based on a random lottery incentive system. The expected pay-off for 
the average participant is £8; and the average participant earned £6.88. Participants 
are told during an introductory PowerPoint explanation that they earn a performance 
fee based on the amount of tokens won in a randomly selected trial. We did not 
inform participant of the conversion rate (tokens to pounds) to avoid potential biases 
due to monetary expectations. Each token that is won in the randomly selected trial 
translated into an additional £0.10 in performance fee. We did not provide 
participants with details regarding the random selection procedure for the 
'performance fee' trial; concretely, a python script randomly selects a trial per 'team' 
to base their performance fee on. Different teams can be remunerated upon 
performance in different trials but participants who play in the same team receive the 
same performance fee for fairness reasons.  
 
Materials 
The experiment was performed in the Behavioural Science Lab; the coding 
was done by the author using a combination of python, HTML/CSS and willow. 
Additionally, HexChat software was used to create separate and anonymous chat 
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 Note that we have missing information on the demographics of part of the sample due to 
maintenance of the SONA database requiring participants to redo their prescreen demographics 
yearly which isn't always done. 
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rooms for each two-player team. Participants face a total of six trials; and they swap 
between being in the role of P1 and being in the role of P2 on each consecutive trial 
to maximize both fairness and exposure to both roles. The six trials are summarized 
in Table 45)
45
. 
Table 45: Trials in Experiment Three (i.e. chat variation) 
Dominance level Role Directionality Transfer Amount 
No dominance P1/P2 BS 5 
No dominance P2/P1 SB 10 
Weak dominance P1/P2 SB 20 
Weak dominance P2/P1 BS 20 
Strong dominance P1/P2 BS 30 
Strong dominance P2/P1 SB 35 
Trials of each role are randomized separately and are zipped together such 
that participants change role on consecutive trials. Transfer amounts for the 
experiment were chosen such that we have one trial representing scenarios without 
dominance (i.e. 5 or 10), one trial representing scenarios with weak dominance (i.e. 
20) and one trial representing scenarios with strong dominance (i.e. 30 or 35) in 
either role; with the transfer amounts differing between roles when possible. Given 
that participants were already divided in two-player teams we did not subdivide 
experimental sessions into 'mini sessions' for this experiment (in contrast with our 
other experiments). Every trial teams are randomly re-matched with another team 
and they do not know who they are matched with. Their own team remains the same 
throughout the experiment but they do not know the identity of their teammate. We 
did not drop variables, conditions or trials from our analysis.  
 
Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three sessions with twelve participants per 
session (N=36 participants or 18 teams). A 75-minute timeframe was available for 
each session and sessions typically lasted 60 minutes. Using an alphabetical listing 
of signed-up participants we allocated everyone to numbered cubicles. The 
experiment is set-up such that adjacently seated participants have the same starting 
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 Similarly to the first experiment teams change their role on consecutive trials. Furthermore, in each 
role the team faces one trial involving strong dominance, one trial involving weak dominance and one 
trial without dominance; and the directionality in which you face trials of a specific dominance level 
as P1 versus P2 is reversed. 
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role; though they are unaware of this feature. Furthermore, teammates are seated 
three seats away from one another as is indicated by a colour scheme in Figure 56.    
Figure 56: Experimental Setup 
 
This figure provides a schematic overview of our experimental layout. Participants sit in two 
rows of desks each with a computer. Shutters (partitions) are used such that they can only 
see their own computer. Participants in the same row (e.g. 1-6) start the experiment in the 
same role. Teammates are separated by two participants as is indicated by the colour of 
computer monitors. The same monitor colour indicates that participants are on the same 
team.  
If more than twelve people showed up we would randomly exclude 
participants by blindly selecting a cubicle number from a pack of numbered cards 
after shuffling the cards in front of the participants. Excluded participants received a 
£2 show-up fee and filled in a payment receipt after which the doors were closed and 
the experimental setup was explained by means of a PowerPoint presentation (see 
Appendix 2.2 for details on instructions). The main points from the PowerPoint 
instructions are shortly summarized below: 
This experiment is played in two-player teams. We randomly assign you with a teammate 
who plays in the same role and sees the same information on their computer screen. You can 
communicate with your teammate through a private chat room. On each trial you have to 
make decisions together with your teammate by clicking one of two buttons. Your goal is to 
gain tokens which are converted into a monetary amount at the end of the experiment. If 
your team does not click the same button or if your team does not make decisions within a 
two-minute timeframe you are both penalized (i.e. you receive zero tokens on that trial); it is 
thus important to coordinate with your teammate.  
The task itself is as follows. Each trial you see two boxes on the screen. We refer to the left 
box as Box A and we refer to the right box as Box B. You are informed that one of the boxes 
contains 40 tokens whilst the other box contains 80 tokens -- but you do not know which box 
has which token amount. Your team is either assigned the role of Decider (player one) or the 
role of Chooser (player two). As Decider Team you can look at the true content of the two 
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boxes and you are presented with a transfer suggestion. The computer suggests a transfer of 
a predefined token amount in a predefined direction and informs the Decider Team how 
many tokens would be in either box if the suggested transfer is made. The Decider Team 
decides whether or not to make the suggested transfer by clicking on the corresponding 
button. Next, the Chooser Team has to make a decision. This team does not know which box 
contains which token amount but they know the transfer suggestion and whether or not this 
suggested transfer was made. The Chooser Team chooses which of these two boxes they 
want to have for themselves (which decides their own payoff) by clicking the button 
underneath the desired option. The unchosen option is assigned to the Decider Team 
deciding their payoff. Feedback is provided after every trial specifying which box your team 
received and what its final contents are; furthermore, feedback also informs you of the box 
received by the other team and its content. If a team was penalized this is also mentioned 
during the feedback stage.  
During each trial you are given two minutes to discuss the scenario with your teammate and 
to make a decision. A countdown clock is displayed on the screen. If no decision is made by 
one of the teammates (or if the teammates make different decisions) then the team is 
penalized and receives no tokens on that trial. After each trial your team's role swaps (i.e. 
Deciders become Choosers and Choosers become Deciders) and you are randomly re-
matched with another team for the next trial. However, your teammate remains the same 
throughout the experiment. A total of six trials is played. Regarding your final payment you 
receive a participation fee of £2 and additionally you earn a performance fee based on the 
amount of tokens your team has won in a randomly selected trial.  
 Participants were given the opportunity to raise their hand if further 
clarification was required and were informed that they could do so at any time during 
the experiment if they had further questions. Before starting the experiment 
participants were asked to put their electronic devices and notes away. Furthermore, 
between each experimental cubicle we pulled out ‘shutters’ (i.e. partitions) to avoid 
the temptation of glancing on a neighbour’s computer screen. At the end of the 
experiment pay-offs were calculated using a python script. Concretely, the script 
randomly generates a trial number for each participant and assesses how many 
tokens they won on that particular trial. Tokens are multiplied by a factor of 0.1 to 
generate the performance fee and a two pounds show-up fee is added in. The python 
script does this for every 'team' and makes a clean output file with a summary of 
individual cubicle numbers and payments.  
 Finally, participants fill in receipts for payment and are asked to come 
forward when we call their cubicle number to receive payment in exchange for their 
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receipt ticket. Data from the experiment is stored in a time-stamped folder containing 
a multitude of CSV-files (i.e. one for each trial played by each participant ─ in case 
the program were to malfunction not all data would be lost) and these are converted 
into a big CSV-datafile using a python script. The data is analysed using RStudio.  
 
Decider behaviour: results from verbal protocols 
In this section we discuss the six scenarios that Deciders could face in 
Experiment Three. We use a simplified notation to refer to the six scenarios; for 
example we use the term BS30 to refer to the scenario in which 30 tokens can be 
transferred in BS-directionality. This section consists of two parts. First, we discuss a 
summary table of the verbal protocol findings. This table was computed by encoding 
every trial played by every team using the coding scheme specified in Appendix 2.7. 
A full trial-by-trial version of the table can be found in Appendix 2.8. and the raw 
verbal protocol data can be found in Appendix 2.9. Afterwards, we provide an 
overview of the verbal protocols using quotations.  
We separated Table 46 into three sections using a colour pattern. Reasoning 
coding has a white background, bluffing coding has a light-grey background and 
dominance awareness coding has a dark-grey background. Additionally, we use a 
salmon-colour to indicate the sentiment that the transfer amount is too small to 
matter.   
Table 46: Summary table for P1 
Coding BS30 SB35 BS20 SB20 BS5 SB10 
no reasoning 3 2 3 1 3 2 
Equality 0 0 5 0 0 0 
Maximin 3 0 1 1 2 3 
avoid risk 0 5 0 3 0 1 
considers bluff 1 1 0 2 3 2 
Looks at EV 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dominance 0 0 0 1 0 0 
random guess 0 0 0 0 0 0 
not coordinated 1 0 0 0 0 0 
did not understand task 1 1 0 1 1 0 
not on time 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Amount too small 0 0 0 0 4 2 
NA 5 6 6 5 3 3 
Decrease variance (no bluff) 2 1 1 2 3 5 
Increase variance (bluff) 2 2 2 2 3 1 
NA 1 1 0 1 9 10 
Does not spot dominance 3 8 5 6 0 0 
Unclear 5 0 0 1 0 0 
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Spots dominance 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Spots equality  0 0 4 0 0 0 
General observations include a decent degree of maximin reasoning across 
dominance levels. Furthermore, in SB-scenarios we observe a strong focus on risk 
avoidance. We point out that the BS20-scenario suggests a strong awareness of the 
equality potential; meanwhile dominance awareness is lacking in other scenarios; 
some teams even consider it viable to ‘bluff’ in scenarios of dominance. Scenarios 
without dominance generally induce the feeling that the task is irrelevant since the 
payoff-difference of transferring is quite small; and despite these small transfer 
amounts being the sole scenarios where bluffing behaviour is a viable strategy they 
are not often approached as such. 
Next, we provide some quotes from the verbal protocol data to indicate the 
encoding. Each scenario is faced by nine Decider-teams; however, decisions made 
by Team 9 are excluded from analysis since this team was extremely confused 
throughout the whole experiment
46
. We inform the reader that a semicolon (‘;’) is 
used in quotations to indicate when the speaker changes during the dialogue (i.e. 
when the teammate’s reply is included). Furthermore, the dialogues refer to ‘Box A’ 
and ‘Box B’ which is the physical screen location for the payoffs – DT and DF are 
terms used in this thesis to make clear which box can increment in value (i.e. this 
differs between trials in Experiment Two). Physical screen location is kept constant 
in Experiment Three since we did not find behaviourally differences on this in the 
previous experiment: thus, ‘Box A’ is always DF whilst ‘Box B’ is always DT.  
Scenarios of strong dominance in this experiment are either BS30-scenarios 
or SB35-scenarios. When we look at the BS30-scenario we find evidence for 
maximin reasoning in three out of the nine teams who faced such scenarios. 
Concretely, these teams felt as if they would receive the lower payoff regardless their 
decision and, hence, they rather transfer and receive 50 tokens compared to not 
transferring and receiving 40 tokens (Team 1: “I imagine the other team would pick 
the higher amount”, Team 13: “I think the question is do we want 50 or 40”, Team 
15: “Think we are going to lose this one either way”). Given the certainty expressed 
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 The experimenter visited them twice during the experiment but they simply failed to communicate 
and understand the basics of the task. At one trial their dialogue even reveals how one of the 
teammates says that she will make the transfer whilst the teammate replies “and I will choose (box) 
A”; suggesting that one of them cannot even assess their own role.  
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by these teams that they would end up with the shorter straw regardless their 
decision we had a closer look at P2-choices for trials involving 30 tokens (i.e. to 
assess whether this was a viable best response strategy or whether it involved a 
maximin strategy due to pessimistic feelings about the experimental outcome). Data 
suggests that the teams would have had good odds at earning the larger payoff if they 
did not make the transfer
47
. Furthermore, we had three teams who did not provide 
reasoning (Team 2: “How many tokens are you guys transferring; 30; OK”; Team 3: 
“What do you want to do; Don’t transfer; Sure”; Team 14: “No transfer; No 
transfer”). One team misunderstood each other’s intentions (Team 7: “I say go for 
it; Risk; And do not make the transfer; OK”). And a final team considered it viable 
to make a bluff (Team 8: “They may think Box A still has more and that is why we 
transferred”) – and they were lucky enough to get away with it.  
Next we discuss the SB-35 scenario. Four teams considered it too risky to 
transfer in SB35-scenarios which is sensible since they could end up with five tokens 
(Team 4: “If we make a transfer and they opt for Box B we are left with only five 
tokens”; Team 10: “I don’t want a probability of getting 5”; Team 12: “If we 
transfer we have a chance of getting just 5”; Team 16: “It’s too risky to just get 5 
tokens”). However, the fact that such transfers result into a dominant choice for the 
opponent is seemingly not realised. The team speaks of a ‘probability’ of receiving 
five tokens if they make the transfer without realising that any rational opponent 
would always pick DT in such a scenario – the five tokens would not be a 
probability, it would be a certainty. Furthermore, one team even considered it a 
viable idea to attempt bluffing in the SB35-scenario (Team 5: “How can you make 
them not choose box B? – lets transfer”). Two teams did not provide reasoning 
(Team 6: “Transfer or not; Transfer”; Team 17: “Don’t transfer; yeah”). One team 
misunderstood that they were on the same team leading to communication failures 
(Team 11: “Box A=40, Box B=80; Yes, what should I do; Transfer is 35 to Box B”). 
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 Concretely, whenever a transfer was made involving 30 tokens five out of seven teams picked DT 
whilst two teams went against the dominance and picked DF; when the transfer was not made two out 
of two teams picked DT. 
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One team suggested not to transfer such that the payoff difference doesn’t increase 
(Team 18: “No transfer to keep a fair balance; yeah”)48.  
Next, we assess behaviour under weak dominance. When the directionality of 
the suggested transfer is BS a transfer would equalize the payoff of the two teams. 
Deciders should thus be cautious to transfer 20 (or more) tokens since rational 
Choosers are expected to select DT whenever 20 (or more) tokens are transferred  
(i.e. DT cannot be worse than DF). For BS20-scenarios we find that five out of nine 
teams are aware of the dominant nature of transferring and aim to equalize the two 
boxes (Team 4: “If we transfer both end up getting 60”; Team 10: “If we transfer we 
win for sure 60”; Team 16: “We would both get 60”; Team 17: “the boxes will 
balance so it is a win-win”; Team 18: “If we transfer we win 60 anyway"). Three 
teams did not providing reasoning (Team 11: “Make transfer; Yes”; Team 12: 
“Don’t make transfer; Let’s not make the transfer”; Team 6: “No transfer”). And 
one team decided to transfer out of maximin reasoning (Team 5: “If we transfer we 
get minimum 60 instead of 40”).  
For SB20-scenarios we see two teams who considered bluffing behaviour 
(Team 3: “So the aim is to convince them that Box A has more tokens”; Team 8: 
“Do you think we should trick them this time?”). One team used a maximin 
approach (Team 1: “don’t make the transfer and then we get at least 40 rather than 
20”). One team did not provide reasoning (Team 2: “Are we transferring; I would 
say no; Alright”) and another team  did not want to take the risk of transferring and 
considered it equally likely to receive DT as DF when they do not transfer (Team 7: 
“We will get 40 or 80 equally likely”). One team realises the dominance when they 
make the transfer whilst assuming it a fifty-fifty chance if they do not transfer (Team 
13: “If we make a transfer they will obviously know which box to select. On the other 
hand not making the transfer leaves them with 50 50 chance”). Two teams do not 
want to take the risk of transferring (Team 14: “A has 40, B has 80. Transfer from A 
to B is not worth it”; Team 15: “Not transfer; In case they choose box B”). 
Finally, we discuss scenarios without dominance. If 5 or 10 tokens are 
transferred it is not clear to the opponent whether DT versus DF offers the better 
                                                 
48
 This team is coded as ‘Avoid risk’ in our table; however, the quote is mentioned separately given 
that it is only one of multiple possible interpretations. It is possible that the team refers to a “fair 
balance” out of other-regarding preferences for example. 
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payoff. This means that P1 can engage in bluffing attempts. In BS5-scenarios we 
often observe the idea that regardless the outcome the difference is marginal (Team 
7: “It’s just 5”; Team 15: “If we are to lose the margin will be almost the same 
anyway”; Team 13: “It’s only five”; Team 14: “It won’t make a big difference so 
either way is fine”). Looking at actual choices we observe three teams who try to 
trick the opponent (Team 3: “We should transfer to do the trick thing”; Team 7: “It 
effects their decision; I would say do not transfer”; Team 15: “Let’s not transfer; 
they will assume Box B was bigger”). Three teams did not provide reasoning (Team 
2: “I’ld say no; Okay, I’ll put no”; Team 8: “Transfer; Yeah”; Team 14: “It won’t 
make a big difference so either way is fine”). Finally, there were two teams who 
engaged in maximin reasoning (Team 1: “Transfer then we at least get 45 rather 
than 40”; Team 13: “Transfer; Yeah, even if they picked the 80 box we would get 
more than 40 as we have transferred”).  
For the SB10-scenario there were also two teams who considered the amount 
too small to matter much (Team 17: “It is only ten”; Team 18: “10 tokens is little 
amount to bluff”). Regarding decisions we observe two teams who attempted to 
outsmart their opponents (Team 17: “We could confuse them and transfer the 
tokens”; Team 18: “Stay the same because they will be expecting a bluff; alright, so 
not transfer”). Three teams did not want to increase the difference between the 
payoffs in relation to maximin reasoning (Team 4: “We at least win 40 better than 
winning 30 anyways; OK so no transfer”; Team 6: “Not make transfer if they choose 
B we end up getting 30; Exactly”; Team 11: “No point making it 30 and 90”). One 
team did not want to take the risk of transferring with the idea that the opponent 
would have a 50-50 chance (Team 5: “No transfer; then they will have to guess so 
its 50-50”) and another team attempted to outsmart their opponent but did not make 
a choice within the time limit (Team 10: “We can do the scam; But what if they 
never think of it being a trap and go for box b”). Finally, there were two teams who 
did not provide reasoning (Team 12: “Let’s go with no transfer; no transfer it is”; 
Team 16: “Let’s not transfer; I agree”). 
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Chooser behaviour: results from verbal protocols 
In this section we discuss the six scenarios that Choosers can face in 
Experiment Three starting with scenarios of strong dominance and ending with 
scenarios without dominance. Scenarios of strong dominance are merged (and the 
same is done for scenarios without dominance) to make the discussion easier to 
digest. We use a simplified notation to refer to the six scenarios. ‘Transfer30/35’ 
refers to a scenario in which 30 or 35 tokens are transferred. Each of our eighteen 
Chooser-teams faced one scenario of strong dominance, one scenario of weak 
dominance and one scenario without dominance. We start this section by 
illuminating a summary table for Chooser behaviour when the transfer was made 
(see Table 47) and a summary table for Chooser behaviour when the transfer was not 
made (see Table 48). Afterwards we illustrate the verbal protocol data using some 
quotations. We point out to the reader that the columns in our summary table reflect 
how many tokens are/could have been transferred; and that there is more data in the 
‘20’ column since the BS20 and SB20 scenarios are merged together (Choosers do 
not know the directionality of the suggested transfer) whilst we kept other scenarios 
such as BS30 and SB35 separated since the amounts differ.  
Table 47: Reasoning for P2 when transfer is made  
Coding 30 35 20 5 10 
no reasoning 2 0 1 1 0 
spots dominance 3 2 3 0 0 
Spots equality 0 0 3 0 0 
looks at EV 0 0 0 2 2 
Maximin 0 1 0 0 0 
avoid risk 0 0 1 0 0 
random guess 0 0 0 2 0 
Considers bluff 1 0 0 0 0 
did not understand task 1 0 2 0 0 
NA 4 2 8 2 2 
Assumes transfer means DF > DT (no bluff) 1 0 0 2 0 
Assumes transfer means DT > DF (bluff) 2 1 2 1 0 
Unclear 1 1 0 0 0 
Spots dominance 3 2 6 0 0 
Does not spot dominance 2 0 3 0 0 
NA 1 0 1 5 2 
 
Choosers have strong awareness of dominance when transfers are made (both 
under strong and weak dominance). Meanwhile, the focus in scenarios without 
dominance lies mainly on expected values; despite being an ideal set-up for bluffing 
behaviour by the opponent this is not something Choosers consider.  
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Table 48: Reasoning for P2 when transfer is not made 
Coding 30 35 20 5 10 
no reasoning 1 1 3 1 2 
random guess 0 1 1 2 4 
Considers bluff 1 3 4 1 0 
did not understand task 0 1 0 0 1 
NA 0 1 0 0 1 
Assumes no transfer means DF > DT (bluff) 0 3 3 3 2 
Assumes no transfer means DT > DF (no bluff) 2 2 5 1 4 
Does not spot dominance 2 5 8 0 0 
NA 0 1 0 4 7 
 
When transfer are not made Choosers refer to scenarios of dominance as 
‘coin flips’ or ‘bluffing attempts’; they seemingly fail to realise that it is a rational 
decision not to transfer in such scenarios. Scenarios without dominance are mostly 
approached as coin flips when the transfer is not made. Despite being the only viable 
set-up for bluffing behaviour they are not often seen as such by Choosers.  
Next, we illustrate the verbal protocol data through some direct quotes. 
Decisions made by Team 9 are again excluded since this team was extremely 
confused throughout the whole experiment. We start with scenarios of strong 
dominance after which we discuss weak dominance and finally we discuss scenarios 
without dominance.  
 
Strong dominance 
We start by discussing the Transfer35/30-scenarios. Five teams were aware 
of the dominance involved with a 30 or 35 token transfer (Team 2: “Are we going to 
take the box with the highest payment; Yeah; So it is Box B; Yeah”; Team 7: 
“Definitely Box B, then we are guaranteed at least 75 or 115”; Team 10: “All the 
possibilities turn to Box B being the better choice”; Team 16: “Box B surely, it’s 
going to have either 80 [initially already] or 70 [at minimum]”; Team 17: “I can’t 
see why they did that transfer, in any way Box B will have more; I guess they thought 
better win 50 than 40”). One team did not notice dominance and tried to logically 
explain the opponents transfer decision (Team 12: “They won’t transfer so many 
knowing if we select Box B they get Box A, Box A has to be better; Fair enough”). 
One team used a maximin strategy and picked DT since it would have a minimum 
content of at least 35 tokens (Team1: “We should choose Box B we know at least we 
  Transfer Game   
 
125 
 
will have 35”)49. Furthermore, we had two teams who did not provide reasoning as 
to why they chose DT (Team 4: “Do we go Box B; yeah I think so”; Team 5: “Shall 
we take Box B; Okay”) and a final team which was confused about the task (i.e. 
didn’t understand they were talking with a teammate instead of an opponent) (Team 
11: “How many are in each, 50/50”). 
Next, we assess the NoTransfer35/30-scenarios. One team considered it to be 
a random guess (Team 3: “What’s your favourite letter A or B, lol”) whilst two 
teams considered the rejection of the suggested transfer to be an indicator that DT 
initially had the 80 tokens (Team 14: “Should we choose Box B, because Box B had 
80 and Box A had 40”; Team 18: “I think they were conservative and didn’t leave 
Box A with only 10; So you think Box A has 40 tokens”). Finally, we had one team 
who chose DF with the idea that their opponent may be playing a trick suggesting 
that they are unaware of the dominance involved with such a large amount (Team 8: 
“They could be tricking us, if they did not transfer they might want us to think Box B 
already has more, let’s go with Box A”) and another team who assumed the 
opponent is not trying to trick them and chose DF for that reason (Team 13: “They 
didn’t transfer from Box A to Box B, are we saying Box A has more; Yeah, I think so, 
unless they are trying to trick us”)50. Finally one team provided no reasoning with at 
least one teammate being indifferent (Team 15: “What shall we pick, Box A; Let’s do 
Box B; Cool”) and another team simply did not provide reasoning (Team 6: “What 
are we choosing; B; I picked B”) 
 
Weak dominance 
Now we focus on scenarios involving weak dominance. We start by 
discussing Transfer20-scenarios. There were nine Transfer20-scenarios and eight 
NoTransfer20-scenarios. Six teams realise the dominance involved with the transfer 
(Team 2: “Either it was A80 B40 and its now 60/60 or it was A40 B80 and its now 
                                                 
49
 This team did not mention the initial minimum value of the DT-box at all times (i.e. at the start of 
the game DT must have at least 40 tokens already; thus DT has at minimum 40+35 tokens if the 
transfer is made). However, this may simply be a typo of ‘35’ instead of ‘75’.  
50
 This team clearly made a mistake in their reasoning since, surely, DT would be the option with the 
larger payoff when a no-transfer decision is interpret as ‘non-trickery’ (when participants are not 
aware of the dominance involved). If DF had the larger payoff and no transfer was made then the 
reasoning should be that it is a trick – not inversely.   
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20/100, right”; Team 4: “If it started with 40 then it now has 60 or if it started with 
80 then it now has 100”; Team8: “Transferring 20 from 80 or 40 works fine for us 
either way, equal or more”; Team 13: “If Box B had 80 then it now has 100 and if it 
had 40 then both boxes have 60”; Team 14: “I think choose Box B; Both have the 
same amount so doesn’t matter”; Team 15: “Either B will be 100 or 60”). One team 
was confused early on and decided to choose DT out of simplicity (Team 11: “Let’s 
just keep the boxes as equal as we can and choose the one it transfers to”) whilst 
another team considered it risky to pick DF (Team 1: “It will be risky to pick Box A; 
Let’s do Box B”). A final team did not provide reasoning (Team 12: “Let’s take Box 
B; Sure”).  
Next, we discuss NoTransfer20-scenarios. Four teams considered bluffing 
logic assumed (Team 3: “I feel like if they declined then they want more tokens, but 
they could be doing your trick”; Team 10: “I feel like the possibility that a transfer 
was declined is maybe if they did Box A would have the 40 tokens; I don’t know we 
just have to gamble on this one”; Team 17: “My guess is that they had 40 in Box A 
and didn’t want to transfer”; Team 18: “My bet is that the 80 are in the B Box; 
Actually yeah I agree”). One team considered it a guess (Team 7: “Just a guess 
really; Hmmm… Box B; Yeah, I would say so”). Finally there were three teams who 
did not provide reasoning (Team 5: “Shall we take Box A; I was thinking so”; Team 
6: “I picked Box B; Box A; I picked Box B”; Team 16: “Should we pick Box A; I 
think so”). 
 
Without dominance 
Finally, we discuss the scenarios without dominance. We start by discussing 
the Transfer10/5-scenarios. There were four teams who simply looked at the 
expected values of the two boxes (Team 8: “I think Box B, it will either be 50 or 90 
tokens”; Team 13: “Box B is either 50 or 90 whereas Box A is either 30 or 70”; 
Team 10: “If we pick Box A we either have 75 or 35 if we pick Box B we either have 
85 or 45; Box B; Both options are higher in Box B with 50/50 chances”; Team 18: 
“Could be everything, 50/50; If we go for Box B and it started at 40 it’s now 45 and 
if it started at 80 it’s 85, Box A is either 35 or 75 so I say go Box B”). Then there 
were two teams who considered it a random guess (Team 5: “I think Box A might be 
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larger, but it’s a guess”; Team 11: “It’s so difficult to tell other people’s strategy”). 
And a final team did not provide reasoning (Team 6: “Box A; Ok”).  
Next we look at the NoTransfer10/5-scenarios. Six teams consider it to 
involve luck and make a random guess (Team 1: “I’m thinking Box A but I’m not 
100% confident; Let’s do Box A then”; Team 3: “Let’s stick to tradition; Can’t 
really tell if they wanna lure us or not; Let’s pass it to fate”; Team 7: “I really don’t 
know”; Team 15: “Either one could have more”; Team 12: “This is a coin-flip”; 
Team 16: “I have no idea; Okay random guess Box B then”). One team considers it 
a trickery attempt (Team 4: “I think they want us to think there is more in Box B so 
they didn’t transfer”). And three teams did not provide reasoning for their decisions 
(Team 2: “Which box are you picking; I don’t know; Pick Box B I think”; Team 14: 
“Choose Box A; Yes”; Team 17: “We are not losing much; Because it is only 5; I 
agree”51). 
 
Across roles 
We end this section by focussing on behaviour and reasoning across roles. 
Firstly, we discuss dominance-awareness across trials and secondly we discuss 
whether teams consistently reason according to particular frameworks. Regarding 
dominance we looked for consecutive trials which both involved dominance; Table 
49 offers a summary – which is based on the full codings from Appendix 2.8. 
Table 49: When consecutive trials were both scenarios involving dominance 
First trial Second trial Scenario1, Scenario2 Team 
Spotted 
Dominance 
Spotted Dominance SB20 – Transfer / BS20 Team 4 
BS20 / BS30 – Transfer Team 16, 17 
BS20 / BS30 – No transfer Team 18 
Unclear SB35 – Transfer / SB20 Team 2 
BS20 – Transfer / BS30 Team 13, 14, 15 
Not Spotted SB35 – Transfer / SB20 Team 7 
BS30 – Transfer / SB35 Team 10 
SB20 / SB35 – No transfer Team 13 
Unclear Spotted Dominance BS30 / SB35 - Transfer Team 2 
SB20 / BS20 - Transfer Team 2 
Not Spotted BS30 / SB35 – No transfer Team 3 
BS30 – Transfer / SB35 Team 5 
Not Spotted Dominance SB35 / SB20 - Transfer Team 4 
                                                 
51
 It is slightly odd to comment on the five token transfer amount when the transfer is not made as 
argument; it is unclear whether the team wrote a typo or whether some innuendo is present such as 
“regardless whether they transferred or not would not affect things”.  
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Spotted BS30 / SB35 – Transfer Team 7 
SB20 / BS20 -  Transfer Team 8 
Not Spotted BS30 / SB35 – Transfer Team 1 
BS30 / SB35 – No transfer Team 8 
BS30 – Transfer / SB35 Team 4, 12 
BS30 – No Transfer / SB35 Team 6 
SB35 / SB20 – Transfer Team 12 
SB35 / SB20 – No transfer Team 5, 6, 10 
SB35 – No transfer / SB20 Team 3, 8 
SB35 – Transfer / SB20 Team 1 
SB20 / BS20 – No transfer Team 3, 7 
SB20 / SB35 – No transfer Team 14, 15 
SB20 / BS20 – Transfer Team 1 
SB20 – No Transfer / BS20 Team 5, 6, 10 
SB20 – Transfer / BS20 Team 11, 12 
SB20 – No transfer / SB35 Team 16, 17, 18 
 
There were eleven cases in which dominance was recognised on the first of 
the two trials. It seems quite straightforward to expect participants to be aware of 
dominance on the consecutive trial if they were aware of it on the first trial. Four of 
these also had dominance-recognition on the second trial; for another four trials it 
was unclear whether dominance was spotted on the second trial and for three trials 
dominance was not spotted on the second trial
52
. Choosers are less likely to spot 
dominance when the transfer is not made; meanwhile, Deciders are less likely to spot 
dominance when the directionality is SB.  
Finally, we looked at consistency of choices across trials. A study by Colman 
et al. (2014) explored self-reported reasons as to why participants made certain 
decisions in context of twelve cooperative games. These self-reports indicated that 
roughly 80% of participants used two or more types of reasoning within the same 
game. Furthermore, our individual version of the Transfer Game suggested that 
participants often do not make predictions according to specific frameworks in trials 
involving the same dominance level whilst even less consistency is found across 
dominance levels. Using our verbal protocols we looked at consistency of reasoning 
across trials. We point out to the reader that we only have data on six trials per team 
(due to the temporal limitations for the experiment) which only allows an assessment 
                                                 
52
 When dominance was spotted twice the second trial involved weak dominance (1x), strong 
dominance with a transfer made (2x) and strong dominance with the transfer not made (1x); when it 
was unclear on the second trial the second trial involved weak dominance in SB-directionality (1x) 
and strong dominance (3x). When dominance was not spotted on the second trial it involved weak 
dominance in SB-directionality (1x), strong dominance in SB-directionality (1x) and a strong 
dominance trial in which the transfer was not made (1x).  
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across dominance levels. We looked at the number of unique ‘codings’ that each 
team received as a way to assess the consistency of their choices (for this assessment 
we refer to the overview table from Appendix 2.8). Teams that are coded as “no 
reasoning provided” or “did not understand the task” on three or more of their six 
trials were excluded from this assessment
53
. Out of the remaining 13 (out of 18) 
teams seven are coded in at least four different ways (across their six trials – not 
including “no reasoning” codings); three teams are coded in three different ways and 
two teams are coded in two different ways (i.e. Team 3 and Team 17). We thus 
conclude that researchers should be wary of attempts to explain experimental 
behaviour by a single theoretical framework; furthermore, we suggest a broader 
usage of verbal protocols and self-reported behaviour to better grasp how 
participants themselves approach the task and how this differs between trials with a 
same or different structure. It may be that consistency is found after a large amount 
of trials – especially for our verbal protocol experiment we cannot make strong 
conclusions – however, it seems warranted to further explore these ideas.  
 
Across experiments 
In this section we summarize findings across the two experiments. Our aim is 
to point out similarities and differences and to explain why behaviour may be 
observed in certain scenarios from Experiment Two based upon the verbal protocol 
data we collected on the same scenarios from Experiment Three. We start by 
discussing Decider behaviour after which we discuss Chooser behaviour and 
behavioural consistencies across the two roles.  
 
Decider behaviour across experiments 
We discuss scenarios chronologically from strong to weak dominance. In 
Experiment Two we observed that two thirds of SB-scenarios result into no transfer 
decisions which we can explain through a perspective of maximin thanks to the 
reasoning data collected in our second experiment. Meanwhile, Experiment Two 
suggested roughly the same degree of transferring and not transferring under strong 
                                                 
53
 These are teams 2, 6, 9, 12 and 14. 
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dominance. From the reasoning data of Experiment Three we can deduce that a large 
proportion of the BS-transfer decisions are due to maximin strategies. Furthermore, 
reasoning data suggests that a proportion of the transfer-decisions in both BS and 
SB-scenarios of strong dominance may be due to ‘trickery’ attempts. 
When we look at scenarios of weak dominance we observed a relatively 
sharp preference for BS20-transfers in experiment one; this may be due to the ease of 
spotting dominance in such scenarios given that the majority of BS20-teams from 
Experiment Three displayed an awareness of dominance combined with a desire to 
make the payoffs equal. The SB20 trials from Experiment Two suggested that two 
thirds of participants prefer not to transfer which appears to be due to feelings of 
high risk according to Experiment Three; meanwhile the transfers that are made 
could easily be explained as ‘bluffing’ attempts since three (out of nine) teams from 
Experiment Three attempted to trick their opponents in SB20-scenarios. 
Furthermore, the chatting data suggests that it is a lot harder for participants to 
realise dominance in SB20-scenarios compared with BS20-scenarios.  
Finally, we discuss the scenarios without dominance. In Experiment Two we 
observed a preference for transferring in BS-scenarios and seemingly indifferent 
behaviour for SB-scenarios. Furthermore, the transfer preference for BS is slightly 
stronger for BS10-scenarios compared with BS5-scenarios. From our verbal 
protocols we learn that many teams consider the five and ten token amounts too 
small to effectively influence their payoffs – which intuitively affects scenarios 
involving five token transfer amounts more strongly. Furthermore, it is quite 
intriguing how different teams attempted trickery in these trials through opposing 
assumptions. Two BS5-teams attempted trickery by transferring whilst two other 
BS5-teams attempted trickery by not transferring; similarly, one SB10-team 
attempted trickery by transferring whilst another SB10-team attempted trickery by 
not transferring. It is clear that some teams aim to trick their opponents in scenarios 
without dominance but it is somewhat ironic that no consensus exists as to ‘what’ 
trickery behaviour would entail. The best explanation for their diverging 
understanding of trickery behaviour would, of course, be a differential level of 
reasoning from a level k perspective. Finally, we note that three out of nine SB10-
teams did not transfer simply to avoid increasing the payoff difference. This was a 
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common finding for SB-trials across dominance levels; which aligns well with 
maximin behaviour.  
 
Chooser behaviour across experiments 
In scenarios of strong dominance for which the transfer was made in 
Experiment Two we mostly see DT-decisions. Looking at verbal protocol data we 
observe five teams who pointed out the dominance and one team who chose DT 
since it offered a minimum of 35 (i.e. this may potentially be a typo meant to be 
‘75’) tokens. One team chose DF with the idea that the opponent would not make 
such large transfers if DF is not better. The data from Experiment Two suggests a 
slight preference towards DT when no transfer is made. Verbal protocol data 
suggests that this may be a random choice (one team concluded this), that it implies 
an SB-directionality and thus DT is the better decision (two teams concluded this), 
whilst an expectation of both trickery and non-trickery is used to argue in favour of 
DF-choices.  
For scenarios of weak dominance we only observe a slight DT-preference 
when transfers are made in Experiment Two. This contrasts quite strongly with the 
verbal protocol findings in which most teams realise dominance whilst other teams 
also pick DT for reasons such as ‘risk’. Furthermore, when no transfer is made 
Experiment Two shows a slight favouring for DF-decisions whilst the verbal 
protocols suggest somewhat of a preference towards DT with reasoning suggesting 
that the transfer may be rejected due to an SB-directionality. One potential reason 
why we see a mismatch between Experiment Two and Experiment Three for twenty 
token-scenarios relates to the task now involving two people. Only one teammate 
needs to realise dominance to demonstrate the logic to their teammate making it 
more likely for teams in general to realise dominance.   
In scenarios without dominance we observe a slight DF-preference when 
transfers are made and perhaps a slight DT-preference when transfers are not made. 
Looking at reasoning processes from Experiment Three we see that the majority of 
Chooser-teams looks at expected values when the transfer is made (providing an odd 
contrast with data from experiment one – where DF was preferred when the transfer 
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is made) whilst a few teams consider it a random guess. When the transfer is not 
made the majority of teams considers it a game of luck.  
 
Behavioural consistency 
Awareness of dominance does not persist across trials. When we assessed 
consistency of behaviour within trials of a certain dominance level in Experiment 
Two we observed some behaviour in line with predictions from popular frameworks 
however many participants do not appear to behave consistently according to the 
same frameworks. Furthermore, Participants adhering to predictions do not seem to 
do this consistently across dominance levels; different reasoning patterns may guide 
behaviour depending on the structure of the game. This may relate to the finding by 
Colman et al. (2014) that behaviour could be explained best through a combination 
of frameworks and that certain frameworks work better in simpler settings (e.g. a 
2x2 or a 3x3 game matrix) whilst other frameworks are more effective in more 
complex games (e.g. 4x4 game matrixes). For example, it may be more 
straightforward for participants that dominance is involved when they are presented 
with a twenty token transfer in BS-directionality allowing dominance to guide 
behaviour whilst a thirty token transfer might make features such as ‘risk’ more 
salient to guide decision making resulting to higher adherence to strategies such as 
maximin.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provides us with insights into behaviour in a novel competitive 
game. Additionally to our base game (Experiment Two) we use an approach of 
verbal protocols (Experiment Three) to gauge how participants experience the game 
and what their reasoning processes are. Furthermore, we assessed whether theoretical 
frameworks are used consistently across trials. Findings suggest that small transfer 
amounts are often discounted since they cannot affect payoffs in a strong way; 
furthermore, dominance is not spotted as easily as would be expected for a simplistic 
game. It should appear relatively straightforward that a transfer of 30 tokens always 
implies a better DT-value compared with the DF-value; however, it is often easier 
for participants to realise weak dominance than strong dominance. Furthermore, 
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awareness of dominance on one trial does not result into awareness of dominance on 
the consecutive trial; for example, it should be easy to discover that a thirty token 
transfer is ill-advised when one discovered on the previous trial that a twenty token 
transfer consistently leads to a better DT-value. Regarding theoretical consistency 
we observed in Experiment Two that many participants do not make systematic 
choices in the same context (i.e. involving a same dominance level and directionality 
when looking at Decider behaviour; or involving a same dominance level and 
transfer decision when looking at Chooser behaviour). Furthermore, theoretical 
adherence across dominance levels is even less prevalent. From Experiment Three 
we learned that participants reason differently about the task depending on the 
concrete scenario they face (though we only have six trials to assess this on). This 
somewhat relates to the finding by Colman et al. (2004) that behaviour is explained 
best by a combination of different frameworks and that certain frameworks work 
better in simpler settings (e.g. a 2x2 or a 3x3 game matrix) whilst other frameworks 
are more effective in more complex games (e.g. 4x4 game matrixes). For example, it 
may be more straightforward for participants that dominance is involved when they 
are presented with a twenty token transfer in BS-directionality allowing dominance 
to guide behaviour whilst a thirty token transfer might make features such as ‘risk’ 
more salient in guiding decision-making. Furthermore, we consider it extremely 
useful to explore reasoning for experimental games. It can help fine-tune designs by 
identifying potential weaknesses (e.g. many participants do not consider the transfer 
amounts from scenarios without dominance large enough to affect payoffs) and may 
explain behaviour in ways that were not considered previously.  
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Chapter 4 Suitcase Game: a game of trickery, equality and information 
 
Abstract  
In the previous chapters we introduced the reader to two novel competitive 
games. We consistently looked at the same theoretical frameworks (i.e. Nash, 
level k and maximin) to explore experimental predictions and we concluded 
that behaviour does not consistently relate to a specific framework. 
Additionally, we discussed risk attitudes and verbal protocols as potential 
procedures to help explain observed behaviour. In the current chapter we 
introduce a final competitive game. Our exploration for this chapter centers 
on a number of hypotheses. Furthermore, we assess how behaviour is 
affected by the provision of additional knowledge.  
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we discussed two competitive games in which Player 
One (P1) divides an amount into two shares whilst Player Two (P2) decides who 
receives which share as their pay-off. The current chapter introduces a third game 
with this set-up. Each of the three games involves a different degree of knowledge as 
is described in Figure 57. 
Figure 57: The relationship between the Envelope, Transfer and Suitcase Game 
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In the Envelope Game (chapter 2) P1 knows the value of one of two 
envelopes whilst P2 did not know the value of either envelope; in the Transfer Game 
(chapter 3) P1 knows the value of two boxes whilst P2 does not know the value of 
either box. In the current paradigm P1 knows both the value of a ‘suitcase’ and a 
‘table’ whilst P2 solely knows the value of the table. Clearly, the three games have 
strong relationships as they fill the gaps between games of perfect information and 
games of imperfect information
54
.  
 
Paradigm 
In the current chapter we refer to the pay-off options as ‘suitcase’ and ‘table’. 
The initial set-up is such that the suitcase contains an unknown amount of valuable 
tokens (referred to as the ‘distribution amount’ or DA) whilst the table contains zero 
tokens. P1 privately opens the suitcase and his task is to split the DA in two parts. 
One part is placed on the table whilst the remainder is kept in the suitcase (see Figure 
58).  
Figure 58: P1's task 
                                                 
54
 We point out to the reader that the moves made by nature are not observed by the second player; in 
the envelope game the first player even suffers imperfect information.  
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This figure illustrates the experimental task for the Splitter.  
 
P2 does not know the (remaining) value of the suitcase but she knows how 
many tokens have been transferred to the table. Her choice is to decide between the 
suitcase amount and the table amount (see Figure 59).  
Figure 59: P2's task 
 
This figure illustrates the task for the Chooser.  
 
So far we omitted one crucial aspect of our paradigm. Concretely, 
participants are provided with additional knowledge on half of their trials. This 
knowledge comes in the shape of two numerical values which we refer to as 
“Announced Values” (AV) throughout this chapter. The AVs are consistently 
represented in symbolic forms of ‘S’ and ‘L’ (i.e. Small and Large AV). It should be 
clear that both players receive AVs on the same trials and that they receive the exact 
same AVs. The reader may remember that we also provided additional knowledge in 
previous chapters. In the Envelope Game (chapter 2) participants knew the minimum 
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value of each envelope and the sum of the three envelopes
55
; and in the Transfer 
Game (chapter 3) we told participants that one box is worth 80 tokens whilst the 
other box is worth 40 tokens. However, in the Suitcase Game we investigate the 
effect of having such background knowledge by providing participants with AVs on 
only half of the trials.  
 
Links to the Literature 
The Suitcase Game strongly relates to the topic of information asymmetry. A 
highly influential model in this context was Akerlof’s (1970) discussion on the 
second-hand car market. He posits that there are both bad cars (which we call 
lemons) and good cars (which we call cherries or peaches). Akerlof makes the 
assumption that sellers have more information that buyers (i.e. they can assess 
whether a car is a lemon versus a cherry). Since buyers cannot distinguish between 
cherries and lemons the rational buyer is assumed to have a willingness to pay 
(WTP) of only the average market price. However, sellers of cherries do not accept 
the average price and are hence driven from the market through adverse selection 
(i.e. only sellers of lemons are happy to sell at the average market price). We provide 
a schematic illustration of Akerlofs model in which we simplify by assuming that 
equal amounts of lemons and cherries are present in the market; however even 
without this simplification the same conclusions are drawn (see Figure 60).  
Figure 60: Akerlof's market for lemons 
 
This figure schematically summarizes Akerlof’s model.  
                                                 
55
 We remind the reader that the Envelope Game consisted of three envelopes which each had a 
minimum value of 2 coins and which summed together to a total of 12 coins. One of these three 
envelopes was destroyed without revealing its content such that participants had some information 
whilst lacking perfect information.  
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To illustrate the relevance of the Suitcase Game to the reader we rephrase the 
game as the Car Game. Image that two people co-own a car (for example, after a 
divorce or inheritance). One of them is quite knowledgeable about cars and can 
easily assess its value whilst the other person has no idea what the car is worth. To 
induce fairness it is decided that the knowledgeable person estimates the resale value 
of the car and that he offers half of the resale value estimate on the table. The less 
knowledgeable person then decides whether she rather receives the amount offered 
on the table (and foregoes her ownership of the car) or whether she rather pays the 
table amount herself such that she receives full ownership of the car (see Figure 61).  
Figure 61: The suitcase game in comparison with Akerlof 
 
This figure illustrates how the Suitcase Game can be framed as a ‘Car Game’ for 
comparison with Akerlof’s model. 
 
Psychologically, we consider the car game of interest since it can provide 
intuitions as to why cherries are sold since it does not relate solely to co-owners of 
goods. When buyers assess whether to buy a specific car they may not always 
rationally consider the average market price which Akerlof’s model suggests; instead 
they might approach the task by looking at the price of the car and assessing whether 
they rather have the car by foregoing some of their savings versus whether they 
rather keep their savings intact by foregoing the car. Furthermore, one can argue that 
the real life scenarios are not as simple as knowledgeable sellers and uninformed 
buyers; it is possible that buyers assess the maximum and minimum value of cars 
similar to the one that can be bought (by researching the make, model, mileage etc.). 
Assuming that buyers and sellers have the same maximum and minimum values in 
mind this idea corresponds well with our AVs.  
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The Car Game is roughly the same as the Suitcase Game setup, with the main 
difference being that the Car Game can be interpret as having ‘costs’ (since one 
“pays” the table amount to receive the car – even though the car is supposedly 
always worth more than the table amount) whilst the Suitcase Game is framed solely 
in terms of gains (i.e. either I gain the suitcase amount or I gain the table amount). 
Furthermore, the suitcase game cannot lead to negative payoffs (i.e. the suitcase 
contains at worst zero tokens) whilst the car game can theoretically lead to negative 
payoffs, i.e. if the table amount is larger than the car’s resale value estimate.  
 
Mathematical notation 
In this chapter we occasionally use a mathematical notation for intervals that 
may be unique for specific countries. Imagine an interval of values situated between 
X and Y. Depending on the scenario it is possible that X (or Y) lies within the 
interval but it is also possible that X (or Y) lies outside of the interval. Our notation 
uses the direction of square brackets to indicate whether the boundaries of the 
interval lie within the interval. Thus, the notation  X,Y signifies an interval 
consisting of values between X and Y, with both X and Y included in the interval. 
Meanwhile, the notation  X,Y signifies the interval of values between X and Y with 
both X and Y excluded from the interval. The final two notations we may use are 
 X,Y and  X,Y which signify intervals between X and Y in which the former 
notation includes Y but excludes X whilst the latter notation includes X but excludes 
Y. 
 
Assumptions and game structure  
We assume that participants are rational agents who aim to maximize their 
own pay-off (and thus minimize the pay-off of the other player). Furthermore, we 
assume that decisions are affected by knowledge of the two announced values 
(AVs). Concretely, we assume that the choice made by P1 (to whom we refer in this 
chapter as ‘Splitter’) is affected both by the distribution amount (DA) and the AVs 
whilst the choice made by P2 (to whom we refer in this chapter as ‘Chooser’) is 
assumably affected both by the AVs and the table amount. Next, we explore the 
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structure of the experimental game. To provide a clear explanation we start off with 
a numerical example in which the small AV equals 40 tokens whilst the large AV 
equals 60 tokens (i.e. S=40 and L=60) (see Figure 62).  
Figure 62: Numerical example S=40 and L=60 
 
It should be clear from Figure 62 that a rational Splitter cannot place less than 
20 tokens on the table (since the Chooser would pick the suitcase due to strong 
dominance) nor can he place more than 30 tokens on the table (since the Chooser 
would pick the table due to strong dominance). The Splitter is thus limited to either 
place exactly 20 or 30 tokens on the table (i.e. scenarios of weak dominance) or to 
select an amount between 20 and 30 tokens (i.e. scenarios without dominance). We 
conclude that 
S
2
 and 
L
2
are threshold values for dominance and rational Splitters 
should never place an amount smaller than 
S
2
 or larger than 
L
2
 on the table. 
Furthermore, the Splitter should not place 
S
2
on the table when the DA is L nor 
should he place 
L
2
 on the table when the DA is S, since a rational Chooser would 
pick according to weak dominance in such contexts. It is worthwhile to note that the 
scenario is slightly more nuanced when the AVs lie further apart (see Figure 63).  
Figure 63: Numerical example S=40 and L=100 
 
When the AVs lie far apart it is possible to place an amount on the table 
between 
S
2
 and 
L
2
which is larger than S. Clearly, this allows the Chooser to infer 
that L has been divided implying that she would always pick the larger chunk if the 
DA were divided in unequal parts. Using the example from Figure 63 it is possible to 
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place an amount on the table that falls between the thresholds of 20 and 50 tokens 
which reveals that L has been divided (e.g. 41 tokens cannot be placed on the table 
when dividing 40 tokens). Thus, a rational Splitter should never place more than S 
on the table unless he divides into equal segments.  
 
Nash predictions 
In this section we discuss the Nash predictions for the suitcase game. Given 
the multitude of possible scenarios we limit our analysis to a more abstract 
computation using simplified numbers. First, we look at scenarios in which 
additional values (AVs) are provided since such scenarios lead to a lower bound 
threshold (i.e. 
2
S
) and a higher bound threshold (i.e. 
2
L
) for the table amount. When 
less tokens are placed on the table than the lower bound threshold the suitcase 
becomes strongly dominant whilst the table becomes strongly dominant if more 
tokens than the higher bound threshold are placed on the table
56
. Thus, equilibria 
states can only exist within the interval ,
2 2
S L 
 
 
. It is worthwhile to point out that the 
AVs in our numerical example are close-distanced (i.e. half of the large amount is 
less than the small amount). Whenever we find a PBNE state we infer whether the 
same PBNE exists for far distanced amounts by assessing whether the interval 
,
2
L
S
 
 
 
 is part of the equilibrium. Far-distanced AVs cannot be in an equilibrium 
state when the table amount lies in the interval ,
2
L
S
 
 
 
given that P2 would be able to 
deduce the exact DA in such scenarios (and thus P1 would want to change to a 
different table amount). This implies that whenever a PBNE state is found for close 
distanced AVs in which the table amount is not part of the interval ,
2
L
S
 
 
 
, the same 
PBNE will exist for scenarios in which the AVs are far distanced. Furthermore, if no 
                                                 
56
 Notice that we already explained this in the ‘game structure’ of the experiment. We can exclude the 
idea that less/more tokens would be transferred than the lower/higher bound threshold since this 
allows P2 to systematically receive the better deal; hence, P1 would want to deviate – i.e. such 
decisions cannot lead to a PBNE.  
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PBNE state is found for close distanced AVs then there will never be a PBNE state 
for far distanced AVs.  
We explore potential PBNEs for close-distanced AVs using a simplified 
example in which the small amount is a DA of six tokens whilst the large amount is 
a DA of ten tokens (i.e. S=6, L=10) (see Figure 64).  
Figure 64: Game tree for PBNE computations involving close values 
 
Note that we speak of the ‘init6’ type when the distribution amount is six 
tokens whilst we speak of the ‘init10’ type when the distribution amount is ten 
tokens.  
 
Information sets 
We point out to the reader that our figures in this appendix do not display 
information sets. A dotted line should be present between ‘transfer 3’ decisions for 
both types; between ‘transfer 4’ decisions for both types and between ‘transfer 5’ 
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decisions for both types
57
. However, the information set for ‘transfer 4’ decisions 
cannot be added to the figure without cluttering the display; thus we simplified the 
visual representation of the PBNE calculations by not including these information 
sets – but they are still present.  
Next, we explore potential PBNEs starting with the Pooling PBNEs.  
 
Pooling PBNE 
A Pooling Equilibrium requires that the two types (init6 and init10) behave 
the same way. There are three potential Pooling Equilibria in our example: (a) both 
types can transfer three tokens; (b) both types can transfer four tokens; or (c) both 
types can transfer five tokens (see Figure 65).  
Figure 65: Possible Pooling PBNEs 
 
                                                 
57
 i.e. P2 does not know which node she is in whenever a transfer of X tokens is made: she may be in 
the (init6, transfer X) node or she may be in the (init10, transfer X) node. 
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We can easily deduce that there is no equilibrium possible when both types 
choose to transfer three tokens (i.e. the orange path) since P2 would choose the 
suitcase (at least 50% of the time) implying that the ‘init10’ type wants to deviate 
and transfer five tokens (i.e. this would offer him an EP of five tokens rather than 
three tokens). Similarly, there is no equilibrium possible when both types of P1 
choose to transfer five tokens (i.e. the purple path) since P2 would choose the table 
(at least 50% of the time) implying that the ‘init5’ type wants to deviate and transfer 
three tokens (i.e. this would offer him an EP of three tokens rather than one token). 
There is only one possibility left: both types may decide to transfer four tokens (i.e. 
the blue path); in such a scenario it is not immediately clear to P2 whether the table 
versus suitcase yields a better pay-off
58
. We explore this possibility more in-depth in 
Figure 66. 
Figure 66: Is there a Pooling PBNE in which both types of P1 transfer four tokens 
 
                                                 
58
 The same conclusion holds if more than three choices could be made. For example, if 3.5 tokens 
could be transferred this would not result in a Pooling Equilibrium because P2 has a higher expected 
payoff (EP) from choosing the suitcase with it being equally likely that P1 made this choice as init6 
versus init10 type. Thus, the init10 type would deviate towards transferring four tokens. And if 4.5 
tokens could be transferred then the init6 type would deviate. Thus, only the average of the two AVs 
can be a Pooling PBNE.  
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First, we observe that P2 is indifferent between the suitcase and the table 
when four tokens are transferred since  2 | 4PEP table transfer =
 2 | 4PEP suitcase transfer . She can thus choose the table in any probability she likes 
– we can later restrict this probability to remain in an equilibrium state. Next, we set 
P2’s beliefs such that she becomes indifferent (between choosing the table and the 
suitcase) when three or five tokens are transferred (i.e. the off-equilibria paths). 
When three tokens are transferred P2’s belief is such that P1 must be the ‘init6’ type 
( 1p  ) (see Equation 38). 
Equation 38: Setting P2s beliefs (p) 
2( | 3)PEP suitcase transfer = 3 7(1 )p p   
2( | 3)PEP table transfer = 3 3(1 )p p   
2( | 3)PEP suitcase transfer = 2( | 3)PEP table transfer 3 7(1 ) 3 3(1 )p p p p     
 7(1 ) 3(1 )p p     7 7 3 3p p    4 4p   1 p  
If she believes there is even the slightest chance of being in the ‘init10’ node 
she would pick the suitcase (instead of being indifferent). When five tokens are 
transferred P2’s belief is such that P1 must be the ‘init10’ type ( 0r  ) (see Equation 
39). 
Equation 39: Setting P2s beliefs (r) 
2( | 5)PEP suitcase transfer =1 5(1 )r r   
2( | 5)PEP table transfer =5 5(1 )r r   
2( | 5)PEP suitcase transfer = 2( | 5)PEP table transfer 1 5(1 ) 5 5(1 )r r r r        
1 5r r   0 4r   0 r  
If she beliefs that there is even the slightest chance of being in the ‘init6’ 
node she would pick the table (instead of being indifferent). To ensure that this is an 
equilibrium state we need to set a probability (Q) for P2 to pick the suitcase when 
four tokens are transferred such that P1 has no desire to deviate from the equilibrium 
path (see Figure 67 and Equation 40). 
Figure 67: Setting the value for Q such that P1 does not desire to deviate 
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Equation 40: Setting the value for Q such that P1 would be indifferent 
1 1( 3) ( 4)P PEP transfer EP transfer 3 4 2(1 )Q Q    3 2 2Q   1 2Q 
1
2
Q   
1 1( 5) ( 4)P PEP transfer EP transfer 5 4 6(1 )Q Q    5 2 6Q   2 1Q 
1
2
Q   
This means that P2 has to pick the table exactly 50% of the time when four 
tokens are transferred to prevent P1 from deviating towards transferring three or five 
tokens. However, we should also consider what would happen if P1 could make 
transfers such as 3.5 tokens (i.e. scenarios between the currently assessed cases 
typically exist and may change the picture). This possibility would involve its own 
beliefs for P2 and the probability of P2 picking the suitcase if a 3.5 transfer is made 
needs to be set such that P1 does not desire to deviate from the suggested 
equilibrium state (see Figure 68 and Equation 41).  
Figure 68: What happens if a transfer of 3.5 tokens can be made 
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Equation 41: Computing P2s beliefs (p') if 3.5 tokens are transferred 
2( | 3.5)PEP suitcase transfer = 3.5 ' 3.5(1 ')p p   
2( | 3.5)PEP table transfer = 2.5 ' 6.5(1 ')p p   
2( | 3.5)PEP suitcase transfer = 2( | 3.5)PEP table transfer  3.5 ' 3.5(1 ')p p  =
2.5 ' 6.5(1 ')p p    3.5 4.5 ' 6.5p    3 4.5 'p    
6
'
9
p  
2
'
3
p   
We skip the computation of the parameter ‘R’ due to its symmetric nature; 
and assess whether we can set the probability Q (i.e. the same Q as we set before to 
equal 50%) such that P1 is indifferent between transferring 3.5 tokens versus 
transferring 4 tokens. Note, that the EP of a 3.5 token transfer also requires a 
probability parameter (since the table and suitcase now have different values). 
Equation 42: Setting parameter values such that P1 does not desire to deviate 
1 1( 3.5 | 6) ( 4 | 6)P PEP transfer init EP transfer init 3.5 2.5(1 ) 4 2(1 )S S Q Q       
2.5 2 2S Q    0.5 2S Q  
0.5
2
S
Q

   
  Suitcase Game   
 
148 
 
1 1( 3.5 | 10) ( 4 | 10)P PEP transfer init EP transfer init
3.5 6.5(1 ) 4 6(1 )S S Q Q       3 6.5 2 6S Q     3 0.5 2S Q   
3 0.5
2
S
Q

   
Since we already set the value of Q earlier to be 50%, this means that the 
parameter S needs to be set as 0.5S  and 0.5S  . Thus, if a transfer is made 
between three and four (or between four and five) tokens P2 should pick randomly 
such that P1 has no incentive to deviate. Concretely, the init6 type would transfer 3.5 
tokens if P2 were more likely to pick the suitcase whilst the init10 type would 
transfer 3.5 tokens if P2 were more likely to pick the table. Thus, we conclude that 
parameters can be set such that P1 does not desire to deviate even when additional 
‘in between’ scenarios are possible strategies59. 
In essence, there is a Pooling PBNE in which P1 always transfers four tokens 
whilst P2 picks the suitcase exactly half the time when four token transfers are made. 
P2 picks the suitcase at least 50% of the time if three tokens are transferred whilst 
she picks the table at least 50% of the time if five tokens are transferred. 
Furthermore, if an amount between three and five tokens is transferred P2 picks the 
suitcase exactly 50% of the time (to prevent P1 from deviating with either of his 
types). We stress for the reader that a Pooling PBNE does not exists for any other 
amount between three and five tokens since P2 would then have a clear preference 
(i.e. a preference for the table if 4.5 tokens are placed on the table without regards to 
the distribution amount being small versus large; and a preference for the suitcase if 
3.5 tokens are placed on the table without regards to the distribution amount). The 
only Pooling PBNE possible is when exactly 4 tokens are placed on the table since 
this makes P2 indifferent between the table and suitcase.  
For far AVs the same Pooling PBNEs exist since half of the average AV for 
far values is consistently smaller than S (implying that same conclusions hold as for 
close values). This is proven in Equation 43.  
                                                 
59
 We did this additional part with ‘in between’ scenarios to illustrate that the same results are found 
in cases where more complex numbers are used. This excursion is irrelevant for the separating PBNEs 
that we discuss later on given that those already have an ‘in between’ scenario exemplified (i.e. 
transfer four); but it seems worthwhile to add it in for Pooling PBNEs due to their lack of in between 
scenarios in our simplified example.  
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Equation 43: Proof that half the average AV for small values is smaller than S 
If the small AV is S then the large AV for values is 
5S
2
; thus the average AV value 
is 
5S 2S+5S
S+
2S+5S 7S2 2
2 2 4 4
   . Thus, half of the average AV value is by 
definition smaller than S, since 
7S
7S4
2 8
S  .  
 
Separating PBNE  
Separating Equilibria are those in which P1 makes a different choice if his 
type is init6 versus init10. The result is that P2 can deduce P1’s type based on his 
actions. We assess whether a Separating PBNE is possible for close amounts (see 
Figure 69). 
Figure 69: Assessing whether a separating PBNE possible for close amounts 
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P2’s preferences for each of the possible nodes are illustrated in orange. 
Based on these preferences we can assess when P1 would deviate in each of his 
types. The purple arrows show how P1 wants to deviate as ‘init6’ type from 
transferring five or four tokens to transferring three tokens. The blue arrows show 
how P1 wants to deviate as ‘init10’ type from transferring three or four tokens to 
transferring five tokens. From this we conclude that the only possible Separating 
PBNE is to transfer three tokens as ‘init6’ type and to transfer five tokens as ‘init10’ 
type. In Figure 70 we assess whether such equilibrium can exist.  
Figure 70: Is a Separating PBNE possible for close values 
 
If this is an equilibrium-state then P2 is indifferent between the table and the 
suitcase. After all, her EP is the same regardless her choice since only the ‘init10’ 
type transfers five tokens whilst only the ‘init6’ type transfers three tokens. 
However, to be in this equilibrium state her choices need to be such that P1 has no 
incentive to deviate. Concretely, if she always picks ‘table’ when five tokens are 
transferred whilst picking ‘suitcase’ when three tokens are transferred P1 has no 
incentive to deviate and an equilibrium-state would be reached. However, even when 
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P2 uses a mixed strategy the probabilities can be set such that P1 does not desire to 
deviate (see Equation 44 and Figure 71).  
Equation 44: Setting the probabilities for P2’s decisions such that P1 does not want to deviate 
from the equilibrium path 
   1 13| 10 5 | 10P PEP transfer init EP transfer init  
   1 15 | 6 3| 6P PEP transfer init EP transfer init  
Figure 71: Setting the probabilities Q and R such that P1 does not want to deviate 
 
To prevent P1 from deviating we set 
1
2
Q  and 
1
2
R   (see Equation 45). 
Equation 45: Setting the values for Q and R 
 5 1 1 3Q Q   5 1 3Q Q    4 2Q 
1
2
Q   
 3 7 1 5R R    3 7 7 5R R    4 2R  
2
4
R

 

1
2
R  .  
Thus, as long as P2 picks the table at least 50% of the time when five tokens 
are transferred whilst picking the suitcase at least 50% of the time when three tokens 
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are transferred she ensures that P1 has no desire to deviate from the equilibrium state 
(since deviating would decrease his EP).   
In conclusion, there is a Separating PBNE in which P1 aims to equalize the 
table and suitcase value whilst P2 picks the table (at least 50% of the time) when it 
contains five tokens (i.e. half of the large amount’s value) whilst she picks the 
suitcase (at least 50% of the time) when the table contains three tokens (i.e. half of 
the small amount’s value). Since the equilibrium does not involve values from the 
,
2
L
S
 
 
 
 interval it remains an equilibrium state when the AVs are ‘far’ distanced.  
 
Semi-Separating PBNE 
We speak of a Semi-Separating PBNE when one type uses a mixed strategy 
whilst the other type uses a pure strategy. From our previous discussions it should be 
obvious that there cannot be an equilibrium state in which both types consider the 
strategy of transferring three tokens (i.e. the init10 type would deviate) nor can there 
be an equilibrium state in which both types consider the strategy of transferring five 
tokens (i.e. the init6 type would deviate). Thus, we are left with five possible Semi-
Separating PBNEs as is summarized in Table 50.  
Table 50: Possible semi-separating PBNEs 
 Type init6 Type init10 
Type init6 mixes Transfer three or transfer four Transfer four  
Transfer three or transfer four  Transfer five 
Type init10 mixes Transfer three Transfer four or transfer five 
Transfer four  Transfer four or transfer five 
Both types mix Transfer three or transfer four Transfer four or transfer five 
 
However, it does not take much imagination to further exclude two of these 
mixtures as they cannot be equilibrium states. If type ‘init6’ mixes between 
transferring three and four tokens whilst type ‘init10’ transfers five tokens then P2 
can deduce her opponents type from their decision. Thus, the ‘init6’ type would 
rather transfer three tokens (and receive three tokens as pay-off) than transferring 
four tokens (and receiving only two tokens as his pay-off). Similarly, there is no 
equilibrium possible in which the ‘init10’ type transfers four or five tokens whilst the 
‘init6’ type transfers three tokens for the same reasons (i.e. P2 would deduce P1’s 
type and thus the ‘init10’ type rather transfers five tokens than using a mixed 
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strategy). Thus, we only need to consider scenarios in which both types transfer four 
tokens.  
We first discuss the scenario in which the ‘init6’ type mixes whilst the 
‘init10’ type does not mix. Given the symmetry with the scenario in which the 
‘init10’ type mixes whilst the init6’ type does not mix we only discuss one of these 
scenarios and generalize the outcome.  
Figure 72: Exploring whether a semi-separating PBNE exists in which the 'init6' type mixes 
between transferring three and four tokens whilst 'init10' always transfers five tokens 
 
For this to be a Semi-Separating PBNE we need to set P2’s belief (‘p’) such 
that she is indifferent between choosing the table versus suitcase when four tokens 
are transferred. This requires a belief 0.5p   (see Equation 46). 
Equation 46: Computing P2's belief 
 
2
| 4 2 6(1 )
P
EP suitcase transfer p p    
 
2
| 4 4 4(1 )
P
EP table transfer p p    
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   
2 2
| 4 | 4 2 6(1 ) 4 4(1 )
P P
EP suitcase transfer EP table transfer p p p p      
2(1 ) 2p p   1 p p  
1
2
p   
Next, we compute which mixed strategy P1 should use for the equilibrium 
state to exist. We use Bayes’ rule (see Equation 47). 
Equation 47: Computing P1s mixed strategy 
10 4| 10
10 4| 10 6 4| 6
1
2
init transfer init
init transfer init init transfer init
prob prob
p
prob prob prob prob

 
  
4| 6
1
1
1 2
1 12
1
2 2
transfer initprob

 
   4| 6
1
1
1 2
1 12
1
2 2
transfer initprob

 
  
 
4| 6
1
1
1 2
1 12
1
2 2
transfer initprob

 
  
4| 6
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2 2
transfer initprob
 
      
 
 
4| 6
1 1
1 1
2 2
transfer initprob     4| 6
1 1
2 2
transfer initprob   4| 6 1transfer initprob   
This does not lead to a Semi-Separating PBNE of the desired structure since 
the init6 type would transfer four tokens with probability ‘one’ instead of using a 
mixed strategy. There cannot be a Semi-Separating PBNE either in which the init10 
type mixes between transferring four versus five tokens whilst the init6 type transfers 
four tokens since the init10 type would then transfer four tokens with probability 
‘one’ (i.e. symmetrical to the scenario that was just discussed).  
A final Semi-Separating PBNE that can exist is when both types mix 
between equalizing and transferring four tokens (see Figure 73).  
Figure 73: Exploring a fully mixed PBNE 
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For this to be a Semi-Separating PBNE P2 needs to be indifferent between 
the suitcase and the table regardless whether three, four or five tokens are 
transferred. When three tokens are transferred P2 knows to be in the ‘init6, transfer 
3’ node in which she is indifferent between the table and suitcase (she would pick 
the suitcase at least 50% of the time to prevent P1 from deviating); similarly, when 
five tokens are transferred P2 knows to be in the ‘init10, transfer 5’ node in which 
she is also indifferent between the table and suitcase (she would pick the table at 
least 50% of the time to prevent P1 from deviating). Finally, when four tokens are 
transferred we compute P2EP  when she chooses the table versus the suitcase and set 
the parameters such that she is indifferent between them (see Equation 48).  
Equation 48: Setting Q and R such that P2 is indifferent when four tokens are transferred 
6 4|6
6 | 4
6 4|6 10 4|10
initially transfer initially
initially transfer
initially transfer initially initially transfer initially
prob prob
prob
prob prob prob prob


  
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                  =   
1
2
1 1
2 2
Q
Q R

  
= 
Q
Q R
 
 2 | 4PEP suitcase transfer =  2 6 1
Q Q
Q R Q R
 
  
  
 
 2 | 4PEP table transfer = 4 4 1
Q Q
Q R Q R
 
  
  
 
P2 is indifferent if: 2 6 1 4 4 1
Q Q Q Q
Q R Q R Q R Q R
   
       
      
 
 2 1 2
Q Q
Q R Q R
 
  
  
 1
Q Q
Q R Q R
 
 
 1 2
Q
Q R


 1 ( )
2
Q R Q 
 1 1
2 2
R Q  R Q  
Thus, we conclude that there is a Semi-Separating PBNE as long as the 
probability of the ‘init6’ type making a four tokens transfer equals the probability of 
the ‘init10’ type making a four token transfer ( R Q ). P1 cannot gain from 
deviating and thus we have a PBNE. Again, we stress for the reader that this 
equilibrium structure does not exist for any other amounts between three and five 
tokens that is shared between the two types of P1 since P2 would not pick the table 
exactly 50% of the time for any other amounts.  
Finally, the same Semi-Separating PBNE exists if far distanced AVs are used 
as long as the two types avoid the interval ,
2
L
S
 
 
 
(i.e. in this interval P2 can deduce 
that the large amount is divided and hence she can pick the larger value). 
 
Fully Mixed PBNE 
We speak of a Fully Mixed PBNE if both types of P1 use the same mixed 
strategy. The only Fully Mixed PBNE that we cannot immediately reject is one in 
which both types mix between transferring amounts from the interval ,
2 2
S L 
 
 
. We 
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thus explore whether a Fully Mixed PBNE can exist in which P1 uses only two 
strategies: either he transfer 3.5 tokens or he transfers 4.5 tokens. These strategies are 
equidistant from half of the average AV and thus have the most likelihood of 
generating equilibrium. Since we only discuss two potential strategies we use a 
simplified representation of the game structure which solely looks at those two 
strategies.  
Figure 74: Assessing Fully Mixed PBNEs 
 
Equation 49: Bayes' rule to compute parameter values such that the PBNE can exist 
6 3.5| 6
6| 3.5
6 3.5| 6 10 3.5| 10
init transfer init
init transfer
init transfer init init transfer init
prob
prob prob
prob prob prob prob

  
 
= 
1
2
1 1
2 2
S
S T

  
=
S
S T
 
2 ( | 3.5) 3.5 3.5(1 )P
S S
EP table transfer
S T S T
  
 
 
2 ( | 3.5) 2.5 6.5(1 )P
S S
EP suitcase transfer
S T S T
  
 
 
To be indifferent between the table and the suitcase when 3.5 tokens are 
transferred the parameters need to have the following relationship (see Equation 50): 
Equation 50: Making P2 indifferent when transfer 3.5 
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3.5 3.5(1 ) 2.5 6.5(1 )
S S S S
S T S T S T S T
    
   
3.5 3.5 3.5 2.5 6.5 6.5
S S S S
S T S T S T S T
     
   
 
3.5 6.5 4
S
S T
   

3 4 3( ) 4 3 3 4 3
S
S T S S T S T S
S T
          

 
To also be indifferent between the table and the suitcase when 4.5 tokens are 
transferred the parameters also need to have the following relationship
60
: 
Equation 51: Making P2 indifferent when transfer 4.5 
2 ( | 4.5) 4.5(1 ) 4.5P
S S
EP table transfer
S T S T
  
 
 
2 ( | 4.5) 1.5(1 ) 5.5P
S S
EP suitcase transfer
S T S T
  
 
 
4.5(1 ) 4.5 1.5(1 ) 5.5
S S S S
S T S T S T S T
    
   
4.5 4.5 4.5 5.5 1.5 1.5
S S S S
S T S T S T S T
     
   
 
4.5 1.5 4 3 4 3( ) 4 3 3 4 3
S S
S T S S T S T S
S T S T
            
 
 
Thus, we potentially have a Fully Mixed PBNE in which both 3.5 and 4.5 
transfers are made (both by the init6 and init10 player) as long as the probability of 
the init6 player making a 3.5 transfer is three times smaller than the probability of 
the init10 player making such a transfer. Similarly, the probability of the init6-player 
making the 4.5 transfer should be three times larger than the probability of the init10 
player making such a transfer. To ascertain whether this state is a plausible 
equilibrium we need to set P2’s decision probability such that P1 has no incentive to 
deviate from the equilibrium. We set the probability of P2 selecting the suitcase 
when 3.5 tokens are transferred as Q whilst we set the probability of selecting the 
suitcase when 4.5 tokens are transferred as Z (see Figure 75). 
                                                 
60
 Note that the probability of a 3.5 transfer being made by the init6-player is set as S
S+T
;  since the 
suggested equilibrium has only 3.5 and 4.5 transfers as possibilities this means that the probability of 
a 4.5 transfer being made by init6 has to equal S1 - 
S+T
; hence, even though it may seem like we swap 
which variable is multiplied by which parameter it is simply because the parameters need to sum to 
‘one’.  
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Figure 75: Setting Q and Z such that P1 does not desire to deviate  
 
Equation 52: Setting Q and Z parameters such that init6 does not desire to deviate 
1( 6 | 3.5) 3.5 2.5(1 )PP init transfer Q Q    
1( 6 | 4.5) 4.5 1.5(1 )PEP init transfer Z Z    
P1 is indifferent as init6 if: 3.5 2.5(1 ) 4.5 1.5(1 )Q Q Z Z      
3.5 2.5 2.5 4.5 1.5 1.5Q Q Z Z      1 2.5 3 1.5Q Z     
1 3 3 1Q Z Q Z       
Equation 53: Setting Q and Z parameters such that init10 does not desire to deviate 
1( 10 | 3.5) 3.5 6.5(1 )PEP init transfer Q Q    
1( 10 | 4.5) 4.5 5.5(1 )PEP init transfer Z Z    
P1 is indifferent as init10 if: 3.5 6.5(1 ) 4.5 5.5(1 )Q Q Z Z      
3.5 6.5 6.5 4.5 5.5 5.5Q Q Z Z       
3 6.5 5.5 3 1Q Z Q Z        
1
3 1 3 1
3
Z
Q Z Q Z Q

           
To have a Fully Mixed PBNE we need to satisfy 3 1Q Z  and 
1
3
Z
Q

 , thus: 
Equation 54: Setting Q and Z such that both init6 and init10 are indifferent between 3.5 and 4.5 
transfers  
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1 1 1
3(3 1) 1 9 3 1 8 43 1
3 3 2
3 1 3 1 3 1
3 13 1 3 1
Z Z
Z Z Z Z ZQ Z Z
Q Z Q Z Q Z
Q ZQ Z Q Z
   
             
     
                
 
1 1 1
1
2 2 2
2
1 3 2 1
3 1 3 1
2 2 2 2
Z Z Z
Z
Q Z Q Q Q
  
        
   
              
 
In conclusion, we find a Fully Mixed PBNE in which the init6 and init10 
type use the same two strategies which are equidistant from half of the average AV. 
P2 is indifferent since P1 uses a mixed strategy that does not allow her to gain from a 
consistent bias towards the table or suitcase; and P1 is indifferent since P2 uses a 
mixed strategy in which she picks the table and suitcase equally often regardless 
whether the 3.5 or the 4.5 transfer is made, since this does not allow P1 to gain from 
deviating
61
. This is applicable to all values between the thresholds for weak 
dominance; however, when we talk about ‘far’ values this is only applicable in a 
smaller interval (since P1 should not place more tokens on the table than S unless he 
aims for equal division).  
 
PBNE without additional knowledge 
We can also assess the Nash predictions when no additional information is 
given. In such scenarios players are not confronted with ‘possible’ DAs. Instead P1 
can only base his decision on the actual DA whilst P2 solely has the table amount to 
base her decision upon. Thus, the best strategy for P2 is to decide randomly (since 
she has no way to assess the size of the table value and can be exploited otherwise); 
meanwhile, any random (non-zero) table value is considered an equilibrium strategy 
for P1
62
.  
 
                                                 
61
 Note that P1 cannot gain from a systematic equal division strategy since the expected payoffs 
would be the same. This is not included for this analysis but is worthwhile being pointed out.  
62
 Note that P1 would place exactly half of the division amount on the table if we added the 
assumption of risk aversion to the analysis. 
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Nash Conclusion 
When participants receive AVs we find a number of Nash equilibria. There is 
an equilibrium in which the Splitter simply divides the DA in equal halves regardless 
his type; such equilibrium requires the Chooser to choose in accordance with weak 
dominance with a probability of at least 50% to ensure that the Splitter does not 
change his strategy
63
. Concretely, the Chooser chooses the table at least 50% of the 
time when 
L
2
is placed on the table whilst she chooses the suitcase at least 50% of 
the time when 
S
2
is placed on the table. Secondly, we find an equilibrium state in 
which the Splitter places half of the average of these threshold values on the table (
S+L
4
). For this to be an equilibrium state our Chooser needs to pick the table exactly 
50% of the time. If the Chooser picks the table more frequently then the Splitter 
would rather make an equal division if the distribution amount is S (by placing 
S
2
 on 
the table); whilst a Chooser-preference towards the suitcase would persuade the 
Splitter to make an equal division (by placing 
L
2
on the table) when the distribution 
amount is L. 
Another equilibrium state is reached when the Splitter mixes between placing 
half of the DA on the table (i.e. equal division) and placing half of the average AV 
on the table. In this equilibrium the Chooser picks the table with probability equal or 
larger than 50% if half of the large value is placed on the table whilst she picks the 
suitcase with probability equal or larger than 50% if half of the small value is placed 
on the table (to prevent the Splitter from deviating). Whenever half of the average 
AV is placed on the table she picks the suitcase at exactly 50% of the time. 
                                                 
63
 Note that the 50% requirement is set such that the Splitter has no incentive to deviate from the 
equilibrium state as deviations would decrease his EP. Given weak dominance it makes sense to 
assume that the Chooser makes choices with 100% certainty (since one of the options cannot be worse 
than its alternative), however, such behaviour is not required to remain in the equilibrium state. If she 
were to pick in accordance with weak dominance with a probability of 70% then the Splitter would 
still not desire to deviate from the equilibrium state; and as long as the Splitter doesn’t want to deviate 
the Chooser knows that she earns the same payoff regardless whether she picks the suitcase versus the 
table.  
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Finally, an equilibrium state exists in which the Splitter mixes between two 
(or more) strategies that are symmetrically equidistant from half of the average AV. 
The requirement is of course that he does not surpass the threshold values of 
dominance; and in case of ‘far’ values he should not place amounts larger than S on 
the table. The probability in which the Splitter uses his mixed strategy depends on 
the concrete DA and the mixed strategy he employs; for the Chooser the task is quite 
simple since her EP remains the same regardless her choice: she is indifferent. Due 
to her equilibrium requirements (i.e. she has to behave such that her opponent cannot 
gain from deviating from the equilibrium state) she picks the table and suitcase 
equally often regardless the concrete mixed strategy used by her opponent.  
It is worthwhile to assess how the Nash predictions change if the assumption 
of risk neutrality is replaced by an assumption of risk aversion. This would result in 
a preference towards equal division by the Splitter (since he risks losing out by 
employing alternative tactics). Meanwhile, a risk averse Chooser would prefer the 
table amount if more than half of the average AV is displayed on the table (i.e. the 
expected value of the table is higher) whilst she prefers the suitcase if less than half 
of the average AV is displayed on the table. 
If no AVs are provided then the Splitter should place a minimum of one 
token on the table (i.e. if the table contains zero tokens then Choosers would pick the 
suitcase since the suitcase cannot provide a worse pay-off). There are no other 
threshold values that Splitters needs to respect and thus he can randomly decide how 
many tokens to place on the table. Choosers do not have enough knowledge to assess 
whether the table versus suitcase provides a better pay-off and thus she should pick 
randomly. Under the assumption of risk averse behaviour the Nash equilibrium 
without AVs is for Splitters to divide the DA in equal parts; whilst the risk averse 
Chooser without AVs should still pick randomly. 
 
Level k predictions 
In this section we discuss the level k predictions for the suitcase game. We 
use a simplified notation to denote the level of reasoning for the Splitter as xS  whilst 
we denote the level of reasoning for the Chooser as xC ; the subscript ‘x’ refers to 
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their level of reasoning. For example, 0S  refers to the Splitter reasoning at level zero. 
Our main assumptions are that each player considers themselves to reason exactly 
one level higher than their opponent and that they make a best response on the 
assumed behaviour of the opponent. Thus, 
xS  makes his decisions with the 
expectation that his opponent is x-1C  whilst xC  makes her decisions expecting that 
her opponent is x-1S . We discuss level k predictions both under the assumption of risk 
neutrality and under the assumption of risk averseness.  
First, we discuss the predictions for the simplest scenario namely risk neutral 
agents in a context without AV-knowledge. 0S  and 0C are unsophisticated and make 
random decisions without considering the actions of the other player. At higher 
levels of reasoning decisions are based upon a best response strategy in relation to 
the expected actions of the opponent (who is assumed to be reasoning one level 
lower than themselves). Thus, 0S  randomly picks an amount from the interval 
 0, DA  whilst 0C  randomly decides whether to pick the table versus suitcase. Next, 
we reach level one. 1S  expects his opponent, 0C , to behave randomly and thus he 
again randomly picks an amount from the interval  0, DA  to place on the table. 1C  
has no way to assess whether the table amount is smaller or larger than the suitcase 
amount and thus she still picks randomly. However, it should be noted that 1C  would 
always pick the suitcase if no tokens are transferred (since this provides a context in 
which the suitcase cannot be worse than the table). At level two the Splitter realises 
that he should never place zero tokens on the table and thus he randomly selects a 
transfer amount from the interval  0, DA . A stable state is reached at this point (see 
Table 51). 
Table 51: Risk neutral level k predictions without AVs  
 Splitter Chooser 
Level 0 Random choice Random choice 
Level 1 Random choice Random choice 
  
The scenario changes slightly when we assume risk aversion. We expect that 
a risk averse 0S  has an inherent desire to decrease the payoff difference due to his 
risk averse nature. Thus, 0S  is expected to place half of the DA on the table. The risk 
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averse 0C  does not have any means to assess whether the table amount is small 
versus large and thus her risk aversion doesn’t affect her behaviour: she randomly 
decides between the table and the suitcase. Next, we reach level one. 1S  expects his 
opponent, 0C , to behave randomly and thus he remains true to his risk averse desires 
by dividing the DA equally. Similarly, 1C  realises that her opponent simply divides 
the DA into equal segments and thus she cannot do better than randomly selecting 
the table or the suitcase. A stable state is reached (see Table 52). 
Table 52: Risk averse level k predictions without AVs  
 Splitter Chooser 
Level 0 Equal division Random choice 
Level 1 Equal division Random choice 
 
We now move on to the more complicated scenario in which AVs are 
provided. We again start by discussing level k predictions under risk neutrality after 
which we explore risk averse predictions. The risk neutral 0S randomly decides how 
many tokens to place on the table (he is only limited by the DA as a maximum). 
Meanwhile 0C  randomly picks between the table and the suitcase. Next, we reach 
level one reasoning. 1S  randomly decides how many tokens to place on the table. 
Meanwhile, 1C  uses half of the average AV as a threshold value for her decision. If 
the table amount is larger than this threshold she picks the table whilst she picks the 
suitcase if the table amount is fewer than the threshold value. This is a best response 
since she expects the Splitter to behave randomly. Now we reach level two 
reasoning. 2S  tries to exploit his opponent’s decision threshold: whenever the 
suitcase contains the smaller amount ‘S’ he places one token less than the threshold 
value on the table; whenever the suitcase contains the larger amount ‘L’ he places 
one token more on the table compared with the threshold value
64
. 2C behaves the 
same as 1C : she picks the table whenever the table amount is larger than the 
threshold value whilst she picks the suitcase whenever the table amount is fewer than 
                                                 
64 
Note that he plays one token more on the table compared with the threshold since his opponent 
would choose the table amount (and thus he rather keeps the suitcase as large as possible); similarly 
when he plays one token less on the table compared with the threshold value this is because his 
opponent would choose the suitcase (and thus he wants to maximize the table value without passing 
the threshold). It is also worth pointing out to the reader that the Splitter will not divide into equal 
parts from level two onwards. Furthermore, this behaviour can only be due to randomness at level 0 
and level 1 for risk neutrality.  
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the threshold value. Next, we reach level three. 3S  behaves the same as 2S  since 
their opponents behaved the same. Meanwhile, 3C realises that her 2S -opponent has 
been exploiting her threshold heuristic and reverses her tactics. Thus, she selects the 
table whenever the table contains 
mean(AV)
1
2
 tokens, whilst she picks the suitcase 
whenever the table contains 
mean(AV)
+1
2
 tokens. Next, we reach level four 
reasoning. 4S is aware that his 3C -opponent uses a new decision rule and thus he 
reverses his own approach. Whenever the suitcase contains ‘S’ he places 
mean(AV)
+1
2
 on the table whilst he places 
mean(AV)
1
2
  on the table if the suitcase 
contained ‘L’65. At this point it should be clear that predictions continue cycling the 
same behaviour in a game of exploitation-attempts. A summary of these predictions 
is found in Table 53. 
Table 53: Risk neutral level k predictions with AVs  
 Splitter Chooser 
Level 0 Random choice Random choice 
Level 1 Random choice 
If Table > 
mean(AV)
2
: pick table 
If Table < 
mean(AV)
2
: pick suitcase 
If Table = 
mean(AV)
2
: pick randomly 
Level 2 
If S: place 
mean(AV)
1
2
 on table 
If L: place 
mean(AV)
+1
2
on table 
If Table > 
mean(AV)
2
: pick table 
If Table < 
mean(AV)
2
: pick suitcase 
If Table = 
mean(AV)
2
: pick randomly 
Level 3 
If S: place 
mean(AV)
1
2
 on table 
If L: place 
mean(AV)
+1
2
on table 
If Table = 
mean(AV)
1
2
 : pick table 
If Table = 
mean(AV)
+1
2
: pick suitcase 
Level 4 
If S: place 
mean(AV)
+1
2
on table 
If L: place 
mean(AV)
1
2
 on table 
If Table = 
mean(AV)
1
2
 : pick table 
If Table = 
mean(AV)
+1
2
: pick suitcase  
                                                 
65
 Note that the Splitter has to reverse his behaviour to outsmart the opponent. He cannot place other 
values on the table since it is unclear how the Chooser would respond to them (he may not gain from 
such strategies). 
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Finally, we discuss level k predictions for risk averse scenarios in which AV-
knowledge is present. We expect that a risk averse 
0S  has an inherent desire to 
decrease the payoff difference due to his risk averse nature. Thus, 0S  is expected to 
place half of the DA on the table. Meanwhile 0C  randomly decides between the table 
and the suitcase. Next, we reach level one. 1S  expects his opponent, 0C , to behave 
randomly and thus he remains true to his risk averse desires by dividing the DA 
equally. Similarly, 1C  realises that her opponent simply divides the DA into equal 
segments and thus she might as well pick randomly. A stable state is reached – with 
the same predictions as we had for risk averse scenarios without AV-knowledge (see 
Table 54).  
Table 54: Risk averse level k predictions with AVs  
 Splitter Chooser 
Level 0 Equal division Random choice 
Level 1 Equal division Random choice 
 
 
Maximin principle 
Predictions from maximin principle are the same regardless provision of 
AVs. Concretely, maximin would predict that Splitters divide the DA into two equal 
segments since this ensures the largest possible minimum payoff. For Choosers the 
maximin predictions with AVs are that she picks the table whenever more than 
S
2
is 
placed on the table since this means that the suitcase might contain less than 
S
2
(in 
the worst case scenario, in which S was divided). Furthermore, she picks the suitcase 
if less than 
S
2
is placed on the table since the suitcase would surely contain a larger 
amount. Finally, if 
S
2
is placed on the table she can choose randomly since the table 
and suitcase have the same minimum value. When AVs are not provided maximin 
predictions for Choosers are simply ‘random’ behaviour (since she cannot assess 
which option provides the best payoff).  
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Experiment Four 
Participants 
Participants for Experiment Four were 36 students and employees from 
Warwick University. They were recruited through SONA, an online system for 
participant recruitment. Data on demographics is missing (due to a yearly SONA-
maintenance which removed such data from the database). We ran three 
experimental sessions each consisted of exactly twelve participants (N=36). To avoid 
cancelling sessions due to participants not showing up we recruited four additional 
participants per session; if more than twelve participants showed up before the 
starting time we randomly selected participants to be send home with a £2 show-up 
fee. The possibility of being send home (due to an exact number of participants 
being required for the study) was advertised on SONA when participants signed up. 
Excluding participants happened through a procedure of shuffling a deck of cards 
(containing the cubicle numbers of all occupied computers) and randomly drawing 
one or more cards. 
Participants were paid a show-up fee (£2) and an additional performance fee 
(£0-£10) based on a random lottery incentive system. The expected pay-off for the 
average participant is £5.80; and the average participant earned £5.76. Participants 
are told during an introductory PowerPoint explanation that they earn a performance 
fee based on the amount of tokens won in a randomly selected trial. We did not 
inform participant of the conversion rate (tokens to pounds) to avoid potential biases 
due to monetary expectations. Each token that is won in the randomly selected trial 
translated into an additional £0.15 in performance fee
66
. We did not provide 
participants with details regarding the random selection procedure for the 
'performance fee' trial; concretely, a python script randomly selects a trial per 
participant to base their performance fee on. Different participants may be 
remunerated upon performance in different trials.  
 
                                                 
66
 This implies that theoretically the maximum performance fee is £15 (100 tokens); however, this is 
not too likely to occur given that it requires that (a) the randomly selected trial involves the highest 
distribution amount and that (b) P1 decides to transfer either zero tokens or the full amount. Hence, 
we advertised the experiment with a maximum performance fee of £10.   
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Materials 
 The experiment was performed in the Behavioural Science Lab; the coding 
was done by the author using a combination of python, HTML/CSS and willow. 
Participants faced a total of sixteen trials; and they swapped between being in the 
role of Splitter (P1) and being in the role of Chooser (P2) on each consecutive trial 
(to maximize fairness and exposure to both roles). They were randomly re-matched 
on every trial with an anonymous opponent and were aware of this. Random re-
matching was programmed to be fully random; in theory participants can be matched 
twice in a row with the same opponent but they do not know who they play against. 
Half of the trials in each role involved additional knowledge in the shape of two AVs 
(i.e. Announced Values). This means that Splitters and Choosers are provided with 
two numerical values and the knowledge that one of these two values has been 
placed in the suitcase (with equal probabilities for both amounts; and with both 
players knowing the same two numerical values). For practical reasons we refer to 
the smaller AV as 'S' whilst we refer to the larger AV as 'L'. Concretely, we used 
four amounts (i.e. 28, 32, 36 and 40) as Small AVs and computed a corresponding 
(close and far distanced) Large AV for each of these amounts. We speak of close 
distanced values when the larger amount consists of the small amount multiplied by 
one and a half (i.e.
3
2
L S  ); we speak of far distanced values when the larger 
amount consists of the small amount multiplied by two and a half (
5
2
L S  ) (see 
Table 55).  
Table 55: Value pairs used in the experiment 
 
Small 
Large 
Close Far 
28 42 70 
32 48 80 
36 54 90 
40 60 100 
By (separately) combining each small value with both its close and far 
distanced large value we end up with eight AV-pairs. Four of these pairs are 
randomly selected to be played in the initial role whilst the remaining pairs are 
played in the ending role
67
. Of the selected four pairs we then randomly picked two 
                                                 
67
 We use the terms ‘initial’ versus ‘ending’ role since participants start in different roles (some are 
first Splitters whilst others are first Choosers) but they are matched together such that they face the 
same trials in their ‘initial’ role (just from the opposite perspective).   
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pairs to involve AV-knowledge; the two remaining pairs could have balanced for 
‘distance’ (close versus far AVs) but sadly this was not implemented in the 
experimental programming
68
. Table 56 provides the reader with a hypothetical 
example of trial creation. 
Table 56: Hypothetical example of trial creation 
Role Paired values AV-knowledge 
Initial Role 40-60 Yes 
Initial Role 28-70 Yes 
Initial Role 36-90 No 
Initial Role 32-80 No 
Ending Role 32-48 Yes 
Ending Role 36-54 Yes 
Ending Role 40-100 No 
Ending Role 28-42 No 
 
 Each of the eight scenarios that is created in this way occurs twice – once the 
DA is the large value 'L'; and once the DA is the small value 'S'. This results into a 
total of eight trials in either role; the trial order is randomized separately for trials in 
the initial role and in the ending role after which the two trial lists are zipped 
together such that participants change role on every trial. We remind the reader that 
everyone who plays in the same group faces the same scenarios in the same order but 
the independent groups (even in the same session) follow a different trial order. 
Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that we subdivided each experimental 
session into two mini-sessions. Concretely, sessions consist of twelve participants; 
six of them are placed in 'Mini-Session A' whilst the other six are placed in 'Mini-
Session B'. Participants can only be matched with others from the same mini-session. 
We did not inform participants that they are in one of two mini-sessions as this 
would affect their perspective on potential opponents to be (re-)matched with. The 
logic behind these independent mini-sessions is to maintain the same prior 
experience for participants who are matched together whilst decreasing the risk of 
biases due to sequence effects (i.e. we now use twice as many randomly generated 
trial orders). Every trial participants are randomly re-matched and they do not know 
who they are matched with. We did not drop variables, conditions or trials from our 
analysis.  
 
                                                 
68
 When the experiment was programmed the author randomized the order of the pairings and 
overlooked the distance inside each value pair. 
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Procedure 
The experiment consisted of three experimental sessions each consisting of 
exactly 12 participants (N=24). A 60-minute timeframe was available for each 
session and sessions typically lasted 45 minutes. Using an alphabetical listing of 
signed-up participants we allocated everyone to numbered cubicles. The experiment 
is set-up such that adjacently seated participants have the same starting role; though 
they are unaware of this feature (see Figure 76).  
Figure 76: Experimental setup for the Suitcase Game 
 
This figure provides a schematic overview of our experimental layout. Participants sit in two 
rows of desks each with a computer. Shutters (partitions) are used such that they can only 
see their own computer. Participants in the same row (e.g. 1-6) start the experiment in the 
same role.   
If more than twelve people showed up we would randomly exclude 
participants by blindly selecting a cubicle number from a pack of numbered cards 
after shuffling the cards in front of the participants. Excluded participants received a 
£2 show-up fee and filled in a payment receipt after which the doors were closed and 
the experimental setup was explained by means of a PowerPoint presentation (see 
Appendix 3.1 for details on instructions). The main points from the PowerPoint 
instructions are shortly summarized below: 
This game revolves around a suitcase with an unknown amount of valuable tokens and a 
table with a known amount of tokens. It is played by two players who have different tasks 
during the game. Initially both players share the same knowledge regarding the unknown 
suitcase amount. Either both have no information regarding the suitcase value; or they are 
both given the same two numerical amounts with the knowledge that one of these two 
amounts is certain to be found in the suitcase (and that both amounts are equally likely). You 
are randomly re-matched with an anonymous player on each trial; one of you is assigned the 
role of 'Splitter' (Player One) whilst the other is assigned the role of 'Chooser' (Player Two).  
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The game is setup such that the Splitter privately looks at the token contents of the suitcase 
and decides upon an amount of tokens to take from the suitcase; this amount is placed 
visibly on the table. Concretely, the content of the suitcase are displayed on his screen as a 
numerical amount and he types an integer value into a textbox; his choice becomes final 
after he presses a 'continue' button. The Chooser has no idea what contents are left in the 
suitcase but she knows how many tokens are placed on the table. Her task is to decide 
whether she rather has the known amount of tokens from the table or the unknown amount 
of tokens from the suitcase; the unchosen option is given to the Splitter. Concretely, she sees 
a numerical value displayed as the table amount (and knows that this value is deducted of the 
initial suitcase content) but she does not know how many tokens are left in the suitcase. 
Using a 'table' versus 'suitcase' button she decides which option she wants for herself.  
Feedback is provided after every trial specifying which option you received (i.e. suitcase 
versus table) and what its token content is; furthermore, feedback also informs you of the 
option received by the other player and its token content. After each trial your role swaps 
(i.e. Splitters become Choosers and Choosers become Splitters) and you are randomly re-
matched with another player for the next trial. A total of sixteen trials is played for the 
experiment. Regarding your final payment you receive a participation fee of £2 and 
additionally you earn a performance fee based on the amount of tokens you win in a 
randomly selected trial.  
Participants were given the opportunity to raise their hand if further 
clarification was required and were informed that they could do so at any time during 
the experiment if they had further questions. Before starting the experiment 
participants were asked to put their electronic devices and notes away. Furthermore, 
between each experimental cubicle we pulled out ‘shutters’ (i.e. partitions) to avoid 
the temptation of glancing on a neighbour’s computer screen. Before the experiment 
started we provided participants with four practice trials to get familiar with the task 
and experimental setup; we stressed that the practice trials are unrelated to 
experimental trials and that they simply serve for task familiarity. At the end of the 
experiment pay-offs were calculated using a python script. Concretely, the script 
randomly generates a trial number for each participant and assesses how many 
tokens they won on that particular trial. Tokens are multiplied by a factor of 0.15 to 
generate the performance fee and a two pounds show-up fee is added in. The python 
script does this for every participant and makes a clean output file with a summary of 
cubicle numbers and payments. At the end of the first session of Experiment Four we 
asked participants to play a variation of the experimental game involving cheap talk 
whilst the experimenter computed their payoffs. This variation involved hypothetical 
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scenarios (i.e. they could not earn monetary rewards and were informed of this) and 
was simply meant to assess whether this is worthwhile to explore in the future. 
Preliminary data of this variation is not discussed in the chapter but can be found in 
Appendix 3.2. 
 Finally, participants fill in receipts for payment and are asked to come 
forward when we call their cubicle number to receive payment in exchange for their 
receipt ticket. Data from the experiment is stored in a time-stamped folder containing 
a multitude of CSV-files (i.e. one for each trial played by each participant ─ in case 
the program were to malfunction not all data would be lost) and these are converted 
into a big CSV-datafile using a python script. The data is analysed using RStudio.  
 
Experiment Five 
We used the same procedure and materials for Experiment Five as were used 
for Experiment Four. The main differences with the previous experiment are that we 
only ran two twelve-person sessions for Experiment Five (N=24) and that none of 
the trials in Experiment Five involved AV-knowledge (i.e. AVs were not even 
mentioned). The average payoff in this experiment was £5.85. The central aim of this 
variation is to compare behaviour in 'no knowledge' trials from Experiment Four 
with behaviour in 'never knowledge' trials from Experiment Five. A summary of the 
task description is:  
This game revolves around a suitcase with an unknown amount of valuable tokens and a 
table with a known amount of tokens. It is played by two players who have different tasks 
during the game. You are randomly re-matched with an anonymous player on each trial; one 
of you is assigned the role of 'Splitter' (Player One) whilst the other is assigned the role of 
'Chooser' (Player Two).  
The game is setup such that the Splitter privately looks at the token contents of the suitcase 
and decides upon an amount of tokens to take from the suitcase; this amount is placed 
visibly on the table. Concretely, the content of the suitcase are displayed on his screen as a 
numerical amount and he types an integer value into a textbox; his choice becomes final 
after he presses a 'continue' button. The Chooser has no idea what contents are left in the 
suitcase but she knows how many tokens are placed on the table. Her task is to decide 
whether she rather has the known amount of tokens from the table or the unknown amount 
of tokens from the suitcase; the unchosen option is given to the Splitter. Concretely, she sees 
a numerical value displayed as the table amount (and knows that this value is deducted of the 
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initial suitcase content) but she does not know how many tokens are left in the suitcase. 
Using a 'table' versus 'suitcase' button she decides which option she wants for herself.  
Feedback is provided after every trial specifying which option you received (i.e. suitcase 
versus table) and what its token content is; furthermore, feedback also informs you of the 
option received by the other player and its token content. After each trial your role swaps 
(i.e. Splitters become Choosers and Choosers become Splitters) and you are randomly re-
matched with another player for the next trial. A total of sixteen trials is played for the 
experiment. Regarding your final payment you receive a participation fee of £2 and 
additionally you earn a performance fee based on the amount of tokens you win in a 
randomly selected trial.  
 
Hypotheses 
Various interesting patterns have been found in the literature concerning 
experimental games. In this chapter we decided to explore whether some of these 
findings hold true in our own experimental game. Güth and Van Damme (1998) ran 
a three-person UG in which the third person is an inactive participant. The proposer 
suggests a payoff distribution assigning monetary values to himself, the responder 
and the inactive third player. It is common knowledge that the responder either 
receives information about (a) the full payoff distribution, (b) solely his own payoff, 
(c) or solely the payoff of the third player. Their findings indicated that proposers 
claim the largest part when irrelevant information is provided to the responder; they 
claim somewhat less when the responder is provided with knowledge on his payoff; 
and they claim even less when information on all payoffs is provided. Since the UG 
has some similarities with our own design (see Chapter 1) we hypothesize that 
Splitters may distribute more equally when AVs are provided compared to scenarios 
in which they are not provided. This seems intuitive since it is harder to get away 
with trickery attempts in contexts where the opponent is more knowledgeable. Our 
second hypothesis is based on a study by Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996). 
These authors compared divisions of small and large amounts in an UG-setting and 
concluded that the data is indistinguishable. Given that their study involved perfect 
information whilst ours involves asymmetric information (allowing psychological 
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trickery attempts)
69
 we wonder whether the same result could be found. Our second 
hypothesis is thus that the same divisions are made for small and large distribution 
amounts. Our third hypotheses relates to high versus low stakes. A paper by Post, 
Van den Assem, Baltussen and Thaler (2008) compared data from a TV gameshow 
with high stakes and classroom replication experiments with lower stakes. They 
found that choices involving small versus large stakes are remarkably similar and 
that choices are in large part affected by previous outcomes in the game. For our own 
experimental setup stakes are higher when far values are involved compared with 
close values (i.e. more can be gained or lost in scenarios with far values). A main 
difference between their design and ours is that participants played a game against 
nature in Post et al. (2008) whilst our participants play a competitive game against 
other strategic agents. Thus, the third hypothesis is that the distance variable (far 
versus close) does not affect experimental behaviour. Finally, Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, (1996) have suggested that heuristics may sometimes work equally well 
(or better) compared with complex decision rules. Thus, we postulate the hypothesis 
that Chooser behaviour can be explained through simple heuristics. Concretely, we 
focus on three ideas. Firstly, we explore whether Chooser behaviour in a context 
without AV-knowledge can be explained through a decision threshold that is based 
upon the average DA from past trials (i.e. knowledge that can be gained from 
feedback). This idea is inspired on the fictitious play algorithm discussed in Seale 
and Phelan (2010) but works differently since our own participants are randomly re-
matched on every trial (and thus they cannot exploit biases of specific opponents; but 
they can learn what values to expect). Secondly, we employ a heuristic of 
representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975) for trials with AV-knowledge: 
Choosers may assess whether the distribution amount is more likely to be ‘S’ (i.e. 
the small AV) versus ‘L’ (i.e. the large AV) by comparing the table amount with half 
of the average AV. If the table amount lies closer to 
L
2
 (i.e. it is larger than the 
average AV) then the Chooser may expect that ‘L’ was divided and act accordingly; 
whilst if the table amount lies closer to 
S
2
 (i.e. it is smaller than the average AV) 
                                                 
69
 For example, when the Splitter divides a small DA he can place the majority on the table since it 
would appear ‘small’; whilst he may keep the majority in the suitcase when dividing a large DA since 
the table amount could appear ‘large’ already. 
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then P2 may expect that ‘S’ was divided and act accordingly 70 . And our final 
heuristic looks at previous outcomes. Post et al. (2008) suggested that decisions 
(both in a TV gameshow and in their own laboratory-replication) are strongly 
affected by previous outcomes. We thus explore whether there is relationship 
between Chooser behaviour in the current trial and the ‘best outcome’ (i.e. table or 
suitcase) on the previous trial (in the same or opposite role).  
Our hypotheses are summarized in Table 57. 
Table 57: Hypotheses for the suitcase game 
Hypothesis 1: Splitters divide more equally when AVs are provided 
Hypothesis 2: The same divisions are made when the DA is S versus L 
Hypothesis 3: Distance between AVs does not affect behaviour 
Hypothesis 4: Heuristics can explain Chooser behaviour 
4A) Behaviour without AVs can be explained through the mean distribution amount 
(MDA) from past trials 
4B)  Behaviour with AVs can be explained through the average AV  
4C)  Behaviour (with and without AVs) can be explained based upon previous outcomes 
 
 
Results 
Splitter Behaviour 
Similar to previous chapters we describe predictions from theoretical 
frameworks in terms of strategy profiles
71. We use subscripts ‘N’ and ‘A’ to refer to 
the risk attitude of certain predictions (see Table 58 and Table 59).  
Table 58: Strategy profiles for Splitters with AVs 
 Amount placed on the table  
Frameworks  Divide S Divide L 
Profile 1 S
2
 
L
2
 N
Nash , ANash , 
Maximin, AlevelK  
Profile 2 Random Random 
Nlevel1  
Profile 3 S+L
4
 
S+L
4
 N
Nash  
Profile 4 S+L
1
4
  
S+L
1
4
  N
level2  
                                                 
70
 This heuristic is also in line with the predictions for risk neutral level one behaviour and the 
predictions for risk averse Nash behaviour.  
71
 As was the case in the previous chapters we do not include mixed strategies for our discussion here 
since they are too difficult to compare with our experimental data and since human decision makers 
rarely attempt to use mixed strategies according to the literature.  
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Profile 5 S+L
1
4
  
S+L
1
4
  N
level4  
 
All behaviour that cannot be explained by the other profiles is considered 
under the ‘random’ profile72. We did not include the mixed strategy suggested by 
NNash in which the Splitter uses strategies that are equidistant from half of the 
average AV given that this cannot be assessed from our data. Given the complexity 
of some of these strategy profiles it appears that profile 1 and 2 may the easiest for 
participants to adopt. These same two profiles are the only ones that can occur 
without AVs (see Table 59).  
Table 59: Strategy profiles for Splitters without AVs 
 Amount placed on table  
Frameworks  Divide S Divide L 
Profile 1 S/2 L/2 
ANash , Maximin, 
AlevelK  
Profile 2 Random Random 
NlevelK , NNash  
 
We now discuss observed Splitter-behaviour according to these strategy 
profiles using data from Experiment Four . Profiles 3, 4 and 5 are greyed-out (since 
are rarely observed) to facilitate visual comparison between the remaining profiles. 
Each participant has four observations with AVs and four observations without AVs 
(see Table 60). 
Table 60: Splitter behaviour according to the suggested profiles 
 With AVs  Without AVs 
Subject Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 3 Profile 4 Profile 5 Profile 1 Profile 2 
0 0 3 1 0 0 0 4 
1 2 2 0 0 0 1 3 
2 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 
3 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 
5 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 
6 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
7 0 4 0 0 0 1 3 
8 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
9 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 
10 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 
11 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
12 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
13 2 2 0 0 0 1 3 
                                                 
72
 In this game we consider behaviour that diverges from our most straightforward predictions to be 
‘random’ – this coding cannot be applied to the previous chapters since all behaviour could be 
explained in such a context (i.e. the other games have a low number of available strategies for P1). 
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14 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 
15 3 1 0 0 0 2 2 
16 3 1 0 0 0 4 0 
17 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
18 4 0 0 0 0 1 3 
19 0 4 0 0 0 0 4 
20 4 0 0 0 0 1 3 
21 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
22 4 0 0 0 0 4 0 
23 4 0 0 0 0 1 3 
24 3 1 0 0 0 1 3 
25 1 2 1 0 0 0 4 
26 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
27 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
28 4 0 0 0 0 1 3 
29 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
30 1 3 0 0 0 0 4 
31 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 
32 3 1 0 0 0 0 4 
33 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 
34 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 
35 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 
We conclude that both with and without AVs theories only explain behaviour 
when they predict equal division or random behaviour. Furthermore, skimming 
through the data with and without AVs suggests that random behaviour might be 
more frequent in scenarios without AVs. This can be explained from a simple 
comparison between Table 58 and Table 59; there are more theories suggesting 
random behaviour without AVs compared to with AVs and additionally there are 
less frameworks suggesting equal division with AVs compared to without AVs. 
However, this also relates to one of the hypotheses we wanted to explore so we take 
a closer look at these cases. Figure 77 displays the percentage of trials on which 
Splitters divide the DA into equal segments depending on AV-knowledge. 
Considering that this figure uses data from both Experiment Four (knowledge and no 
knowledge) and Experiment Five (never knowledge) we converted data to 
percentages since the ‘never knowledge’ condition has more data points73.  
Figure 77: The effect of AV-knowledge on equality 
                                                 
73
 We ran three sessions in which half of the trials provided AVs (knowledge trials) whilst the other 
trials did not provide AVs (no knowledge trials); the experiment in which none of the trials involved 
AVs only had two sessions but all of its trials are ‘never knowledge’ trials. 
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This figure displays the effect AV-knowledge has on the frequency of equal division by 
Splitters. Knowledge and No Knowledge trials represent data from Experiment whilst Never 
Knowledge trials are from Experiment Five.  
 
In aggregate Splitters make equal splits more frequently in trials where AV-
knowledge is provided compared to no knowledge and never knowledge trials. No 
knowledge and never knowledge trials do not appear to differ in relation to equal 
division behaviour suggesting that the presence of AVs on some trials does not affect 
behaviour in trials without AVs. A within participants comparison between 
knowledge and no knowledge trials is made in Appendix 3.3. Approximately two 
thirds of our Splitters divide more equally in knowledge scenarios compared to no 
knowledge scenarios; and one third does it equally often in either scenario. Only 
three Splitters (out of 36) made equal splits more frequently in scenarios without 
knowledge than they did in scenarios with knowledge. We conclude that Splitters 
divide more equally when AVs are given which provides basic support for 
hypothesis one.   
Next, we explore whether the Splitter makes the same divisions when the DA 
is S versus L. It is possible that the Splitter attempts trickery, for example by placing 
a large proportion of the DA on the table when dividing S whilst placing a small 
proportion of the DA on the table when dividing L (such that the opponent is 
tempted to pick the worse option). Thus we make a comparison of the frequencies in 
which the table amount is smaller, equal or larger compared with the suitcase amount 
for each of the knowledge conditions. We point out to the reader that the same 
amounts are considered small (S) versus large (L) across condition to allow 
comparison even though participants can make different assessments in the 
conditions were AVs are not provided. Data from ‘far’ and ‘close’ trials is merged 
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together into AV-knowledge trials to be consistent across conditions. The most 
frequent strategy of each row is indicated by a bold font (see Table 61 and Table 62). 
Table 61: Splitter behaviour dividing small values 
 Table < Suitcase Table = Suitcase Table > Suitcase 
Exp 4 Knowledge 3 39 30 
No Knowledge 9 13 50 
Exp 5 Never Knowledge 34 25 37 
 
Table 62: Splitter behaviour dividing large values 
 Table < Suitcase Table = Suitcase Table > Suitcase 
Exp 4 Knowledge 27 42 3 
No Knowledge 32 22 18 
Exp 5 Never Knowledge 50 27 19 
 
Looking at no knowledge and never knowledge trials we see evidence of 
trickery attempts. When the large amount is divided most Splitters keep the largest 
chunk hidden in the suitcase; and when the small amount is divided most Splitters 
display the largest chunk on the table. Given that Choosers have no knowledge to 
assess the relative size of the table amount this suggests that Splitters try to trick 
their opponent by placing a seemingly large value on the table when the suitcase 
contains more tokens whilst placing a seemingly small value on the table when the 
suitcase contains even less tokens. This line of reasoning can potentially be explored 
further through verbal protocols. Another comparison of interest is between 
behaviour in ‘no knowledge’ and ‘never knowledge’ scenarios. For small amounts 
we observe more random looking behaviour in the never knowledge condition. It is 
unclear why such a difference is found. It may be that the ‘no knowledge’ condition 
allows faster learning of the expected DAs since it is intermixed with ‘knowledge’ 
trials which is not the case for the ‘never knowledge’ condition. 
When AVs are provided the most frequent tactic is an equal division both for 
S and L. This suggests that Splitters are less keen on trickery attempts when their 
opponent becomes more knowledgeable. The reader may notice that the second most 
frequent strategy for the knowledge condition differs between the two tables; this 
difference is in line with the same trickery-idea as before, however, such difference 
should be found due to the strong dominance that is involved with the provision of 
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AVs.
74
. We thus explore Splitter-behaviour in context of AV-knowledge through a 
coding that compares the table amount with the two AVs (see Table 63).  
Table 63: Splitter behaviour in relationship to the AVs (i.e. S and L) 
  
2
S

 2
S

 
,
2 4
S S L 
 
   4
S L

 
,
4 2
S L L 
 
   2
L

 2
L

 
Small 
(S) 
Close 2 22 3 2 3 5 2 
Far 1 17 6 0 9 0 0 
Large 
(L) 
Close 1 3 3 5 4 20 3 
Far 1 2 5 0 3 22 0 
 
We observe a few errors against strong and weak dominance (i.e. cells with 
orange background). Furthermore, as we pointed out in the previous tables the most 
frequent strategy for either type is to divide equally (i.e. cells with green 
background). One observation of interest is that half of the average AV is 
occasionally placed on the Table – which corresponds to a prediction made by (risk 
neutral) Nash – but this solely occurs for close AVs. However, when we explore the 
frequency in which half of the average AV is placed on the Table for trials without 
AV-knowledge we observe the same behaviour on 8 occasions, suggesting it to be an 
artefact of the experimental procedure.  
Furthermore, it is possible to assess a relationship between the DA being S 
versus L and experimental behaviour both for close and far distanced AVs though 
this requires us to combine the columns ,
4 2
S L L 
 
 
and
2
L
 for the 'far' distanced 
observations (given that the far distanced Splitter cannot place half of the large 
amount on the Table when he divides S (since 
L
S<
2
 for far scenarios)). At face 
                                                 
74
 Splitters should never place fewer tokens on the table than that are kept in the suitcase when they 
divide ‘S’ since this implies that less than S
2
is placed on the table – i.e. providing a strongly dominant 
strategy for the Chooser. The same is true when Splitters divides ‘L’: they should never place more 
tokens on the table than that are left in the suitcase since it implies that more than 
L
2
is placed on the 
table already. As a numerical example consider S=40 and L=60. If P1 divides L and places more 
tokens on the table than he leaves in the suitcase the scenario is at minimum Table=31, Suitcase=29. 
Whenever 31 tokens (or more) are placed on the table the Chooser would rationally pick the table 
given these AVs due to strong dominance (i.e. the suitcase would contain only 29 or 9 tokens whilst 
the table contains 31 tokens). Similarly if the Splitter divides S and places fewer tokens on the table 
than that the suitcase then the scenario is at minimum Table=19, Suitcase=21. Whenever 19 (or less) 
tokens are placed on the table the Chooser would rationally pick the suitcase given these AVs due to 
strong dominance (i.e. the suitcase will contain 21 or 41 tokens whilst the table contains only 19 
tokens). 
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value there does not appear to be a relationship between distance and experimental 
behaviour though our exploration is heavily limited in its number of datapoints.  
 
Chooser Behaviour 
First, we summarize the strategies suggested by the frameworks we discussed 
earlier (see Table 64). 
Table 64: Chooser strategies with AVs 
 Amount placed on the table Frameworks 
Profile 1 S
2
:            pick suitcase 50%+ 
S+L
4
:       pick table 50% 
L
2
:           pick table 50%+ 
Between S/2 and L/2: pick table 50% 
NNash  
Profile 2 S+L
4
 : pick suitcase  
S+L
4
: pick randomly 
S+L
4
 : pick table 
ANash , Nlevel1  
Profile 3 S
2
 : pick table 
S
2
: indifference 
S
2
 : pick suitcase 
Maximin 
Profile 4 S+L
1
4
 : pick table 
S+L
1
4
 : pick suitcase 
Nlevel3  
Profile 5 S+L
1
4
 : pick suitcase 
S+L
1
4
 : pick table 
Nlevel5  
 
Without AVs Chooser strategies are to behave randomly ( NNash , ANash ,
NlevelK , AlevelK )
75
. It thus seems hard for these frameworks to explain a variety of 
Chooser behaviour. Especially, since we saw that Splitter behaviour consists mainly 
of a mixture of equal divisions and random-looking decisions. Given the multitude 
of possible scenarios that Choosers can face when Splitters make random choices
76
 
we are limited to what we can realistically assess. We summarize Chooser behaviour 
                                                 
75
 We also predict random behaviour for the risk averse level k reasoner with AVs; however, ‘random’ 
behaviour is quite hard to assess so this prediction is not included in our table.  
76
 We remind the reader that different trials involve different DAs going up to a maximum of 100 
tokens; and that any integer amount of tokens (up to the full value of the DA) can be placed on the 
table.  Thus, we cannot look at all possible scenarios that occur in an ordered fashion.  
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by dividing scenarios based upon the table amount ‘x’ lying between specific 
threshold values (see Table 65).  
Table 65: Chooser behaviour with AVs 
  
2
S

 2
S

 
,
2 4
S S L 
 
   4
S L

 
,
4 2
S L L 
 
   2
L

 2
L

 
Table Close 0 5 1 3 5 18 5 
Far 0 0 2 0 6 11 0 
Suitcase Close 3 20 5 4 2 7 0 
Far 2 19 9 0 6 11 0 
 
Comparing aggregate Chooser behaviour with the strategy profiles suggested 
by theoretical frameworks we observe a decent fit for profile 1 and especially for 
profile 2. In this context we also point out to the reader that ‘far’ scenarios in which 
the suitcase is chosen despite the Table containing 
L
2
should not be seen as 
contradictive for predictions since Choosers can deduce that the Suitcase initially 
contained the large amount whenever half of the large AV is placed on the Table. 
Specifically, half of the large AV in ‘far’ scenarios is always larger than the small 
AV and thus it can be deduced that both Table and Suitcase contain the exact same 
value in this context
77
. It should be clear that profile 3 is ineffective to explain 
behaviour and that profile 4 and 5 are too specific (i.e. Splitters never made the exact 
choices related to profile 4 and 5 making it hard to assess how Choosers would 
behave in those contexts).  
Next, we briefly discuss errors against dominance (cells with an orange 
background colour). We remind the reader that ‘far’ scenarios in which the suitcase 
is chosen despite the table containing half of ‘L’ does not constitute weak dominance 
since this amount is by definition larger than the full value of ‘S’. We do not observe 
any errors against strong dominance by Choosers; however, we see a few errors 
against weak dominance. Furthermore, as could be expected Choosers are more 
likely to pick the table when the table-amount becomes larger whilst they are more 
likely to pick the suitcase when the table amount becomes smaller; however, 
Choosers also display a general preference towards the Suitcase. Furthermore, it is 
                                                 
77
 As numerical example: S=40 and L=100. When half of L (i.e. 50 tokens) is placed on the table then 
it is clear that only ‘L’ could have been divided since 50>40. 
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worth mentioning that this suitcase-preference only surfaces when AVs are included. 
When AVs are not known there is a preference towards the Table (see Table 66).  
Table 66: Chooser behaviour and knowledge in Experiment Four 
 Knowledge No knowledge 
Table chosen 56 82 
Suitcase chosen 88 62 
  
This observation is in line with findings from Van Dijk and Zeelenberg 
(2007) that additional knowledge increases curiosity about a ‘sealed package’. 
Furthermore, their study suggests that curiosity flourishes even more strongly if 
feedback (regarding the suitcase amount) becomes conditional on the Chooser’s 
decision. This may be interesting to explore for our own design in a future 
experiment given that the Sealed Package Paragdigm introduced by Van Dijk and 
Zeelenberg (2007) did not explore the context of strategic opponents
78
. 
Finally, we explored whether heuristics do a good job explaining Chooser 
behaviour since it is quite challenging from the perspective of typical theories and 
models. We first explored whether decision time decreases over time as this may 
indicate learning effects or usage of a heuristic (see Figure 78).  
Figure 78: Evolution of decision time over trials 
 
This figure displays the evolution in decision time across the eight trials played as Splitter 
(blue) and as Chooser (red). The x-axis represents the chronological order of facing trials in 
a particular role while the y-axis represents decision time in seconds.  
 
                                                 
78
 Concretely, the participants of their experiment chose between a fixed monetary amount and a 
‘sealed package’ as remuneration for their participation to a study. In other words, their choice was 
not against an agent with competitive interests unlike our own experiment. 
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There is no clear evolution in decision time over trials
79
. Despite the 
pessimistic indication provided by decision times we still explored a number of 
heuristics that may explain decision-making for Choosers. Our first heuristic aims to 
explain behaviour for trials without AVs. Concretely, we hypothesize that Choosers 
base their decisions on a specific threshold amount: when the table contains fewer 
tokens than the threshold value she picks the suitcase whilst she picks the table in 
scenarios where the table amount contains more tokens than the threshold value (and 
she is indifferent between the table and suitcase whenever the table amount equals 
the threshold value). We based our threshold value on an idea suggested by Seale 
and Phelan (2010) in their study on bluffing and betting behaviour. These authors 
discussed the ‘fictitious play’ (FP) algorithm introduced by Brown (1951)80. This 
algorithm involves an iterative method in which players keep track of past choices to 
select the strategy yielding the largest expected value. We found inspiration for a 
heuristical threshold from this idea but made a few modifications since our own 
participants (know that they) are randomly re-matched on every trial – implying that 
they cannot exploit the biases of a particular opponent. Concretely, we used the 
knowledge of DAs from past trials (in either role) to compute the mean distribution 
amount (MDA). Participants have this knowledge available through feedback at the 
end of each trial (i.e. they simply need to sum the suitcase and table amounts to 
know the DA of the last trial). Such MDA-computation provides the Chooser with 
an expectation regarding the value that the Splitter may be dividing. It may be too 
challenging to actually compute the MDA-value, however, an intuition on the MDA 
may well be what guides decisions. With our first heuristic we thus assess whether 
half the MDA-value provides a decision criterion that can explain behaviour when 
AVs are not present. A numerical example would be that the DAs of past trials are 
50, 70, 80 and 40 tokens. This means that the MDA equals 60 tokens. According to 
the heuristic the Chooser would then pick the table if more than 30 tokens (i.e. 60/2) 
are placed on the table; whilst she would pick the suitcase if less than 30 tokens are 
placed on the table. To express such heuristical relationship we created a graphical 
representation of Chooser data in which the X-axis represents the difference between 
the MDA on a specific trial and the table amount on that trial; meanwhile the Y-axis 
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 We also explored whether individual Choosers display a decision time evolution across their trials. 
These graphs displayed the same lack of ‘evolution’ and are hence not included in the chapter.  
80
 I could not locate the original paper by Brown, so my understanding of the FP algorithm is based on 
the paper by Seale and Phelan.  
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represents whether the table versus suitcase was chosen by the Chooser. 
Furthermore, numerical values specify how many observations are in each section of 
the graph. The expectation is that the Suitcase is preferred when the MDA is larger 
than the Table amount (i.e. MDA-Table > 0) whilst the Table is preferred when the 
MDA is smaller than the Table amount (i.e. MDA-Table < 0). This tendency is 
present in all three conditions but is stronger when AVs are not provided or never 
provided (see Figure 79, Figure 80 and Figure 81).   
Figure 79: Chooser Heuristics: MDA with AVs 
 
Figure 80: Chooser Heuristics: MDA without AVs 
 
Figure 81: Chooser Heuristics: MDA with never AVs 
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A second heuristic we can explore is concerned with the knowledge provided 
in AV-trials. Concretely, we expect Choosers to use half of the average AV as a 
threshold value
81
. Our expectation is that the Suitcase is preferred when the Table 
amount is less than the Mean AV (i.e. Mean AV – Table > 0) whilst the table is 
preferred when the Table amount is more than the Mean AV (i.e. Mean AV – Table 
< 0). However, this heuristic should not be effective when AV knowledge is 
unavailable (i.e. No/Never AVs) given that Choosers don’t have access to the 
threshold on such trials.  
Figure 82: Chooser Heuristics: Mean AV with AVs 
 
Figure 83: Chooser Heuristics: Mean AV without AVs 
 
Figure 84: Chooser Heuristics: Mean AV with never AVs 
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 We remind the reader that this is also the prediction for profile 2 (i.e. risk neutral level one 
Choosers; and the risk averse Nash) for which we already indicated a decent fit with behaviour.  
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The heuristic seems valid in scenarios with AVs but also does a decent job in 
scenarios without AVs and scenarios with never AVs (see Figure 82, Figure 83 and 
Figure 84). This may mean that something else is in play since AV-knowledge is 
required to use the average AV as a heuristical threshold
82
. To confirm our 
suspicions we next explored whether a fixed value threshold could explain 
behaviour. Concretely, we used the (non-disclosed) average of all the distribution 
amounts in their experimental frequency as a constant decision threshold. Thus, if 
more than 25.5 tokens are placed on the Table (i.e. Table > 25.5) then the Table 
should be chosen whilst the Suitcase should be chosen if less than 25.5 tokens are on 
the Table (i.e. Table < 25.5) (see Figure 85, Figure 86 and Figure 87).  
Figure 85: Chooser Heuristics: Constant Threshold with AVs 
 
 
Figure 86: Chooser Heuristics: Constant Threshold without AVs 
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 It may be for example that our values are too similar to one another to distinguish between different 
threshold values.  
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Figure 87: Chooser Heuristics: Constant Threshold with never AVs 
 
 
 This constant threshold does not appear too effective in scenarios with AVs 
(which can be explained by the AVs providing better ways to assess whether the 
table amount is large besides its ‘naked’ value) but appears effective in scenarios 
without AVs and scenarios with never AVs.  
A final attempt to explain behaviour through heuristics relates to previous 
outcomes. We thus explored whether the best outcome (i.e. Table versus Suitcase) 
from the last trial played as Splitter (or Chooser) affects the current decision. We 
omitted trials in which no prediction can be made (i.e. the first trial cannot use the 
‘previous’ trial to base decisions on). First, we look at trials for which the heuristic 
looks at the previous trial (i.e. played as Splitter) and afterwards we explore the 
heuristic that looks at two trials ago (i.e. the last trial played as Chooser). Our 
heuristical threshold for both scenarios is the difference between the Table and 
Suitcase amount in the predictive trial. If the Table was better (i.e. Table – Suitcase 
> 0) then we simply expect a preference towards the Table on the current trial; if the 
Suitcase was better (i.e. Table – Suitcase < 0) then we expect a preference towards 
the Suitcase on the current trial. First we look at the heuristic that uses the last trial to 
base predictions on (see Figure 88, Figure 89 and Figure 90).  
 
Figure 88: Chooser Heuristics: Last trial with AVs 
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Figure 89: Chooser Heuristics: Last trial without AVs 
 
 
Figure 90: Chooser Heuristics: Last trial with never AVs 
 
 
The expected effect from the last trial played does not appear to be present in 
neither of the three conditions. Finally, we assess the same idea looking at the last 
trial played as Chooser (i.e. data from two trials ago) (see Figure 91, Figure 92 and 
Figure 93). 
Figure 91: Chooser Heuristics: Two trials ago with AVs 
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Figure 92: Chooser Heuristics: Two trials ago without AVs 
 
 
Figure 93: Chooser Heuristics: Two trials ago with never AVs 
 
 
 This heuristic also does not appear to hold true (except perhaps in the Never 
AVs condition).  
 
Conclusion  
We conclude that behavioural predictions from Nash, level k and maximin 
are quite complex for our experimental game. The most straightforward prediction 
(which is also observed quite frequently) is that the Splitter should make equal 
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divisions. Observed behaviour suggests that equal divisions are made more 
frequently when AVs are provided compared to a context without AVs (which 
supports hypothesis one). Meanwhile, we also find differences between experimental 
behaviour when the small versus large amount is divided suggesting trickery 
attempts (which contradicts hypothesis two). Regarding the distance between AVs 
we do not find a behavioural effect of distance (which supports hypothesis three) 
which suggests that future variations of the experiment do not need to include a 
distance variable. For Choosers we conclude that it is extremely hard to assess 
predictions from theories and models since they are either too precise or they simply 
suggest that mixed strategies are used in every scenario (which can be hard to assess) 
or that subjects would behave randomly. Behaviour is generally in line with 
dominance and in scenarios without dominance behavioural patterns appear 
consistent with strategy profile 2 (i.e. risk averse Nash predictions and risk neutral 
level one predictions). We explored whether heuristics are viable at predicting 
Chooser-behaviour. There may be value in further exploring threshold heuristics; 
however, past-trial heuristics do not appear successful. Additionally it is worth 
noticing that the mean AV-heuristic also does a decent job in scenarios without AV-
knowledge (where the heuristic cannot logically be used); this suggests that the 
tendencies found from our heuristics may be due to indirect influences of other 
factors. Furthermore, this heuristic overlaps with strategy profile 2 which makes it 
hard to assess whether behaviour is really in line with a specific framework or 
whether it is simply an artefact of our experimental setup. Extreme caution should be 
employed given that theoretical adherence may be an artefact in designs similar to 
the Suitcase Game. A verbal protocol setup may be extremely useful to further 
explore how Choosers make their decisions. 
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Chapter 5: Implications and future directions 
Many real life scenarios involve information, uncertainty and conflicting 
interests. Advertisements try to sell things, stores try to nudge you with discounts on 
selected products, and even social card games such as “Werewolves of Millers 
Hollow” have players attempt to fool those on opposite teams. It is difficult to know 
which choice will lead to the best outcome and due to the competitive context you 
cannot rely on the information that is given to you. Still, we are all susceptible to the 
advertisements we see in daily life, the discounts we find in stores and players can 
deceive us with convincing arguments. Our experiments explore more deeply in the 
nature of these scenarios and wonder how and why certain tactics work whilst others 
do not. Each of our experiments helps fill in the gaps between bargaining scenarios 
of perfect information and no information. Past literature explored the effects of 
adding uncertainty to Ultimatum Games (e.g. Mitzkewitz and Nagel, 1993; 
Rapoport, Sundali and Seale, 1994; Croson, 1996) whilst our own experiments look 
at Cake Cutting Games with uncertainty surrounding the alternatives. Our games aim 
to be realistic and intuitive for participants with a close relationship to real life 
bargaining scenarios.   
In the Envelope Game we explored how much risk people are willing to take 
when they encounter uncertainty and cannot make an informed choice. Would 
participants make a value transfer when they know nothing about the Closed 
Envelope (i.e. where they can transfer tokens to) even when the Opened Envelope 
has a small amount? In the Transfer Game we provide enough information to the 
first player for making informed decisions; however, we heavily restrict his choice 
options. Furthermore, we explore reasoning through verbal protocols. Finally, in the 
Suitcase Game we explore the influence of background knowledge on decisions. 
How are choices affected by the knowledge of a minimum and maximum value 
(which have equal probabilities)? This type of question has previously been explored 
in games against nature through lottery-games, however, everything changes when 
the opponent is a rational agent. If you are to choose between 23 tokens on the table 
and a suitcase which has either 17 or 37 tokens in it; then your choice in a context 
against nature is defined by your risk attitude and the expected values. However, 
versus a strategic agent you need to consider the possibility of psychological ‘traps’.   
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A number of ideas can be explored in future research. Generally speaking, we 
suggest a broader usage of verbal protocols (in experimental pilots at least) to have a 
better understanding regarding the logic underlying experimental decisions and to 
realise potential shortcomings of the design. For each of our games we suggest a few 
variations which could be interesting to explore.  
 
5.1 Envelope Game 
One strain of the literature is concerned with topics of ‘voluntary disclosure’. 
A typical topic used in this literature involves restaurant hygiene notices. Restaurant 
choice is significantly affected by these food inspection notices (Henson et al., 2006) 
but disclosure of these notices remains a voluntary choice. Experimental disclosure 
games can appear somewhat odd and may lack realism for participants. For example, 
in Jin, Luca and Martin (2015) participants are either senders or receivers. Senders 
observe a state ‘S’ (which is a number between 1 and 6) and their task is to decide 
whether to (truthfully) reveal this value to the receiver. The receiver then makes a 
‘guess’ regarding the value of ‘S’. Central is in this game is that senders desire that 
the receiver makes high guesses (as that maximizes the payoff for senders) whilst 
receivers desire to make accurate guesses (to maximize their own payoff). However, 
the envelope game can be modified to explore these topics from a somewhat 
different angle (and arguably be easier to understand). Concretely, instead of 
transferring value between envelopes the Opener’s task can be reframed as 
‘revealing’ a desired amount of value. Such a design is less risky for the Opener 
since the expected value of the two envelopes remains the same even when he 
reveals value. Furthermore, revealing any amount below the EV should not affect 
P2’s behaviour as it is simply ‘cheap talk’83 – however, it is easy to foresee that this 
may not be the case in an actual experiment. Furthermore, this “Revealing Game” 
allows more freedom to Openers since revealing three coins is less risky than a one-
coin transfer in the Envelope Game (i.e. in either game P2 is certain that three coins 
are found in a specific envelope but the difference is that the revealing game does 
not change the value of the envelopes). Such a variation can be of interest both for 
comparisons with the base game but also to explore disclosure behaviour in a 
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 Unless he reveals a value larger than the expected value P2 is none the wiser whether 0, 1, 2 or 3 
coins are revealed.  
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different context. Restaurants with a low hygiene rating may choose not to disclose 
their rating out of fear (of scaring costumers away) whilst restaurants with a high 
rating are more likely to display (to lure in costumers). The predictions for the 
Revealing Game variation are the exact opposite: one would want to reveal a small 
looking amount (i.e. give a bad impression) when a large value is found in the OE 
whilst revealing a large looking amount (i.e. give a good impression) when a small 
amount is found in the OE. Other interesting ideas that can be explored from this 
variation relate to exact revelations: since it is common knowledge that each 
envelope has a minimum of two coins there is clearly no additional value in 
revealing zero versus one versus two coins – however, these amounts may be 
revealed depending on the concrete value in the OE. Similarly, it would be quite 
curious if Choosers react differently if zero coins are revealed versus two coins given 
that both scenarios consist of the exact same lack of knowledge – however, this may 
well be a common finding for such a variation.   
Another variation would be to play the game as a Opener versus nature (i.e. 
versus a randomly deciding Chooser). Past experiments on decisions under 
uncertainty only look at choices against nature whilst our game involves choices 
against a rational agent. This variation would help bridge the gap between our novel 
game and the existing literature on decisions under uncertainty. It allows us to 
explore whether the same choices are made versus nature and versus a strategic 
agent and if this is not the case we can explore where the differences lie. E.g. when 
the OE has a small value P1s generally do not want to transfer, however, versus a 
strategic agent such reluctance can be seen as a signal. Another example is the 
question whether we would see more attempts to equalize the two envelopes when 
playing versus a random agent as we saw evidenced in our variation of the risk 
attitude assessment (an overview of these ideas is found Table 67). 
Table 67: Potential variations using the Envelope Game design 
 Why this could be of interest 
Variation 1: 
Value 
revelation 
(instead of 
value 
transfers) 
- less risky for P1 
-  relates to information disclosure literature 
- trickery is possible and clearly defined 
- behaviour should not be affected by revelations below the EV 
- revelation of 0, 1 or 2 coins allow interesting comparisons since they provide the 
same amount of nil-information 
Variation 2: 
Played versus 
nature 
- allows comparison of behaviour with respect to luck versus strategic opponents 
- to bridge the gap with literature on decisions under uncertainty 
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5.2 Transfer Game 
For future work regarding the transfer game it should be obvious that 
replications regarding violations of strong dominance are worthwhile to explore. 
However, this game allows more than that. One topic of interest is to assess the 
effect of differential degrees of knowledge. How would the game change if the 
Chooser does not know the transfer amount and thus the dominance level can only 
be assessed by the Decider? Would we observe transfer-decisions for all BS-
scenarios and no transfer-decisions for all SB-scenarios (i.e. in line with maximin 
behaviour) or would mind-games occur depending on the transfer amount? 
Furthermore, another variation can omit the transfer direction for Choosers – again, 
allowing the Decider to decrease variance without revealing which option contains 
the better payoff (providing a within-game parameter for risk attitude measurement). 
Finally, it is possible to omit the knowledge whether the Decider made the transfer 
(creating a more simultaneous design instead of a sequential design) to assess 
whether behaviour would relate more strongly to predictions of theoretical 
frameworks. It seems intuitively that the Chooser would pick DT in such context 
whilst the Decider would not transfer out of expectation that the Chooser picks DT 
(in accordance with Nash etc.). If differences are found this would illustrate a finding 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1975) that participants use ‘prior probabilities’ (in our 
case: theoretical predictions) correctly when they have no additional information 
available but that they evaluate things wrongly when additional information is 
provided. For example, if participants are asked whether a personality description 
belongs to an engineer or a lawyer they base themselves on the degree to which the 
description represents the respective stereotypes regardless prior probabilities; 
without a personality description they use the prior probabilities to make their 
judgments (an overview of these ideas is found in Table 68). 
Table 68: Potential variations using the Transfer Game design 
 Why this could be of interest 
Variation 1: 
transfer amount 
unknown by P2 
- simply ommitting this knowledge could strongly affect Decider-decisions 
- This ommitance should result into a strong Chooser-preference for DT 
Variation 2: 
Transfer direction 
not known by P2 
- This scenario is not interesting from the perspective of Choosers since they 
can only make random decisions essentially 
- For Deciders it provides a context in which maximin-behaviour can be fully 
embraced without risk of receiving the worse payoff due to ‘dominance’ 
Variation 3: 
Whether the transfer 
is made not known 
- This variation could make it easier for Choosers to realise that they  should 
pick DT consistently; furthermore, if Deciders realise this they are more likely 
to opt for ‘never transferring’ strategies in line with Nash predictions. 
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by P2 
 
5.3 Suitcase Game 
Some variations can be explored on the suitcase design. Firstly, a variation is 
possible in which a message is send to the P2 (i.e. in line with the ‘cheap talk’ pilot 
we briefly explored and which can be found in Appendix 3.2). This may provide 
interesting insights into behavioural tendencies in relation to honesty (i.e. are P1s 
truthful in their messages and do P2s believe that they are truthful or not). A similar 
idea has been explored by Gneezy (2005) by comparing three treatments in which 
the benefits of lying and the harm done to the other player by lying are manipulated. 
However, perhaps a more playful design (e.g. incorporating suggestive images 
instead of ‘written lies’) in the constant-sum context of our game may be the best 
approach for such a variation. This could result in interesting findings regarding 
consistency of truthfulness (over trials), contexts of truthfulness, and behavioural 
patterns for selecting specific messages on specific trials. Furthermore, using less 
explicit ways of expressing untruths may be less unpleasant than written messages. 
A second variation of interest explores behaviour in a context where 
information on potential distribution amounts (i.e. “the distribution amount is either 
X or Y tokens”) is known solely by the Splitter or Chooser. If only the Splitter has 
such information then he should behave the same as when he has no information – as 
he cannot try to trick the Chooser through this knowledge, nor does he need to fear 
the Chooser’s knowledge. However, we expect that mere exposure to the potential 
amounts would affect Splitter-decisions nonetheless. Furthermore, if only Choosers 
were to know the potential distribution amounts then rational Splitters should solely 
make equal splits as any deviation can lead to a dominant choice for an informed 
Chooser (e.g. if we place less than half on the table and our distribution amount was 
the ‘small’ amount, then an informed Chooser would rationally pick the suitcase due 
to strong dominance). Our expectation is that this behaviour would be observed in 
such a variation. These same ideas can be explored more deeply when we add in 
more uncertainty. A variation can be explored in which the Chooser may know the 
potential distribution amounts – but where the Splitter is uncertain about it. Should 
he risk deviating from equal divisions when he does not know the degree of 
knowledge that the Chooser holds? 
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Finally, feedback manipulations can be explored. In our study we provide 
feedback on both the table and the suitcase amounts regardless what choices are 
made. However, Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2007) already illustrated how behaviour 
is affected by conditional feedback in a non-competitive scene. Their idea can also 
be explored in our competitive game since it could be nefast for the Chooser if she 
were tempted by her curiosity for the suitcase value.  Another relevant difference 
with their design is however that the suitcase game involves solely monetary 
amounts which seem less likely to invoke strong curiosity compared to a mysterious 
package. Concretely, we can explore how Choosers behave if they only receive 
feedback on the suitcase amount when they selected the suitcase (an overview of 
these ideas is found Table 69).  
Table 69: Possible variations using the Suitcase Game design 
 Why this could be of interest 
Variation 1:  
The Splitter can 
send a message 
- The game could provide an interesting setup for exploration of truthfulness. 
Trials have a similar underlying structure but this is not so obvious for 
participants allowing us to assess behavioural patterns regarding bluffing and 
deceitfullness; potentially using a playfull design with figurative messages 
Variation 2:  
Only one player has 
AVs 
- This could be interesting since it should not affect Splitter behaviour since 
trickery based on AVs is not possible when Choosers are ignorant of these AVs 
- Furthermore, when only Choosers know the AVs it becomes hard for Splitters 
to divide unequally since this may provide a knowledgeable Chooser with a 
dominant choice option 
- Another interesting variant on this is when it is ‘uncertain’ whether the other 
player has this information.  
Variation 3: 
Conditional 
feedback on 
choosing the 
Suitcase 
- It is worth assessing whether the findings of Van Dijk and Zeelenberg (2007) 
also apply in a game versus a strategic agent (compared to a game against nature)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Implications and Future Directions  
 
198 
 
Real world relevance 
Finally, we provide the reader with real world scenarios that relate to our 
experimental games (see Table 70).  
Table 70: Relevance to real world scenarios 
Game Real life scenarios How the game can apply to these scenarios 
Envelope The Envelope Game has potential 
applications for the literature on voluntary 
disclosure. The typical example is how 
restaurants decide themselves whether to 
display their hygiene ratings to consumers 
which can affect patronage. Typically, the 
literature uses complex games to explore 
this topic; however, a variation on the 
Envelope Game can explore things in a 
simplified way.  
Concretely, instead of transferring value between envelopes 
the Opener’s task can be reframed as ‘revealing’ a desired 
amount of value. Such a design is less risky for the Opener 
since the expected value of the two envelopes remains the 
same even when he reveals value. Furthermore, revealing any 
amount below the EV should not affect P2’s behaviour as it is 
simply ‘cheap talk’. Restaurants with a low hygiene rating 
may choose not to disclose their rating out of fear (of scaring 
costumers away) whilst restaurants with a high rating are more 
likely to display (to lure in costumers). The predictions for the 
Revealing Game variation are the exact opposite: one would 
want to reveal a small looking amount (i.e. give a bad 
impression) when a large value is found in the OE whilst 
revealing a large looking amount (i.e. give a good impression) 
when a small amount is found in the OE. The logic is that 
restaurants aim to have consumers choose their restaurant 
whilst P1 in the Revealing Games aims for P2 to choose the 
less valuable envelope. 
Transfer Many real life scenarios involve a 
decision  between two uncertain choice 
alternatives. E.g. which stocks to buy/sell; 
which restaurant to pick; which holiday 
package to take. At times we see one of 
the alternatives being discounted which 
can influence our final decision. One 
holiday package may receive a special 
promotion involving a ‘free breakfast’; 
Stocks X may be at an all time low whilst 
Stocks Y is at its usual price; and 
Restaurant A may offer a free bottle of 
wine when you take their romantic three-
course menu on Valentine’s day. Some of 
these scenarios involve natural 
discounting (e.g. stocks changing value) 
whilst others may be due to strategic 
considerations of salesmen (e.g. free 
breakfast for the Spain holiday). Our 
Transfer Game looks at the latter 
scenarios.  
The Transfer Game explores the strategic interactions from 
such scenarios by placing participants in a context where one 
option is better than its alternative (i.e. 80 versus 40 tokens) 
but where only the salesperson knows which option is better. 
The salesperson is faced with the opportunity to discount 
Option A (which may or may not be the more valuable option) 
by decreasing its cost with a pre-decided fixed amount – thus 
making it more appealing to the buyer relative to Option B. 
Should they perform this discount when Option A is worse 
than Option B (which only they know); should they perform 
the discount when Option A is already better than Option B? 
And how does the pre-decided discount amount affect their 
decisions? From the perspective of the consumer should they 
pick the discounted or the non-discounted option knowing that 
the salesperson has diverging interests from themselves? And 
how does the discount-amount affect consumers behaviour?  
Suitcase The used car market is a classic example 
for topics involving information 
asymmetry. Sellers have more 
information than buyers and given that 
buyers are only willing to pay the average 
market price adverse selection takes place 
chasing the good cars from the market. 
 
 
Our own setup approaches things from a somewhat different 
angle. Stating that buyers don’t always consider the average 
market price when buying a car. They may weigh off their 
estimate of the car’s value and assess whether they rather 
forego their savings in exchange for the car or whether they 
rather keep their savings intact and forego the car. 
Furthermore, we assess the effects of additional knowledge in 
the shape of two AVs (Additional Values). This corresponds 
to buyers and sellers having an idea of the minimum and 
maximum value that the car may have. This limits the risk to 
some degree and may incentivize “fair play” based on our 
preliminary findings. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
We started this thesis with a background discussion on the field of 
behavioural game theory and introduced the reader to three novel games with 
different degrees of information. These games were contrasted with prior literature 
and discussed in more detail in their respective chapters. Each of these games is 
analysed through the viewpoint of three popular frameworks, namely Nash, level k 
and maximin. Our standpoint is that some of these frameworks require complex 
calculations to reach decisions – even in these apparently simple games – and that 
participants are more likely to have a flexible and intuitive approach to these tasks. 
In each chapter we made comparisons between experimental behaviour and strategy 
profiles that were defined based on the predictions of our three main frameworks.  
We found in the Envelope Game (Chapter 2) that only a minority of 
participants truly behaves according to the predictions of a specific framework. 
However, it could be that a combination of frameworks is used across trials (which is 
also suggested by prior literature, e.g. Colman et al. (2014)). Another topic explored 
in Chapter 2 is whether experimental behaviour relates to risk attitudes. For P1 we 
find that risk averseness leads to a desire to transfer more value when large amounts 
are involved compared to non-aversely coded P1s; for P2 we did not find a 
behavioural difference in relation to risk attitude.  
In our third chapter we used an even simpler experimental game with 
arguably a very clear structure. However, it remains a big challenge to compute 
predictions for some of these frameworks. Again, we found evidence that 
participants do not adhere consistently to predictions of specific frameworks. As a 
secondary experiment, we modified the design to allow the collection of verbal 
protocols. This procedure has not been employed too frequently for experimental 
games even though it provides researchers with a better understanding of 
motivations and reasoning behind experimental decisions. Findings indicated that 
participants, indeed, have no strong adherence to the predictions of specific 
frameworks
84
. Another benefit of verbal protocols is that it provides us with a better 
insight regarding the limitations of our experimental design. It became apparent that 
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 Though, it can be argued that this variation is limited by the number of trials and by the fact that it 
involves team decisions (since one can argue that different teammates may potentially adhere to 
different frameworks). However, we point out that our within-participant data supports the same 
conclusions.   
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small transfer amounts were frequently seen as ‘irrelevant’ due to the marginal effect 
they have on payoffs – even though they allow ‘bluffing’ through signalling. 
Furthermore, it is extremely interesting to note that dominance was not spotted that 
easily despite the simplistic nature of the game. Instead of considering it ‘obvious’ 
that the DT (direction to) option has a better payoff when 30 tokens are transferred 
(regardless whether the transfer went from 80 to 40 or 40 to 80) this was 
occasionally considered a ‘potential bluff’ according to the verbal protocol data. 
Furthermore, such choices were even made in one third of the scenarios involving 
strong dominance in an SB (small to big) directionality (i.e. none of the frameworks 
can explain the behaviour for SB-scenarios of strong dominance)
85
. The fact that 
participants realise dominance most easily in BS (big to small) scenarios of weak 
dominance – where a transfer results into equal division – also underscores the idea 
that behaviour may be best explained through the intuitions participants have and the 
aspects that are considered most ‘salient’ on specific trials (e.g. ‘equality is possible 
if we transfer!’, ‘it is risky to transfer since we could end up with low payoffs’, 
‘making the transfer results into a better minimum payoff’).  
Finally, chapter four discussed a game in which the standard theoretical 
frameworks have quite clear and specific predictions. One of the topics we explored 
was the effect of additional knowledge. Concretely, we sometimes provide 
participants with two values (AVs) which set expectations for the minimum and 
maximum division amount for the trial that is played. As a result P2 could easily 
make her decisions by using these values as an indicator regarding the relative size 
of what is offered to her in comparison to the size of the hidden remainder. Without 
this data, however, frameworks simply predict her to behave randomly. We made 
comparisons between experimental behaviour and predictions from the three 
frameworks and we additionally assessed whether P2’s behaviour can be explained 
through simple heuristics.  
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 Potentially, this could be a result of our small experimental sample but it remains an odd 
observation nonetheless. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Envelope Game 
Appendix 1.1: Computing EV(CE) conditional on each scenario 
The computation of  EV CE  is done in the following way. First, we assess 
how many coins are spread between the closed envelope (CE) and destroyed 
envelope (DE). If we found six coins in the OE we know that the CE and DE should 
total to six coins as well as the overall sum of the three envelopes is twelve coins. 
Next, we assess the potential scenarios that may occur, knowing that at minimum 
two coins are found both in the CE and in the DE. Thus the possible scenarios are (a) 
CE=4, DE=2; (b) CE=2, DE=4; and (c) CE=3, DE=3. Finally, we can compute the 
probabilities for each of these three scenarios; however, this is not required since the 
scenarios have a symmetrical structure. The probability of (a) CE=4 and DE =2 
equals the probability of (c) CE=2 and DE=4; this is true for each of the possible 
scenarios implying that we can simply take their mean value to compute EV(CE). In 
our example where OE=6 we thus expect to find three coins in the CE (
4+3+2
EV(CE|OE=6)=
3
 = 3).  
Hence, in a scenario in which OE=6 and where zero coins are transferred
 EV CE 3 . When a transfer is made we can compute a new OE value and a new 
 EV CE  value by subtracting and adding the transfer amount to the values. For 
example if one coin is transferred the OE would have ‘5’ coins remaining (i.e. 6 -1 = 
5) and  EV CE would increase to ‘4’ coins (i.e. 3 + 1 = 4).  
Table 71: EV(CE) for each OE-value 
OE EV(CE) 
2 5 
3 4.5 
4 4 
5 3.5 
6 3 
7 2.5 
8 2 
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Appendix 1.2: Computing the probabilities of finding 'x' coins in the OE 
In this appendix we explain to the reader how the probability of finding ‘x’ 
coins in the OE is computed. Since each envelope contains two coins minimum we 
thus compute the probability of each of the six remaining coins ending up in the OE 
(i.e. in total there are 12 coins, each of the three envelopes contains minimum two 
coins; hence, 12 - 2 - 2 - 2 = 6 coins are randomly assigned to the envelopes). In 
Table 72 we look at all unique ways in which the remaining six coins can be 
randomly assigned to the three envelopes. We compute in how many ordered 
sequences the divisions can happen and the final probability of assigning ‘x’ out of 
six coins to the OE is computed by dividing these amounts by the total number of 
possible sequences. We use ‘O’ to refer to a coin being placed in the OE; ‘C’ refers 
to a coin being placed in the CE and ‘D’ refers to a coin being placed in the DE. 
Each coin can end up in O, C or D and each location is equally likely. Thus there are 
1 6
3
( )  possible ways of dividing six coins across the envelopes (=
1
729
).  
Table 72: Computing the probabilities of finding X coins in the OE 
 Unique ways in which 
we can assign ‘x’ out of 
6 coins to the OE 
These events can happen in any sequential order, thus we calculate 
the number of ways in which each of these combinations of O, C and 
D can occur 
Probability 
8 6xO + 0xC + 0xD 6!
6!0!0!
= 1 
1
729
 
7 5xO + 1xC + 0xD 
5xO + 0xC + 1xD 
 
6!
2
5!1!
 = 12 
12
729
 
6 4xO + 2xC + 0xD 
4xO + 0xC + 2xD 
4xO + 1xC + 1xD 
6! 6!
2
4!2! 4!1!1!
  = 30+30 = 60 
60
729
 
5 3xO + 3xC + 0xD 
3xO + 0xC + 3xD 
3xO + 2xC + 1xD 
3xO + 1xC + 2xD 
6! 6!
2 2
3!3! 3!2!1!
   = 40 + 120 = 160 
160
729
 
4 2xO + 4xC + 0xD 
2xO + 0xC + 4xD 
2xO + 3xC + 1xD 
2xO + 1xC + 3xD 
2xO + 2xC + 2xD 
6! 6! 6!
2 2
2!4! 2!3!1! 2!2!2!
    = 30 + 120 + 90 = 240 
240
729
 
3 1xO + 5xC + 0xD 
1xO + 0xC + 5xD 
1xO + 4xC + 1xD 
1xO + 1xC + 4xD 
1xO + 3xC + 2xD 
1xO + 2xC + 1xD 
6! 6! 6!
2 2 2
3!2!1! 4!1!1! 5!1!
     = 120 + 60 + 12 = 192 
192
729
 
2 0xO + 6xC + 0xD 
0xO + 0xC + 6xD 
0xO + 5xC + 1xD 
0xO + 1xC + 5xD 
6! 6! 6! 6!
2 2 2
6! 4!2! 5!1! 3!3!
      = 2 + 30 + 12 + 20 = 64 
64
729
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0xO + 4xC + 2xD 
0xO + 2xC + 4xD 
0xO + 3xC + 3xD 
 
As a final test we check whether the sum of our probabilities equals one
1 12 60 160 240 192 64
1
729
     
 .  
 
Appendix 1.3: How the CE is generated in the experiment in relation to the OE 
Table 73 summarizes which amounts can be found in the CE when any 
specific value is observed in the OE. Note that some values are more likely to be in 
the CE (written in bold). This is because the content of the CE also depends on the 
content of the DE. 
Table 73: How the value of the CE is computed 
Content OE Possible Values CE 
8 2 
7 2 /3 
6 2 / 3 / 3 / 4 
5 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 
4 2 / 3 / 4 / 4 /5 / 6 
3 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6 / 7 
2 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 5 / 6 / 7 / 8 
The content of the CE is decided by randomly drawing one of the numbers 
from the corresponding cell of the table. See Figure 94 for an example in which the 
opened envelope contains 6 coins. 
Figure 94: Example of CE-value Computation when the OE contains six coins 
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In the scenario where the OE contains 6 coins we have four possible values 
for the CE, namely: 4, 2, 3 or 3. The envelope on the left is the OE in our example
86
. 
If the middle envelope is destroyed then the envelope on the right becomes the CE 
(alternative A). The right envelope contains two coins if “Possibility 1” is real and 
contains three coins if “Possibility 2” is real. If the right envelope is destroyed then 
the envelope in the middle becomes the CE (alternative B). The middle envelope 
contains four coins if “Possibility 1” is real and contains three coins if “Possibility 2” 
is real.  
 
Appendix 1.4: Instructions for participants 
This appendix provides an overview of the instructions received during a 
PowerPoint introduction to the experimental task. We point out to the reader that we 
referred to the P1-role as ‘Splitter’ and the P2-role as ‘Chooser’ during the 
experiment (compared to the terminology of ‘Opener’ that is used for P1 within 
Chapter 2).  
Slide 1: Title with three envelope images 
Hello everyone, today we are playing the envelope game. I will explain the 
task using a PowerPoint presentation. At the end of the presentation you can ask 
questions if anything is unclear. Now, first I will explain how things work.   
Slide 2: Three envelopes 
Each trial starts with three envelopes. And each of these envelopes contains a 
number of valuable ‘coins’.  
Slide 3: Destroyed, Opened and Closed Envelope 
On each trial one of these three envelopes will be destroyed. It will be burned 
to ashes as in the image. A second envelope will be opened and the final envelope 
remains closed. We thus refer to the three envelopes as a Destroyed, Opened and 
Closed Envelope.  
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 Note that the same outcome would be found if the middle or right envelope were to be opened and 
contained 6 coins. 
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Slide 4: Trials 
You will be playing 20 trials. Each trial you are randomly matched with 
another player. One of you will be the Splitter (first player) whilst the other is the 
Chooser (second player).  At the end of each trial you receive feedback on your 
performance; and your role will change for the next trial. Thus, if you start off as 
Splitter you then become a Chooser, Splitter, Chooser etc.  
Slide 5: Splitter tasks 
In each trial, the Splitter’s task is to first destroy one of the three envelopes. 
This is done simply by clicking the button below one of the envelopes. This should 
not take long (you can just randomly select one of the envelopes).  For example you 
pick the envelope on the right.  
 
Slide 6: Splitter tasks (b) 
The corresponding envelope is then burned to ashes (destroyed) without 
revealing its content. Next, the Splitter is asked to open one of the two remaining 
envelopes. Again, you can randomly select an envelope. In our example we open the 
envelope in the middle. We are now informed of the content of the opened envelope. 
In our example the envelope contains 999 coins. This is a hypothetical amount of 
course; and you should not expect to see this amount during the experiment.  
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Slide 7: make a transfer 
Next, the Splitter is asked to provide an integer amount of coins which he 
wants to transfer from the opened to the closed envelope. This can be any amount he 
likes, including zero coins or the full value 999 coins.  The only requirement is that 
you type an integer amount of tokens, so nothing like 9.5896 or pi; and that the 
amount cannot be larger than what is found in the opened envelope.
 
As example, the Splitter may decide to transfer 123 coins to the closed 
envelope. Thus, he types ‘123’ into the box and clicks on the ‘Continue’ button.  
Slide 8: Chooser tasks 
Next, we discuss the Chooser tasks. After the Splitter completes his transfer, 
the Chooser will see how much the Splitter has transferred, for example ‘123 coins 
have been transferred from the opened to the closed envelope’ (again, this is just an 
example so don’t focus on the numbers too much). The Chooser’s task is to decide 
which envelope he wants for himself by clicking its button. 
 
So if you want the opened envelope you click the button below the opened 
envelope; if you want the closed envelope you click the button below the closed 
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envelope. Whichever envelope the Chooser selects is given to him as his payoff; and 
the other envelope  is given to the Splitter as his payoff.  
Slide 9: Information  
Next, I want to go over some background information regarding the three 
envelopes. First, each of the three envelopes contains at least 2 coins and the sum of 
coins in the three envelopes is always 12 (i.e. coins in the left envelope plus coins in 
the middle envelope plus coins in the right envelope sums to 12 coins). This is 
constant throughout the experiment and will be the case on every trial.  
 
Slide 10: payment 
Now, the payment. For participating to the experiment you receive a 
participation fee of two pounds and additionally you receive a performance fee based 
on the amount of coins you earned in a randomly selected trial. We do not take the 
average performance in account; we only look at one trial. The performance fee can 
be anything between zero and twenty pounds. It is worth knowing that each coin in 
the experiment is worth exactly two pounds
87
.  
Slide 11: Final notes 
Before we start the experiment I will summarize some of the main points of 
the game.  
The game involves some background knowledge. Splitters know the content 
of the opened envelope (but they do not know the content of the closed or destroyed 
envelopes). The Chooser does not know the content of any of the three envelopes. 
Furthermore, both players know that at the start of each trial each of the three 
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 We decided to reveal this to participants from the start. This is not known in our other two 
experiments.  
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envelopes contains at minimum two coins and that the three envelopes always sum 
together to exactly twelve coins.  
Finally, I want to stress that the Splitter can transfer coins from the opened to 
the closed envelope. This is always in this direction – opened to closed – and he 
decides upon the transfer amount. This can be zero, the full value or any integer 
amount in between. Furthermore, the Chooser knows how many coins are 
transferred. The task for the Chooser is to decide whether he wants to closed or 
opened envelope for himself. And the unchosen envelope is given to the Splitter.  
Are there any questions? 
 
Appendix 1.5: Risk Attitude Measurements 
Risk attitude is measured in two ways. Firstly there is a hypothetical scenario 
in which two envelopes contain money. The player decides whether to transfer coins 
from the Left Envelope to the Right Envelope. However, the player now knows that 
the Left Envelope contains eight coins and the Right Envelope contains four coins. 
Furthermore, they play against a random computer opponent (and are aware of this). 
With this measurement we assess whether participants are risk avoidant (i.e. transfer 
1, 2 or 3 coins to decrease the variance), risk neutral (i.e. do not transfer any coins) 
or risk seeking (i.e. transfer more than 3 coins hence increasing the variance)
88
. One 
benefit of this assessment is that it is quite close to the experimental game.  
The second measurement of risk attitude is more cannon. We offer 
participants the choice between a lottery ticket with a certain likelihood of winning 
£10 versus a fixed amount. After every choice the fixed amount changes until we 
have an accurate picture of the indifference point for each subject. We repeat this 
set-up twice by changing the likelihood of winning the £10 to draw a more nuanced 
picture. Our Lottery assessment is based on the most frequently coded risk attitude 
across the three lotteries. The tables below provide an example of how we assessed 
risk attitude if the lottery ticket has a 50% chance of winning £10. 
Table 74: Lottery ticket has 50% chance to win £10: example risk neutral 
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 In case a subject transfers 4 coins we also flag this, as it comes down to the same scenario as doing 
nothing. It makes them sound confused (if this occurs it is referred to as “Confused/Neutral”).  
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Lottery Ticket Fixed Value On Offer Choice Subject 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£6.5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£6 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£5.5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£4.5 Lottery 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£4 Lottery 
The subject in this example has his indifference point between £5 and £4.5 
(estimate: £4.75). The expected value of the lottery is £5. Given that our fixed values 
differ from each other by £0.5 increments we will consider the subject to be risk 
neutral. His indifference point lies at the expected value of the lottery. Similarly, if 
his indifference point was situated between £5 and £5.5 (estimate: £5.25) we would 
still consider him risk neutral.  
 Table 75: Lottery ticket has a 50% chance of winning £10: example risk averse 
Lottery Ticket Fixed Value On Offer Choice Subject 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£5.5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£4.5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£4 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£3.5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£3 Lottery 
The subject in this example has his indifference point between £3.5 and £3 
(estimate: £3.25). The expected value of the lottery is £5. Since the subject does not 
want to take the lottery until the fixed amount becomes too minimal we consider him 
to be risk avoidant. They prefer a small fixed value over a risky lottery with a higher 
expected value.  
Table 76: Lottery ticket has a 50% chance of winning £10: example risk seeking 
Lottery Ticket Fixed Value On Offer Choice Subject 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£6.5 Fixed Value 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£6 Lottery 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£5.5 Lottery 
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50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£5 Lottery 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£4.5 Lottery 
50% chance £10 
50% chance £0 
£4 Lottery 
The subject in this example has his indifference point between £6 and £6.5 
(estimate: £6.25). The expected value of the lottery is £5. Since the subject prefers 
the risky lottery over a fixed amount of money even though the expected value of the 
lottery is lower than the amount on offer we consider him to be risk seeking. He 
prefers a risky gamble over a certain amount despite the expected value of the 
gamble being lower.  
 
Appendix 1.6: Specifics as to how lottery questions are administered 
In this section we explain how the array of fixed values is created to assess 
risk attitude through lottery questions. First, a list is defined in which all possible 
fixed values are stored. This list contains the following values: 0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 
3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5, 5.5, 6, 6.5, 7, 7.5, 8, 8.5, 9, 9.5, 10, 10.5, 11. Next, the subject 
chooses between a Lottery Ticket with a certain probability (e.g. 80%) of winning 
£10 and a Fixed Value of £5. We start by offering the fixed value of £5 but 
afterwards we randomly sample from the remaining values from our list. We exclude 
values that are more extreme than the current fixed value (as we assume them to 
result into the same choice behaviour) but we do not exclude the closest value to 
account for potential trembling hand phenomena. The reason why we randomly 
sample from the remaining values instead of a constant incremental procedure is to 
avoid sequence effects. Similarly, we always start with the fixed value of £5 to 
minimize anchor effects due to starting off with a more versus less extreme value. 
Numerical Example of Procedure: 
 If you prefer a Lottery Ticket with a certain probability (say 80%) of winning 
£10 over a fixed amount of £5, then we exclude all the fixed amounts below £4.5 
from our list by extrapolating that “the lottery would still be preferred if the fixed 
amount were smaller”. We do not remove the fixed amount of £4.5, however, as we 
want to ascertain that choices are not due to a “trembling hand”. The list now 
becomes: 4.5, 6, 6.5, 7.5, 8, 8.5, 9, 9.5, 10, 10.5, 11. Since we already asked the 
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preference when the fixed amount is £5 this value has also been excluded from the 
list. Next we randomly sample a value from the list; for example, we ask the subject 
whether they prefer the Lottery Ticket (with the same 80% probability of winning 
£10) over the new Fixed Value of £9. The subject indicates that they prefer the fixed 
value of £9. We extrapolate that a fixed value of £10, £10.5 or £11 would also be 
preferred over the lottery ticket as these are more extreme choice options. We still 
keep the fixed value of £9.5 in our list in case of a “trembling hand”. Our list is now 
reduced to: 4.5, 6, 6.5, 7.5, 8, 8.5, 9.5. Our next sampling gives us the fixed amount 
of £7.5. The subject prefers the Lottery Ticket and thus we extrapolate that our 
subject would also prefer the lottery ticket if the fixed value was £4.5, £6 or £6.5. 
We would include £7 in our list if it was still available, but this value has already 
been accounted for in past trials. The new list is: 8, 8.5, 9.5. We now sample whether 
the subject prefers the lottery or a fixed value of £8. He prefers the fixed value. We 
exclude £9.5 from our list by extrapolation.  
Only £8.5 is left to enquire about. This should logically also result into a 
preference for the Fixed Value given that both £8 and £9 have this preference 
already. Our hypothetical subject indeed prefers the fixed value as we expected. If it 
were the case that he preferred the Lottery over a fixed value of £8.5 then we would 
have placed a “flag89” in our analysis that the subject did something “odd” in the 
lottery. We would code him as “NA” on this trial as his data may be invalid given 
that he made odd choices.  
Table 77: Preferences in a numerical example 
Lottery Ticket Fixed Value On Offer Choice Subject 
80% chance £10 
80% chance £0 
£5 Lottery 
80% chance £10 
80% chance £0 
£9 Fixed Value 
80% chance £10 
80% chance £0 
£7.5 Lottery 
80% chance £10 
80% chance £0 
£8 Fixed Value 
80% chance £10 
80% chance £0 
£8.5 Fixed Value. 
Given our numerical example above, we compute the indifference point for 
our hypothetical subject to be between £7.5 and £8 (i.e. the point where his 
                                                 
89
 A flag in this context is something to pull attention to a given feature, namely: “this person did 
something odd”. 
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preference swaps from the lottery to the fixed value). Our indifference estimate is 
thus £7.75. In this example the Expected Value of the Lottery is £8 and hence we 
consider the subject to be risk neutral (as his indifference point lies as close as 
possible to the expected value of the lottery). 
 
Appendix 1.7: Dominant choices and violations against dominance 
In this section we discuss scenarios of strong and weak dominance. Table 78 
shows that regardless the amount in the OE one should never transfer four or more 
coins. The maximum remainder in the OE would be four coins whilst the minimum 
value of the CE would be six coins. A rational P2 would act according to the 
dominance and pick the better option. Table 79 shows that one should also be careful 
of transferring three coins as this leads to weak dominance. A three coin transfer can 
be made when exactly five coins are found in the OE – as the two envelopes would 
have the exact same content – but is ill-advised in other scenarios due to the weak 
dominance involved with three coin transfers. P2 would simply pick the CE and 
receive the better pay-off. 
Table 78: Strongly dominant choices 
Opened Envelope 
Initial Amount 
Opened Envelope 
After Transfer 
Closed Envelope After 
transfer 
8 4 minimum 2 + 4 = 6 
7 3 minimum 2 + 4 = 6 
6 2 minimum 2 + 4 = 6 
5 1 minimum 2 + 4 = 6 
4 0 minimum 2 + 4 = 6 
3 NA NA 
2 NA NA 
 
Table 79: Weakly dominant choices 
Opened Envelope 
Initial Amount 
Opened Envelope 
After Transfer 
Closed Envelope After 
transfer 
8 5 minimum 2 + 3 = 5 
7 4 minimum 2 + 3 = 5 
6 3 minimum 2 + 3 = 5 
5 2 minimum 2 + 3 = 5 
4 1 minimum 2 + 3 = 5 
3 0 minimum 2 + 3 = 5 
2 NA NA 
 
In Table 80 we summarize the trials in which P1 decided to transfer more 
than three coins (i.e. resulting into strong dominance for P2). In Table 81 we do the 
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same for scenarios in which exactly three coins are transferred (i.e. resulting into 
weak dominance for P2). However, it is worthwhile to stress that three coin transfers 
are only erroneous decisions when less than eight coins are found in the OE.  
Table 80: When P1 transfers more than three coins 
Subject Trial Number OE Content Transfer Amount 
3 0 8 5 
3 2 7 5 
8 1 6 4 
8 11 8 7 
12 0 4 4 
12 10 8 4 
21 1 7 7 
There were seven trials in which more than three coins were transferred. 
Generally speaking the same participants made this error twice and this only 
happened in the first ten (out of twenty) trials that were played implying that learning 
effects may be involved. Finally, it is worthwhile to point out that P2 made the 
rational choice of picking the CE in all seven of these cases.  
Table 81: When P1 transfers exactly three coins 
Subject Trial Number OE Content 
0 2 4 
0 10 8 
2 10 8 
7 11 8 
8 7 7 
9 1 8 
11 1 8 
11 3 7 
13 0 4 
14 0 4 
15 0 7 
16 0 7 
22 5 8 
28 2 5 
35 9 8 
There were fifteen trials in which exactly three coins were transferred. Seven 
of these choices involved eight coins in the OE – which is a rational strategy 
resulting into equal valued envelopes. Eight choices involved less than eight coins in 
the OE and are thus errors against weak dominance. In one of these fifteen cases P2 
made the erroneous choice of picking the OE but all other choices were in line with 
weak dominance.  
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Appendix 1.8: Statistical Output from R 
In this appendix we provide the reader with the output files from our 
statistical tests.  
Output for Openers 
We ran a one-way repeated measures ANOVA to explore the relationship for 
P1 between the initial OE-value and the transfer amount. This analysis only used 
data of trials without dominance involved (i.e. decisions in which the transfer 
amount is less than three tokens) to minimize noise: 
Transferamount ~ InitialAmountOE + Error(Subject/InitialAmountOE) 
 
We computed effect sizes using the formula for partial eta squared:  
2 effect
partial
effect error
SS
SS SS
 

 
 
2
partialη : 14.12/(14.12+139.61) = 0.092 
 
We also assessed the relationship between decision time and the initial OE-
value and transfer amount. Concretely, we recoded decision times for each 
individual Opener into z-scores after which we ran a two-way ANOVA. Again, we 
looked at trials without dominance: 
Zscores ~ TransferAmount * InitialAmountOE + Error(Subject/ 
(TransferAmount * InitialAmountOE)) 
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 We computed effect sizes using the formula for partial eta squared:  
2 effect
partial
effect error
SS
SS SS
 

 
 
2
partialη : 6.8/(6.8+229.71) = 0.0287 
2
partialη : 2.87/(2.87+229.71) = 0.012 
2
partialη : 18.21/(18.21+229.71) = 0.073 
 
Output for Choosers: 
For each of the transfer amounts we observe a preference towards choosing 
the CE (i.e. the green bars). We ran a repeated measures ANOVA to assess whether 
there is a relationship between the envelope choice and the transfer amount. We 
again looked solely at data in which dominance is not involved to minimize noise.  
TransferAmount ~ P2decision + Error(Subject/(P2decision)) 
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We computed effect sizes using the formula for partial eta squared:  
2 effect
partial
effect error
SS
SS SS
 

 
 
2
partial = 0.02 / (0.02 + 167.51) = 0.00012 
Next, we converted the decision time of individual Choosers into z-scores to 
assess whether a relationship exists between the transfer amount, the Chooser’s 
decision and her decision time. Our two-way ANOVA suggests no relationship 
between the transfer amount and decision time (
2,326F =0.564, p=0.569, 
2
partialη
=0.003) and no relationship between the chosen envelope and decision time (
1,326F
=0.123, p=0.726, 
2
partialη = 0.0003)
90
. 
Zscores ~ TransferAmount * P2decision + Error(Subject/(TransferAmount * 
P2decision)) 
 
 
                                                 
90
 For completeness we add that there is no interaction effect either ( 2,326F =0.492, p=0.612, 
2
partialη
=0.003). 
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Appendix 2: Transfer Game 
Appendix 2.1: Why physical screen location does not matter 
In our experiment we look at each scenario using two different framings. One 
framing involves a possible transfer from left to right in which the box on the left has 
80 tokens; the other framing involves a transfer from right to left in which the box on 
the right has 80 tokens. At face value these framings should be the same but 
psychologically subjects may have a bias due to the physical screen location. In the 
tables below we make the comparison between P1 behaviour (transfer versus no 
transfer) when the left box contains 80 tokens versus when the right box contains the 
80 tokens. These comparisons are made separately for each possible transfer amount 
(5, 10, 20, 30 and 35) with exactly one observation per participant in BS-scenarios 
and one observation per participant in SB-scenarios. First, we look at the data for 
Deciders. 
Table 82: Transfer Amount 5 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  No Transfer Transfer No Transfer Transfer 
Left=40 No Transfer 5 6 7 3 
Transfer 4 9 5 9 
Table 83: Transfer Amount 10 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  No Transfer Transfer No Transfer Transfer 
Left=40 No Transfer 2 6 7 3 
Transfer 2 14 6 8 
 
Table 84: Transfer Amount 20 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  No Transfer Transfer No Transfer Transfer 
Left=40 No Transfer 3 5 13 5 
Transfer 3 13 1 5 
 
Table 85: Transfer Amount 30 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  No Transfer Transfer No Transfer Transfer 
Left=40 No Transfer 7 5 12 2 
Transfer 3 9 7 3 
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Table 86: Transfer Amount 35 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  No Transfer Transfer No Transfer Transfer 
Left=40 No Transfer 9 3 11 5 
Transfer 7 5 6 2 
We did McNemar chi squared tests for each possible transfer amount to see 
whether there is a difference between transferring and not transferring when the 
physical screen location has the bigger box on the left versus the right side. Results 
are summarized in Table 87.  
Table 87: Summary McNemar Chi Squared Tests for Physical Screen Location and P1 
Behaviour 
 BS (Big To Small) SB (Small To Big) 
Transfer Amount 5 2 = 0.100, df = 1, p = 0.752 2 = 0.125, df = 1, p = 0.724 
Transfer Amount 10 2 = 1.125, df = 1, p = 0.289 2 = 0.444, df = 1, p = 0.505 
Transfer Amount 20 2 = 0.125, df = 1, p = 0.724 2 = 1.500, df = 1, p = 0.221 
Transfer Amount 30 2 = 0.125, df = 1, p = 0.724 2 = 1.778, df = 1, p = 0.182 
Transfer Amount 35 2 = 0.900, df = 1, p = 0.343 2 = 0, df = 1, p = 1 
Since we did not find any behavioural differences for Deciders based on the 
physical screen location we can collapse this variable for P1-data. We assessed for 
Choosers whether the same holds true in the tables below. It is worthwhile to point 
out that we can only do McNemar tests for P2-data if we keep data separated based 
on directionality (i.e. BS versus SB); if we separate based on transfer decisions by 
P1 we would have two paired-observations for Choosers at times. Separation based 
on directionality can potentially affect choices made by P2 due to indirect effects on 
Decider decisions (i.e. transfers may be made conditional on directionality and 
choices by P2 may be made conditional on transfer decisions).  
Table 88: P2 and Physical Screen Location for 5 Coins 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  DT DF DT DF 
Left=40 DT 5 8 3 11 
DF 9 2 6 4 
 
Table 89: P2 and Physical Screen Location for 10 Coins 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  DT DF DT DF 
Left=40 DT 8 2 5 6 
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DF 4 10 5 8 
 
Table 90: P2 and Physical Screen Location for 20 Coins 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  DT DF DT DF 
Left=40 DT 8 5 6 8 
DF 5 6 6 4 
 
Table 91: P2 and Physical Screen Location for 30 Coins 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  DT DF DT DF 
Left=40 DT 10 5 11 9 
DF 8 1 1 3 
 
Table 92: P2 and Physical Screen Location for 35 Coins 
  BS  SB 
  Left=80  Left=80 
  DT DF DT DF 
Left=40 DT 12 6 6 11 
DF 5 1 4 3 
A summary of the McNemar chi squared tests from these tables can be found 
in Table 93. We again did not find an effect of the physical screen location on 
behaviour. One exception is the “SB30” scenario. Most logically the difference with 
BS30 is due to P1 behaviour (P2 doesn’t know directionality) or artefact of small 
sample size. 
Table 93: Summary Chi Squared Tests for Physical Screen Location and P2 Behaviour 
 BS (Big to Small) SB (Small to Big) 
Transfer Amount 5 2 = 0.000, df = 1, p = 1 2 = 0941, df = 1, p = 0.332 
Transfer Amount 10 2 = 0.1667, df = 1, p = 0.683 2 = 0, df = 1, p = 1 
Transfer Amount 20 2 = 0, df = 1, p = 1 2 = 0.714, df = 1, p = 0.789 
Transfer Amount 30 2 = 0.308, df = 1, p = 0.579 2 = 4.9, df = 1, p = 0.029 
Transfer Amount 35 2 = 0.000, df = 1, p = 1 2 = 2.4, df = 1, p = 0.121 
 
Appendix 2.2: Instructions for participants 
This appendix provides an overview of the instructions received during a 
powerpoint introduction to the experimental task. Note that we referred to the P1-
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role as ‘Splitter’ and the P2-role as ‘Chooser’ during the experiment (compared to 
the terminology of ‘Decider’ used for P1 within chapter 3).  
A) Instructions for Experiment Two 
Slide 1: Title and image of two boxes 
Hello everyone, today we are playing the Transfer game. I will explain the 
task using a PowerPoint presentation. At the end of the presentation you can ask 
questions if anything remains unclear. Now, how does the game work?   
Slide 2: How the game works 
Each trial you see two boxes displayed on the screen. We refer to the left box 
as Box A and to the right box as Box B. Both of these boxes contain ‘tokens’. Now 
what are tokens? Tokens are like money, but you do not know their exact value.  
Besides the two boxes it is important to point out that there are two roles in 
this game. You will play both roles equally often and every trial your role changes. 
On some trials you are In the role of Splitter while on other trials you are in the role 
of Chooser.  If you start as Splitter you then play as Chooser, Splitter, Chooser etc.  
The two roles involve different tasks. The Splitter is able to look at the 
content of the two boxes but the Chooser cannot. However, the Chooser will decide 
who receives which box as their payoff… 
Slide 3: Transfers 
Now, what happens on each trial? Each trial the computer will suggest a 
token transfer. For example: one token can be transferred from Box A to Box B. This 
suggestion is thus made with a certain direction (From box a to box b or from box b 
to box a) and with a specific transfer amount specified. The task for the Splitter is 
simply to decide whether or not this transfer takes place.  
Slide 4: Knowledge: 
Now what knowledge is available on each trial? Each trial the Chooser 
knows the direction of the suggested transfer, the amount of the suggested transfer 
and whether or not this transfer was made by the Splitter. As a relevant sidenote each 
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trial one box will contain exactly 80 tokens while the other box contains 40 tokens. 
This is known to everyone and this is the case on every trial. However, the Splitter 
knows which box has the 80 tokens and the Chooser does not know this.  
Slide 5: Notes 
Some notes about the experiment. Every trial you swap role between being a 
Splitter versus being a Chooser. You are randomly matched with someone in the 
opposite role and feedback is provided after every trial. Again, I remind you that the 
direction and amount of potential transfers is decided by the computer; the Splitter 
simply decides whether to make the transfer that is suggested. 
Slide 6: Payment 
Now, payment. The experiment uses tokens as a currency. What are tokens? 
Tokens are like pounds but you do not know their value. At the end of the 
experiment the conversion rate from tokens to pounds is revealed. The amount of 
tokens you earned on a randomly selected trial decides your performance fee. Thus, 
your payment consists of two parts. A participation fee of two pounds, and a 
performance fee based on the amount of tokens you earned in a randomly selected 
trial.  
Slide 7: Sequence of events 
The overall sequence of events in the experiment is the following. First the 
Splitter decides whether to make the transfer while the Chooser waits. Then the 
Chooser chooses between the two boxes. Finally, feedback is provided. Next, I show 
some examples of how things will look on the computer screen.  
(Slide 8-11 are simply “Example screens”) 
Are there any questions? 
 
B) Instructions for Experiment Three 
Slide 1: Title and image of two boxes 
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Hello everyone, today we are playing the Transfer game. I will explain the 
task using a PowerPoint presentation. At the end of the presentation you can ask 
questions if anything remains unclear. Now, how does the game work?   
Slide 2: How the game works 
Each trial you see two boxes displayed on the screen. We refer to the left box 
as Box A and to the right box as Box B. Both of these boxes contain ‘tokens’. Now 
what are tokens? Tokens are like money, but you simply do not know their exact 
value.  
Besides the two boxes it is important to point out that there are two roles in 
this game. During every trial you are in one of these two roles; and every trial your 
role changes. The first role is the Splitter and the second role is the Chooser. If you 
start as Splitter you next play as Chooser, Splitter, Chooser etc.  
Slide 3: What happens 
Now, how does the game work? The game starts with the Splitter observing 
the content of the two boxes. The computer then makes a transfer suggestion. The 
suggested transfer consists of a transfer direction, left to right or right to left, and a 
transfer amount. For example X tokens can be transferred from box a to box b. The 
Splitter’s task is simply to decide whether to make this transfer or not. While the 
Splitter makes his decision the Chooser waits.  
Once the Splitter is done it is revealed to the Chooser that a transfer of X 
tokens from box a to box b was suggested and whether or not the Splitter made this 
transfer. The choice for the Chooser is to pick one of the two boxes as his own prize. 
Finally, you receive feedback. Feedback consists of the prize you won as your payoff 
(box a or box b) and how many tokens are in this box; furthermore, feedback informs 
you of the payoff received by the other player (box a or box b) and how many tokens 
where in this box.  
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Slide 4: Knowledge 
Next, I discuss knowledge. On every trial there is some knowledge available 
to the Chooser. The Chooser knows the direction and amount for the suggested 
transfer and whether or not the Splitter made this transfer. Furthermore, every trial 
one of the two boxes contains 80 tokens whilst the other box contains 40 tokens. 
Thus, either the left box has 80 and the right box has 40; or the left box has 40 and 
the right box has 80. But this is constant on every trial.   
Slide 5: Teams 
Next, we discuss teams. During this game you will play in two-player teams. 
We randomly assign you a teammate; who plays in the same role as you and who 
sees the same information displayed on the screen. You are either both Splitters or 
you are both Choosers. This teammate is the same person throughout the experiment 
and you will communicate with each other through a chatting program. Besides a 
teammate you are also randomly matched with another team on every trial. The other 
team plays in the opposite role. Thus, if you are a Splitter team then the other team is 
a Chooser team. If you are a choose team then the other team is a Splitter team. 
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Slide 6: Chatting program 
In this experiment we use a chatting program to allow you to discuss the task 
with your teammate. It is extremely important that you and your teammate always 
make the same choices. If you make different choices, for example, one teammate 
does X while the other teammate does Y; or if a teammate does not make a choice; 
then a penalty is given. This penalty means that both teammates earn ZERO tokens 
on the trial that was just played. It is thus important to discuss the task with your 
teammate and to always make the same choices. Now what happens to the matched 
team in the opposite role when you get penalized? Whenever a penalty is given the 
computer makes a random choice in your stead for the matched team that plays in 
opposite role; it is only your own team that receives a penalty. 
 
Slide 7: Timer 
Timers. During each trial you have a time limit to make decisions. A 
countdown clock is displayed on the screen whenever you make choices. You are 
given two minutes to make a decision as Splitter team and you are given two minutes 
to make a choice as Chooser teams. Furthermore, there are fifteen seconds to process 
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the outcomes at the end of the trial during the feedback stage. It is important to know 
that you can change your decision as long as the timer is running. However, when 
the timer runs out you cannot change your decision and your choice becomes final. 
To make it clear that your choice is registered by the computer it is always displayed 
next to the timer.  
Slide 8: Important 
Some important notes about the experiment. Firstly, you only chat with your 
teammate. We do not want you to discuss your identity or your seating location in 
the lab, etc. You are simply meant to discuss the experimental task. Furthermore, it is 
important to decide with your teammate before the timer runs out AND to make the 
same choice to avoid the penalty. This is especially important since there are only six 
trials in total. Finally, we do not want you to work on any other tasks during the 
experiment, so no homework, no phones, no papers etc. Please, put all those things 
away before the experiment starts.  
Slide 9: Payment 
Now, payment. The experiment uses tokens as a currency. What are tokens? 
Tokens are like pounds but you do not know their value. At the end of the 
experiment the conversion rate from tokens to pounds is revealed. The amount of 
tokens you earn decides your performance fee. So how does payment work? 
Payment consists of a participation fee of two pounds which you receive simply for 
showing up and participating and a performance fee between zero and twelve pounds 
which is based on the amount of tokens you earned in a randomly selected trial. Of 
course if you are penalized on the trial that is selected you do not earn a performance 
fee.  
Are there any questions?  
 
Appendix 2.3: Behaviour according to theoretical profiles for P1 
In this appendix we provide the reader with tables in which we assess the 
strategy profiles that were suggested by theory. We discuss strong dominance, weak 
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dominance and no dominance in this order. The strategy profiles suggested by theory 
are refreshed by Table 94. 
Table 94: Strategy profiles for P1 
 Strategy 
Profile 1 Never transfer 
Profile 2 BS: transfer 
SB: no transfer 
Profile 3 BS: random 
SB: no transfer 
Profile 4 BS: No transfer 
SB: Transfer 
 
 
Table 95: P1s behaviour under strong dominance 
 BS SB 
 Transfer No transfer Transfer No transfer 
0 3 1 3 1 
1 2 2 0 4 
2 2 2 1 3 
3 4 0 0 4 
4 1 3 1 3 
5 2 2 0 4 
6 2 2 1 3 
7 4 0 1 3 
8 2 2 1 3 
9 3 1 1 3 
10 2 2 2 2 
11 0 4 1 3 
12 4 0 3 1 
13 4 0 1 3 
14 2 2 0 4 
15 0 4 0 4 
16 1 3 2 2 
17 2 2 2 2 
18 3 1 0 4 
19 1 3 1 3 
20 1 3 3 1 
21 1 3 3 1 
22 0 4 3 1 
23 0 4 0 4 
 
Allowing slight degrees of trembling hand errors we can categorize five 
subjects as profile one (purple colours) and five subjects as profile two (i.e. green 
colours). This means that 60% of participants do not behave according to the strategy 
profiles suggested by theories in context of strong dominance.   
Table 96: P1s behaviour under weak dominance 
 BS SB 
 Transfer No transfer Transfer No transfer 
0 2 0 1 1 
1 2 0 0 2 
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2 1 1 2 0 
3 2 0 2 0 
4 2 0 2 0 
5 2 0 0 2 
6 2 0 0 2 
7 1 1 0 2 
8 2 0 0 2 
9 1 1 1 1 
10 2 0 1 1 
11 1 1 0 2 
12 1 1 0 2 
13 2 0 1 1 
14 0 2 0 2 
15 2 0 0 2 
16 1 1 0 2 
17 2 0 1 1 
18 2 0 1 1 
19 2 0 0 2 
20 1 1 2 0 
21 0 2 0 2 
22 1 1 0 2 
23 0 2 2 0 
 
For scenarios of weak dominance we do not have many observations and 
hence cannot allow trembling hand errors when assessing behaviour according to 
profiles. We now categorize two participants as profile 1 (i.e. purple colours); five 
participants as profile 2 (i.e. green colours) and five participants as profile three (i.e. 
orange colours). 50% of the sample does not behave (fully) according to predictions 
from our frameworks.  
Table 97: P1 behaviour without dominance 
 BS SB 
 Transfer No transfer Transfer No transfer 
0 3 1 4 0 
1 2 2 4 0 
2 1 3 3 1 
3 2 2 4 0 
4 3 1 2 2 
5 1 3 1 3 
6 4 0 1 3 
7 2 2 3 1 
8 3 1 2 2 
9 3 1 4 0 
10 2 2 1 3 
11 2 2 0 4 
12 4 0 2 2 
13 3 1 1 3 
14 4 0 1 3 
15 3 1 1 3 
16 0 4 2 2 
17 4 0 1 3 
18 4 0 1 3 
19 4 0 1 3 
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20 2 2 4 0 
21 2 2 2 2 
22 2 2 3 1 
23 4 0 3 1 
 
For scenarios without dominance we observe one participant for profile 1 
(i.e. purple colours), seven participants for profile 2 (i.e. green colours), and one 
participant for profile 4 (i.e. red colours). This means that 63% of participants does 
not behave according to the suggested profiles for weak dominance.  
 
Appendix 2.4: Behaviour according to theoretical profiles for P2 
In this appendix we discuss the behaviour of P2 according to the strategy 
profiles suggested earlier by theory and models. We discuss in order strong 
dominance, weak dominance and no dominance. First, we remind the reader how 
strategy profiles are coded by referring to Table 98. 
Table 98: Strategy profiles for P2 
 Strategy 
Profile 1 Always pick DT 
Profile 2 Transfer: DT 
No transfer: Random 
Profile 3 Transfer: DT 
No transfer: DF 
Profile 4 Transfer: DF 
No transfer DT 
 
 
Table 99: Strong dominance P2 behaviour 
 No transfer Transfer 
DF DT DF DT 
0 6 0 0 2 
1 2 3 0 3 
2 2 0 0 6 
3 2 3 0 3 
4 2 3 1 2 
5 3 2 0 3 
6 4 3 0 1 
7 3 1 0 4 
8 1 1 2 4 
9 2 2 1 3 
10 2 3 1 2 
11 2 5 0 1 
12 1 3 0 4 
13 3 2 0 3 
14 1 5 0 2 
15 1 5 0 2 
16 2 4 1 1 
17 2 3 0 3 
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18 0 0 3 5 
19 2 4 0 2 
20 2 2 2 2 
21 2 4 0 2 
22 3 4 0 1 
23 3 1 1 3 
 
We coded eight Choosers as adhering to Profile 2 and three Choosers as 
adhering to profile 1. We do not assess the other profiles since they are only 
applicable for scenarios without dominance. The majority of Choosers cannot be 
categorized as strongly acting according to predictions from the suggested 
frameworks. Note that we even allowed for a slight ‘trembling hand’ occurrence 
when categorizing participants.  
Table 100: Weak dominance P2 behaviour 
 No transfer Transfer 
DF DT DF DT 
0 2 0 0 2 
1 0 2 1 1 
2 3 0 1 0 
3 0 1 2 1 
4 3 0 0 1 
5 0 2 0 2 
6 0 2 2 0 
7 1 1 0 2 
8 0 0 2 2 
9 0 0 2 2 
10 1 0 1 2 
11 1 0 0 3 
12 1 0 0 3 
13 1 0 3 0 
14 1 1 0 2 
15 1 2 0 1 
16 2 1 1 0 
17 2 1 0 1 
18 2 0 1 1 
19 1 2 1 0 
20 1 2 1 0 
21 0 1 1 2 
22 1 1 0 2 
23 1 2 0 1 
 
In scenarios of weak dominance we have fewer trials to assess and thus 
cannot allow for ‘trembling hand’ phenomena given that each participant only has 
four trials that can be assessed. Again, we can only assess profile one and profile two 
and neither of these strongly reflects Chooser-behaviour.  
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Table 101: No dominance P2 behaviour 
 No transfer Transfer 
DF DT DF DT 
0 1 1 5 1 
1 1 2 2 3 
2 1 3 4 0 
3 1 3 4 0 
4 4 1 2 1 
5 2 1 3 2 
6 2 1 3 2 
7 1 0 3 4 
8 2 1 0 5 
9 2 2 4 0 
10 3 2 1 2 
11 1 1 5 1 
12 2 1 2 3 
13 1 1 5 1 
14 1 2 1 4 
15 0 0 2 6 
16 1 5 2 0 
17 0 2 2 4 
18 2 0 3 3 
19 1 2 3 2 
20 3 1 1 3 
21 1 3 2 2 
22 2 4 2 0 
23 0 3 3 2 
 
Finally, we look at scenarios without dominance. We can now assess 
Choosers on four different profiles. Again, we allow for a slight ‘trembling hand’ 
occurrence, but nevertheless most participants do not behave according to the 
predictions of the frameworks that were assessed.  
 
Appendix 2.5: Extensive tables based on P2 behaviour  
Within this thesis we assess P1 and P2 behaviour across scenarios. For P1 
data is quite compact whilst for P2 there is a multitude of scenarios possible (since 
the frequency in which P2 faces scenarios is partly dependent on P1’s decisions91). 
This appendix provides a detailed summary of P2 behaviour whilst within the paper 
certain scenarios are merged together (as is required for analysis purposes). Table 
102 provides a summary of P2 behaviour in scenarios of strong dominance; Table 
103 provides a summary for P2 behaviour in scenarios of weak dominance; and 
Table 104 provides a summary for scenarios without dominance. Note that the 
                                                 
91
 Concretely, if none of the randomly matched P1-participants make a transfer under weak 
dominance regardless of the transfer direction then the P2-participant who is matched with them can 
never face a scenario in which no transfer is made under weak dominance.  
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transfer and no transfer column in our tables contain exactly one observation for 
each participant. It is possible for P2 to never face a trial involving a specific 
dominance level (i.e. strong, weak or no dominance) in which her opponent made a 
certain decision in which case the participant is coded as ‘0/0’ for that scenario (e.g. 
she never faced a P1 opponent who made a transfer under strong dominance). 
Whenever this occurs P2 is coded as ‘unobserved’ and excluded from analysis for 
that specific scenario. Furthermore, when we merge scenarios for analysis this is 
done such that all scenarios in which DT > DF are coded as ‘mostly DT’ whilst all 
scenarios in which DT < DF are coded as ‘mostly DF’. If the two frequencies are 
equal the subject is coded for that scenario as ‘undecided’. Note that NA-values in 
the table simply mean that no participant faced this particular ‘DT/DF’ frequency in 
that scenario.  
Table 102: P2 behaviour in scenarios involving strong dominance 
DT/DF Transfer No Transfer 
6/0 1 NA 
5/1 NA 2 
5/2 NA 1 
5/3 1 NA 
4/0 2 NA 
4/2 1 3 
4/3 NA 1 
3/0 5 NA 
3/1 2 1 
3/2 NA 5 
2/0 5 NA 
2/1 2 NA 
1/0 3 NA 
1/1 1 1 
2/2 1 2 
0/2 NA 1 
2/3 NA 2 
1/3 NA 2 
¾ NA 1 
0/6 NA 1 
0/0 NA 1 
 
Table 103: P2 behaviour in scenarios involving weak dominance  
DT/DF Transfer No Transfer 
3/0 2 NA 
2/0 5 3 
2/1 2 4 
1/0 4 2 
1/1 2 3 
2/2 2 NA 
0/1 4 4 
½ 1 2 
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0/2 1 2 
0/3 1 2 
0/0 NA 2 
 
Table 104: P2 behaviour in scenarios without dominance 
DT/DF Transfer No Transfer 
6/2 1 NA 
5/0 1 NA 
5/1 NA 1 
4/1 1 NA 
4/2 1 1 
4/3 1 NA 
3/0 NA 1 
3/1 1 3 
3/2 2 NA 
2/0 NA 1 
2/1 1 3 
1/1 NA 3 
2/2 1 1 
3/3 1 NA 
0/1 NA 1 
½ 1 4 
0/2 2 1 
2/3 4 1 
1/3 NA 1 
¼ NA 1 
0/4 3 NA 
1/5 3 NA 
0/0 NA 1 
 
Appendix 2.6: Team play data 
Given that Experiment Three is played in teams whilst the initial experiment 
is played by individuals it is important to realise that choices can be influenced due 
to the fact that subjects play in a team. In this appendix we provide a summary of 
choice behaviour for P1 and P2 in both experiments. This offers a rough idea of 
behavioural differences between the two experiments but the reader should be aware 
that the data from our third experiment is too scarce to make an adequate comparison 
between the two experiments. However, the reader should be aware of the small 
number of observations we have for team-decisions: the comparison between the two 
experiments should thus be taken lightly.  
Table 105: Decision frequencies for P1 as individual  
 Big to Small  Small to Big 
 Transfer No Transfer Transfer No Transfer 
No dominance 64 32 51 45 
Weak dominance 34 14 16 32 
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Strong dominance 46 50 30 66 
 
Table 106: Decision frequencies for P1 as team  
 Big to Small  Small to Big 
 Transfer No Transfer Transfer No Transfer 
No dominance 5 4 1 7 
Weak dominance 7 2 2 6 
Strong dominance 5 2 3 6 
 
The reader should be aware that each row in Table 106 consists of one 
decision (transfer versus no transfer) made per P1 team – which is either in a BS or 
in a SB-scenario
92
. Furthermore, data from some teams is missing from this table due 
to a failure of making an uniform choice within the two minute decision frame (i.e. 
we cannot use the random decision made by the computer on penalized trials). 
Concretely; 5 out of 108 choices were excluded due to penalization – four of these 
were P1 decisions.  
Looking at the data of individuals versus teams we observe the following 
differences for P1. When no dominance is involved (transfer amount 5 or 10) 
individuals prefer to transfer as BS-type and are indifferent as SB-type whilst teams 
are indifferent as BS-type and prefer not to transfer as SB-type. When weak 
dominance is involved (transfer amount 20) both teams and individuals prefer to 
transfer as BS-type whilst they prefer not to transfer as SB-type. It seems clear from 
the verbal protocols that most teams realised as BS-type how a 20 token transfer 
leads to an equal value for either box which they generally preferred; presumably the 
same realisation occurred for individuals playing this scenario. When strong 
dominance was involved both teams and individuals prefer not to transfer as SB-
type; meanwhile as BS-type we observe indifference between transferring and not 
transferring for individuals whilst teams displayed a preference towards transferring. 
We note that the verbal protocols indicated how teams were often pessimistic about 
the 30 tokens BS-transfer option with the idea that they would receive the smaller 
value either way (thus they rather decreased the value difference by making the 
transfer). This may be true for individuals too but cannot be assessed in the current 
experiment.  
                                                 
92
 Each team faced exactly six trials, three of which are faced as P1 team. Thus out of the six cells 
from our table each team contributed solely to three of these cells.  
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Next, we compare P2 decisions as individual versus team.  
Table 107: Decision frequencies for P2 as individual  
 Transfer  No Transfer 
 DF DT DF DT 
No dominance 64 51 35 42 
Weak dominance 19 31 25 21 
Strong dominance 12 64 53 63 
 
 
Table 108: Decision Frequencies for P2 as Team  
 Transfer  No Transfer 
 DF DT DF DT 
No dominance 2 5 7 4 
Weak dominance 0 10 3 4 
Strong dominance 2 8 3 5 
Note that we have one data point per P2 team in each row – either in a 
scenario where a transfer was made or in a scenario where the transfer was declined. 
For the weak dominance scenario there is one P2 team excluded from this table due 
to the penalization rule.  
We find that P2 teams are more likely to pick DT whenever a transfer is 
made compared to individual P2s (including when the transfer amount is small). 
Furthermore, when no dominance is involved the P2 team picks DT mostly when a 
transfer is made whilst picking DF mostly when a transfer is not made – suggesting 
that they assume bluffing behaviour. Individual P2s acts somewhat randomly and 
displays opposite tendencies. Under weak dominance the behaviour of teams and 
individuals is roughly the same though teams seem more aware of the weak 
dominance given that they consistently picked DT whenever 20 tokens were 
transferred whilst individuals only picked DT slightly more frequent than DF in such 
a context. Finally, under strong dominance individuals and teams seem to display the 
same tendencies.  
 
Appendix 2.7: Coding for verbal protocols 
In this appendix we describe how the author has coded the verbal protocol 
data into an assessment for the reasoning process, an assessment whether the team 
considered bluffing and an assessment whether or not the team recognized 
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dominance when applicable. This appendix will explain in detail which coding 
options are used and how they are defined. 
 
A) Reasoning: what is the main motivation for the team to make a specific choice? 
- Maximin: the team motivates their choice as trying to minimize the difference (and 
thus maximizing their minimum gain). 
- Avoid risk: the team makes their choice by wanting to avoid risk. 
- Random Guess: the team has no reason to believe either option should be 
preferred and thus makes a random choice. 
- No reasoning: no clear reasoning is provided to base our coding on. The team 
coordinates on the same decision without need to motivate their preferred choice. 
- Dominance: the team spots dominance and explains it to their teammate as the 
reason why they should make a specific choice. 
- Equality: the team faces a BS20 scenario and decides to transfer as the boxes 
would be 60-60. 
- Looks at EV: the team bases its choice on the expected value of the two boxes, 
thus picking DT when a transfer is made. 
- Considers bluff: explicit mentioning that the team will try to trick the other team 
in picking the smaller box. 
- Amount too small: the team thinks that the amount is too small to be relevant; 
regardless their choice as Splitter it won’t matter much. As Chooser it is not seen as 
a valid signal as it is too tiny to affect the expected value much. 
- Not coordinated: the team did not make the same choice. 
- Not on time: the team did not make a choice in the two minute time limit.  
- Did not understand task: based on their chat log the team did not understand the 
task.  
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B) Bluffing: did the team consider bluffing behaviour? 
 - NA: The team made their choice based upon a line of reasoning not compatible 
with ‘bluffing’ logic. They reason according to: avoid risk, maximin, dominance, 
equality, not on time, not coordinated, did not understand task, looks at EV. Trials 
that are not coded “NA” on bluffing are categorized based on the scenario that 
participants face and their decision.  
- Assumes no transfer means DF > DT (bluff): The Chooser team faces a no 
transfer scenario and picks DF. This behaviour suggests that they assume that DF 
has a larger value than DT which is a ‘bluffing’ interpretation of P1s behaviour.  
- Assumes no transfer means DT > DF (no bluff): The Chooser team faces a no 
transfer scenario and picks DT. This behaviour suggests that the assume that DT has 
a larger value than DF which is a ‘non bluffing’ interpretation of P1s behaviour.  
- Assumes transfer means DT > DF (bluff): The Chooser team faces a transfer 
scenario and picks DT. This behaviour suggests that the assume that DT has a larger 
value than DF which is a ‘bluffing’ interpretation of P1s behaviour. 
- Assumes transfer means DF > DT (no bluff): The Chooser team faces a transfer 
scenario and picks DF. This behaviour suggests that the assume that DF has a larger 
value than DT which is a ‘no bluffing’ interpretation of P1s behaviour. 
- Decrease variance (no bluff): The Decider team faces a BS-trial and makes the 
transfer thus decreasing the variance between the two boxes; or the Decider team 
faces a SB-trial and refuses the transfer thus not increasing the variance between the 
two boxes. This behaviour can be seen as a ‘non bluff’. 
- Increase variance (bluff): The Decider team faces a BS-trial and does not make 
the transfer thus not decreasing the variance between the two boxes; or the Decider 
team faces a SB-trial and makes the transfer thus increasing the variance between the 
two boxes. This behaviour can be seen as a ‘bluff’. 
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C) Dominance: did the team spot dominance when the transfer amount is 20 or 
more? 
- NA: the trial involves a small amount (five or ten tokens) implying that there is no 
dominance to assess. 
- Does not spot dominance: based on the chat and choice made by the team they did 
not seem to realise that dominance is involved if a transfer is made. 
- Unclear: the team makes the correct choices and their chat suggests that they may 
have spotted dominance but no explicit mentioning of dominance as given.  
- Spots dominance: the team realised that dominance is involved. 
- Spots equality: the team realised that a transfer leads to a scenario where the boxes 
both contain exactly 60 tokens. 
 
Appendix 2.8: Full overview encoding for reasoning, bluffing and dominance in Experiment 
Three 
Table 109 provides an overview of the verbal protocol encoding following 
the coding scheme specified in Appendix 2.7. We assess reasoning, bluffing and 
dominance in the columns whilst the rows represent data of the six trials that are 
played by each of the eighteen teams. Note that reasoning for amounts five and ten 
can have a double-coding with ‘amount too small’ suggesting that the team did not 
consider the trial worthwhile to put much effort into.  
Table 109: Coding For Verbal Protocols 
Team Trial Role Scenario Reasoning Bluffing interpretation Dominance 
1 0 P1 BS30 Maximin  NA Does not spot 
1 1 P2 SB35 – transfer Maximin  NA Does not spot 
1 2 P1 SB20 Maximin  NA Does not spot 
1 3 P2 BS20 – transfer Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
1 4 P1 BS5 Maximin NA NA 
1 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer Random guess 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
NA 
2 0 P1 BS30 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
Unclear  
2 1 P2 SB35 – transfer Dominance  
Assumes transfer means 
DT>DF (bluff) 
Spots dominance  
2 2 P1 SB20 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
Unclear  
2 3 P2 BS20 – transfer Dominance  NA Spots dominance 
2 4 P1 BS5 No reasoning Increase variance (bluff) NA 
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2 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer No reasoning 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
NA 
3 0 P1 BS30 No reasoning Increase variance (bluff) unclear 
3 1 P2 SB35 – no transfer Random guess 
No transfer means DF>DT 
(bluff) 
Does not spot 
3 2 P1 SB20 Considers bluff Increase variance (bluff) Does not spot 
3 3 P2 BS20 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
Does not spot 
3 4 P1 BS5 Considers bluff 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
3 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer Random guess 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
NA 
4 0 P2 BS30 – transfer No reasoning 
Assumes transfer means 
DT>DF (bluff) 
Does not spot 
4 1 P1 SB35 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
4 2 P2 SB20 – transfer Dominance  NA Spots dominance 
4 3 P1 BS20 Equality  NA Spots equality  
4 4 P2 BS5 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
NA 
4 5 P1 SB10 Maximin NA NA 
5 0 P2 BS30 – transfer No reasoning  
Assumes transfer means 
DT>DF (bluff) 
Unclear  
5 1 P1 SB35 Considers bluff Increase variance (bluff) Does not spot 
5 2 P2 SB20 – no transfer No reasoning 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
Does not spot 
5 3 P1 BS20 Maximin NA Does not spot 
5 4 P2 BS5 – transfer Random guess 
Assumes transfer means 
DF>DT (no bluff) 
NA 
5 5 P1 SB10 Avoid risk 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
6 0 P2 BS30 – no transfer No reasoning 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
6 1 P1 SB35 No reasoning Increase variance (bluff) Does not spot 
6 2 P2 SB20 – no transfer 
No reasoning Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
Does not spot 
6 3 P1 BS20 No reasoning Increase variance (bluff) Does not spot 
6 4 P2 BS5 – transfer 
No reasoning Assumes transfer means 
DF>DT (no bluff) 
NA 
6 5 P1 SB10 Maximin NA NA 
7 0 P1 BS30 Not coordinated NA Does not spot 
7 1 P2 SB35 – transfer Dominance NA Spots dominance 
7 2 P1 SB20 Avoid risk 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
Does not spot 
7 3 P2 BS20 – no transfer Random guess 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
7 4 P1 BS5 
Amount too 
small; considers 
bluff 
Increase variance (bluff) 
NA 
7 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer Random guess 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
NA 
8 0 P1 BS30 Considers bluff 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
Does not spot 
8 1 P2 SB35 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT 
Does not spot 
8 2 P1 SB20 Considers bluff Increase variance (bluff) Does not spot 
8 3 P2 BS20 – transfer Equality  NA Spots dominance 
8 4 P1 BS5 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
8 5 P2 SB10 – transfer Looks at EV  NA NA 
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9 0 P1 BS30 Did not understand task 
9 1 P2 SB35 – no transfer Did not understand task 
9 2 P1 SB20 Did not understand task 
9 3 P2 BS20 – transfer Did not understand task 
9 4 P1 BS5 Did not understand task 
9 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer Did not understand task 
10 0 P2 BS30 – transfer Dominance NA Spots dominance 
10 1 P1 SB35 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
10 2 P2 SB20 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
10 3 P1 BS20 Equality  NA Does not spot 
10 4 P2 BS5 – transfer Looks at EV NA NA 
10 5 P1 SB10 Not on time NA NA 
11 0 P2 BS30 – transfer Did not understand task 
11 1 P1 SB35 Did not understand task  
11 2 P2 SB20 – transfer 
Did not 
understand task 
(so uses simply 
heuristic from 
here on to always 
pick DT if 
transfer is made) 
Assumes tansfer means 
DT>DF (bluff) 
Does not spot 
11 3 P1 BS20 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
Does not spot 
11 4 P2 BS5 – transfer Random guess 
Assumes transfer means 
DT>DF (bluff) 
NA 
11 5 P1 SB10 Maximin 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
12 0 P2 BS30 – transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes transfer means 
DF>DT 
Does not spot 
12 1 P1 SB35 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
12 2 P2 SB20 – transfer No reasoning 
Assumes transfer means 
DT>DF (bluff) 
Does not spot 
12 3 P1 BS20 No reasoning Increase variance (bluff) Does not spot 
12 4 P2 BS5 – no transfer Random guess  
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
NA 
12 5 P1 SB10 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
13 0 P1 SB20 Dominance NA Spot dominance 
13 1 P2 SB35 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
Does not spot  
13 2 P1 BS5 
Amount too 
small; maximin 
NA 
NA 
13 3 P2 BS20 – transfer Dominance NA Spots dominance 
13 4 P1 BS30 Maximin NA Unclear 
13 5 P2 SB10 – transfer Looks at EV NA NA 
14 0 P1 SB20 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
14 1 P2 SB35 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
14 2 P1 BS5 
Amount too 
small; no 
reasoning 
Increase variance (bluff) 
NA 
14 3 P2 BS20 – Transfer  Equality NA Spots equality 
14 4 P1 BS30 No reasoning Increase variance (bluff) Unclear  
14 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer No reasoning 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
NA 
15 0 P1 SB20 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
15 1 P2 SB35 – no transfer  No reasoning Assumes no transfer Does not spot 
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means DT>DF (no bluff) 
15 2 P1 BS5 
Amount too 
small; considers 
bluff 
Increase variance (bluff) 
NA 
15 3 P2 BS20 – Transfer  Equality  NA Spots dominance 
15 4 P1 BS30 Maximin NA Unclear  
15 5 P2 SB10 – no transfer Random guess 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
NA 
16 0 P2 SB20 – no transfer  No reasoning 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff)  
Does not spot 
16 1 P1 SB35 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
16 2 P2 BS5 – no transfer Random guess 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
NA 
16 3 P1 BS20 Equality  NA Spots equality 
16 4 P2 BS30 – transfer  Dominance NA Spots dominance 
16 5 P1 SB10 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
17 0 P2 SB20 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
17 1 P1 SB35 No reasoning 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
Does not spot 
17 2 P2 BS5 – no transfer No reasoning 
Assumes no transfer 
means DF>DT (bluff) 
NA 
17 3 P1 BS20 Equality NA Spots equality  
17 4 P2 BS30 – transfer Dominance NA Spots dominance 
17 5 P1 SB10 
Amount too 
small; considers 
bluff 
Increase variance (bluff) 
NA 
18 0 P2 SB20 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
18 1 P1 SB35 Avoid risk NA Does not spot 
18 2 P2 BS5 – transfer Looks at EV NA NA 
18 3 P1 BS20 Equality  NA Spots equality 
18 4 P2 BS30 – no transfer Considers bluff 
Assumes no transfer 
means DT>DF (no bluff) 
Does not spot 
18 5 P1 SB10 
Amount too 
small; considers 
bluff 
Decrease variance (no 
bluff) 
NA 
 
 
Appendix 2.9: Raw data from verbal protocols 
Below are the chat files from the three sessions we ran using verbal 
protocols. Each team can talk with their teammate during the whole experiment 
using chatting software. It is important to point out to the reader that we used the 
terms ‘Splitter’ and ‘Chooser’ during the experimental sessions to refer to P1 
(Decider) and P2 (Chooser) respectively – and that these same terms thus occur in 
the chatting data instead of the terminology used within this thesis. P1 trials are 
coded in a green font and P2 trials are coded in a blue font. Now and then we 
observe lack of task understanding and faulty reasoning which is indicated in red 
font. Chit-chat is kept in a black font. Note that the chat data is largely kept as it was 
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(i.e. we did not convert chat-speak to clean English) though typos are corrected and 
small adjustments – such as turning ‘i’ into ‘I’ – were made to improve clarity and 
readability. Above each dialogue we summarize the data that was collected on the 
team’s trials. Tables mention whenever a team failed to make a uniform decision in 
the allotted timeframe by the wording ‘penalty’ as their choice (with the randomly 
made choice by the computer, in their stead, written between brackets). If the 
opposing team were penalised it is not mentioned in the table since this is only 
known at the feedback stage and cannot affect decisions.  
 
Session 1: 
Team 1: 
 
Table 110: Scenarios faced by team 1 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 BS30 Transfer  DT 
1 P2 SB35 Transfer DT 
2 P1 SB20 No transfer DF 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P1 BS5 Transfer DF 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DF 
 
12:41:49 <Team1B> hello? 
12:42:00 <Team1A> Hello 
12:42:18 <Team1A> Are we making the transfer? 
12:42:26 <Team1B> what do you think 
12:42:37 <Team1A> It would give us higher overall as I imagine the other team would pick the 
higher amount 
12:42:47 <Team1A> So we would get 50 instead of 40 
12:42:53 <Team1B> then transfer? 
12:42:56 <Team1A> I think so 
12:42:59 <Team1B> ok 
12:43:24 <Team1A> Have done it 
12:43:29 <Team1B> me2 
12:44:09 <Team1B> I have a question 
12:44:16 <Team1A> Okay 
12:44:22 <Team1B> are going to be Splitter throughout 
12:44:39 <Team1A> No we alternate so next time we will be the Choosers 
12:44:58 <Team1B> but we have to pick the same box is that correct? 
12:45:15 <Team1A> Yeah we have to make the decision together and make the same choice to 
avoid getting 0 
12:45:25 <Team1B> cool 
12:46:43 <Team1B> I think it will be even more interesting if the Choosers don't know the 
amount 
12:47:09 <Team1A> Yeah, maybe they'll do that on another experiment 
12:48:41 <Team1B> what do you think 
12:48:59 <Team1A> I'm not sure 
12:49:07 <Team1B> I think we should choose box b 
12:49:22 <Team1B> we know at least we will have 35 
((Subject doesn’t seem to pay attention to initial content of 40 minimum in box b…)) 
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12:49:27 <Team1A> Yeah 
12:49:35 <Team1A> I will choose that now 
12:49:42 <Team1B> ok I will do the same 
12:49:53 <Team1A> Have chosen 
12:50:02 <Team1B> me2 
12:50:37 <Team1A> Nice thinking 
12:50:37 <Team1B> that’s a lot 
12:51:08 <Team1A> I say don't make the transfer and then we at least get 40 rather than 20 
12:51:08 <Team1B> what do you think 
12:51:18 <Team1B> this can be a bluff 
12:51:28 <Team1B> but I agree 
12:51:32 <Team1B> let’s not transfer 
12:51:36 <Team1A> Agreed 
12:51:51 <Team1A> Have chosen 
12:52:03 <Team1B> me2 
12:53:09 <Team1B> hope they will choose box a 
12:53:21 <Team1A> They might do 
12:53:28 <Team1B> we need to pray 
12:53:33 <Team1A> Haha 
12:53:41 <Team1B> how much are you expecting to earn 
12:54:04 <Team1A> Not sure really, have done these kind of things before and been quite lucky 
12:55:07 <Team1A> Nice 
12:55:15 <Team1B> strange 
12:55:23 <Team1B> prayers work 
12:56:00 <Team1B> I have another question 
12:56:05 <Team1A> Go ahead 
12:56:15 <Team1B> so are we splitting the token? 
12:56:22 <Team1A> No we get it each I think 
12:57:44 <Team1A> What do you think? 
12:57:48 <Team1B> haha 
12:57:51 <Team1B> u did it first 
12:58:09 <Team1B> if box A has more  
12:58:16 <Team1B> then they won't transfer 
12:58:26 <Team1B> or this can be a bluff 
12:58:37 <Team1A> Or would they transfer so that they could have more as a minimum? 
12:58:52 <Team1A> 40 seconds... 
12:59:04 <Team1A> Shall we go with Box A? 
12:59:05 <Team1B> it will be risky to pick box A 
12:59:10 <Team1A> Box B then? 
12:59:16 <Team1A> Let's do B 
12:59:18 <Team1B> ok 
12:59:25 <Team1B> done 
12:59:28 <Team1A> Done 
12:59:42 <Team1A> Ooh interesting 
12:59:52 <Team1B> strange 
13:00:21 <Team1A> Hmm 
13:00:51 <Team1A> I'm thinking don't transfer? 
13:00:55 <Team1B> why? 
13:00:59 <Team1A> And make it a bluff 
13:01:18 <Team1A> Or transfer then we at least get 45 rather than 40? 
13:01:31 <Team1B> if we transfer they will think there are more in box B 
13:01:40 <Team1A> We'll transfer then 
13:01:44 <Team1B> ok 
13:01:48 <Team1A> Done 
13:01:55 <Team1B> done 
13:02:30 <Team1A> Do we have one more after this? 
13:02:34 <Team1B> I think so 
13:03:07 <Team1B> actually I think I was wrong 
13:03:11 <Team1B> should be not transfer 
13:03:12 <Team1B> sorry 
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13:03:17 <Team1B> you were right 
13:03:30 <Team1A> We don't know what they will choose so we might be okay 
13:03:38 <Team1A> It's still a decent amount 
13:03:39 <Team1B> hopefully 
13:03:53 <Team1B> yeah not bad 
13:04:01 <Team1B> not 5 tokens in the second round 
13:04:20 <Team1A> Exactly 
13:04:27 <Team1B> yeah sorry 
13:04:32 <Team1A> And hopefully that'll be the round they pick to give us the money 
13:04:35 <Team1A> No worries 
13:05:25 <Team1B> how are you doing today 
13:05:42 <Team1A> not bad thank you, yourself? 
13:05:51 <Team1B> not too bad thx 
13:06:53 <Team1B> what do you think 
13:06:53 <Team1A> What are we thinking? 
13:07:10 <Team1B> there might very few in A 
13:07:22 <Team1B> or a lot in A 
13:07:23 <Team1B> haha 
13:07:30 <Team1A> Haha I know that's the dilemma 
13:07:52 <Team1A> I'm thinking A but I'm not 100% confident 
13:08:03 <Team1B> let’s do A then 
13:08:06 <Team1A> Oh it says it's been decline 
13:08:09 <Team1A> *declined 
13:08:10 <Team1B> we have enough tokens 
13:08:18 <Team1A> Okay so A? 
13:08:26 <Team1B> yeah let’s do it 
13:08:31 <Team1A> Done 
13:08:35 <Team1B> Done 
13:08:55 <Team1B> OH they won 
 
 
Team 2: 
 
 
Table 111: Scenarios faced by team 2 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 BS30 Transfer DT 
1 P2 SB35 Transfer DT 
2 P1 SB20 No transfer DF 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer  DT 
4 P1 BS5 No transfer DF 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DT 
 
12:42:02 <Team2B> hi 
12:42:25 <Team2A> how many tokens are you guys transferring 
12:42:35 <Team2B> 30 
12:42:39 <Team2A> ok 
12:47:02 <Team2B> are we going to select the box with the highest payment? 
12:47:48 <Team2A> yeap 
12:48:00 <Team2B> perfect 
12:48:42 <Team2B> so it is B 
12:48:43 <Team2A> box B right 
12:48:45 <Team2A> yeap 
12:51:08 <Team2A> are we transferring? 
12:51:15 <Team2B> I would say no 
12:51:19 <Team2A> alright then 
12:57:36 <Team2A> I think we should pick box b 
12:57:51 <Team2B> I think it too 
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12:57:55 <Team2A> okay 
12:59:24 <Team2B> either was A80 B40 and so now it's 60/60 or it was A20 B80 and now 
20/100, right? 
12:59:38 <Team2A> yeap 
12:59:46 <Team2B> good 
13:00:15 <Team2A> to transfer or not to 
13:00:18 <Team2A> ? 
13:00:29 <Team2A> I think we should transfer 
13:00:29 <Team2B> this is tricky 
13:00:45 <Team2B> any idea? 
13:01:23 <Team2B> I'd say no 
13:01:30 <Team2A> okay I’ll put no 
13:01:39 <Team2B> no it is 
13:07:00 <Team2A> which box are you picking 
13:07:15 <Team2B> I don't know 
13:07:24 <Team2A> pick B I think 
13:07:31 <Team2B> ok I'll put b 
13:08:48 <Team2B> nice 
13:09:13 <Team2A> <y> 
 
 
 
Team 3: 
 
Table 112: Scenarios faced by team 3 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 BS30 No transfer DT 
1 P2 SB35 No transfer DF 
2 P1 SB20 Transfer  DT 
3 P2 BS20 No transfer  DF 
4 P1 BS5 Transfer DF 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DF 
 
12:42:36 <Team3B> hey, what do you want to do? 
12:42:47 <Team3A> don’t transfer? 
12:42:53 <Team3B> sure  
12:42:58 <Team3A> cool 
12:43:02 <Team3B> do it now?  
12:43:06 <Team3A> yup 
12:43:18 <Team3B> okay :) 
12:46:01 <Team3B> yay! 
12:46:07 <Team3A> yay 
12:47:49 <Team3A> this is a long wait 
12:47:59 <Team3B> I know!  
12:48:20 <Team3B> don't really know what to do about choosing, it’s basically just a guess 
12:48:34 <Team3A> hmm 
12:48:44 <Team3B> so they haven't transferred  
12:48:52 <Team3B> what’s your fav letter a or b? lol 
12:49:01 <Team3A> ermmm 
12:49:09 <Team3A> I would say A? 
12:49:11 <Team3B> maybe A 
12:49:15 <Team3A> haha same 
12:49:20 <Team3B> I think the same let's go for it 
12:49:28 <Team3A> hell yeah 
12:49:44 <Team3B> sorry if it's wrong haha 
12:50:19 <Team3A> if its wrong we will be left with only 5 tokens lol 
<<subject suggests they may earn 5 tokens from picking A even though they know no transfer has 
been made; may not fully understand the game>> 
  Appendix 2   
 
250 
 
12:50:34 <Team3A> ooo 
12:50:37 <Team3B> you win some you lose some i guess 
12:50:43 <Team3A> I see 
12:50:48 <Team3B> ooo 
12:51:12 <Team3B> there was no outcome right?  
12:51:29 <Team3A> nope... its either 40 or 80 tokens 
12:51:39 <Team3B> want to transfer? 
12:51:43 <Team3B> or nah 
12:51:48 <Team3A> okay 
12:51:53 <Team3A> we transfer 
12:51:58 <Team3B> okay let's try it  
12:52:40 <Team3A> so the aim is to convince them that box b has more tokens… 
12:52:48 <Team3A> I mean box a haha 
12:53:05 <Team3B> ahhh I see 
12:53:10 <Team3B> smart move if it works 
12:54:04 <Team3A> let’s just hope so 
12:54:10 <Team3B> I hope you're lucky haha 
12:55:09 <Team3B> damn 
12:55:15 <Team3A> ah damn 
12:55:24 <Team3B> 20 is better than nothing  
12:55:31 <Team3A> ikr 
12:57:45 <Team3B> what you thinking?  
12:57:50 <Team3A> ah 
12:57:57 <Team3A> don’t really know 
12:58:01 <Team3A> B this time? 
12:58:11 <Team3B> me either, I feel like if they declined it then they want more tokens  
12:58:16 <Team3A> yeah 
12:58:22 <Team3B> but they could be doing your trick 
12:58:33 <Team3A> its basically luck 
12:58:40 <Team3A> what do u think? 
12:58:41 <Team3B> I know!  
12:58:47 <Team3B> box a?  
12:58:52 <Team3A> cool 
12:58:54 <Team3B> sure?  
12:59:01 <Team3B> this is too much pressure haha 
12:59:04 <Team3A> hahah 
12:59:08 <Team3A> its fine this time 
12:59:11 <Team3A> 40 or 80 
12:59:21 <Team3B> okay okay  
12:59:25 <Team3B> so A?  
12:59:26 <Team3A> A yeah 
12:59:30 <Team3A> click it 
12:59:41 <Team3A> haha yay 
12:59:43 <Team3B> yaaaaay! 
12:59:52 <Team3B> it's because I’m wearing my lucky necklace you see 
12:59:56 <Team3A> u rock haha 
13:00:10 <Team3B> 5 tokens is good 
13:00:17 <Team3B> I think we should transfer 
13:00:21 <Team3A> cool 
13:00:21 <Team3B> to do the trick thing 
13:00:26 <Team3B> you sure?  
13:00:46 <Team3A> yeah...it’s only 5 
13:00:57 <Team3B> nice 
13:02:22 <Team3B> hopefully our earnings are based on a good one 
13:02:34 <Team3A> it’s a random round? 
13:03:00 <Team3B> I mean I hope the picked random one is a good one 
13:03:07 <Team3B> sorry ahaha 
13:03:11 <Team3A> hopefully not the one we got 20 tokens 
13:03:20 <Team3B> hopefully not no! 
13:03:36 <Team3A> haha… let’s not jinx it 
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13:03:46 <Team3B> you're right! 
13:04:13 <Team3B> damn! 
13:04:15 <Team3A> ahhhh 
13:04:24 <Team3B> sorry that was my bad 
13:04:28 <Team3A> its fine 
13:04:33 <Team3B> you pick this one??  
13:04:33 <Team3A> 45 is good enough 
13:04:38 <Team3B> true 
13:06:52 <Team3A> which one? 
13:07:00 <Team3B> I don't know 
13:07:01 <Team3A> A? 
13:07:11 <Team3B> yeah let’s stick to tradition  
13:07:20 <Team3A> okay okay 
13:07:22 <Team3B> A it is 
13:07:39 <Team3A> can’t really tell if they wanna lure us or not 
13:08:00 <Team3B> depends how evil they are 
13:08:14 <Team3A> yeah so let’s pass it to fate 
13:08:22 <Team3B> good idea 
13:08:48 <Team3A> haiz 
13:08:52 <Team3B> damn fate is not very nice 
13:09:08 <Team3B> good round! 
13:09:14 <Team3A> yeah 
13:09:27 <Team3A> at least we got earnings 
13:09:39 <Team3B> exactly  
13:09:45 <Team3B> I feel like we were a good team 
13:10:02 <Team3A> we were! 
 
Team 4: 
 
Table 113: Scenarios faced by team 4 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 BS30 Transfer  DT 
1 P1 SB35 No transfer DF 
2 P2 SB20 Transfer DT 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P2 BS5 No transfer DF 
5 P1 SB10 No transfer DF 
 
12:41:57 <Team4B> hi 
12:42:10 <Team4B> how do you want to go about it? 
12:42:14 <Team4A> hello, I assume we're choosing this time 
12:42:23 <Team4A> I don’t mind 
12:42:34 <Team4A> I suppose we wait to see what the other people have said 
12:42:53 <Team4B> it’s a chat between just the 2 of us 
12:43:06 <Team4B> if you are splitting then I will follow you 
12:43:11 <Team4B> and if I split follow me 
12:43:19 <Team4B> we have to have the same options selected 
12:43:19 <Team4A> yeah I know 
12:43:50 <Team4B> like if I transfer from a to b assume that b has better values and select b 
12:44:08 <Team4A> so 30 tokens have been transferred 
12:44:22 <Team4A> do we go B? 
12:44:25 <Team4B> should we go for b? 
12:44:34 <Team4B> yeah I think so 
12:44:41 <Team4A> we go B then yeah? 
12:44:47 <Team4B> yes let’s go for it 
12:44:49 <Team4B> all the best 
12:44:56 <Team4A> have clicked box B 
12:45:16 <Team4B> same here 
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12:45:25 <Team4A> perfect 
12:46:06 <Team4A> 70!!! 
12:46:18 <Team4B> that’s awesome 
12:46:45 <Team4B> let’s select box b and not make a transfer 
12:47:05 <Team4A> no transfer 
12:47:06 <Team4B> because if we make a transfer and they opt for box b, we are left with only 
5 tokens in box a 
12:47:10 <Team4A> yeah exactly 
12:47:20 <Team4B> so am selecting no transfer 
12:47:27 <Team4A> same, have clicked no transfer 
12:48:35 <Team4A> now we have to wait 
12:48:42 <Team4A> let’s hope they click A aha 
12:48:48 <Team4B> yes, hoping they choose a 
12:50:36 <Team4B> yes! 
12:50:43 <Team4A> that’s amazing! 
12:50:44 <Team4B> 80! 
12:51:13 <Team4A> the wait is so long 
12:51:19 <Team4B> lets be careful this time, they might try to trick us this time 
12:51:25 <Team4A> yeah okay 
12:51:28 <Team4B> yes that is the irritating part 
12:52:50 <Team4A> although the opposition are randomly assigned 
12:52:58 <Team4A> so we probably won’t have the same people again 
12:53:05 <Team4B> oh yes true 
12:53:10 <Team4A> B? 
12:53:19 <Team4A> if it started with 40 then it now has 60 
12:53:27 <Team4A> or if it started with 80 then it now has 100 
12:53:32 <Team4B> yes true that 
12:53:40 <Team4B> anyways we would have a decent total 
12:53:49 <Team4B> lets go with b 
12:53:52 <Team4A> b 
12:54:01 <Team4A> clicked B 
12:54:07 <Team4B> same here! 
12:54:11 <Team4B> good luck! 
12:54:21 <Team4A> thanks aha 
12:55:07 <Team4B> woohoo 
12:55:08 <Team4A> wow!! 
12:55:48 <Team4A> transfer? 
12:55:53 <Team4B> if we make a transfer both end getting 60 
12:55:56 <Team4B> so yeah let’s do it 
12:56:06 <Team4A> clicked transfer 
12:56:16 <Team4B> yep same here 
12:59:45 <Team4A> just like we expected 
12:59:55 <Team4B> yes, they went with the transfer 
13:00:18 <Team4B> next time we might take a risk and maximise our points 
13:00:37 <Team4A> we could, but they randomly select one of the trials for our pay 
13:00:40 <Team4A> so if we risk it 
13:00:42 <Team4A> and lose 
13:00:50 <Team4A> and they select this trial 
13:00:55 <Team4A> then we don’t get much money 
13:01:02 <Team4A> I suppose it all depends on what choices we have though 
13:01:15 <Team4B> yes that’s a valid point 
13:01:23 <Team4B> let’s see how it progresses 
13:01:38 <Team4A> yeah, cos some have been straightforward, it depends on the numbers 
13:02:00 <Team4B> yes okay, let’s see the transfer first 
13:02:41 <Team4B> a or b? 
13:02:49 <Team4A> I don't know, feel like it could be a trick 
13:02:56 <Team4B> same here 
13:03:10 <Team4A> I feel like going a 
13:03:29 <Team4B> the transfer has been declined it says 
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13:03:30 <Team4A> because I think they want us to think there is more in B so they didn’t 
transfer 
13:03:53 <Team4B> okay let’s take a 
13:04:00 <Team4A> a 
13:04:15 <Team4B> awesome! 
13:04:16 <Team4A> success! 
13:04:50 <Team4A> what do we do? 
13:05:14 <Team4B> let’s just choose a, we at least win 40 
13:05:23 <Team4B> and if we win 80 it’s our good day 
13:05:30 <Team4B> better than winning 30 anyways 
13:05:32 <Team4A> yeah okay, so no transfer 
13:05:33 <Team4A> true 
13:05:36 <Team4B> yep done 
13:05:47 <Team4A> same, and this is our last one I think 
13:06:03 <Team4B> I think there's one more left isn't it? 
13:06:14 <Team4A> I feel like this could be the 6th 
13:06:16 <Team4A> but not sure aha 
13:06:30 <Team4B> haha, we shall know in 2 mins 
13:06:46 <Team4A> a very long 2 mins  
13:07:06 <Team4B> yes, let’s hope it’s the last. no more waits 
13:07:24 <Team4A> yeah, it seems ages, but then on the previous one we did spend 2 minutes 
deciding 
13:07:53 <Team4B> yes that was tricky, for the others we were done in under a minute 
13:08:48 <Team4B> our good day! 
13:08:49 <Team4A> wow!!! 
13:08:57 <Team4A> we never got less than half 
13:09:04 <Team4B> yeah 
13:09:07 <Team4B> congrats 
 
Team 5: 
 
Table 114: Scenarios faced by team 5 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 BS30 Transfer DT 
1 P1 SB35 Transfer DT 
2 P2 SB20 No Transfer DF 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P2 BS5 Transfer DF 
5 P1 SB10 No Transfer DF 
 
12:42:13 <Team5A> hello 
12:42:17 <Team5B> hello 
12:42:29 <Team5A> what are you assessing to do? 
12:42:45 <Team5B> let’s see the strategy 
12:42:58 <Team5A> don’t we need to pick the same? 
12:43:03 <Team5B> what the other team has done 
12:43:08 <Team5B> yes we need to 
12:43:15 <Team5A> okay 
12:43:26 <Team5A> so we just wait? 
12:43:35 <Team5B> yes I guess 
12:43:41 <Team5A> okay cool 
12:44:08 <Team5A> what would you like to do 
12:44:13 <Team5B> shall we take b 
12:44:25 <Team5A> okay 
12:44:40 <Team5A> have you selected it? 
12:44:42 <Team5A> selected 
12:44:46 <Team5B> so box b it is 
12:44:49 <Team5B> yes 
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12:44:50 <Team5A> yes  
12:44:57 <Team5A> done 
12:45:09 <Team5B> done as well 
12:46:18 <Team5B> nice choice 
12:46:22 <Team5A> did well 
12:46:25 <Team5B> haha 
12:46:46 <Team5A> I guess we shouldn’t transfer? 
12:47:08 <Team5B> but what if they choose b 
12:47:15 <Team5A> how can you make them not choose B 
12:47:32 <Team5A> you decide 
12:47:39 <Team5A> I’ll match you 
12:47:41 <Team5B> ok let’s do it  
12:47:47 <Team5B> let’s transfer 
12:47:48 <Team5A> so transfer? 
12:47:49 <Team5A> okay 
12:47:53 <Team5B> yes transfer 
12:47:58 <Team5A> ok done 
12:48:08 <Team5B> done as well 
12:49:02 <Team5A> I think 5 may come our way 
12:49:19 <Team5B> yes I have the same feeling 
12:49:30 <Team5A> fingers crossed 
12:49:33 <Team5B> yes 
12:50:35 <Team5A> oh dear 
12:50:39 <Team5B> as expected 
12:50:44 <Team5A> we won’t do that again 
12:50:49 <Team5B> yes 
12:53:24 <Team5A> what do you think 
12:53:27 <Team5B> shall we take box a 
12:53:35 <Team5A> I was thinking so 
12:53:46 <Team5A> A? 
12:53:48 <Team5B> so box a then 
12:53:51 <Team5B> yes a 
12:53:52 <Team5A> yeah 
12:54:06 <Team5B> done box a 
12:54:10 <Team5A> same 
12:55:14 <Team5B> what the hell 
12:55:18 <Team5A> haha 
12:55:22 <Team5A> double bluff 
12:55:28 <Team5B> lets change a bit now onwards 
12:55:42 <Team5A> I say don’t transfer 
12:56:02 <Team5A> or that’s risky 
12:56:06 <Team5B> but if we transfer we will get minimum 60 instead of 40 
12:56:17 <Team5A> yeah but could risk 
12:56:18 <Team5A> okay 
12:56:24 <Team5A> we will transfer then 
12:56:28 <Team5B> so I suggest it makes sense to transfer 
12:56:31 <Team5A> okay 
12:56:35 <Team5B> yes let’s transfer 
12:56:39 <Team5A> done 
12:56:48 <Team5B> done as well 
13:02:24 <Team5A> I think A might be larger 
13:02:29 <Team5A> but it’s a guess 
13:02:33 <Team5B> yes so do I 
13:02:39 <Team5A> okay shall we choose a 
13:02:41 <Team5B> let’s take a then 
13:02:44 <Team5A> I don’t know though it’s a guess 
13:02:48 <Team5B> yes let’s choose a 
13:02:53 <Team5A> okay 
13:02:54 <Team5A> done 
13:03:06 <Team5B> yes let’s go with it 
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13:03:11 <Team5A> who knows 
13:03:14 <Team5B> done as well 
13:03:21 <Team5A> nice 
13:04:13 <Team5A> yay result 
13:04:19 <Team5B> haha nice 
13:04:50 <Team5A> I think no transfer 
13:04:55 <Team5B> I would say let’s not transfer 
13:04:59 <Team5A> then they will have to guess 
13:04:59 <Team5B> yes same 
13:05:02 <Team5A> so its 50 50 
13:05:05 <Team5A> okay cool 
13:05:15 <Team5B> yes let’s go with no transfer 
13:05:23 <Team5A> transfer has not been made 
13:05:24 <Team5A> done 
13:05:38 <Team5B> done as well 
13:06:52 <Team5A> a lot of waiting in this game 
13:07:13 <Team5A> anticipation 
13:07:14 <Team5B> yes needs a lot of patience 
13:07:19 <Team5A> indeed 
13:07:20 <Team5B> haha true 
13:07:46 <Team5A> I hear a lot of typing, maybe people are more tactical than us haha 
13:07:56 <Team5B> haha let’s hope not 
13:08:00 <Team5A> let’s hope not  
13:08:50 <Team5A> nice! 
13:08:55 <Team5B> nice 
 
Team 6: 
 
Table 115: Scenarios faced by team 6 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 BS30 No Transfer DT 
1 P1 SB35 Transfer DT 
2 P2 SB20 No Transfer DF 
3 P1 BS20 No transfer DF 
4 P2 BS5 Transfer DF 
5 P1 SB10 No transfer DT 
 
12:42:17 <Team6B> Splitters? 
12:42:35 <Team6B> What are we deciding on? 
12:43:23 <Team6B> ?! 
12:45:00 <Team6A> I forgot… do Choosers all have to choose the same box too? 
12:45:24 <Team6B> Yes 
12:45:32 <Team6B> Otherwise we get a penalty 
12:45:37 <Team6A> ok Choosers what are we choosing?? 
12:45:43 <Team6A> B? 
12:45:56 <Team6B> I picked B 
12:46:48 <Team6A> Splitters,  
12:47:27 <Team6A> transfer or not? 
12:47:34 <Team6B> Transfer 
12:50:15 <Team6A> I picked B 
12:50:52 <Team6B> can we decide not to transfer 
12:50:57 <Team6A> yes 
12:51:30 <Team6B> and the Splitter can suggest the box with 40 coins to the other members 
12:54:16 <Team6B> A? 
12:54:32 <Team6A> I picked b 
12:56:05 <Team6B> no transfer 
12:56:47 <Team6A> who can actually see this chat? Both teams? 
12:57:33 <Team6B> don't think so 
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12:58:09 <Team6B> but how do you coordinate then? 
12:58:19 <Team6A> so did you just act as Splitter? 
12:58:25 <Team6B> yes 
12:58:36 <Team6A> ah makes sense now 
12:59:09 <Team6B> how? 
12:59:30 <Team6A> I thought the A/B part was Splitter/Chooser but it’s not 
12:59:50 <Team6B> Oh 
12:59:54 <Team6B> alright 
12:59:58 <Team6B> that makes sense 
13:01:54 <Team6A> is there any real strategy or is it just a lot of luck / guessing?? 
13:02:27 <Team6B> luck and guessing. and figuring out the chat 
13:02:35 <Team6B> A? 
13:02:42 <Team6A> can’t see their chat though? 
13:02:56 <Team6B> exactly 
13:02:57 <Team6A> ok 
13:03:45 <Team6A> fingers crossed ;) 
13:04:13 <Team6A> yes then 
13:04:15 <Team6B> Finally! 
13:05:08 <Team6A> so, last time they transferred a tiny amount to look like they were doing us 
a favour... hoping we would pick the box they transferred to 
13:05:12 <Team6B> Not make transfer? If they choose B, we'll end up getting 30 
13:05:17 <Team6A> exactly 
13:06:26 <Team6A> by not transferring hopefully they'll think A is better 
13:06:46 <Team6B> I hope so 
13:07:09 <Team6B> does A always have 40? 
13:07:20 <Team6B> excluding transfer 
13:07:41 <Team6A> I think the instructions said it's randomised, there's 40 + 80 between either 
of them 
13:08:18 <Team6B> makes sense 
13:08:47 <Team6A> nah they didn't fall for it 
 
 
Session 2 
Team 7 
 
Table 116: Scenarios faced by team 7 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 BS30 Penalty (transfer) DF 
1 P2 SB35 Transfer DT 
2 P1 SB20 No transfer DT 
3 P2 BS20 No transfer DT 
4 P1 BS5 No transfer DF 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DT 
 
13:56:26 <Team7B> hey 
13:56:31 <Team7A> hi 
13:56:45 <Team7B> lets play x 
13:56:48 <Team7B> ? 
13:56:53 <Team7A> yep 
13:57:05 <Team7A> not really sure 
13:57:26 <Team7A> its whether we want to risk it and go for 80 or play it safe 
13:57:40 <Team7B> what do u want 
13:57:49 <Team7A> I say go for it 
13:57:55 <Team7B> risk 
13:57:56 <Team7B> ? 
13:57:57 <Team7A> and do not make transfer 
13:58:08 <Team7B> ok 
13:58:14 <Team7A> done 
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13:58:56 <Team7B> box A? 
13:59:15 <Team7A> we are waiting for them to choose I think 
13:59:31 <Team7A> did you choose, do not make transfer? 
13:59:32 <Team7B> yeah 
13:59:37 <Team7B> yeah 
13:59:49 <Team7B> I did transfer 
14:00:09 <Team7A> I didn’t, we didn’t make the same choice so we get 0 now 
14:00:24 <Team7B> oh fuck 
14:00:27 <Team7B> I am sorry 
14:00:41 <Team7A> its ok 
14:00:54 <Team7A> just make sure to make the same one for the rest of them 
14:00:57 <Team7B> yup 
14:03:09 <Team7B> which box 
14:03:12 <Team7B> ? 
14:03:15 <Team7A> I say definitely box b 
14:03:19 <Team7B> ok 
14:03:21 <Team7B> B 
14:03:26 <Team7A> then we are guaranteed at least 75 
14:03:38 <Team7B> done 
14:03:40 <Team7A> or 115 
14:04:08 <Team7A> is your current choice box b? 
14:04:34 <Team7B> yes 
14:04:40 <Team7A> ok, good :) 
14:04:51 <Team7B> sorry for the last one 
14:04:58 <Team7A> no worries 
14:05:15 <Team7A> ok good, we won a lot that time 
14:05:17 <Team7B> perfect 
14:05:40 <Team7A> do not make transfer 
14:05:44 <Team7B> ok 
14:06:02 <Team7B> current choice: no transfer 
14:06:09 <Team7A> good 
14:06:16 <Team7A> leave it at that :) 
14:08:18 <Team7A> we will get 40 or 80 this round so not too bad, equally likely 
14:08:25 <Team7B> yup 
14:09:48 <Team7A> not great but not awful 
14:09:50 <Team7B> anyways 
14:09:58 <Team7B> ha ha 
14:10:54 <Team7B> this is so cool feels like u are sitting 1990's chat room! 
14:11:02 <Team7A> haha yep 
14:12:12 <Team7A> just a guess really 
14:12:34 <Team7B> hmm...B? 
14:12:50 <Team7A> yeah I’ld say so 
14:12:56 <Team7A> I’ve chosen box b 
14:12:58 <Team7B> ok B then 
14:14:17 <Team7A> unlucky 
14:14:28 <Team7B> yeah 
14:14:50 <Team7A> hmmm idk 
14:15:16 <Team7B> lol its just 5 
14:15:16 <Team7A> depends how smart the others are 
14:15:30 <Team7A> no but it effects their decision 
14:15:43 <Team7B> yup 
14:15:46 <Team7A> I’ld say do not make transfer I think 
14:15:55 <Team7B> ok 
14:16:08 <Team7B> let’s not make the transfer 
14:16:11 <Team7A> ok 
14:16:13 <Team7A> done 
14:16:19 <Team7A> no transfer 
14:18:56 <Team7A> this is not going well 
14:19:01 <Team7B> yeah 
14:19:04 <Team7A> we are unlucky 
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14:19:22 <Team7B> no no... relax  
14:19:44 <Team7A> hopefully the 115 one will get selected 
14:19:50 <Team7B> ha ha 
14:19:56 <Team7B> definitely 
14:21:41 <Team7B> which one? 
14:21:42 <Team7A> I really don’t know 
14:22:10 <Team7B> Hmm...well if I say with probability  
14:22:10 <Team7A> b again? idk 
14:22:14 <Team7B> b 
14:22:18 <Team7B> ha ha 
14:22:19 <Team7A> ok 
14:22:23 <Team7A> I’ve chosen b 
14:22:36 <Team7B> but don't kill me I have done enough damage! 
14:22:48 <Team7A> haha dont worry 
14:22:54 <Team7A>  I should have made it clearer 
14:23:21 <Team7A> woo haha 
14:23:32 <Team7B> cheers 
14:23:39 <Team7A> no worries, thank you 
 
 
Team 8 
 
Table 117: Scenarios faced by team 8 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 BS30 Transfer DF 
1 P2 SB35 No transfer DF 
2 P1 SB20 Transfer DT 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P1 BS5 Transfer DT 
5 P2 SB10 Transfer  DT 
 
13:56:34 <Team8A> Hi 
13:57:01 <Team8B> hi. decide to transfer? 
13:57:22 <Team8A> Yes. 
13:57:33 <Team8B> cool 
13:57:53 <Team8A> The Chooser might think A still has more and that is why we transferred 
13:57:58 <Team8A> So might pick A. 
13:58:05 <Team8A> That will give us more points 
13:58:14 <Team8B> yeah, sounds good 
13:58:20 <Team8A> So make a transfer 
14:00:44 <Team8A> It worked! 
14:00:55 <Team8B> good job! 
14:01:14 <Team8A> We are the Chooser now. 
14:03:26 <Team8B> I'm thinking box a? 
14:03:33 <Team8A> Yes. 
14:04:04 <Team8B> cool 
14:04:42 <Team8A> They could be tricking us. If did not transfer, they might want us to think B 
already has more and so we'll choose that. But let's go with A.  
14:04:57 <Team8B> cool 
14:05:10 <Team8A> Damn. 
14:05:13 <Team8B> oh, well 
14:05:46 <Team8B> do you think we should trick them this time? 
14:05:53 <Team8B> decline a transfer? 
14:05:53 <Team8A> But how? 
14:06:21 <Team8A> Then that will be using their trick. They might pick B 
14:06:21 <Team8B> they might think A has more. like we did 
14:06:28 <Team8B> fair enough 
14:06:34 <Team8B> yes to transfer then? 
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14:06:57 <Team8A> I guess.  
14:07:06 <Team8A> Give a final word? 
14:07:07 <Team8A> Quick 
14:07:10 <Team8B> alright 
14:07:12 <Team8B> make it 
14:07:32 <Team8A> This game is tricky. I have a bad feeling about this round 
14:08:06 <Team8B> that's alright. we'll make up for it in another one 
14:09:47 <Team8B> oh damnit 
14:09:49 <Team8A> I'm sorry 
14:09:58 <Team8B> no worries 
14:10:05 <Team8A> Whatever you pick now. 
14:10:43 <Team8B> oh, not the best idea. but sure! 
14:12:17 <Team8B> I'm thinking b? 
14:12:21 <Team8A> cool 
14:12:41 <Team8B> could they be tricking us by making a transfer? 
14:13:03 <Team8A> May or may not. No way to say for sure  
14:13:35 <Team8B> transferring 20 from 80 tokens or 40 works fine for us either way 
14:13:59 <Team8B> either equal or more 
14:14:03 <Team8B> go with b 
14:14:56 <Team8B> transfer? 
14:15:02 <Team8A> Yeah. Same opinion 
14:15:10 <Team8B> cool, let's do it 
14:18:59 <Team8A> Not bad at all! 
14:19:16 <Team8B> yeah 
14:19:24 <Team8B> this is the last one, isn't it? 
14:19:29 <Team8A> yeah 
14:19:55 <Team8B> well, good luck then 
14:20:10 <Team8A> Good luck to you too 
14:21:33 <Team8B> what do you think? 
14:22:21 <Team8B> I think b. it'll be either 50 or 90 tokens 
14:22:24 <Team8A> Umm, maybe b 
14:22:36 <Team8A> B then. 
14:22:41 <Team8B> cool 
14:23:24 <Team8B> oh wow 
14:23:27 <Team8B> interesting 
14:23:38 <Team8A> got lucky! 
 
Team 9 
 
Note: Team 9 did not manage to communicate at all; they did not seem to 
understand the task and even after the experimenter coming to them twice during the 
experiment they remained confused throughout. 
Table 118: Scenarios faced by team 9 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 BS30 Penalty (transfer) DT 
1 P2 SB35 No transfer DT 
2 P1 SB20 Penalty (transfer) DT 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P1 BS5 Transfer DT 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DF 
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13:56:52 <Team9B> hi what should we decide? 
13:57:09 <Team9B> I'll choose a 
13:57:28 <Team9B> for every trial 
13:57:44 <Team9B> is that ok? 
13:58:17 <Team9B> hi 
13:59:20 <Team9A> b 
13:59:32 <Team9B> we have to make the same choice 
13:59:42 <Team9B> if you choose b I'll choose b 
14:00:01 <Team9B> so we'll choose b? 
14:00:05 <Team9B> is that ok? 
14:00:21 <Team9B> please reply 
14:01:01 <Team9B> b? 
14:01:08 <Team9A> ok 
14:01:33 <Team9A> so I'll choose b? 
14:01:41 <Team9B> yes 
14:05:15 <Team9B> b again? 
14:05:47 <Team9B> choose b again? 
14:05:48 <Team9A> yeah b 
14:09:45 <Team9A> what I’m so confused 
14:09:55 <Team9B> you have to choose b 
14:10:00 <Team9A> I did 
14:10:40 <Team9B> I did previously and its worked 
14:11:03 <Team9B> I'll choose b again? 
14:11:37 <Team9A> ok I'll choose b 
14:14:40 <Team9A> ok what should we do? 
14:14:55 <Team9A> choose no? 
14:15:01 <Team9B> choose box a 
14:15:27 <Team9B> click on the grey button since you are the Chooser 
14:15:54 <Team9B> this is also confusing for me 
14:16:02 <Team9A> should I choose to make the transfer or not 
14:16:07 <Team9B> but I think we should choose box a 
14:16:10 <Team9B> I make transfer 
14:16:28 <Team9B> and I'll choose a 
14:16:37 <Team9A> ok yes 
14:19:40 <Team9B> we have to make the same choice 
14:19:47 <Team9B> box a this time? 
14:20:00 <Team9A> ok I'll choose a 
14:20:04 <Team9B> ok 
14:21:31 <Team9B> I just clicked a 
14:21:49 <Team9A> how? 
14:21:53 <Team9A> oh 
14:21:59 <Team9A> ok I get it 
14:22:05 <Team9A> I chose a 
14:22:10 <Team9B> there is grey button 
 
Team 10 
 
Table 119: Scenarios faced by team 10 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 BS30 Transfer DT 
1 P1 SB35 No transfer DF 
2 P2 SB20 No transfer DT 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P2 BS5 transfer DT 
5 P1 SB10 Penalty (transfer) DT 
 
13:57:34 <Team10B> are you still waiting? 
13:57:38 <Team10A> so one has 40 the other 80 and we wait to see if they transfer right? 
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13:57:39 <Team10A> yeah 
13:57:57 <Team10B> so we wait till the time runs out? 
13:58:02 <Team10A> yh 
13:58:04 <Team10B> ok 
13:58:15 <Team10A> and then decide to pick a box 
13:58:24 <Team10B> ok yeah got it :) 
13:58:51 <Team10A> we either have 10 or 110 
13:58:57 <Team10B> a transfer of 30 tokens has made from box A to box B 
13:59:01 <Team10A> or 50 or 70 
13:59:05 <Team10A> yh 
13:59:10 <Team10B> Which one are you choosing 
13:59:12 <Team10A> there are 4 situations  
13:59:26 <Team10B> ok  
13:59:34 <Team10A> let s pick B 
13:59:42 <Team10B> Yup agreed, I’ll go with B too 
13:59:51 <Team10A> ok  
13:59:54 <Team10A> I put box B 
14:00:05 <Team10B> All the possibilities turn to B being the better choice 
14:00:10 <Team10A> yh 
14:00:10 <Team10B> I have put B as well 
14:00:43 <Team10A> sweet 
14:00:46 <Team10A> 70 
14:00:49 <Team10B> nice  
14:00:53 <Team10B> good job at guessing 
14:00:59 <Team10A> ahaha same 
14:01:09 <Team10B> are you transferring? 
14:01:17 <Team10A> I'd say no 
14:01:21 <Team10B> Okay me too 
14:01:24 <Team10A> hbu? 
14:01:25 <Team10B> Let’s not transfer 
14:01:30 <Team10A> ok not transfer 
14:01:32 <Team10B> I’ll go w your choice 
14:01:46 <Team10B> Chosen no transfer 
14:01:49 <Team10A> it really depends on how risk averse the other team is 
14:02:00 <Team10A> ok chose no transfer 
14:02:30 <Team10B> I don’t want a probability of getting 5 lol 
14:02:47 <Team10A> yh exactly  
14:02:49 <Team10A> exactly 
14:02:57 <Team10A> so no transfer remains  
14:03:11 <Team10B> yup 
14:04:25 <Team10A> Team 70 
14:04:27 <Team10A> fantastic4 
14:04:30 <Team10A> lol 
14:04:33 <Team10B> hahahaahahaha 
14:05:10 <Team10A> 80 
14:05:11 <Team10B> YAYY GET IN 
14:05:17 <Team10A> CASH IN 
14:07:47 <Team10B> okay so a transfer got declined 
14:07:57 <Team10A> so it is either 40/80 in each box 
14:08:00 <Team10A> right? 
14:08:01 <Team10B> yeah 
14:08:18 <Team10A> y would they not transfer  
14:08:32 <Team10B> I feel like the possibility a transfer was declined is maybe if they did 
transfer box A would have the 40 tokens 
14:08:51 <Team10B> I don’t know, we just have to gamble on this one I think 
14:08:58 <Team10A> so which one you say we should pick? 
14:09:07 <Team10B> which one do you think 
14:09:08 <Team10B> b? 
14:09:15 <Team10B> let’s try b  
14:09:20 <Team10A> hmm don't know might be a as well 
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14:09:25 <Team10A> but let's go b if you say so 
14:09:28 <Team10A> b? 
14:09:32 <Team10B> yup 
14:09:40 <Team10B> YAY 
14:09:43 <Team10A> nice 
14:09:50 <Team10A> we're halfway through  
14:09:51 <Team10B> PHEW was close 
14:09:58 <Team10B> I know 
14:10:07 <Team10A> yh really close 
14:10:15 <Team10B> should we transfer? 
14:10:33 <Team10A> if we transfer we win for sure 60 
14:10:36 <Team10A> if we don't 
14:10:44 <Team10A> it's going to either be 80 or 40 
14:10:47 <Team10B> Yup, you make the decision on this 
14:10:51 <Team10B> I’ll go with it 
14:10:55 <Team10A> safe bet or risk it out? 
14:11:12 <Team10B> which one would you go for 
14:11:26 <Team10A> I'd say no transfer 
14:11:35 <Team10B> okay I’m going with you  
14:11:42 <Team10A> hope I'm right 
14:11:46 <Team10A> sorry 
14:11:48 <Team10A> make transfer 
14:11:54 <Team10A> put make transfer 
14:11:55 <Team10A> !!! 
14:12:03 <Team10B> okay make transfer 
14:12:13 <Team10A> phew close call 
14:12:15 <Team10B> made so this one we can relax 
14:12:27 <Team10A> yh 
14:13:05 <Team10A> they are quite risk averse I'd say 
14:13:15 <Team10A> I think they might pick box A 
14:13:20 <Team10B> I thought it was different teams each round?  
14:13:27 <Team10A> in which case we lost potentially 20 tokens 
14:13:34 <Team10A> aaah yh 
14:13:36 <Team10A> fuck  
14:13:38 <Team10A> yh ur right 
14:13:40 <Team10A> ahaha 
14:13:59 <Team10B> yeah, but let’s just hope our chosen round is our highest round lol 
14:14:05 <Team10A> I was trying to spot a behaviour  
14:14:10 <Team10A> yh same 
14:14:27 <Team10B> they chose b 
14:14:35 <Team10A> yh they did 
14:15:01 <Team10A> this is 5 
14:15:06 <Team10A> right? 
14:15:07 <Team10B> 5? 
14:15:13 <Team10B> oh yeah I think so 
14:15:14 <Team10A> like fifth round 
14:15:26 <Team10B> yup should be 
14:15:46 <Team10A> so we have 70 80 80 60? 
14:16:03 <Team10B> yup that’s what we have 
14:16:10 <Team10A> most prob 10 tokens=£! 
14:16:15 <Team10A> £1* 
14:16:28 <Team10A> 0-120 tokens and they pay 0-12 gbp 
14:16:34 <Team10B> yeah seems right 
14:16:47 <Team10B> oooooh 5 tokens 
14:17:07 <Team10A> if we pick A 
14:17:13 <Team10A> we either have 75 or 35 
14:17:17 <Team10B> yeah 
14:17:22 <Team10A> if we pick B we either have 85 or 45 
14:17:26 <Team10B> yup 
14:17:31 <Team10A> pick B then? 
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14:17:45 <Team10B> b?  
14:17:56 <Team10A> yh I'd say B 
14:18:10 <Team10A> both options are higher in B 
14:18:16 <Team10A> with 50/50 chances 
14:18:26 <Team10B> okay :) 
14:18:31 <Team10A> put B 
14:18:51 <Team10A> sorry 
14:18:57 <Team10B> No no its fine 
14:19:05 <Team10A> realised last minute it could've been a trap 
14:19:05 <Team10B> I think they were trying to trick us 
14:19:08 <Team10B> yeah 
14:19:10 <Team10B> no that’s fine 
14:19:21 <Team10A> shall we do the same? 
14:19:27 <Team10B> I say we don’t make the transfer 
14:19:31 <Team10A> ok 
14:19:40 <Team10A> I'll stick with your decision 
14:19:50 <Team10B> what do you think? 
14:19:55 <Team10A> but I'm thinking  
14:20:02 <Team10B> okay  
14:20:06 <Team10B> we have time don’t worry 
14:20:06 <Team10A> we can do the same scam 
14:20:25 <Team10A> like transfer 10 how they transferred 5  
14:20:33 <Team10B> but what if they never think of it being a trap and go for box b? 
14:20:42 <Team10B> then we're stuck with a 
14:20:43 <Team10B> so? 
14:20:50 <Team10A> yeah I know 
14:20:59 <Team10B> just say a decision 
14:21:04 <Team10A> I'll follow you 
14:21:05 <Team10A> say 
14:21:09 <Team10B> no transfer 
14:21:22 <Team10B> did you pick the same? 
14:21:28 <Team10A> didn't have the time to pick 
14:21:34 <Team10A> the computer will randomly pick 
14:21:39 <Team10A> fuck 
14:21:40 <Team10B> okay  
14:21:42 <Team10A> sorry man 
14:21:42 <Team10B> no its fine 
14:21:46 <Team10B> I don’t mind 
14:21:48 <Team10B> :) 
14:22:25 <Team10A> so it transferred 
14:22:29 <Team10B> yeah 
14:22:35 <Team10A> the computer transferred the money 
14:22:37 <Team10A> money 
14:22:42 <Team10B> just hope that they think it’s a trap  
14:22:44 <Team10A> I was thinking doing the same tbh  
14:22:52 <Team10B> but I don’t think this round we would get any cash 
14:22:53 <Team10A> yh and pick A 
14:25:15 <Team10A> I thought they said that if one of their team members doesn't pick  
14:25:25 <Team10A> the computer will randomly pick 
14:25:40 <Team10B> no I think it meant like if we don’t pick to make a transfer 
14:25:47 <Team10B> the comp will pick 
14:26:23 <Team10A> yh whatever 
 
Team 11 
 
 
Table 120: Scenarios faced by team 11 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 BS30 Transfer DF 
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1 P1 SB35 Transfer DT 
2 P2 SB20 Transfer DT 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P2 BS5 Transfer DT 
5 P1 SB10 No transfer DF 
 
13:56:27 <Team11A> hello 
13:56:29 <Team11B> hi 
13:57:07 <Team11A> what you clicking? 
13:57:10 <Team11B> I’m thinking it’s a good idea to play fair since there are only 6 trials 
13:57:16 <Team11A> okay :) 
13:57:34 <Team11A> Promise fair and I'll click on whatever you tell me to 
13:57:50 <Team11B> ok promise 
<<Participants did not understand that they chat with a teammate; they initially think their chat is with 
the opponent>> 
13:57:56 <Team11B> Box A? 
13:57:56 <Team11A> A or B 
13:58:00 <Team11A> A, sure 
13:58:05 <Team11B> great 
13:58:59 <Team11A> How many are in each? 50/50? 
<<Participant did not pay attention at the start of the experiment since it was made clear that the 
initial values are always 40/80 or 80/40; It thus does not make sense to ask whether the boxes started 
as 50/50>> 
13:59:05 <Team11A> I clicked A 
13:59:12 <Team11B> 30 tokens have been transferred to B 
13:59:26 <Team11A> What does that mean though? What is in A? 
13:59:39 <Team11B> so there is 50 in A 
13:59:47 <Team11B> and 80 in B 
13:59:55 <Team11A> Okay, gotcha 
13:59:58 <Team11B> but I’ll go for A so we make the same choice 
14:00:36 <Team11B> whooo 
14:00:41 <Team11B> we made the same 
14:00:46 <Team11A> yes! 
14:01:27 <Team11B> ok box A = 40 tokens 
14:01:33 <Team11B> Box B = 80 tokens 
14:01:37 <Team11A> yes 
14:01:41 <Team11A> what should I do? 
14:01:43 <Team11B> transfer is 35 to box b 
14:01:47 <Team11A> yes 
14:01:50 <Team11B> it makes sense to choose box b 
14:01:54 <Team11A> okay 
14:01:59 <Team11B> I will make the transfer to B 
14:02:01 <Team11A> and make transfer? 
14:02:18 <Team11A> I have the options this time? 
14:02:25 <Team11B> yes  
14:02:26 <Team11A> I am making transfer to B 
14:02:49 <Team11A> I made the transfer 
14:02:56 <Team11B> I have already picked to transfer to B 
14:02:57 <Team11A> to B 
14:03:20 <Team11A> you are the Chooser now? 
14:03:33 <Team11A> it says you are choosing between A and B 
14:03:37 <Team11B> think so 
14:03:44 <Team11B> no I’m not 
14:03:49 <Team11B> I can’t click anything 
14:03:51 <Team11A> I'm not either though... 
14:03:57 <Team11B> it’s the other team 
14:04:01 <Team11A> OH 
14:04:08 <Team11B> we have to wait 
14:04:27 <Team11B> I wish there had been a practice round 
14:04:30 <Team11A> same 
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14:04:40 <Team11A> this is risky but I think I understand it now 
14:04:47 <Team11A> hopefully they choose A lol 
14:04:49 <Team11B> yeah it took me a min to understand it 
14:05:11 <Team11A> DAMMIT 
14:05:14 <Team11B> huh 
14:05:15 <Team11A> aha 
14:05:24 <Team11A> they won 
14:05:29 <Team11B> how? 
14:05:52 <Team11A> they got more of the tokens we just got 5 
14:05:56 <Team11A> what does it say? 
14:06:14 <Team11B> the other player is assessing a potential transfer 
14:06:26 <Team11A> okay so it's the other team now 
14:07:17 <Team11A> Oh wait.... are we on different teams? 
14:07:35 <Team11B> yeah it changes teams each round 
14:07:51 <Team11A> Okay, both choose B 
14:07:55 <Team11B> yeah sure 
14:08:15 <Team11A> Box B 
14:08:22 <Team11B> done 
14:08:48 <Team11A> This game is confusing me a bit now 
14:08:55 <Team11B> yeah I don’t get it 
14:09:17 <Team11B> If we both picked Box B last round why did we end up with A? 
14:09:26 <Team11A> Let's just keep the boxes as equal as we can 
14:09:32 <Team11A> and choose the one it transfers to 
14:09:43 <Team11B> whooo 100 tokens 
14:09:46 <Team11A> YES 
14:10:21 <Team11B> ok I’ll make the boxes equal 
14:10:25 <Team11A> Okay, make transfer? 
14:10:28 <Team11A> yes 
14:10:30 <Team11B> yes 
14:11:36 <Team11A> so are we teamed up with another pair? 
14:11:50 <Team11B> yeah we are playing against another pair 
14:11:58 <Team11A> gotcha 
14:12:14 <Team11A> oooooh the tension 
14:12:20 <Team11B> haha yeah 
14:12:39 <Team11B> ok so 'The Chooser is deciding between the two boxes' is that the other 
team? 
14:12:51 <Team11A> I assume so 
14:13:15 <Team11A> I thought we were doing it with each other but we always have the same 
screen up 
14:13:41 <Team11A> so I'm assuming there is another pair that alternate in opposite role to us 
14:13:46 <Team11B> yeah 
14:13:58 <Team11B> again - I wish there was a practice round 
14:14:07 <Team11B> this would have all been so much easier 
14:14:12 <Team11A> same, or an example that they worked through 
14:14:18 <Team11A> yay 
14:14:23 <Team11B> :) 
14:16:55 <Team11B> which one? 
14:17:05 <Team11A> okay, do we go with B? or do you think there weren’t that many and it is 
better with A? 
14:17:32 <Team11B> maybe B 
14:17:39 <Team11A> okay, B? 
14:17:55 <Team11B> Its so difficult to tell other people's strategy 
14:18:00 <Team11A> I know ah 
14:18:11 <Team11A> B 
14:18:13 <Team11B> I’ve picked B 
14:18:23 <Team11A> as have I 
14:18:51 <Team11A> ah 
14:18:56 <Team11B> not too bad 
14:19:10 <Team11A> I got 45, did you get 45 or 75? I don’t understand lol 
14:19:13 <Team11B> 45 
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14:19:18 <Team11A> oh gotcha 
14:19:32 <Team11B> ok don’t make the transfer 
14:19:45 <Team11B> and pick box B 
14:19:47 <Team11A> okay :) 
14:20:01 <Team11A> I don’t think we can choose a box, do we? 
14:20:25 <Team11A> they choose the box they want and we get the other, right? 
14:20:37 <Team11B> oh this is complex 
14:21:05 <Team11A> We'll understand how to play the game when it's over lol 
14:21:10 <Team11B> I have made the fair choice for both the teams 
14:21:36 <Team11B> Box A contains 40 tokens and Box B contains 80 tokens 
14:21:38 <Team11A> yeah, I agree 
14:21:44 <Team11A> as fair as it could be 
14:21:49 <Team11B> no point making it 30 and 90 
14:21:58 <Team11A> yeah 
14:22:19 <Team11A> hopefully they choose A though aha 
14:22:37 <Team11B> fingers crossed yeah! 
14:23:21 <Team11B> yay 
14:23:22 <Team11A> yay 
14:23:24 <Team11A> ahaha 
14:23:35 <Team11B> they had a 50/50 chance 
14:23:58 <Team11A> nice talking to you:) 
14:25:31 <Team11B> same! 
14:26:05 <Team11B> that was quite a short experiment 
14:26:10 <Team11A> indeed 
14:26:16 <Team11A> glad actually :) 
 
 
Team 12 
 
Table 121: Scenarios faced by team 12 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 BS30 Transfer DF 
1 P1 SB35 No transfer DT 
2 P2 SB20 Transfer DT 
3 P1 BS20 No transfer DT 
4 P2 BS5 No transfer DF 
5 P1 SB10 No transfer DT 
 
13:56:38 <Team12A> hello 
13:56:41 <Team12B> HI 
13:57:18 <Team12B> Are you working on a transfer 
13:57:37 <Team12A> no I’m waiting for the other team to decide if they are going to split  
13:57:49 <Team12B> Okay, perfect 
13:58:41 <Team12A> what do you think  
13:58:59 <Team12B> Lets take box A? 
13:59:12 <Team12A> sure  
13:59:21 <Team12A> why box a  
14:00:12 <Team12B> Because they won’t transfer so many knowing if we select b they get a 
14:00:25 <Team12B> A has to be better 
14:00:29 <Team12A> fair enough  
14:01:24 <Team12B> Do you want to make a transfer? 
14:01:26 <Team12A> shall we make it?  
14:01:34 <Team12A> yes  
14:02:14 <Team12B> If we don’t we at least get 40, but if we do then we have a chance of 
getting just 5 
14:02:25 <Team12A> that’s true  
14:02:29 <Team12A> it’s up to you  
14:02:33 <Team12A> I don’t really mind  
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14:02:40 <Team12B> Let’s not make the transfer and see 
14:02:48 <Team12A> okay 
14:07:59 <Team12B> Lets take box b? 
14:08:20 <Team12A> sure  
14:09:46 <Team12A> good job  
14:09:50 <Team12B> Great job! 
14:10:21 <Team12A> don’t make transfer?  
14:10:23 <Team12B> Let’s not make the transfer? 
14:10:27 <Team12B> Perfect 
14:10:27 <Team12A> sweet  
14:14:19 <Team12B> Great job! 
14:14:23 <Team12A> good good  
14:16:54 <Team12A> erm  
14:17:06 <Team12B> This a coin flip 
14:17:26 <Team12B> You have any decision? 
14:17:43 <Team12B> Lets take A? 
14:17:45 <Team12A> a 
14:17:50 <Team12A> yes  
14:17:55 <Team12B> Perfect 
14:18:54 <Team12B> Great job 
14:18:54 <Team12A> its going well  
14:19:32 <Team12A> no?  
14:19:50 <Team12B> No transfer? 
14:20:07 <Team12A> lets go with no transfer  
14:20:12 <Team12A> yes?  
14:20:15 <Team12B> Perfect 
14:20:31 <Team12B> No transfer it is 
14:20:40 <Team12A> is this the last one?  
14:20:44 <Team12B> Yes 
14:20:48 <Team12B> Probably 
14:20:54 <Team12A> good good  
14:21:10 <Team12B> All the best 
14:21:45 <Team12A> we've done well in all of them so we should have an okay payment  
14:22:02 <Team12B> Excepting the first 2 
14:22:23 <Team12B> and don't know about this one 
14:22:46 <Team12A> oh yeah  
14:23:25 <Team12B> Ahh bad decision  
14:23:28 <Team12A> hey ho  
 
 
 
Session 3 
Team 13 
 
Table 122: Scenarios faced by team 13 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 SB20 No transfer DT 
1 P2 SB35 No transfer DF 
2 P1 BS5 Transfer DT 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P1 BS30 Transfer DT 
5 P2 SB10 Transfer DT 
 
15:11:59 <Team13A> hi 
15:12:02 <Team13B> don’t make the transfer 
15:12:07 <Team13B> hey 
15:12:08 <Team13A> I agree 
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15:12:10 <Team13B> cool 
15:12:27 <Team13B> I selected it 
15:12:37 <Team13B> what’s your strategy? 
15:12:44 <Team13A> I’ve clicked it as well 
15:12:52 <Team13A> I don’t really know what about you? 
15:13:26 <Team13B> I’m thinking if we make a transfer they will obviously know which box to 
select. On the other hand not making the transfer will leave them with a 50 50 chance 
15:13:57 <Team13B> let's see 
15:14:01 <Team13A> yeah 50:50 
15:14:10 <Team13B> good luck :) 
15:14:11 <Team13A> its depends how much we are able to transfer in the trials 
15:14:26 <Team13B> yeah because we couldn’t change the amount right? 
15:14:39 <Team13A> no but I guess it changes as the trials go on 
15:14:49 <Team13B> I see 
15:15:07 <Team13B> so we can’t make a selection on the amount. the computer gives us the 
amount we can transfer 
15:15:27 <Team13A> yeah the computer decides how much we can transfer, and then we have to 
decide whether to do it or not 
15:15:33 <Team13B> okay got it 
15:15:51 <Team13B> great :P 
15:16:18 <Team13A> what do we do if they transfer 
15:16:42 <Team13B> take it I think 
15:16:56 <Team13A> you think they would be trying to trick us? 
15:17:11 <Team13B> say if they transfer 20 from the 40 to 80 
15:17:43 <Team13B> or 20 from the 80 to 40... it would still be 60 60 in each box. the thing is I 
don’t know how they could trick us. That’s what I’m trying to figure out 
15:17:58 <Team13B> sure if they have a chance they will try to trick us but yeah I don’t quite get 
how yet 
15:18:25 <Team13A> they didn’t transfer from a to b 
15:18:32 <Team13B> so it’s a? 
15:18:35 <Team13A> so are we saying a has more in?? 
15:18:42 <Team13B> yeah I think so 
15:19:07 <Team13B> unless of course they are trying to trick us 
15:19:12 <Team13B> that would be unfortunate 
15:19:15 <Team13B> :P 
15:19:20 <Team13A> but either way it’s no transfer 
15:19:23 <Team13A> so it’s still 40 or 80  
15:19:38 <Team13B> it could be A has 40 
15:19:43 <Team13B> and they denied the transfer of 35 
15:19:44 <Team13B> u see 
15:19:51 <Team13A> you choose 
15:19:53 <Team13B> what do u think 
15:19:55 <Team13B> A 
15:19:57 <Team13B> I’m not sure 
15:19:59 <Team13A> A it is 
15:20:02 <Team13B> but let’s go with A and see 
15:20:09 <Team13A> I’ve clicked box a 
15:20:11 <Team13B> same 
15:20:20 <Team13B> damn it 
15:20:29 <Team13B> just what I was afraid of 
15:20:44 <Team13B> okay your turn to choose now :P 
15:20:55 <Team13A> transfer 
15:21:05 <Team13A> its only 5  
15:21:07 <Team13B> yeah 
15:21:10 <Team13B> cool 
15:21:12 <Team13B> I agree 
15:21:13 <Team13B> transfer 
15:21:30 <Team13B> so transfer yeah- selected 
15:21:31 <Team13A> cause even if they picked the 80 box we would get more than 40 as we 
have transferred  
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15:21:39 <Team13B> yeah 
15:21:51 <Team13A> and we can scout out what they choose 
15:21:56 <Team13A> they tricked us last time  
15:21:59 <Team13B> yeah 
15:22:53 <Team13B> so much waiting time 
15:23:04 <Team13A> I know 60 seconds would be enough 
15:23:09 <Team13B> agreed 
15:23:25 <Team13B> think they might go with the 75 box again 
15:23:32 <Team13B> wonder how they r thinking this 
15:23:39 <Team13A> I think the other team know what they are doing haha 
15:23:47 <Team13B> true :P 
15:24:56 <Team13A> buzzing 
15:24:59 <Team13B> congrats :) 
15:25:04 <Team13A> well done  
15:25:26 <Team13B> okay now we know they are trying to trick us 
15:25:38 <Team13B> so let’s think as if we were Splitters and what we would do 
15:25:42 <Team13B> maybe that helps? 
15:25:45 <Team13A> I hope the value that can be transferred isn’t high 
15:25:49 <Team13A> yeah let’s do that 
15:25:50 <Team13B> hmmm 
15:26:04 <Team13B> should be higher than 40... so then we know automatically :P 
15:26:08 <Team13B> duh! 
15:26:25 <Team13A> yeah!! 
15:27:23 <Team13A> okay so say we are Splitters 
15:27:46 <Team13A> if box a had 80 it would be a 60 b 60  
15:27:54 <Team13B> lets go with box be because... if box be had 80, then it now has 100 and if 
it had 40 then both boxes have 60 
15:27:55 <Team13A> but if box a had 40 it would be a 20 and b 100 
15:28:04 <Team13B> :)  
15:28:09 <Team13B> so box b? 
15:28:13 <Team13A> perfect yeah 
15:28:20 <Team13A> so we are either getting 60 or 80  
15:28:24 <Team13B> yeah 
15:28:28 <Team13B> I think we will be getting 60 
15:28:30 <Team13A> 60 or 100 I mean 
15:28:31 <Team13B> b right? 
15:28:35 <Team13A> which is good  
15:28:39 <Team13A> yeah box B 
15:29:02 <Team13A> hope it’s 100 
15:29:12 <Team13A> but I think it would be 60 60 cause I would do that as a Splitter 
15:29:18 <Team13B> hope so but I wouldn’t get their logic if they chose that..  
15:29:23 <Team13B> yeah I think so too 
15:29:29 <Team13B> yeah there we go 
15:29:31 <Team13A> yeah we were right  
15:29:40 <Team13B> they’re playing well 
15:29:41 <Team13B> grrr 
15:30:01 <Team13A> if we transfer its 50 70 
15:30:07 <Team13B> yes 
15:30:12 <Team13B> as a Chooser what would u choose 
15:30:28 <Team13A> if they transferred I would choose b 
15:30:39 <Team13B> and if we don’t? 
15:30:55 <Team13A> if they didn’t transfer I would choose a I think? 
15:31:02 <Team13B> I think the question is do we want 50 or 40 
15:31:19 <Team13A> I think transfer? 
15:31:24 <Team13B> agree 
15:31:29 <Team13A> ok transfer it is 
15:31:34 <Team13B> perf 
15:31:58 <Team13B> this is so unlucky they got it the better way, to transfer 35 from the lower 
one to the higher one 
15:32:10 <Team13A> yeah we have the unlucky ones 
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15:32:19 <Team13B> it’s okay we will make the best of it 
15:32:24 <Team13A> either way if we transferred or not it would be them getting the higher 
tokens 
15:32:34 <Team13B> yeah 
15:32:50 <Team13A> hopefully they think we are tricking them and so they pick A 
15:33:02 <Team13B> hahahaha 
15:33:08 <Team13B> hope so u think that’s possible 
15:33:23 <Team13A> I doubt it but we can hope hahaha 
15:33:25 <Team13B> if 30 is being transferred to which everyone, it would be the higher amount 
one 
15:33:31 <Team13B> so they would be stupid to not choose it 
15:33:32 <Team13B> hahahaha 
15:33:35 <Team13B> yes we can 
15:34:02 <Team13B> duh! 
15:34:08 <Team13A> that was gonna happen 
15:34:13 <Team13A> still 50 tokens though! 
15:34:18 <Team13B> yeah exactly 
15:34:50 <Team13B> 100 seconds 
15:34:54 <Team13B> 90 seconds 
15:35:08 <Team13A> so long 
15:35:20 <Team13A> one minute left 
15:35:33 <Team13A> is the 5th trial out of 6?? or is this 6? I’ve lost track 
15:35:39 <Team13B> me too 
15:35:42 <Team13B> maybe 5th 
15:35:49 <Team13B> no idea 
15:35:51 <Team13B> 30 seconds 
15:36:00 <Team13A> I hope 6 lol 
15:36:06 <Team13B> lol painful! 
15:36:08 <Team13B> 15! 
15:36:16 <Team13B> 10!! 
15:36:32 <Team13A> 10 tokens  
15:36:56 <Team13A> so it’s either A 30 B 90 or A 70 B 50  
15:37:07 <Team13B> yeah 
15:37:18 <Team13B> I think A 
15:37:23 <Team13A> I think A is risky  
15:37:25 <Team13B> they might have made the transfer to confuse us 
15:37:37 <Team13B> okay 
15:37:51 <Team13B> B might give us a 90 or 50 
15:37:52 <Team13A> B is either 50 or 90 whereas A is either 30 or 70 
15:37:55 <Team13B> cool 
15:38:03 <Team13B> B it is 
15:38:04 <Team13A> B then? 
15:38:09 <Team13A> b it is  
15:38:34 <Team13A> yes!!! 
15:38:35 <Team13B> GOOD!!! 
15:38:37 <Team13A> they tried to trick us!!! 
15:38:42 <Team13B> you’re good 
15:38:58 <Team13B> it was he 6th 
15:38:58 <Team13A> what a good ending 
15:39:01 <Team13B> agree 
15:39:09 <Team13B> good job! it was fun playing with u 
15:39:58 <Team13A> you’re a good player 
15:40:04 <Team13A> hopefully we get a good amount 
15:40:24 <Team13B> fingers crossed good luck! 
15:40:38 <Team13A> you too! 
 
 
 
 
 
  Appendix 2   
 
271 
 
Team 14 
 
Table 123: Scenarios faced by team 14 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 SB20 No transfer DT 
1 P2 SB35 No transfer DT 
2 P1 BS5 No transfer DF 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P1 BS30 No transfer DT 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DF 
 
15:12:01 <Team14B> hi 
15:12:04 <Team14A> hi  
15:12:08 <Team14B> do you want to make transfer 
15:12:44 <Team14B> ???? 
15:12:59 <Team14A> no not going to make the transfer a has 40 b has 80 tokens and transfer 
from a to b not worth it 
15:13:12 <Team14B> so no? 
15:13:18 <Team14A> no transfer 
15:13:21 <Team14B> ok 
15:14:43 <Team14A> so choose box B has 80 tokens and A has 40 tokens 
15:14:56 <Team14B> yes 
15:15:19 <Team14B> but we don’t have to choose right now 
15:15:39 <Team14A> you have to choose b I think for max payoff 
15:16:25 <Team14B> now it will be our turn to choose 
15:16:43 <Team14B> every round we do either 1 
15:16:51 <Team14B> so this round we choose 
15:17:14 <Team14A> yes what's the transfer 
15:17:22 <Team14B> not come up yet 
15:17:47 <Team14A> Oh right got it  
15:18:44 <Team14A> which box are you choosing? 
15:18:57 <Team14B> should we choose B 
15:19:17 <Team14A> hmmm  
15:19:35 <Team14B> cause B HAD 80 AND A 40 
15:19:40 <Team14A> I think choose b 
15:19:42 <Team14B> QUICK 
15:19:44 <Team14B> YES b 
15:19:54 <Team14B> SO b? 
15:19:57 <Team14A> yep b 
15:21:07 <Team14A> transfer or not? 
15:21:13 <Team14B> umm 
15:21:18 <Team14B> it won’t make a big difference so either way is fine 
15:21:27 <Team14A> so no transfer then? 
15:21:35 <Team14B> okay 
15:21:39 <Team14B> no transfer 
15:22:01 <Team14B> no transfer done? 
15:22:13 <Team14A> yep no transfer 
15:27:42 <Team14A> which one do you think  
15:27:58 <Team14A> I think choose b? 
15:28:00 <Team14B> both have the same amount 
15:28:08 <Team14B> so doesn’t matter 
15:28:09 <Team14A> yep so choose b then ok? 
15:28:14 <Team14B> okay 
15:28:17 <Team14B> so b 
15:28:25 <Team14A> yep 
15:30:18 <Team14B> no transfer? 
15:30:21 <Team14A> no transfer 
15:30:27 <Team14B> yh no transfer 
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15:30:34 <Team14A> cool 
15:36:40 <Team14A> choose A? 
15:36:46 <Team14B> yes 
15:36:51 <Team14B> A 
15:36:56 <Team14A> done 
 
Team 15 
 
Table 124: Scenarios faced by team 15 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P1 SB20 No transfer DF 
1 P2 SB35 No transfer DT 
2 P1 BS5 No transfer DT 
3 P2 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P1 BS30 Transfer DT 
5 P2 SB10 No transfer DT 
 
15:11:53 <Team15A> Hey 
15:12:11 <Team15A> Should we transfer or not? 
15:12:22 <Team15B> not transfer 
15:12:26 <Team15B> I think  
15:12:41 <Team15A> yeah in case they choose box b 
15:12:51 <Team15A> cool 
15:12:53 <Team15B> it gives a better distribution if the other person picks box b 
15:12:55 <Team15B> yeah 
15:13:06 <Team15A> okay not transferring then 
15:13:23 <Team15A> but we could also get a 100 
15:13:30 <Team15A> maybe next round 
15:13:36 <Team15B> yeah 
15:14:59 <Team15B> if the Chooser knows how many tokens are in the boxes they'll always pick 
the larger ones 
15:15:16 <Team15A> Yeah but they don’t know the values right 
15:15:38 <Team15A> I guess they’ll assume we didn’t transfer because A had a higher value 
15:15:53 <Team15B> yeah they don’t I just asked 
15:16:07 <Team15B> lol we could have won 100 
15:16:22 <Team15A> But then they could’ve also picked Box B 
15:16:47 <Team15A> I think we're Choosers now 
15:17:09 <Team15B> yep 
15:17:26 <Team15A> If they transfer lets pick B 
15:17:39 <Team15A> Or even if they don’t? 
15:17:40 <Team15A> Idk 
15:17:43 <Team15A> Confusing 
15:18:29 <Team15A> What shall we pick? 
15:18:35 <Team15A> Box A? 
15:18:36 <Team15B> let’s do B 
15:18:40 <Team15A> Cool 
15:19:07 <Team15A> Try out luck 
15:20:34 <Team15B> dancing 
15:20:41 <Team15A> good choice! 
15:21:08 <Team15A> Let’s not transfer 
15:21:14 <Team15B> yes 
15:22:02 <Team15A> If we are to lose the margin will be almost the same anyway 
15:23:17 <Team15B> I don’t think we will lose though cause they think the same way we do, so 
they'll assume B was bigger 
15:23:44 <Team15A> Hopefully 
15:24:01 <Team15A> This way we may not make over 80 tokens in any of the rounds 
15:24:31 <Team15B> we can risk it all in the next round 
15:24:47 <Team15A> Yeah see what the trade off is 
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15:24:57 <Team15A> Nice! 
15:25:44 <Team15A> This one will be tricky 
15:25:56 <Team15A> They may also get Box with more token 
15:26:15 <Team15A> box A with more tokens* 
15:27:08 <Team15B> I think we should take a risk when we are Splitters not Choosers 
15:27:20 <Team15B> *when 
15:27:30 <Team15A> What shall we pick? 
15:27:35 <Team15A> They made the transfer 
15:27:38 <Team15A> B? 
15:27:45 <Team15B> A is the safe option 
15:27:57 <Team15B> risk B? 
15:27:59 <Team15A> But the split is always 80-40 
15:28:05 <Team15A> So if they have transferred 
15:28:09 <Team15A> Either A will be more 
15:28:12 <Team15A> or equal 
15:28:18 <Team15A> B I mean 
15:28:20 <Team15A> Sorry 
15:28:27 <Team15B> no the last one was 75 -45 
15:28:28 <Team15A> Either B will be 100 or 60 
15:28:35 <Team15B> B 
15:28:45 <Team15B> pick b? 
15:28:47 <Team15A> But this is 20 right 
15:28:51 <Team15A> Yeah I think B 
15:29:11 <Team15A> B should be a safe one 
15:29:13 <Team15A> Pick B 
15:29:20 <Team15B> picked 
15:29:30 <Team15A> See 
15:29:32 <Team15A> equal 
15:29:59 <Team15B> that’s good  
15:30:08 <Team15A> What shall we do now? 
15:30:15 <Team15B> transfer 
15:30:28 <Team15A> Think we're going to lose this one anyway 
15:30:33 <Team15B> lol 
15:30:48 <Team15B> transferring now 
15:31:01 <Team15A> Are you sure? 
15:31:25 <Team15B> *transferring * I hope 
15:31:30 <Team15A> Okay 
15:31:32 <Team15A> Cool 
15:31:34 <Team15A> Let’s try 
15:31:41 <Team15A> But they'll pick B then 
15:32:38 <Team15A> They're picking B for sure 
15:33:29 <Team15B> fingers crossed 
15:34:09 <Team15A> See 
15:34:32 <Team15B> I've seen pick the last one 
15:35:07 <Team15A> Hopefully that trial doesn’t get selected 
15:35:38 <Team15B> yep 
15:36:39 <Team15A> What shall we pick? 
15:36:41 <Team15B> so B/A 
15:36:54 <Team15A> Either one could have more 
15:37:07 <Team15B> B? 
15:37:26 <Team15A> Idk 
15:37:28 <Team15A> Confusing 
15:37:46 <Team15A> Either one could have more 
15:37:48 <Team15B> what does your gut say 
15:37:59 <Team15A> Nothing lol 
15:38:05 <Team15B> lol B 
15:38:09 <Team15A> Okay cool 
15:38:10 <Team15A> B 
15:38:22 <Team15A> Chose it 
15:38:28 <Team15B> done 
  Appendix 2   
 
274 
 
15:38:35 <Team15A> Nice! 
15:38:38 <Team15A> Good gut 
15:38:43 <Team15B> and from the ashes we rice 
15:38:49 <Team15A> Haha 
15:38:51 <Team15B> rise 
15:39:11 <Team15A> Good work partner! 
15:39:18 <Team15B> you too 
 
 
Team 16 
 
Table 125: Scenarios faced by team 16 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 SB20 No transfer DF 
1 P1 SB35 No transfer DT 
2 P2 BS5 No transfer DT 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P2 BS30 Transfer DT 
5 P1 SB10 No transfer DF 
 
15:14:02 <Team16B> should we pick Box A? 
15:14:11 <Team16A> I think so  
15:14:25 <Team16B> okay let’s see what happens 
15:14:30 <Team16B> BOX A then 
15:14:39 <Team16A> let’s try A yeah 
15:16:40 <Team16B> should we transfer? 
15:16:45 <Team16B> or not? 
15:17:01 <Team16A> I don’t think so  
15:17:04 <Team16B> let’s not transfer 
15:17:07 <Team16B> yeah 
15:17:26 <Team16B> and we'll hopefully get box B in the next round 
15:17:46 <Team16A> yeah it’s too risky to just get 5 tokens  
15:19:31 <Team16B> we should have taken the 80 tokens one in the first round 
15:19:40 <Team16B> nevermind, from next time 
15:20:12 <Team16A> but we didn’t know which one had 80 tokens?  
15:20:24 <Team16B> it shows 
15:21:07 <Team16B> oh yeah I don’t think it shows:/ 
15:22:55 <Team16A> what do you think 
15:23:14 <Team16B> I don’t know :/ 
15:23:31 <Team16B> we're playing against a different team this time isn’t it? 
15:23:36 <Team16A> yeah  
15:23:55 <Team16B> let’s try B?;:/ 
15:23:58 <Team16A> yeah guess B  
15:24:06 <Team16A> I have no idea 
15:24:27 <Team16B> okay random guess B then 
15:24:34 <Team16B> Box B 
15:24:40 <Team16A> yeah  
15:24:55 <Team16B> oh noooo 
15:24:59 <Team16B> hahahha 
15:25:07 <Team16A> ahaha 
15:25:29 <Team16A> we should transfer  
15:25:36 <Team16B> let’s transfer 
15:25:37 <Team16A> all we have been getting is 40 before 
15:25:44 <Team16B> yeahh 
15:25:56 <Team16B> I’m sure they'll pick B if we transfer 
15:26:10 <Team16B> and we'll get the 80 tokens  
15:26:26 <Team16A> we would both get 60  
15:26:33 <Team16B> oh right  
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15:26:35 <Team16B> 60 
15:27:29 <Team16B> BOX A 
15:27:44 <Team16B> we should pick the same option  
15:27:54 <Team16A> yeah I thought that  
15:27:56 <Team16B> oh sorry 
15:28:09 <Team16B> the other team picks 
15:32:13 <Team16B> let’s take B 
15:32:14 <Team16A> box b surely?  
15:32:27 <Team16B> it’s going to have either 80 or 70  <note: he means 70 or 110> 
15:32:33 <Team16B> so Yes BOX B 
15:34:50 <Team16B> let’s not transfer? 
15:35:01 <Team16A> I agree  
 
Team 17 
 
Table 126: Scenarios faced by team 17 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 SB20 No transfer DT 
1 P1 SB35 No transfer DF 
2 P2 BS5 No transfer DF 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
4 P2 BS30 Transfer DT 
5 P1 SB10 Transfer DT 
 
15:11:40 <Team17B> hello 
15:11:48 <Team17A> hi 
15:11:54 <Team17B> shall we go for a or b? 
15:12:03 <Team17A> I think we are Choosers  
15:12:06 <Team17A> so we need to wait  
15:12:14 <Team17B> oh yeah 
15:12:17 <Team17B> sorry  
15:14:00 <Team17A> there are either 40 or 80  
15:14:00 <Team17B> right  
15:14:16 <Team17A> my guess is that they had 40 in A  
15:14:19 <Team17B> y 
15:14:20 <Team17A> and didn’t want to transfer  
15:14:27 <Team17A> but just a guess  
15:14:31 <Team17B> I say go for B 
15:14:39 <Team17A> yes, let’s do that  
15:14:40 <Team17B> agree? 
15:14:48 <Team17A> yes! 
15:14:54 <Team17B> I’ve clicked B 
15:14:59 <Team17A> same here  
15:15:48 <Team17B> yes 
15:15:51 <Team17B> got 80! 
15:15:52 <Team17A> good job! 
15:16:22 <Team17B> right we are transferring 
15:16:27 <Team17A> don’t transfer? 
15:16:36 <Team17B> yeah 
15:16:53 <Team17B> I’ve clicked no transfer 
15:16:58 <Team17A> same  
15:18:32 <Team17B> does the box we get depend on what the Choosers pick? 
15:18:39 <Team17A> yes  
15:18:46 <Team17B> thanks  
15:18:59 <Team17A> but I am not sure if they get the info you see above the timer  
15:19:08 <Team17A> or the fact that we did not make the transfer  
15:19:42 <Team17B> they are the told the level we could have transferred and if we did or didn’t 
15:20:05 <Team17B> so they will know we refused to tranfer 35 tokens from A to B 
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15:20:23 <Team17B> yes! 
15:20:25 <Team17A> yes! 
15:20:29 <Team17A> oh no  
15:20:33 <Team17B> what? 
15:20:35 <Team17A> or yes  
15:20:39 <Team17B> yes 
15:20:40 <Team17A> we got 80? 
15:20:42 <Team17B> yes 
15:20:47 <Team17A> good :D  
15:20:54 <Team17B> they went for Box A for some reason 
15:21:01 <Team17B> :P 
15:21:07 <Team17A> interesting strategy  
15:21:23 <Team17B> they probably overthought it  
15:21:34 <Team17A> true  
15:21:35 <Team17B> and tried to be sneaky but it failed  
15:22:08 <Team17A> yeah, I was thinking about that kind of reverse strategy but  
15:22:18 <Team17A> because we play against different people  
15:22:26 <Team17B> as long as we stay logical we should be fine  
15:22:45 <Team17A> it will be hard to catch  
15:22:57 <Team17B> I say A  
15:23:04 <Team17A> let’s go for A 
15:23:09 <Team17A> we are not losing much  
15:23:18 <Team17B> because it is only 5 
15:23:24 <Team17A> I agree  
15:23:27 <Team17A> I clicked A 
15:23:31 <Team17B> same! 
15:24:41 <Team17B> the wait is killing me :O 
15:24:55 <Team17B> yes! 
15:24:59 <Team17B> on it! 
15:25:03 <Team17A> we are on fire  
15:25:04 <Team17A> :D 
15:25:12 <Team17B> DREAM TEAM! 
15:25:18 <Team17B> (touch wood) :P 
15:25:27 <Team17A> will do! 
15:25:46 <Team17A> hm tough one  
15:25:49 <Team17B> I think go for it  
15:25:57 <Team17B> the boxes will balance at 60 
15:26:01 <Team17B> so it’s a win win 
15:26:08 <Team17A> yeah, it is a safe bet  
15:26:17 <Team17A> make transfer? 
15:26:20 <Team17B> yeah 
15:26:22 <Team17B> might as well 
15:26:25 <Team17A> done! 
15:26:39 <Team17B> because if we don’t they will go for A and we will get 40  
15:26:58 <Team17B> same done it 
15:27:37 <Team17A> too much waiting around... 
15:28:01 <Team17B> I know! 
15:28:59 <Team17A> and this round is not even exciting 
15:29:29 <Team17B> yes 
15:29:33 <Team17B> they went for A 
15:29:36 <Team17B> we did the right thing 
15:29:37 <Team17A> two more to go  
15:30:03 <Team17B> we are on a roll! 
15:30:13 <Team17B> gonna be balling at payment time :D 
15:30:23 <Team17A> fingers crossed we keep it that way  
15:30:39 <Team17A> haha yes!  
15:31:59 <Team17B> hmmmmmmm 
15:32:13 <Team17A> if they left only 10 in A  
15:32:13 <Team17B> this is tricky 
15:32:18 <Team17A> quite risky move  
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15:32:28 <Team17A> I say we should play safe and go for B ? 
15:32:32 <Team17B> yeah 
15:32:35 <Team17B> deffo 
15:32:44 <Team17B> I’ve clicked B 
15:32:49 <Team17A> me too  
15:33:11 <Team17B> because if 80 is in A, then B goes up to 70 
15:33:28 <Team17A> I can’t see why they did that transfer 
15:33:36 <Team17B> same 
15:33:37 <Team17A> cause in any way B will have more  
15:33:40 <Team17B> B is a win win 
15:34:10 <Team17B> done it right again! 
15:34:16 <Team17B> one more to go 
15:34:17 <Team17A> I guess they thought better win 50 than 40 :D 
15:34:24 <Team17B> true! 
15:34:33 <Team17B> hmm 
15:35:04 <Team17B> we could confuse them and transfer the tokens 
15:35:11 <Team17A> that’s what I was thinking  
15:35:16 <Team17B> because it is only 10 
15:35:16 <Team17A> and it is the last one  
15:35:22 <Team17B> let’s do it! 
15:35:24 <Team17A> we might as well play it risky  
15:35:25 <Team17B> transfer  
15:35:29 <Team17A> yes! 
15:35:44 <Team17B> we seriously slayed this game! :P 
15:36:02 <Team17A> agree!!! 
15:36:18 <Team17A> hope we have luck with payout cause they will randomly pick a round  
15:36:37 <Team17B> same 
15:36:43 <Team17B> but all of ours so far have been high 
15:36:47 <Team17B> so we should be fine 
15:36:53 <Team17B> the lowest was 60  
15:37:11 <Team17B> unless this one goes wrong 
15:37:17 <Team17A> true, it will be really bad luck if this one is 30 and then with chance 1/6 we 
get it :( 
15:37:34 <Team17B> :*( 
15:37:36 <Team17B> it would  
15:37:44 <Team17B> got too cocky  
15:37:48 <Team17B> but you never know 
15:38:02 <Team17A> haha well the way I see it  
15:38:11 <Team17A> it is always extra money  
15:38:23 <Team17A> even with bad luck and little payment :D 
15:38:26 <Team17A> moment of truth  
15:38:35 <Team17A> nooo  
15:38:35 <Team17B> shit! 
15:38:44 <Team17B> it doesn’t matter 
15:38:45 <Team17A> oh well, fingers crossed  
15:38:53 <Team17B> what is the highest we got? 
15:38:58 <Team17A> 80 
15:39:08 <Team17B> fingers crossed 
15:39:30 <Team17A> :) 
 
 
Team 18 
 
Table 127: Scenarios faced by team 18 
Trial Role Scenario P1 decision P2 decision 
0 P2 SB20 No transfer DT 
1 P1 SB35 No transfer DT 
2 P2 BS5 Transfer DT 
3 P1 BS20 Transfer DT 
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4 P2 BS30 No transfer DT 
5 P1 SB10 No transfer DT 
 
15:11:51 <Team18B> hi 
15:11:58 <Team18A> hi 
15:12:12 <Team18A> we are the Chooser right? 
15:12:19 <Team18B> yeah 
15:12:30 <Team18B> don’t need to do anything yet 
15:13:10 <Team18B> did he say 1 box always has 80 and the other always 40 at the start? 
15:13:16 <Team18A> yeah 
15:13:21 <Team18B> kk 
15:13:25 <Team18A> in every trial 
15:13:36 <Team18B> yeah 
15:14:03 <Team18A> so they decide not to do any transfer 
15:14:25 <Team18B> yeah 
15:14:26 <Team18A> I can think is because box A had initially the 80 maybe? 
15:14:38 <Team18A> or they tried to fool us  
15:14:58 <Team18B> but maybe they wanted to keep them as even as possible if A had 40 
15:15:07 <Team18B> I say we go for A 
15:15:12 <Team18B> the minimum can be 40 
15:15:23 <Team18A> I think they were not taking that risk. My bet is the 80 are in the B box 
15:15:33 <Team18B> actually yeah I agree 
15:15:36 <Team18B> lets go B 
15:15:37 <Team18A> ok choice b 
15:15:49 <Team18B> nice 
15:15:52 <Team18A> yuhuuu! 
15:16:33 <Team18A> hmm 
15:16:37 <Team18B> I say no transfer to keep a fair balance? 
15:16:49 <Team18A> agree 
15:17:01 <Team18A> do not transfer 
15:17:17 <Team18B> yeah pressed it 
15:17:28 <Team18A> same 
15:17:44 <Team18B> its different people this time so maybe they won’t use the same reasoning 
and go for A hopefully 
15:20:42 <Team18A> not too bad… 
15:21:22 <Team18B> yeah 40 is fine, unless later we want to try a bluff 
15:22:56 <Team18A> ufff 
15:23:14 <Team18A> could be everything, 50/50 
15:23:43 <Team18A> which one you want to pick? 
15:23:56 <Team18B> if we go for B and it started at 40 its now 45 and if it started at 80 its 85, a 
is either 35 or 75 so I say go B 
15:24:03 <Team18A> ok B  
15:24:21 <Team18B> yup done 
15:25:37 <Team18A> if we transfer we win 60 anyways 
15:25:50 <Team18B> yeah which is pretty good, so do it? 
15:26:38 <Team18A> if not we can try to tease them, they will think a had initially 40 so we were 
not taking a risk 
15:27:03 <Team18B> yeah could do 
15:27:08 <Team18A> well I press transfer 
15:27:12 <Team18B> same  
15:27:15 <Team18B> leave on transfer 
15:27:19 <Team18A> yes 
15:27:37 <Team18B> but if we have a similar one next time we can try that 
15:27:43 <Team18A> yes 
15:32:43 <Team18B> any ideas 
15:32:46 <Team18A> I think they were conservative and didn’t leave a with only 10 
15:32:58 <Team18B> so you think a is 40? 
15:33:08 <Team18A> I think b is the 80… 
15:33:22 <Team18A> what do you think? 
15:33:22 <Team18B> okay let’s go b then 
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15:33:25 <Team18A> ok 
15:33:29 <Team18B> yeah I think you’re right 
15:33:36 <Team18A> hah well we don’t know 
15:33:44 <Team18A> they might played a bluff here 
15:33:44 <Team18B> we will see I 10 seconds 
15:33:53 <Team18B> yeah but we can’t know that 
15:34:03 <Team18A> argg 
15:34:05 <Team18B> it was a bluff 
15:34:05 <Team18A> hah 
15:34:08 <Team18A> yep 
15:34:09 <Team18B> never mind 
15:34:34 <Team18B> now because this is the last round do we bluff or do we double bluff? 
15:34:47 <Team18A> double bluff? 
15:35:05 <Team18A> 10 tokens is little amount to bluff... but as you want 
15:35:07 <Team18B> so stay the same because they will be expecting a bluff 
15:35:19 <Team18A> alright 
15:35:31 <Team18A> so not make transfer then? 
15:35:52 <Team18B> yeah don’t make the transfer 
15:35:57 <Team18A> ok 
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Appendix 3: Suitcase Game 
Appendix 3.1: Instructions for participants 
This appendix provides the reader with a summary of the instructions 
participants received through a PowerPoint presentation. In line with the wording of 
Chapter 4 we refer to P1 as ‘Splitter’ and to P2 as 'Chooser' during the experimental 
session. 
Slide 1: Title slide with a suitcase image 
Hello everyone, today we are playing the suitcase game. I will explain the 
task using a PowerPoint presentation. At the end of the presentation you can ask 
questions if anything is unclear. Now, how things work.   
Slide 2: How things work 
Every trial you are matched with another player who plays a different role. 
One participant is called the ‘Splitter’ whilst the other is called the ‘Chooser’. In this 
game the Splitter receives a suitcase which has a certain amount inside; and his task 
is to decide how much value to take from the suitcase and place it on the table. The 
other player, the Chooser, can see how much value is placed on the table but he does 
not know how much remains in the suitcase. The task for the Chooser is to decide 
whether he wants the amount on the table or the (unknown) amount in the suitcase.  
Slide 3: Knowledge (this slide is only used for the sessions with AVs) 
Before the suitcase is opened, both players – Splitters and Choosers – share 
the same information about the total amount of money that is to be divided. Either 
both players have no information on the total amount; or both Splitter and Chooser 
are informed of two possible values, one of which will be randomly chosen (by the 
computer) to be placed inside the suitcase. (Both amounts are equally likely to be 
chosen and both players see the same amounts).  
So for example, the possible values may be four and six. This means that 
both players know that the suitcase will contain either four or six tokens.  
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When the suitcase is opened the Splitter finds out what the actual amount 
inside the suitcase was. In our example the suitcase contains six tokens.  
 
Slide 4: Notes 
Next, I discuss some important things to know about the experiment. Firstly, 
every trial your role switches between being Splitter and Chooser; thus if you start as 
Splitter you are then choose, Splitter Chooser etc. If you start as Chooser you are 
then Splitter, choose, Splitter etc. Secondly, you are randomly matched with another 
player on every trial. So you do not play the same person throughout the experiment; 
every trial you are randomly rematched. Finally, feedback is provided at the end of 
each trial. Feedback consists of a summary of what option you won (the suitcase 
versus the table) and how many tokens this option provides; furthermore, you are 
given feedback on the option that the other player won and how many tokens this 
provided him.  
As I already mentioned this experiment uses tokens as its currency. Now, 
what are tokens? Tokens are like pounds but you do not know their value. At the end 
of the experiment the conversion rate (from tokens to pounds) is revealed. The 
amount of tokens you earn on a randomly selected trial will eventually decide your 
performance fee.  
Now, the payment. For participating in the experiment you receive a 
participation fee of two pounds; you receive this just for participating to the 
experiment. And furthermore, you receive a performance fee, between zero and ten 
pounds; depending on the amount of tokens you earned in a randomly selected trial. 
So it is not the average amount you win across trials, we randomly pick one trial 
and assess performance solely on that trial to decide your performance fee.  
Slide 5: Sequence of events for each trial 
We summarize the sequence of events for each trial. First, you may be 
provided with information regarding two possible values for the suitcase. Then, the 
Splitter opens the suitcase and finds out its exact value. His task is to decide how 
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much value to place on the table. Next, the Chooser is told how many tokens are 
placed on the table and he chooses between the amount on the table and the 
(unknown) amount in the suitcase. And finally, feedback is provided.  
Slide 6: Splitter screen 
Next, I will illustrate how the task looks like using some screenshots. As 
Splitter you see the following screen. The knowledge of the suitcase is first 
displayed. This means that both you and your matched player know that the suitcase 
will contain one of the following amounts; for example six or eight chips. The screen 
has a button saying ‘open the suitcase’ which you then click to continue.  
Slide 7: Deciding how to split:  
After clicking the button you are asked to distribute the content of the 
suitcase. You find out that six chips
93
 are hidden in the suitcase and you type a 
number to indicate how many chips you want to transfer to the table. This has to be 
an integer number (thus not something like 1.2345 or pi) but any integer amount 
including zero and the full suitcase value are allowed. Once you decide upon the 
transfer amount you simply click on the ‘continue’ button to finalize your decision.  
 
                                                 
93
 We use ‘chips’ for practice trials and for the example to avoid misconceptions about 
representativeness for the actual experiment. 
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Slide 8: Chooser screens 
As Chooser you are informed of the same prior information as the Splitter 
receives: namely that six or eight chips are found in the suitcase. Once you read this 
information you can click the ‘continue’ button to move to the next stage. You will 
now see a waiting screen until the Splitter makes his decision at which point you see 
the following screen. (see slide 9). 
Slide 9: Chooser decision 
The screen says that player one made his choice and placed four chips on the 
table. Of course this is a hypothetical example and you will see different amounts 
during the actual experiment. You decide whether you want the table or the suitcase 
value by clicking the corresponding button. Afterwards feedback is provided and 
then we wait on everyone to finish the current trial before randomly matching you 
with another player. 
 
Slide 10: practice trials 
We start off with two practice trials. These trials do not affect your pay-off; 
they are solely to get familiar with the task. Furthermore, the amounts in actual trials 
involve ‘tokens’ as the currency whilst practice trials use ‘chips’. It is important to 
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know that the amounts that are won in both sessions are unrelated. Are there any 
questions before we continue?  
(pause) 
Then I will now start the practice trials. If there are any questions during the 
experiment simply raise your hand and I will come to you. 
 
Appendix 3.2: Cheap talk exploration 
After our first session we did a short pilot of a “cheap talk” variation. This 
happened during pay-off calculation and was unrelated to any monetary incentive. In 
this variation the Splitter was allowed to choose one of seven messages to send to the 
Chooser. There was also the option of “not sending a message”. From the 
perspective of many common theories (e.g. Nash) Splitters should not bother with 
sending messages and Chooser should just ignore it when a message is send to them 
as their interests diverge. Psychologically, however, we can imagine how 
participants would be tempted to try and trick their counterparts.  
Our data on this small pilot comprises of only 24 unique trials altogether and 
are thus to be seen as an exploration of the variation. In Table 128 we summarized 
all messages that were available and what frequency they were selected. 
Table 128: Messages in cheap talk pilot and their frequency 
I made you a fair deal 7 
I made you an unfair deal 1 
Let us be nice to each other 2 
I wish you luck 3 
I put the bigger amount on the table 3 
I suggest you to take the amount on the table 2 
I suggest you to take the amount in the suitcase 4 
I do not want to send a message 2 
 
All messages have been used at least once. Twice was chosen not to send a 
message. The messages that have been sent can generally be placed under certain 
categories. One such category is Being Nice (fair deal, be nice, good luck). A second 
category is Nudging (the bigger amount is X, I suggest X). Finally, you have a Being 
Bad category (unfair deal).  
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One interesting observation is that people always split equally when they 
opted for “let us be nice to each other”. This message may be chosen for those who 
expect reciprocity (even though matchings are made randomly on every trial). They 
seem to say: “let us play nice, look what I did, I split equally, now you do the same”. 
A somewhat similar result shows up when people say that they “split fair”: five out 
of seven observations are equal splits, one was with a two token difference and one 
was unfair but with 45 (quite a high amount) tokens on the table. No other messages 
had an equal split! 
On all three trials where “I wish you luck” was opted no information was 
available. Twice a relatively large chunk was on the table and slightly more was 
hidden in the suitcase. Once the amount to be divided was relatively small and the 
biggest part was placed on the table. This may mean that the message can be used for 
displaying a “hidden un-niceness”: I seem to split nicely but am still trying to trick 
you in taking the smaller chunk.  
The claim to be unfair is a weird one. Why would you want to tell your 
opponent that you try to trick them? It seems somewhat odd of a message and was 
selected only once. The split on this trial was 40 – 2. As the numbers in this pilot 
were the same as those from the real experiment played before participants would 
know that 40 is quite a high number to be displayed on the table. Thus, this truthful 
message may have been an attempt to trick the opponent in having a tiny prize or it 
may be a give-away as no monetary incentive was linked to these pilot trials. The 
Chooser ended up with the bigger prize on this trial. 
Finally, when a suggestion was made advice was sometimes followed and 
sometimes ignored. The advice was followed more often when there was information 
on the potential values and ignored more often when no information was available. 
This may be a finding or it may be an artefact from our small number of trials. 
Overall, it seems like a Cheap Talk variation may be interesting to explore 
more deeply with a lower variety of messages to choose from – or perhaps with non-
textual messages (f.e. a hand pointing to a pile of gold on left or right hand side and a 
neutral thumbs up message). 
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Appendix 3.3: Within participant comparison of equal division behaviour 
In Table 129 we assesses the frequency in which each unique P1-participant 
decides to divide the distribution amount in equal halves. A comparison is made 
between his four trials with AVs and his four trials without AVs. We assigned a 
‘green’ background colour to individuals who make more equal divisions when AVs 
are provided than when they are not provided and an ‘orange’ background colour to 
individuals who display the opposite tendency. The ‘blue’ background is used 
whenever individuals made equal divisions equally often in the two conditions.  
Table 129: Within participant frequencies of making equal splits across information conditions 
Participant Information No Information 
0 0 0 
1 2 1 
2 0 0 
3 4 0 
4 0 0 
5 4 4 
6 2 0 
7 0 1 
8 0 0 
9 1 0 
10 4 4 
11 0 0 
12 3 0 
13 2 1 
14 4 4 
15 3 2 
16 3 4 
17 1 0 
18 4 1 
19 0 0 
20 4 1 
21 2 0 
22 4 4 
23 4 1 
24 3 1 
25 1 0 
26 3 0 
27 3 0 
28 4 1 
29 2 0 
30 1 0 
31 2 0 
32 3 0 
33 2 3 
34 2 2 
35 4 0 
 
There are eleven P1s who made equal splits equally often in both conditions 
(blue coding) whilst twenty-two P1s made equal splits more frequently in the 
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condition with additional knowledge (green coding). Three P1s made equal divisions 
more frequently in the condition without AVs (orange coding). It is worthwhile to 
note that these same three individuals made at least once an error against dominance 
when AVs were provided.  
